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My interest in the history of sociology and statistics in Britain began when I 
was still an undergraduate student; at a time when I had more curiosity to find out 
about these subjects than actual experience in studying them. Back then, I had been 
studying sociology for three years but knew little about its development in this 
country. I had some statistical training but mainly through my studies in psychology. 
And although I have improved my statistical skills since then, I would still not 
describe myself as a statistician. I’m not a historian, either – I began reading history 
of science as a hobby during my undergraduate days and this is how I first came 
across some of the major works on the history of statistics which gave me the 
inspiration to delve deeper. My studies really began with my childish knack of 
questioning everything and demanding answers; but it was stamina, devotion and 
systematic investigation and a deep desire to emulate the scholarship of those 
inspirational figures around me that were key in carrying this project through to its 
end. Now, on its completion, I would like to thank all those people and institutions 
who have supported me during my research and helped me turn my scattered 
thoughts into a detailed scholarly work. 
I would firstly like to thank the Sociology department here in Edinburgh who 
have created a warm and hospitable academic environment that has allowed me to 
thrive in the last eight years. In particular, I would like to thank Dr Stephen Kemp, 
Professor John MacInnes, Professor Lindsay Paterson, Professor Donald MacKenzie 
and Professor Vernon Gayle for their valuable advice, encouragement and belief in 
my abilities. From them, I’ve learnt that coming up with the ‘right’ questions is a 
vital prerequisite to searching for and finding the ‘right’ answers. 
Every piece of academic work, even fact-based and austere doctoral theses, 
have a story to tell. In the last few years, I have benefited greatly from numerous 
opportunities to learn how to tell the story of sociology and statistics in Britain in an 
absorbing and entertaining way and I would like to thank the Sociology department 
and Q-step for providing me with opportunities to test my communication skills by 
inviting me to speak at the New Directions conferences and the Q-step seminars. 
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Most of this work is based on detailed archival research which would not have 
been possible without the help and guidance I received from the following 
institutions: the Special Collections Unit at Edinburgh University’s Main Library; the 
National Library of Scotland; Glasgow University’s Main Library; the library at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science and their archival collections; the 
library at Keele University and their archival collection on the Sociological Society 
and The Sociological Review; and the Clara Thomas archives and Special 
Collections at York University, Toronto. I have also benefited immensely from 
consulting Professor Jennifer Platt’s personal archival collection which gave me 
access to material I could not have found anywhere else. 
Doing doctoral research is, inevitably, a largely solitary experience that in my 
case involved many hours of book-hunting, note-taking and imaginary conversations 
with people long deceased whose deeds and ideas shaped the history I was studying. 
Thanks to those people, who are too numerous to mention, I woke up on many 
occasions in a different time, a different year, another century.  
But doctoral study has its social side as well – none of what I’ve discovered 
would matter if I did not have people to share it with. In this respect, further thanks 
must go to those distinguished Edinburgh University scholars already mentioned 
above but also to some great scholars from universities further afield such as 
Professor John Goldthorpe, Dr Christopher Husbands, Professor Peter Mandler and 
Professor Martin Bulmer for the attention they have all paid me over the last year; 
for their reading of parts of my writing and for their invaluable suggestions on how 
to improve it. None of them, of course, bear any responsibility for the errors and 
omissions in this work.  
In addition to the documentary research, I conducted interviews with a dozen 
of the most renowned sociologists and statisticians in the country and I would like to 
thank all my interviewees for their generosity with their time and for breathing life 
into this history. 
I’m especially grateful to my supervisor and esteemed colleague, Professor 
John MacInnes. This work would not have been possible without his unwavering 
support throughout the years and the many long-hour discussions we have had on 
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sociology, statistics and the history of science. He has taught me the statistical 
Lebensgefühl better than anyone else could have done. 
My good friend, Ron Wilson, has read and edited the manuscripts of all articles 
I have written in the last three years and the full manuscript of this thesis – I can’t 
thank him enough for his patience and persistence with this work and his invaluable 
editorial suggestions. We spent many hours over the years discussing my progress on 
this study and he has always been a meticulous sounding board. He taught me as best   
he could (or at least attempted to teach me, as I’m not an easy student) the art of 
clear and concise writing; whenever in doubt, I would rather read him instead of 
Plain Words. But I owe him much more than that: it was he who first inspired my 
interest in history and the history of science in particular; who taught me the craft of 
bookbinding and who built me a time-machine for intellectual travel and exploration 
out of antiquarian and second-hand books. I hope this work will make him proud. 
To my friend Nikos Kourampas, for lighting up with a smile this and every 
other piece of work I have done in the last few years – thank you for many hours of 
listening and for making this PhD a joyful experience. 
My mum and dad would not be able to read this work as it stands, as English is 
not their native language. I will be forever indebted to them for their great efforts to 
raise me as an honest, responsible, hard-working, and open-minded young woman 
and for all the sacrifices they have made, and are making, for the sake of my 
education. They have given me all the love parents could possibly give. And they 
have always believed in my dreams as if they were their own, in spite of the fact that 
the pursuit of those dreams took me away to a foreign country on the other side of 
the continent. 
To my beloved partner, Ivan, I’m immensely grateful for keeping me warm 
and bringing the sun to this bookish, but cold country. It is your love that makes all 
my efforts worthwhile. 
 
 











This thesis examines the historical relationship between British sociology and 
statistics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It begins with an analysis of the 
role that the early development of statistics played in the history of social science, 
followed by an examination of other nineteenth century, non-quantitative, projects of 
social enquiry that were to have an influence on the later development of British 
sociology. The thesis then continues with an analysis of the contributions of the 
Sociological Society to the development of sociology in Britain and its role in 
sociology’s relationship with statistics. The last and most detailed part of the thesis is 
devoted to an examination of the trends in the development of academic sociology in 
Britain in the twentieth century. It analyses the major factors that had significant 
influence on the possible incorporation of quantitative methods, and a statistical and 
probabilistic worldview more generally, into British sociology.  
Most of the study is based on original archival research and uncovers 
previously unexamined aspects of events, movements and choices that have defined 
the character of British sociology since its academic beginnings. The argument is 
that the relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain has been 
characterised by a remarkable continuity and been subject to very little change over 
many years; that it has been distinguished by a negative obsession with statistics on 
the part of British sociologists who have made consistent efforts to try to prove 
statistics unsuitable for sociological research and excuse themselves from using them. 
The study concludes that the relationship between statistics and sociology in Britain 
has not been determined on the basis of pragmatic concerns but on the basis of 
uninformed preferences and deficiency in statistical knowledge.  
The divide that has existed between sociology and statistics was not inevitable 
but was the product of a particular set of circumstances and a particular set of 
choices made, both within and without British academic sociology. The aim of this 
thesis is to bring to the fore the interplay of these factors and show that the 
relationship between sociology and statistics matters and ought to be an area of 
growing concern to British sociologists. It explains not merely British sociology’s 
methodological choices but its relationship with the very thing that made both it and 
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the society it studies – modern science. Ultimately, the relationship between 
sociology and statistics in Britain matters because discoveries in science in the last 
hundred years or so have shown that the World, all of existence, social or otherwise, 
is fundamentally probabilistic; and that statistics is the language best placed to 
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Throughout the twentieth century, British sociology has been obsessed with 
statistics. Obsessed not in the sense of yielding to excessive use of statistical 
techniques and thinking, but obsessed in the rather negative sense of constantly 
needing to prove the unsuitability and the potentially harmful results of statistics in 
order to excuse itself from using them.  
Historically speaking, when British sociologists talked of ‘statistical obsession’ 
they meant other social scientists’ overuse of, or unquestioned belief in, statistics 
both here and elsewhere, notably the USA (see Chapter Eleven). Unsurprisingly, 
they have been reluctant to recognise their own repetitive, inconclusive and 
obsessive reflections on the place of statistical methods and thinking in social science 
and on whether or not statistics has a place in sociology at all. Could it be the case 
that British sociologists’ reluctance to recognise the existence of such an obsession is 
indeed justified and that the very idea of it is merely an historiographical fiction? In 
the same way in which a statistician who is intentionally looking for patterns and 
significant results in their data is bound to find some, in studying an issue like this 
from a predominantly historical viewpoint, isn’t there always the danger that we find 
in that history precisely what we are looking for?  
A primary aim of this thesis is to show that the relationship between statistics 
and sociology – the negative obsession of British sociology with statistics – has its 
own historical reality which is independent of any historiographical choice. 
Moreover, it aims to show that the questions that the examination of this relationship 
raise have a genuine historical importance that goes beyond any concerns that exist 
in sociology in Britain at present.  
This thesis further aims to explain how this obsession originated and what 
sustained it through the numerous changes that took place over many decades. It 
looks firstly at the conditions which brought statistical methods and statistical 
thinking to the forefront of social science in the nineteenth century and from which 
British sociology, eventually, emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century (Part 
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One). It then examines the changing character of British sociology throughout the 
twentieth century and reveals the factors that played a vital role in determining that 
character and sustaining its peculiar obsession with statistics (Part Two and Three).  
The analysis follows a chronological order but the general themes explored are 
not limited to any one particular period; rather, I aim to draw attention to the fact that 
in spite of all that changed in British sociology, the nature of its relationship with 
statistics has been characterised by a remarkable continuity and consistency – and 
this is precisely why examining this relationship gives us a unique vantage point. On 
the surface, this is a story about a nineteenth-century struggle to obtain reliable 
knowledge about the world amidst an unprecedented rate of social change and 
intellectual shifts; about the noble aspirations of a Sociological Society which 
brought sociology into existence in Britain but left it a wandering orphan; about 
intellectual quarrelling and institutional settlement; about a remarkable expansion of 
the higher education system that turned out to be as much of a hazardous challenge 
for sociology as it was its long-awaited blessing. On a deeper level, however, this is a 
story about British sociology’s response to the rise of modern scientific thinking; 
about its indecisiveness and its continuous self-questioning about its character and 
aims, played out against a background of suspicion of statistical thinking; and about 
how the power of attitudes and irrational convictions has prevailed over rational 
considerations at crucial moments. In the end, it would appear that British 
sociology’s negatively charged obsession with statistics is what defines it better and 
more clearly than anything else.  
 
 
Why Study the Historical Relationship between Sociology and Statistics at all? 
 
Anyone who has experienced the more recent relationship between British 
sociology and statistics, will be aware that this relationship has been and remains 
largely unproductive and while this has been recognised in some circles (British 
Academy (2012), Byrne (2012), ESRC, BSA and HaPS (2010), MacInnes (2010) 
May (2005), Payne et al (2004), Williams et al (2004a, 2004b) and Williams et al 
(2008), Goldthorpe (2015)), a solution that reaches all sectors of sociology, not just 
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those interested in ‘statistical sociology’, has not been found. Quantitative methods 
have not been totally absent from the sociological curriculum but, nonetheless, the 
effective incorporation of these methods into sociological teaching and research in 
Britain has recently been limited, despite their increasing importance in a digitised 
and data-oriented world in which the study of human behaviour, including social 
human behaviour, shows promising potential. 
Although the present study may help explain what made a situation like the 
current one possible, it also shows that this course of development was not inevitable. 
And although it aims to illustrate that the relationship between sociology and 
statistics in Britain has developed along a particular long-term evolutionary course, it 
acknowledges clearly the different contexts in which this evolution has manifested 
itself. An historical study like the present one can therefore broaden our 
understanding but it cannot and does not on its own provide a ready solution to any 
situation that we may perceive as problematic today; historical analysis does not 
create or reveal laws with predictive or healing power simply because the events, 
situations, contexts of the past are rarely, if ever, replicated in the present or future 
(for a more detailed discussion, cf. Evans, 1997).  
Broadening our understanding of a current affair, or acting upon some present 
concerns regarding the education of the next generation of sociologists in a data-
driven world may be a sufficient justification for an educational or policy-related 
study of the relationship between statistics and sociology; but an historical study 
requires a more fundamental and wide-reaching justification. An historian, in other 
words, must be able to show that their study is important regardless of any present 
conditions: the fact that some sociologists in Britain have recently come to grapple 
with what they perceive as a problematic relationship between sociology and 
statistics makes a study like the present one relevant but it does not automatically 
make it historically significant. So where does the historical justification and 
significance of the present study lie? Why study the historical relationship between 
sociology and statistics at all? 
There are some general benefits that come from an historical enquiry that also 
apply to the present study. While some of the conclusions of this study may not be 
surprising in themselves, the question of what, historically, influenced the 
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relationship between statistics and sociology, has not been asked or examined before. 
The novelty and originality of a piece of research comes as much from the novelty of 
the research questions as from the novelty of the answers and those who raise 
objections against this whole work based solely on the lack of ‘surprising’ 
conclusions are simply revealing a lack of appreciation for the value of empirical 
historical research; an attitude which I, in fact, show to be characteristic of British 
sociology since its beginnings. Thus a simple answer to the question ‘Why study the 
historical relationship between sociology and statistics? is that this question has been 
left neglected and unexplored in scholarship. 
Another benefit from approaching a question historically is that it creates an 
opportunity to revise and modify existing knowledge. This thesis is not only looking 
at the development of sociology from a new angle; it also reveals in what ways some 
of the most cited accounts of the history of British sociology need to be modified. 
Abrams’ 1968 essay is one of many examples that I will discuss: it has helped spread 
the view that the nineteenth-century development of statistics in Britain frustrated the 
development of sociology. As I show, a closer and more contextual examination of 
the evidence not only reveals the flaws in this argument, but, beyond this, it reveals 
something more fundamental about the nature of British sociology; for Abrams’ 
reasoning has also been post-war sociology’s reasoning. It is as if Abrams and others 
wrote their interpretations from inside sociology looking out, while my aim has been 
to write from the outside looking in. But this thesis does not merely aim to show that 
an alternative perspective on British sociology and its history is possible; it aims to 
show that it leads to a better grounded and more historically accurate account of the 
relationship between sociology and statistics that has the power to reveal the deeper 
and wider implications of this relationship for sociology as a whole. 
History’s lack of predictive power does not mean it cannot provide us with 
examples of something similar, useful analogies that aid us in our assessment of the 
current situation – it is important to remember that ‘the impossibility or low 
feasibility of prediction does not exclude the possibility of comprehension’ (Gellner, 
1988: 15). Without historical knowledge, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish what is different and unique about the current situation. History may not 
help us predict the future but it can open our eyes to alternative possibilities, past 
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and future. The present thesis therefore, is intended to provide relevant and 
indispensable evidence to assist the process of assessing not only the direction that 
British sociology has taken in the past but also in seeing the opportunities, the 
alternative possibilities, that lie ahead. 
The novelty of the research question, the need to modify existing historical 
accounts and the opportunity to make detailed analysis of the historical evidence that 
will allow us to broaden our general knowledge all contribute to the scholarly value 
and historical importance of the present study. However, there are more specific, and 
in some ways more fundamental, reasons why an historical examination of the 
relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain is justifiable that relate to 





An historical examination of the relationship between statistics and sociology 
conducted in the twenty-first century does not necessarily have to fall into the trap of 
‘presentist’ (also known as ‘Whig’) interpretations of history and can actually 
improve our understanding. 
The Whig interpretation of history was first identified, and condemned, by 
Herbert Butterfield in 1931. It is generally characterised as placing emphasis on the 
similarities and analogies between past and present (Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 10) 
and by extracting things from out of their historical context and judging them in 
relation to present concerns (Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 30). It upholds the present as 
absolute against which all things past are to be measured in order to reveal who is in 
the right, as opposed to showing how people and ideas came to differ over time 
(Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 16, 30, 130). The danger of this approach is that, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, the historian distorts the past by assuming that 
something they hold to be true today should guide their judgement and understanding 
of past events. Sociologists who have studied the history of British sociology have 
already fallen victims of ‘presentism’, the most obvious example being Abrams’ 
1968 essay on the origins of British sociology. In this essay, Abrams imposes his 
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understanding of sociology as a primarily theoretical intellectual enterprise (as 
opposed to empirical or policy oriented social research) on the nineteenth-century 
history of social science, which leads him to interpret any movement or person that 
did not have his understanding of sociology as harmful and obstructive to the 
potential emergence of the kind of sociology that Abrams believed to be the best 
possible sociology. This is one way of interpreting the nineteenth-century history of 
sociology in Britain but, as is usually the case with presentist accounts such as this, it 
tells us more about the way sociology was understood in the 1960s, when Abrams 
was writing, than about the ways in which social scientists themselves understood 
what they were doing in the nineteenth century.  
Presentist accounts are also characterised by an emphasis on the continuity of 
historical development – another example of such an historical account, albeit one 
that rests on much better evidential basis than Abrams’ – is Renwick’s (2012) book 
on the biological roots of British sociology. In attempting to present the formation 
and early history of the Sociological Society as a culminating point in the overall 
history of British social science, and also as a point at which the development of a 
biological sociology in Britain was severed, Renwick’s account provides an 
oversimplified interpretation of the events in British sociology towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. The present study is necessary, therefore, not only as a means of 
modifying existing knowledge and providing a different interpretation but as a means 
of showing that existing accounts can be improved.  
To do so, I follow Butterfield’s advice that ‘the chief aim of the historian is the 
elucidation of the unlikenesses between past and present’ (Butterfield, 1965 [1931]:  
10); and that what should guide the historian in any historical examination is ‘the 
belief that we can in some degree enter into minds that are unlike our own’ 
(Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 9). Following Butterfield in his belief that it is possible to 
write history in a non-presentist way, this study emphasises changes in the 
contemporary social, political and scientific context of nineteenth-century statistics; 
changes in the understanding of science; changes in the organisation of higher 
education and its rapid expansion in the post-war period. It also pays special 
attention to the variety of historical contexts in which the relationship between 
sociology and statistics developed - an historical examination is more fruitful, and 
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faithful to the past, when is consists of detailed and contextualised examinations of 
particular events, processes or movements rather than attempts to construct a general 
overarching explanation connecting all examined events or movements. This, of 
course, is not to say that we should ignore the degree of continuity where it exists 
between one set of events and another but it is equally important to recognise where 
the links are missing. 
However, to produce an historical account of the development of sociology it is 
not enough to commit to the general principles of non-presentist history writing. A 
good piece of history that has the potential to improve historical knowledge does not 
imply a total rejection of the use of the benefit of hindsight and of the possibility of 
finding long-term pervasive trends in history; on the contrary, it aims to strike a 
balance between interpretation based on detailed contextual analysis and 
interpretation based on hindsight thinking. Without the benefit of hindsight there 
would be no clear way of deciding what is of historical significance and what to 
study in the first place. Thus, it is only through the benefit of hindsight that we could 
recognise the potential and long-lasting effectiveness of statistics in studying both 
the social and the natural world, and, consequently, consider it important to study its 
historical relationship with other subjects. This, of course, is different from assuming 
that because we can see statistics as important now, statistics was always seen as 
important. A balance between continuity and change is necessary and can only be 
achieved by taking into account both past and present; by reading history both 
backwards and forwards. 
There is another reason why the benefit of hindsight is useful in history writing 
– we can compare the intentions of a person or an institution when they chose to act 
in a particular way with the consequences of their actions which we, with the benefit 
of hindsight, know, but which they could not possibly have known with any certainty. 
For instance, the Sociological Society was founded with intention to unify all 
existing social science specialisms into the general science of sociology, to set up a 
sociological journal and establish the subject academically. However, if in our study 
of the Society, we were only to focus on their intentions, without recognising that the 
consequences of their efforts fell short of fulfilling their intentions, our account 
would be extremely limited. This is one way of examining a particular event, in this 
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case the work of the Sociological society, using both their understanding of their 
work, as manifested in their intentions, but also our understanding of their work, 
based on their legacy. Therefore, although Butterfield is correct is arguing that ‘to 
assume the present at beginning of our study’ can potentially lead to distorting 
accounts, experience shows that he is not correct in equating this with the keeping of 
the present ‘as a reference’ (Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 62). In fact, only by keeping 
the present as a reference could we begin to recognise the differences between past 
and present that Butterfield says are so important when we write history.  
A good piece of historical analysis also acknowledges that history is not 
entirely the product of deliberate decision making. In Butterfield’s words, history is 
not only a product of ‘agency’, but also of slow and incremental ‘processes’ 
(Butterfield, 1965 [1931]: 50). This is another criterion which existing accounts have 
failed to adequately satisfy and on which the present study aims to improve. As I will 
show, the difficult historical relationship between sociology and statistics throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not the result of anyone’s decision-
making or careful planning.  
But something fundamental that even Butterfield does not mention, is that 
history is also not entirely a product of rational choices. It is а well known principle, 
for instance, that the research methods sociologists use to study a particular problem 
should be determined by the research question at hand and that all methods are, in 
principle at least, equal. Although few would disagree, what we see in practice is that 
some methods are ‘more equal than others’ and that the choice that sociologists make 
regarding what research methods to use is rarely determined solely by their research 
question. Moreover, sociologists can abstain and have abstained from asking 
particular questions because that would involve using research methods they do not 
favour. It is not always possible to explain fully why the level of receptiveness to 
certain methods, or ideas more generally, has varied with time, especially when 
talking about ideas that are well received in our time but were less well received in 
the past. But it is important to try to explain what drove the presence or absence of 
receptiveness; and, I argue, that while sociologists did not make a rational choice or 
take a deliberate decision to restrict British sociology’s engagement with statistics, 
the difficult relationship between the two subjects resulted from the effects of a 
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series of interrelated beliefs and opinions about statistics that spread and evolved 
from one generation of sociologists to the next. And, without apportioning blame or 
making judgements, the statisticians themselves, it seems, did little to try to turn 
these beliefs and opinions around. Further justification of why a study of the 
relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain is not only an alternative but 
also better account than existing ones will be provided below with particular 





Given that an historical study of the relationship between statistics and 
sociology is justified through the possibility and necessity to improve existing 
historical knowledge, are there any particular reasons why a study of this kind should 
focus on the British case? 
It is well known that the development of social science in Britain has been 
characterised by a peculiar divide between academic sociology and what is generally 
known as the British empirical tradition of social enquiry that developed in other 
academic departments and civic and government agencies. Bulmer among others has 
argued that it is ‘hardly an exaggeration to say that almost all of the empirical social 
research undertaken in Britain between the wars went untouched by what then passed 
for academic sociology’ (Bulmer, 1985: 4).  This thesis provides further evidence 
that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the empirical tradition of 
social enquiry has included most of the statistical research done in Britain, while 
academic sociology has consistently been oriented towards philosophical and 
theoretical work. The difficulty in understanding these two parallel traditions is not 
resolved by treating one as a subset of the other; we can achieve deeper and better 
understanding only by acknowledging the division and analysing what sustains it. 
Since the application of statistical methods and thinking in social science has 
been mostly done within the empirical tradition of social enquiry, and not within 
academic sociology, an historical examination of the relationship between sociology 
and statistics is justifiable as it offers a suitable opportunity to find out why British 
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sociology as a whole has developed in this particular way and why British social 
science more generally has been split, given that this did not necessarily have to be 
the case.  
Evidence for this comes from the experience of other countries, such as the 
USA, where historians have observed the introduction of statistical training and 
thinking into American sociology towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth centuries as a result of particular academic and institutional conditions. 
The fact that this integration occurred early on in the USA serves as a possible 
example of how a statistical sociology can emerge; but it on its own cannot explain 
why this did not happen in Britain, nor is there any guarantee that, had Britain had 
similar higher educational institutions, a statistical sociology would have emerged 
here. It might be thought that the development of more sophisticated statistical 
techniques, many originating here in Britain, would have created especially 
favourable conditions and stimulated the growth of a quantitative social science; this, 
however, proved not to be the case. Knowing that a statistical sociology was 
nonetheless possible, even in the USA which did not have a distinctive statistical 
tradition as in Britain, prompts us to reconsider traditional explanations and search 
deeper for reasons that go beyond the simple availability of statistical knowledge to 
sociologists. A comparative perspective is therefore illuminating in the sense that it 
opens up our mind to alternatives and draws our attention to the peculiarity of the 
conditions that existed in Britain and the importance of examining them more closely. 
For the purpose of examining the divide which exists within British social 
science, in this study, by ‘sociology’ I mean the subject as it developed academically 
in Britain and was taught by sociologists in departments in higher education 
institutions throughout the twentieth century, referring to the rest of the social 
science field as simply ‘social science’, or social science and administration or the 
empirical tradition of social enquiry. I use the term ‘sociologist’ for those scholars, 
teachers and researchers who called themselves ‘sociologists’. Those who were 
doing research in other areas, such as social policy or social administration, are 
referred to as ‘social scientists’; and those working in the field of social statistics, as 
‘social statisticians’. 
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I realise that there are certain drawbacks in limiting our understanding of 
sociology only to the work done by those who called themselves sociologists. This is 
a common problem for scholars studying the history of social and natural science.  
For instance, the words ‘science’ and ‘scientist’ came to be used to describe what we 
today understand as science only in the 1830s (Ross, 1962) but of course this does 
not mean that there was no science or no scientists before this time – on the contrary, 
we can see a clearly identifiable ‘scientific’ approach to investigating the natural 
world from the early seventeenth century onwards. But the story of the word 
‘sociology’, and what preceded it, is different from the case of ‘science’: in the case 
of ‘science’ and ‘scientist’ a new word was invented in the 1830s to describe the 
same thing that was previously described by words such as ‘natural philosophy’; in 
the case of sociology, the word and title were introduced by Auguste Comte in the 
1830s to describe something different and separate from other nineteenth-century 
projects of social enquiry in Britain, such as social reformism or social statistics. 
Moreover, this difference persisted throughout the twentieth century at an 
institutional level, with separate departments and research centres being established 
for sociology and for other types of empirical/policy-oriented research (one 
exception is Nuffield College); and at an individual level, i.e. rarely did the same 
people work in both traditions, with the exception of, for instance, David Glass or A. 
H. Halsey. It is, therefore, historically justifiable to distinguish between sociology 
and the other social empirical traditions of enquiry on the basis of what they called 
themselves because the different names had clear divisions. 
An additional historiographical approach that facilitates the historical 
examination of the divide within British social science centres upon a distinction 
between the institutional development of academic sociology and its teaching and 
the purely intellectual development of sociological ideas. In this study, I emphasise 
the former more strongly than the latter. This, however, does not mean that I 
completely ignore the intellectual development of the subject and the influence that 
individuals such as Auguste Comte, L. T. Hobhouse, Morris Ginsberg, T. H. 
Marshall etc. exerted on the development of British sociology. But in order to 
understand how they came to hold particular ideas and beliefs, how and why they 
sustained them and what influence they had on sociology more generally, we need to 
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examine the institutional context in which these ideas circulated. Focusing on 
teaching allows us to see what ideas and conceptions of sociology came to form the 
core of academic sociology in this country and were used to train subsequent 
generations of sociologists, thereby strongly influencing their views of what 
sociology was about and what it was going to be about in the future. Where 
particular scholars have engaged with statistics alongside their sociological work, 
this has been examined in more detail with a view of shedding light on how this was 
done and under what conditions and whether or not it had any effect on the more 





Providing justification for approaching the topic of the present study from an 
historical viewpoint and also in choosing to examine, specifically, British sociology 
leaves open the question of whether there are any reasons for examining its 
relationship with statistics. Of what historical importance, therefore, is the 
relationship between British sociology and statistics?  
To answer this question, first, a distinction has to be made between quantitative 
research methods and statistics. By quantitative methods in this study I mean the 
mathematics and procedures of quantitative data collection and analysis that are 
taught to social science students in the classroom. 
Statistics, however, is broader concept. Among statisticians there is a common 
understanding that statistics is a general set of tools: 
 
…it creates a structure for scientific exploration. […] So it is much more 
like a set of methods but it’s a set of methods that are rooted in trying to 
describe scientific reality. I think to describe it as a technology is the 
nearest as one gets (Author’s Interview with Harvey Goldstein, 2017). 
 
[statistics is] the principle instrument yet devised by man for bringing 
within his grasp the terrifying complexity of things and relations between 




But statistics is not merely a technical tool – it does not merely include 
mathematics, probability and modelling, although this is essential. It also involves a 
statistical way of thinking, or worldview, which is characterised by the ability to 
think and analyse on a larger scale and to understand and work with probabilistic 
knowledge not only when conducting statistical analysis, but more generally, as an 
intelligent citizen. To have a statistical worldview about the social world would at 
the very least imply an acknowledgment that society is, at its core, a statistical entity. 
Thus being statistically skilled does not merely mean knowing, for instance, how to 
collect survey data or conduct a regression analysis – statistical output on its own 
does not provide explanation of social phenomena. Being statistically skilled also 
involves ability to use statistical output imaginatively, in a way in which one is able 
to provide more accurate, reliable and exhaustive explanations than existing ones. 
And it is here that appreciation of the importance of the statistical nature of society is 
vital – any explanation that does not take this into account is bound to miss an 
important point. 
Once we start thinking about statistics as a conceptual as well as a technical 
tool for conducting empirical analysis, it becomes clear how misleading it is to think 
that statistics is merely about numbers and that the relationship between statistics and 
sociology can be boiled down to teaching sociologists some mathematics. Those who 
believe that statistical research is mere number crunching and that it is mainly about 
numbers should think again. Although there is social empirical research that contains 
only words, there is no piece of social empirical research that contains only numbers. 
The true value of an empirical piece of research that contains a collection of 
statistical data and uses statistical modelling to analyse these data lies not in the 
statistics themselves but in the explanation of these statistics that draws on 
sociological concepts, premises or theories and goes beyond the data. This is not to 
say that empirical social enquiries which lack a quantitative element are incapable of 
providing powerful and reliable explanations of social phenomena; they are, but 
since generalisation is much more difficult in these cases, without a quantitative 
element, it is much more difficult to say something meaningful and, at least, 
approximately true about society as a whole. 
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Paying special attention to the relationship between sociology and statistics 
therefore can be justified on the basis that the statistical and the sociological 
approaches to studying society are, in principle, not only compatible but necessary 
for each other. A clear explanation why this is the case has most recently been 
provided by Goldthorpe (2015). According to Goldthorpe, although statistics is 
necessary and fundamental for data collection and data analysis of probabilistic 
regularities, ‘statistical analysis alone cannot lead to causal explanation of these 
regularities’ (Goldthorpe, 2015: 103-4). What this means is that statistical models 
showing, for instance, the effect of one variable on another, cannot be taken as final 
results – they can provide evidence that there is a relationship between variables but 
they cannot in themselves explain how this relationship has come about. To explain 
this we need a theoretical input in the beginning or theoretical output in the end, say 
from sociological concepts and theories (for good examples of how this could be 
achieved in practice, see Goldthorpe 2015: 115-119). The fact that this can be done, 
however, does not necessarily mean that it is easily done and it is a prime aim of the 
present study to show what factors were involved in the history of British sociology 
that made it more or less likely to accept and act upon the potential compatibility 
between statistical and sociological conceptions of society. 
Statistics as both a conceptual and technical tool could contribute to a better 
sociological understanding which is another reason why it is important to study the 
mutual interaction between the two. For instance, statistics is essential in the study of 
wider trends which are the product of unprecedented rate of change and rapid 
dynamics which not only affect but define modern society. It may be the case that we 
need more focus and smaller scale studies using qualitative methods to examine how 
these changes are affecting individuals in their everyday routine or in their emotional 
life, but without a clear view of the general trends underlying these effects, the 
usefulness of qualitative studies of this kind is greatly diminished.  
Statistics can also contribute to a better understanding of relationships between 
sociological phenomena. No other method enables us to measure the degree to which 
one phenomenon is related to another, including the ability to make generalisations 
that apply to entire populations.  
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There are also ways in which statistical knowledge can be beneficial even in 
the case of non-quantitative sociological analysis. One of my interviewees explained 
his attempt to teach his students basic statistical principles in the following way: 
 
I would say to them, you may not like numbers and you may or may not 
think you are very good at them but there are lots of clever people out there 
who are going to use numbers systematically to mislead you [...] If you 
don’t acquire some capacity to handle numbers with a degree of 
confidence, you are going to be a victim, so for heaven’s sake, lets get on 
top of this and learn how to appreciate the numbers [...] So I would say to 
students, this is in a sense nothing to do with sociology, it’s to do with 
citizenship and being a member of society (Author’s Interview with Robert 
Moore, 2017). 
 
Statistics teaches students to pay careful attention to the quality of data, any 
data; guides them in judging the extent to which they can draw firm conclusions from 
their data; allows them to measure the inherent variability and uncertainty in any sort 
of findings about the social world and teaches them the importance of precision in 
thought and writing. This is not to say that training in other methods necessarily lacks 
these elements; but while in statistical training these issues are prominent and widely 
discussed, teaching of qualitative methods usually focuses on other elements such as 
interpretation and the application of theory. 
The practical benefits that arise from acknowledging, in principle and in 
practice, the potential compatibility of statistical and sociological approaches to 
studying society, however, provide only partial justification for looking at the 
relationship between the two subjects which, it is not difficult to imagine, can be 
contested by sociologists who believe that sociology and statistics are 
epistemologically incompatible (examples of such arguments will be discussed in 
Chapter Thirteen). Are there any potentially more fundamental ways in which an 
historian can justify examining and even questioning British sociology’s historical 
relationship with statistics? Does statistics matter beyond the practical benefits it 
could bring? 
Statistics as a quantitative method has evolved mathematically and technically 
throughout the years to make possible more accurate and more powerful statistical 
data collection and analysis. This, however, is only one way to look at the historical 
development of statistics, of which Stephen Stigler’s works (1986, 1999, 2016) are a 
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prime example. Alongside the technical development of statistics there is another 
aspect of its historical development that is especially relevant when studying statistics 
in the context of the history of social science and has to do with the role of science in 
modern society and the important role statistics has played in scientific advance since 
the early nineteenth century. 
The nineteenth century witnessed the formation and rise of the sciences of 
geology and biology as well as major advances in the fields of chemistry and 
physics. Scientific discoveries led to advances in technology which over time 
contributed to the re-shaping of social and political structures and to dramatic 
changes in the way people lived their daily lives. Statistics, as we know it today, did 
not initially develop as a method to aid investigation in the natural sciences; it first 
developed as a method aimed at improving the study of society which was only later 
adapted to the study of natural phenomena. But, as I will show in Part One, from its 
very beginnings, the principles behind statistical analysis adopted the characteristics 
of nineteenth-century science. In this way, statistics was one of the representations of 
the consolidation of a new type of ‘culture’ in the Western world – a culture 
grounded in reason, rationality and empirical principles for the establishment of 
reliable knowledge; a culture defined by science and the power of science (Gellner, 
1992). Therefore, statistics represents a particular worldview, a style of reasoning 
which has played an important part not only in providing a basis for the development 
of all statistical techniques, but also in shaping the fundamental concepts in both 
social and natural science. Moreover, even before statistics embraced the advances 
made in the mathematical theory of probability and statistical explanations and 
statistical modelling became available for the use of social and natural sciences in the 
late nineteenth century, statistics provided a concept of society (and of nature) that 
fundamentally changed the way we think about and approach these entities – this 
was not a concept of society that was based on abstract principles of the forces 
within society (as in the Hobbesian principles of the seventeenth century or the ideas 
of social contract of the eighteenth century) or on abstract theories of how to improve 
society (as in nineteenth-century Marxism). The statistical concept of society was 
based on a set of procedures on how to analyse social phenomena in a more effective 
way than had been done before and how to derive knowledge from the empirical 
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investigation of society; it provided a way, in line with the scientific way of 
investigating nature, of testing, of scrutinising all existing knowledge about society.  
It was in this sense that nineteenth-century statistics made social science possible – 
the development of statistics initiated not only a new way of doing research into 
society but it established the foundations of social science itself. A quantification 
mind-set had emerged which, unlike what is usually said about social statisticians, 
was not just about counting up everything that could be counted but about ways in 
which reliable knowledge about society could be achieved.  
Britain was at the forefront of all these changes and therefore makes an ideal 
testing ground for understanding how sociology, which, as I show below was only 
one of a variety of social scientific enterprises, responded to them. At its core, this 
thesis is essentially about the factors and conditions and that led to the emergence and 
development of a sociology in Britain that largely ignored, and occasionally rejected, 
the thing that made social science possible. 
Once we begin to understand statistics not merely as a method but see how it is 
inextricably linked to a way of viewing a world that is inherently uncertain and 
variable, we see that a study of the relationship between statistics and sociology can 
reveal something important about British sociology more generally. It relates to a 
bigger question about how the study of society in Britain, and sociology as one part 
of it, responded to the changes in the cultural and scientific outlook that emerged in 
the nineteenth century. As I show in detail later on, how sociology responded to 
statistics is how sociology responded to modern science. By the nineteenth century 
the scientific method had proven itself and it had made possible the discovery of new 
knowledge that correlated with the way the universe actually was better than 
anything else discovered or invented before. The foundations of all statistical 
thinking which were laid in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were part of that 
same outlook that brought about major advances in the study of electrical phenomena, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, Maxwell’s laws of thermodynamics quantum 
mechanics – all of which, to a greater or lesser extent, implicitly or explicitly, relied 
on statistical principles. It is only through the benefit of hindsight that we know how 
fundamental nineteenth-century statistical thinking was in helping to bring about 
discoveries and inventions that changed our world beyond recognition. 
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Contemporary British sociologists could not have known the full, long term 
implications, but at a time when the successes resulting from the statistical approach 
were building, the fact that British sociology, whether by choice or circumstance, 
took a direction different from that of the general development of natural and social 
science clearly deserves further investigation. Examining the relationship between 
sociology and statistics is therefore ultimately justifiable at a much deeper level than 
simply the benefits arising from sociologists’ use of statistics – the level of the 
relationship between sociology and science a system of knowledge that defines the 
very object of sociology’s study, modern society.  
In our post-modern days, however, even the ability of science and history to 
bring about advancement in knowledge has been questioned. Since the 1960s, there 
have been numerous charges made against the possibility of objective scientific or 
historical knowledge coming from post-modern and post-structural philosophers and 
sociologists (Foucault, Haraway, Derrida, Bloor). Some have argued for extreme 
relativism, basing their view on the understanding that language could not relate to 
anything but itself; that everyone’s point of view is equally valid; and that historical 
but also natural and social reality are all socially constructed and are being constantly 
re-constructed (Evans, 1997: 1-14). Some historians have objected to such arguments 
aimed at history by arguing that: 
 
It does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different 
shapes from different angles of vision, it has objectively either no shape at 
all or an infinity of shapes. It does not follow that, because interpretation 
plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no 
existing interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as 
another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to objective 
interpretation (Carr, 1974 [1961]: 26-27). 
 
Others, like the historian of science David Wootton, have been adamant that 
post-modern arguments aimed at discrediting science are fallacious and totally 
missing the whole point of science, since ‘science as a system of knowledge is more 
than a social construct because it is successful, because it fits with reality’; if 
contemporary methods of science fit better than older ones, it is because they fit 
‘better with the world as it is, not because the world was bound to be like this’ 
(Wootton, 2015: 540).  I tend to agree with Carr and Wootton and hold that none of 
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the post-modern critiques against history or science can successfully invalidate or 
even challenge the ultimate justification of examining the relationship between 
sociology and statistics, as outlined above. 
Post-modern critiques of science and history amount to a proposition that 
knowledge is merely a collection of equally valid viewpoints and that better or more 
useful or more adequate understanding is not possible. However, this in turn means 
that knowledge itself is impossible since the very idea of knowledge is about better 
and more adequate understanding than what we had before. To reject the possibility 
of knowledge is, therefore, also to reject that post-modernism itself is knowledge and 
that it has something better to say about how we can learn about the world. Post-
modernist thought, therefore, contains within it the seeds of its own invalidity. 
Moreover, in arguing for extreme relativism, that all knowledge is relative and 
therefore valid, post-modernism would automatically give equal status to the 
objectivity argument. It is, therefore, also self-contradictory. As far as objectivity is 
concerned, post-modern ways of thinking, it seems, has nothing useful to say. 
Similarly, although the interpretation of a social phenomenon may vary from 
person to person, from place to place and from one point in time to another, post-
modernist thinkers fail to recognise that in its consequences the social world is as 
real as the natural world. There can be numerous social causes and explanations for 
poverty but, ultimately, in its consequences on people’s mental and physical health, 
poverty is just as real as, for instance, the natural erosion of rocks. Social phenomena 
may be socially constructed in their origins, but they are not purely socially 
constructed in their consequences. Objective accounts in social and natural science 
are, therefore, a legitimate aspiration – they are those accounts which allow us to 
grasp more comprehensively and to understand more deeply the consequences of 
natural and social phenomena. One way of achieving this is through the application 
of scientific methods and principles, a prominent part of which are quantitative 
methods. It is through the incorporation of such methods that we can know with 
better precision and accuracy, with more depth and clarity what we understood 
yesterday less precisely, less clearly and in only a superficial way. 
The fact that both natural and social scientists can legitimately strive towards 
objective knowledge does not imply that there are no differences between the natural 
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and the social world and the approaches to studying them. What distinguishes social 
from natural science is not the fact that natural science is somehow more capable of 
producing objective knowledge based on the gathering and analysis of factual 
evidence, while social science, by virtue of studying conscious and language-using 
human beings, is not. What distinguishes the two enterprises is that, first, the number 
of ideas in social science is limited – what is being said in social science nowadays 
has mostly already been said at an earlier point by another person in a different way. 
In contrast, natural science contains a potentially infinite pool of new ideas and has 
the ability to produce new knowledge, make new discoveries and invent new things. 
Therefore, knowledge in the realm of natural science is cumulative in a way in which 
social scientific knowledge cannot be cumulative (cf. Gellner, 1985: 7-9) and the 
latter cannot have the impact on our cognitive world that natural science has by 
enriching it with new knowledge and expanding it to new territories (cf. Gellner, 
1985: 126-7). It is a mistake, however, to use the non-cumulative character of social 
science, as an argument against the possibility of objectivity. Social science may not 
be cumulative in terms of how much we know; but it too progresses from less to 
more sophisticated ways of knowing the social worlds due to the progress in the 
scientific methods of study that we employ in it. 
Absolute objectivity and, with it, absolute progress, might be an illusion; but 
objectivity can still be used as a criterion in social and natural science and for 
evaluating historical accounts. The concept of objectivity in both history and science 
is analogous to the statistical concept of ‘moral certainty’ – moral certainty refers to 
a probability that falls short of mathematical or absolute certainty but that, 
nonetheless, is high enough to allow us to act upon it. Writing a totally objective or 
totally definitive historical or scientific account is just as impossible as it is 
impossible to know something with absolute certainty. But just as the impossibility 
of absolute certainty does not stop statisticians from producing accurate, reliable and 
new knowledge, the impossibility of total objectivity does not preclude making 
scientific advances and doing better history in a more advanced way, thereby 
producing more accurate knowledge and a better understanding of the society, nature 
and their past.  
 39 
An historical examination of the relationship between statistics and sociology 
in Britain, therefore, is not only legitimate and valuable in its own right but it is also 
of substantial historical significance. It allows us not only to advance our historical 
understanding by revising existing historical knowledge on the basis of a more 
contextualised and evidence-based approach; it also allows us to examine some of 
the perennial issues in British social science more generally, such as the divide 
between empirical social science and academic sociology. And, ultimately, 
examining the historical relationship between sociology and statistics will shed light 
on how sociology in Britain has dealt with the scientific advances, part of which is 
statistics, that created and sustain and define better than anything else our modern 
society. How science and statistics achieved this and how the particular idea of 
sociology emerged amidst the rise of science and statistics in the nineteenth century 
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In Britain, in the nineteenth century, there were no ‘sociological’ institutions 
and no professed ‘sociologists’. Auguste Comte, who invented the term ‘sociology’ 
to describe his particular idea of a positive social science in his Course on Positive 
Philosophy (1830-1842), was well-known in British philosophical circles and his 
work regarded with a mixture of criticism and approval. ‘Sociology,’ as such, 
remained stuck on the written pages of scholars such as William Whewell, John 
Stuart Mill, John K. Ingram, Herbert Spencer and Frederic Harrison; it was an idea 
of a social science that only acquired clearer shape and form in Britain in 1903 with 
the establishment of the first Sociological Society in Britain, which had the Comtean 
philosophy at its core. 
This, of course, does not mean that there was no social science practised in 
Britain in the nineteenth century. On the contrary, there was a strong interest in both 
the construction and practice of social science – but there was little agreement on its 
form and scope (Goldman, 2002). Most prominent were the social reformist 
movement, best represented by the work of the Social Science Association (SSA) 
(1857-1886); the statistical movement represented at Section F of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), established in 1833 and the 
Statistical Society of London (SSL), established in 1834; and political economy, 
which was the only social science represented in academia with the first Chair of 
Political Economy established at University College London in 1828. As I explain in 
greater detail later in this chapter, these social science projects differed profoundly 
from what Comte understood as ‘sociology’. 
If, then, in nineteenth-century Britain, ‘sociology’ existed only as a concept, as 
a yet unrealised idea, shouldn’t its history begin with the establishment of its first 
proper institution? Is the development of social reformism, statistics and political 
economy, none of which conform to Comte’s idea of ‘sociology’, at all relevant for 
the establishment of sociology in Britain and for its later development throughout the 
twentieth century as an academic subject? And if so, in what way? Why should the 
history of these social science movements be examined in its own right and not 
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merely as a point of reference to what developed as sociology in the twentieth 
century? 
One way of approaching these questions would be to disregard the differences 
that existed in the nineteenth century between Comte’s understanding of sociology 
and the social science practised in Britain, and assume that the term ‘sociology’ can 
be used to describe all sorts of enquiries into social matters. This approach is best 
exemplified in Kent for whom nineteenth-century British social science is ‘empirical 
sociology’ (Kent, 1981) and therefore not only a relevant but an important part of the 
history of sociology in general. 
This approach is convenient for a descriptive account, like Kent’s, which gives 
an overview of what was practised as social enquiry in nineteenth-century Britain. It 
is, however, an inefficient and potentially misleading approach if we want to 
examine the dynamics of the relationships between different social science projects, 
their differences and their particular influence on the future development of 
academic sociology in Britain. 
Few scholars have attempted such examinations. By far the best-known work 
on this subject is Philip Abrams’ 1968 essay on The Origins of British Sociology 
(1834-1914). Abrams pays special attention to the SSA and the SSL, holding them 
responsible for the failure of British sociology to firmly establish itself both in the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth; in his view, ‘the failure was not at all an 
effect of inadequate intellectual resources – it was a problem of institutionalisation’ 
(Abrams 1968: 4). There are two sides to his argument: firstly, the type of social 
science that was institutionalised in the nineteenth century hampered the early 
development and institutionalisation of sociology; secondly, the first attempts to 
institutionalise sociology in the early twentieth century failed and a few years after 
the establishment of the Sociological Society, the various factions from which it was 
formed went their separate ways, none having a strong enough programme to ensure 
their continued existence long term. For Abrams, the history of nineteenth century 
social science in Britain is relevant and important in the later history of British 
sociology because this early social science had a negative impact on the prospects for 
a ‘successful’ early development of academic – theoretically oriented and 
theoretically sophisticated – sociology. 
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Since its publication in 1968, Abrams’ essay has become a widely referenced 
sociological ‘classic’ and, to my knowledge, has not been revised or challenged by a 
sociologist. It is questionable, however, to what extent Abrams’ analysis of 
nineteenth-century statistics and reformism, provides an accurate evaluation of, or an 
insight into, the role and understanding of science, including social science, in 
Victorian culture. The historian of social science, Lawrence Goldman (1983, 2002) 
who has studied this period extensively, focusing particularly on the development of 
social reformism in the SSA, has challenged Abrams’ interpretation that the 
Association produced a ‘role model of the social scientist as a technician of policy’ 
and that as a result its ‘influence was critical in frustrating the growth of sociology in 
the mid-nineteenth century’ (Abrams 1968: 44). Goldman shows that Abrams’ 
division between academicism and ameliorism, that what was good for social reform 
was bad for sociology, is a ‘false antithesis’ (Goldman, 2002: 316). An important 
aspect of Victorian culture, Goldman argues, was faith in applying scientific 
procedures in the construction of a ‘science of reform’, both as an intellectual 
discipline and a type of public practice; science and reform were closely intertwined, 
not only here in Britain, but also internationally. The manifold contributions of 
Victorian social science can, therefore, be understood and explained through the 
particular cultural and political context of the time; to dismiss them merely as 
‘frustrating’ the rise of sociology is to impose false expectations on the past and 
judge Victorian social science on the basis of what it should have been rather than of 
what it was. Abrams’ interpretation, particularly his insistence that lack of 
formulation of general theories was a ‘failure’ for Victorian social science, shows an 
inability, or reluctance, to understand the context in which movements such as social 
reformism took place and a distortion of their historical meaning. For Goldman, 
therefore, studying the development of social science in nineteenth-century Britain is 
relevant and important for the development of sociology not because the former 
frustrated the development of the latter but because sociology had its origins in the 
frustration of reformism (Goldman, 2002: 344). The social science which Abrams’ 
dismisses as a harmful factor was in fact an important stepping stone, a precursor of 
academic sociology; without understanding the nineteenth-century society that gave 
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rise to social science, we cannot fully understand the twentieth century that gave rise 
to ‘sociology’. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, when sociology entered academia, 
the cultural and political climate had changed and sociology did not bear the central 
characteristics of reformist social science. But while Goldman’s account helps us to 
understand the cultural and political factors that led to the development of social 
science along the lines of ‘science of reform’ in the mid-nineteenth century; and why 
there was not demand for a reformist-oriented sociology at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, there are other aspects of the sociology that emerged in Britain at 
that time that are left unexplained. One such aspect is the non-quantitative 
orientation of British sociology, not only at the beginning, but throughout all of the 
twentieth century. 
It is this orientation of British academic sociology that has prompted another 
scholar, John H. Goldthorpe, to re-examine the nineteenth-century history of social 
science in Britain, Germany and France. Goldthorpe’s account is an indirect 
refutation of Abrams’ thesis according to which the development of nineteenth-
century statistics is important in the history of academic sociology only as far as it 
frustrated sociology’s earlier development. Goldthorpe sets out to challenge Abrams’ 
implicit view that statistical methods, or even statistical understanding of social 
phenomena, are somehow ‘un-sociological’ and therefore unable to make a positive 
contribution to the development of academic sociology. The ‘absent synthesis’, as 
Goldthorpe calls it, between nineteenth-century statistics and sociology is a 
genuinely surprising situation that deserves examination beyond what appear to be 
oversimplified judgments about who frustrated the development of whom. Among 
the intellectual factors that contributed to the separate development of the ideas of 
statistics and sociology in the nineteenth century were: the dominance of the 
Comtean legacy, particularly Comte’s insistence that sociology, if it were to be a 
science, should aim at the formulation of deterministic laws and reject any statistical 
explanations of a probabilistic kind. A second factor was the empiricism of much of 
contemporary statistical work, which apparently restricted statistics to ‘a mindless 
cult of the facts’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 293). A third factor was the conception shared 
by many social thinkers, most prominently by Emile Durkheim that the only 
 47 
appropriate way of explaining ‘social facts’ was on the basis of other ‘social facts’ 
(Goldthorpe, 2000: 293); since statistical explanations were grounded upon the 
measurement of individual actions, statistics was seen to be unsuitable for sociology.  
However, the emergence of a wider statistical worldview and the development 
of methods for social statistics in the nineteenth century is of much greater historical 
importance for the development of academic sociology in Britain in the twentieth 
century than has been acknowledged in the cited scholarship and it is significant for 
reasons that have either been neglected, not understood (Abrams) or only implicitly 
acknowledged (Goldman and Goldthorpe). The following chapter aims to explain 
what these reasons are and to show why the nineteenth-century ‘absent synthesis’, to 
borrow Goldthorpe’s phrase, mattered in the nineteenth century and still matters to 
this day. Since Abrams’ account of the role of nineteenth century statistics in the 
development of academic sociology has been the most widely read and influential 
among sociologists in Britain, and since I have found it to be fundamentally flawed, I 
will pay it particular attention. I will then move on to developing what I believe to be 
a more accurate picture of the significance of the emergence of statistical methods 




The Importance of Nineteenth-century Statistics in the History of British 
Sociology According to Abrams (1968)  
 
The history of sociology before 1914, Abrams argued, was ‘in no sense a 
success story’ (Abrams, 1968: 4). To understand why, in his view, it is important to 
examine what was going on in social science before sociology was established 
institutionally at the beginning of the twentieth century. To Abrams, examining 
nineteenth-century statistics is particularly important as it had an especially negative 
impact on the development of sociology in the nineteenth century and later on. 
Among the major reasons why the development of statistics in nineteenth-
century Britain frustrated the development of sociology is social statisticians’ direct 
engagement with social policy: 
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Potential British social scientists […] found themselves in an almost 
unique situation: government and party politics were open to them, the 
universities were closed. It is hardly surprising that they succumbed readily 
to the lure of administrative opportunity. So sociology languished (Abrams 
1968: 148-149). 
 
Abrams describes the early statistical tradition as essentially a workforce that 
was an extension of the British government, lacking in the analytical expertise to 
deal with the constantly evolving social problems arising out of rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Organisations such as the SSL, he argues, 
contributed to the continuous and rapid growth of British government until it became 
one of the largest of its kind in Europe; they ‘reduced the idea of intelligence to a 
matter of facts and figures’ and produced an empirical tradition that led to ‘massive 
but intellectually sterile levers of social reform’ (Abrams, 1968: 5). Due to the close 
proximity between the British government and British social scientists, the ‘energies 
which might have gone toward sociology’ were ‘soaked up’ in ‘performing 
administration and intelligence functions’; as a result, ‘the sociologist remained a 
potential role’ (Abrams 1968: 4, 5). 
But this was not the sole reason why the existence of a statistical tradition was 
not conducive to the development of a ‘sociology’. Abrams’ core criticism of the 
statistical movement is that they naively pursued empiricist and a-theoretical 
inquiries, largely devoted to the gathering and evaluation of facts, ‘instead of the 
radical reconstruction of theory [the theories of political economy]’ (Abrams 1968: 
15). Working with government, he argues, reinforced this empiricism and made 
‘fundamental speculation’ unnecessary (Abrams, 1968: 15) allowing statisticians to 
cling ‘to the atomistic, optimistic perspectives of political economy as their 
organising frame of reference’ (Abrams, 1968: 25); so that, in the end,  
 
the emphasis settled on the business of producing more exact indicators, 
better methods of classification and data collection, improved life tables 
and so on […] The ad hoc administrative orientation remained strong. The 
commitment was to statistics, not sociology (Abrams 1968: 18). 
 
For an account of ‘the origins of British sociology’ Abrams’ essay is 
remarkably a-historical – his interpretation lacks in historical detail and in references 
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to the broader historical context in which the statistical and social reformist 
movements developed. This is apparent even at the level of terminology – without 
stating explicitly what he understands as ‘sociology’, he is clear that in the SSL and 
the SSA ‘the commitment was to statistics not to sociology’ (Abrams, 1968: 18). An 
historical account with a more careful and responsible handling of terminology 
would have necessarily acknowledged the contemporary meaning of the term 
‘sociology’ and how it developed in the context of the development of statistics and 
social reformism. As previously discussed, ‘sociology’ at this time was an idea of a 
social science largely based on Comte’s understanding of the term as shaped by his 
positive philosophy. It is not uncommon to see the term being used by scholars who 
did not associate themselves with the Comtean tradition, but it was mainly Comte’s 
followers who used it consistently1. However, the British Comtean or positivist 
movement contributed nothing new to Comte’s philosophy and failed to develop a 
sociological theory (Farmer, 1967). It is hard to envisage, therefore, what kind of 
‘sociology’ opportunities Abrams is talking about when he makes the claim that 
‘sociology’ would have taken up these opportunities if it were not for the stifling 
influence of the statistical and social reformist movements. Speculations of this kind 
entirely miss the point of understanding the dynamics that were going on between 
competing visions about what social science could or should be. Instead, Abrams’ 
approach enters the realm of counterfactual history which may be used in 
preliminary historical reflections but not as a tool to analyse and judge actual 
historical events – after all, there would be countless possibilities for ‘a sociology’ in 
a counterfactual history, making analyses, which employ this technique, 
meaningless. 
It can be inferred from Abrams’ account that there is one type of ‘sociology’ 
that he regards as proper and which he uses to judge the social science that 
developed in mid-nineteenth century Britain. In his view, a type of theoretically 
based and theoretically oriented ‘sociology’ that can be applied not only to the 
investigation of society but in the conceptual reconstruction of social phenomena and 
                                               
1 Herbert Spencer used the term but would have described himself as a dissenter from Comte’s views, 
particularly with regard to the status of psychology as a science (cf. Spencer, 1864). Although 
Spencer’s work is important in its own right, I do not discuss Spencer’s work at length since I have 
found very little reference, if any at all, to his writings in the works and authors I examine here.  
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the building of grand theories of society is the only legitimate type of ‘sociology’. 
But where does this concept of ‘sociology as theory’ come from? Abrams provides 
no evidence that this is how nineteenth-century scholars thought about ‘sociology’. 
Instead, he appears to be projecting his own 1960s conceptions of ‘sociology as 
theory’ (see Part Three) onto the early history of social science – a presentist 
approach that not only leaves us with a distorted view but provides little insight into 
the contemporary role and long-term significance of the statistical and social 
reformist movement. In this respect, at the very least, his account is unsatisfactory 





Statistics and Science in Nineteenth-Century Britain 
 
In his monumental work on the history of scientific thought in nineteenth-
century Europe, J. T. Merz argued that the nineteenth century might be called ‘the 
statistical century’ due to the fact that statistics as a science of large numbers was 
increasingly being drawn into use in a variety of fields in social and natural scientific 
research (Merz, 1904: 567). But what was this ‘statistics’? Where did it come from 
and what did it comprise? 
It could be argued that the emergence of the statistical (numerical) attitude 
towards social affairs is to be found in the seventeenth century, particularly in the 
work of the English political arithmeticians (cf. Lazarsfeld, 1961). The idea that 
social phenomena could be subjected to quantitative analysis was already present in 
the work of John Graunt (1620-1674) and Edmund Halley (1656-1742) who 
published the earliest mortality tables in Britain. A new, social, phenomenon was 
conceptualised in this way – the average mortality rate in a population – to express a 
new kind of scholarly interest dealing with the laws which govern the occurrence of 
death in society rather than the reasons why a particular death had occurred. But the 
aspiration, most clearly formulated by William Petty (1623-1687) that “one had to 
express oneself in terms of number, weight and measure” (Petty quoted in Lazarsfeld, 
1961: 281) indicated not only the rise of new particular type of scientific curiosity 
but also the emergence of the idea that quantitatively classifying and analysing all 
social experience increases the chances of better, more efficient, government. And a 
landmark of eighteenth-century statistical work, J. P Süssmilch’s (1707-1767), The 
Divine Order as Proven by Birth, Death and Fertility of the Human Species (1741), 
provided systematic evidence for the constant ratio between male and female child 
births in society, initiating the idea that statistical data could provide insight into the 
unknown, including the previously unknowable, divine providence. This idea later 
evolved into an argument about the power of statistics to help us reliably predict the 
future. 
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The development of the idea that numerical data about society can be used to 
make sense of societal, not merely individual, behaviour and to assist in a more 
effective government and prediction of societal matters, ran parallel with the 
development of a greater understanding of mathematical probability. Throughout the 
eighteenth century a subjectivist approach to the understanding of probability 
predominated which was mainly used in the study of individual rationality and 
decision-making, such as in gambling, risk, insurance policies and criminal law (for 
further details, cf. Daston, 1987; 1988). But towards the end of the eighteenth and 
beginning of the nineteenth century there were major changes in the way statistics 
was practised due to the expanding influence of the frequentist conception of 
probability. This placed emphasis on the ability to effectively analyse and summarise 
large amounts of data, thereby enabling us to track the development of large-scale 
phenomena. Through the study of probability, a rise in interest in inexorable social 
laws was displacing the study of individual rational action with particular 
consequences for the conceptualisation of society: whereas in the eighteenth century 
the study of the reasonable individual or l’homme éclairé provided a satisfactory 
explanation of social affairs (it was believed that society was held together by 
rational actions and that rational actions could be predicted with the help of the 
calculation of probabilistic risk) by the early nineteenth century the study of all 
individuals, reasonable or not, was felt necessary. The development of this idea was 
aided by Poisson’s contribution to the understanding of the law of large numbers. He 
proved that the frequentist approach to probability could be used in the study of 
social affairs, since the law of large numbers applies not only to events such as coin 
tossing, where the probability of the individual event is constant, but also to social 
phenomena where the probability constantly varies (Hacking, 1983a).  
But the slow realisation that one can use numerical data gathered from masses 
of individuals to learn about, govern and predict the course of society; together with 
the evolution of the concept of mathematical probability towards a frequentist 
approach would not have been enough on their own to give rise to modern-day 
statistics. Another major component which was missing until the late eighteenth 
century, was an effective mechanism for the collection of masses of statistical data 
needed to study society.  
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We witness a change in government attitudes towards the publication of 
statistical data from the eighteenth into the nineteenth century. Whereas in the 
eighteenth century, European states generally kept secret even the little statistics they 
gathered, often in purely verbal format2, in the nineteenth century, ‘they loved to 
publish’ (Hacking, 1990: 20).  The first public attempts at large-scale collection and 
publishing of statistical data took place in Prussia. It was German thinkers and 
statesmen, Hacking argues, who ‘brought to full consciousness the idea that the 
nation-state is essentially characterised by its statistics’ and as such it ‘demands a 
statistical office in order to define itself and its power’ (Hacking, 1990: 18). The 
realisation of this idea might have originated in Prussia but it very soon spread all 
over Europe, giving rise to a phenomenon that Hacking has called ‘the avalanche of 
printed numbers’, with statistical offices and institutions being set up and given the 
responsibility to collect and publicise statistical data. 
Although the avalanche of printed numbers occurred with almost equal force in 
all major European countries, not all of them had readers ‘of the right kind’ to 
approach the statistical data as a source that could be used for the formulation of 
societal laws. The Prussians had one of the most powerful statistical bureaus in 
Europe, but it was the French who used their avalanche of printed numbers to first 
begin thinking about the statistical laws of society (Hacking, 1990: 35-6), as in, for 
instance, the work of the Frenchman Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794). Condorcet 
is well-known for outlining one of the first detailed conceptions of what he called 
‘moral science’. It consisted of moral-science-as-history – a branch that dealt with 
the analysis of overarching structures and the evolution of human society throughout 
the ages – and of social mathematics. As envisioned by Condorcet, social 
mathematics was not yet the empirical quantitative study of large-scale social 
phenomena that we today call statistics; but ‘without Condorcet’s enlightenment 
vision of law, of moral science […] those number collecting offices might merely 
manufactured tables in the Prussian style’ (Hacking, 1990: 46). 
 
                                               
2 For further details on the pre-numerical concept of statistics which dominated statistical activity in 
Germany in the eighteenth century, see Hacking (1990: 24-26); on the introduction of the word 
statistics into English, see Yule (1905). 
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Condorcet conceived of the possibility of an empirical quantitative social 
science in the eighteenth century and the avalanche of printed numbers in the 
nineteenth century made possible the realisation of this concept and of the concept of 
statistical laws about society. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the 
work of the Belgian polymath, Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). Quetelet developed 
the idea of ‘the average man’ and promoted its use explicitly for the purpose of 
social research (Quetelet, 1842 [1835]). The average man was a way of 
conceptualising the order and the ‘alarming regularity’ (Quetelet, 1842 [1835]: vii) 
that the descriptive analysis of data about social events was revealing. Quetelet 
shocked the contemporary world by demonstrating that in spite of the irregularity 
and unpredictability of individual deaths or behaviour, such as the commitment of a 
criminal offence or getting pregnant, the annual crime, birth and death rates remained 
stable and could be predicted. Based on his research, Quetelet (wrongly) assumed 
that all social phenomena are normally distributed, i.e. aggregates of statistical data 
on society form a bell curve. But what is more important than Quetelet’s limited 
assumption about possible distributions of statistical data about society was his 
realisation that the bell curve itself could be conceived of as an autonomously 
existing phenomenon; that is, he drew a distinction between the bell curve and the 
individual data that underlie it. This in turn made it possible to conceive of regular 
and predictable large-scale social phenomena existing separately but, nonetheless, 
alongside irregular and unpredictable instances of individual behaviour: the 
‘statistical paradox – that the most unpredictable single event is predictable on a 
larger scale – became a social reality3’ (cf. Panayotova, 2014). 
Once the conception and demonstration of large-scale statistical laws was 
made possible, questions were raised concerning the nature of these laws. At the time 
when Quetelet was working, the most widely accepted interpretation was that they 
were a result of the deterministic character of the natural and the social world. As 
Laplace famously put it, if there was 
 
                                               
3 Many misunderstood Quetelet’s argument and accused him of being a materialist, a fatalist and a 
denier of free will. Many of these accusations, however, were due to critics’ hesitation to 
acknowledge that regular large-scale phenomena do not determine any individual action per se. 
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an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is 
animated […] for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, 
would be present to its eyes (LaPlace, 1996 [1814]: 4). 
 
Quetelet followed by arguing that ‘to one who knew how to foresee all things 
there would be no chance’ (Quetelet, 1849: 9). This idea of uncertainty as resulting 
purely from human ignorance, and of probability as merely a tool to help deal with 
that ignorance, remained prevalent but was becoming increasingly weaker 
throughout the nineteenth century. Hacking (1983a, 1983b, 1990) has described the 
process as ‘the erosion of determinism’; a process which made possible the 
conception of a world which is inherently stochastic, that is, inherently uncertain and 
unpredictable. This was first fully explained in philosophical terms by the 
philosopher C. S. Peirce and demonstrated mathematically by the quantum 
revolution in physics at the beginning of the twentieth century.  A major stepping 
stone in the probabilistic analysis of social phenomena was Francis Galton’s 
discovery of regression to the mean – the mechanism by which variation works, 
enabling certain average characteristics of the population to remain stable over the 
course of time – and of statistical correlation, which allowed a probabilistic 
understanding of the interaction between social phenomena based on how they vary 
in relation to one another (Galton, 1886; 1888; 1889). Galton’s ideas were later 
developed by Karl Pearson and his team, and together with the introduction of 
random sampling (Kiar (1897); Bowley, 1906; Kruskall and Mosteller, 1980) led to 
‘the taming of chance’ and a new understanding of statistical laws as ‘autonomous’. 
This brief overview of the history of statistics from the seventeenth to the early 
twentieth century shows that the emergence of statistics initiated some major 
changes in the understanding, analysis, manipulation and prediction of social 
phenomena and was closely intertwined with it. But how is the history of statistics 
relevant to the emergence of the idea of a social science, and particularly of 
sociology, in Britain?  
Many sociologists in Britain, and internationally, have acknowledged that a 
major factor in the rise of the idea of sociology were the societal changes that took 
place in the Western world, particularly rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. It is 
rarely acknowledged, however, that part and parcel of the processes of urbanisation 
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and industrialisation was the aspiration to design more accurate and more efficient 
ways of gathering information about these processes; and that, crucially, it was 
through statistics that the effects of urbanisation and industrialisation, essential 
characteristics of the modern world, became knowable. Why should this be the case? 
Older forms of knowing and analysing social phenomena, on the basis, for instance, 
of general abstract principles of human nature (as we find in Thomas Hobbes, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau or John Locke) could be used in societies which are characterised 
by no or only slowly developing social change; but in a world where social change is 
rapid, where social phenomena take place on a grander scale and involve aggregates 
of people, statistics becomes an indispensable form of knowledge because it allows 
us to get to grips with social change as it happens (cf. Gellner, 1988). Without this 
statistical basis, without this most basic but indispensable knowledge of the state of 
society and of social change, conceiving of а social science, let alone practising it, 
would not have been possible in the first place. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
therefore, the development of statistics had provided a new, workable concept of 
society – as a ‘dynamic entity’ that was somehow more fundamental than the state 
and requiring a social science to comprehend it’ (Gigerenzer et al, 1997 [1989]: 39) – 
and basic methods of the analysis of social phenomena. 
The fact that modern society was first and foremost made knowable through 
statistics is only one reason why it is important to consider the history of statistics 
when examining the history of sociology as a social science. But there is another, 
broader and in some ways even more fundamental reason why statistics matters in 
the history of sociology, especially in Britain.  
The changes in social conditions which were created through the urbanisation 
and industrialisation of western society which, in turn, prompted social scientific 
concerns, resulted from major scientific discoveries in the fields of physics, 
chemistry and technology that took place in Britain and other parts of Europe 
throughout the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries. It was modern 
science that created the modern world and that created the conditions for the 
emergence of a society that needs a social science to help it to understand and 
manage itself. But what was science in the nineteenth century? And, crucially, we 
know that most of statistics up to mid-nineteenth century was about social matters – 
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but was nineteenth-century statistics also ‘scientific’? In other words, did statistics, 
as it was practised in Britain in the nineteenth century qualify as ‘a social science’ 
according to the contemporary standards of science? If there is good evidence to 
suggest a positive answer, then the history of statistics becomes fundamental in the 
history of sociology, not only because statistics first made possible the study of 
modern society but because it made possible the scientific study of society. If this is 
the case, and given the advances that science has made possible since the sixteenth 
century, it appears inconceivable for any social science to disregard statistics. To 
investigate this question – the core question of this chapter – I first examine the 
nineteenth-century understanding of science, as outlined in the work of some of the 
most prominent scientific thinkers in Britain at the time, John Herschel and William 
Whewell, as well as the philosopher John Stuart Mill. I then compare their 
understanding to the understanding that the SSL had of their own work. This would 
then allow us to assess the extent to which the British statistical tradition, as 




The Idea of Science in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain 
 
What did it mean to be ‘scientific’ in early nineteenth-century Britain? This 
question was at the core of a 1961 study by the historian of nineteenth-century 
science, W. F. Cannon. On the basis of a detailed study of contemporary debates, 
comments and major treatises about science, Cannon argues that, in a nutshell, to be 
scientific meant to be “as much like [John] Herschel as possible” (Cannon, 1961: 
218). Furthermore: 
 
In England of the 1830s, “to be scientific” meant “to be like physical 
astronomy”. To be quite specific, it meant to be like John Herschel’s 
extension of physical astronomy […] (Cannon, 1961: 238). 
 
It was not without good reason that Cannon chose John Herschel as the 
epitome of science in 1830s Britain. John Herschel was the son of the famous 
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astronomer William Herschel, who refined astronomical methods for observation, 
designed new and much more powerful telescopes than were previously available 
and in 1781 discovered the seventh planet in the Solar System, Uranus. In some 
respects, however, John Herschel managed to surpass his father’s extraordinary 
achievements – he quickly developed into a polymath, with contributions to physics, 
astronomy, pure mathematics, chemistry, galvanism, photography and, last but not 
least, philosophy of science. He was not only famous; he was admired by many: 
from John Ruskin to Richard Owen; from Charles Darwin to John Stuart Mill and 
was at the centre of a circle of scientists, including William Whewell, Charles 
Babbage, Adam Sedgwick and Adolphe Quetelet all of whom were in their own way 
revolutionising science and the way people thought about it. Herschel’s work on the 
philosophy of science – Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 
(1851, [1830]) had a major impact on the understanding of science and it is on this 
work that I rely for clarifying what was understood by science in the early nineteenth 
century. 
For Herschel, and for the young generation of scientists who were active in the 
1830s, an important aspect of science was its public and popular character – 
scientific achievements had to be communicated between scientists but also to 
ordinary people; and it was scientific achievements – ‘not the experience of one man 
only, or of one generation, but the accumulated experience of all mankind in all ages’ 
– that should be used in judging the credibility and advance of science (Herschel, 
1851 [1830]: 76)4. But openness and broad communication of science was becoming 
increasingly difficult within the old English scientific circles. The Royal Society, the 
alleged scientific authority in the country, had been in decline since the eighteenth 
century, mainly due to the exclusive character of its membership and the fact that it 
had fallen under the influence of aristocratic dilettantes instead of major contributors 
to scientific knowledge (Basalla et al, 1970). The appointment of the Royal Duke of 
Sussex as a President of the Society instead of John Herschel in 1830 was yet 
another sign that the Society could not offer a good platform for the development of 
the kind of science that the wider scientific community and the general public 
wanted to see. It was the dismissal of Herschel that triggered a crisis in the Royal 
                                               
4 For a detailed overview of the emergence of the idea of scientific progress through co-operation for 
non-personal ends, see Zilsel (1945). 
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Society and that made necessary the establishment of another scientific institution 
that could fulfil the expectations of the new generation of scientists. 
The British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) was 
established in 1831 with William Vernon Harcourt as a chairman of the management 
committee with this idea in mind and 
 
having for its objects, to give a stronger impulse, and more systematic 
direction to the objects of science, and a removal of those disadvantages 
which impede its progress, and to promote the intercourse of the cultivators 
of science with one another, and with foreign philosophers (Hartcourt 1831, 
quoted in Orange, 1981: 43).  
 
Among its founding members were Herschel, Babbage, Whewell, Sir David 
Brewster and J. F. W. Johnson. Unlike the Royal Society, which was solely London-
based, the BAAS was established as a peripatetic, or travelling, organisation – its 
annual meetings took place in different cities each year and in the 1830s it visited 
many of the industrial cities where public unrest was a serious issue. Again, unlike 
the Royal Society, the BAAS was based on a more or less democratic principle and 
was open to laypeople – the technical papers were presented at the sectional 
meetings, whereas the presidential addresses and the public lectures were directed to 
everyone, including the working classes (Basalla et al, 1970). Membership was not 
restricted to any particular political or religious affiliation. And finally, unlike other 
travelling political, social and intellectual coalitions that provided opportunities to 
unify members of the ‘better’ classes by focusing on morals, religion and education, 
the BAAS chose science – abstract and universal, non-political and non-sectarian 
knowledge – as a way to foster vertical unification among the classes (Thackray and 
Morrell, 1981). Overall, the establishment of BAAS was a manifestation of a wider 
movement characterised by a vast increase in scientific activity (the number of 
scientific societies and clubs, scientific chairs and journals had increased rapidly 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, cf. Thackray and Morrell 
(1981)) and a strong desire to communicate science to wider audiences. Nineteenth-
century science was not ‘technical’ like twentieth- or twenty-first century science – 
instead, it was associated with the ideal of public reason; the purpose of science was 
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not merely to bring about scientific progress but also to help to sustain the moral, 
economic and intellectual order (Pearson, 1892; Porter, 2009).  
There were other aspects of science that were being redefined in the 1830s. 
One of them was the term that was used to describe scientific activity. Prior to the 
1830s there were a variety of terms used to describe scientific work and the people 
involved with scientific work, the most popular being natural philosophy/natural 
philosopher. However, as William Whewell pointed out, a new term was necessary 
due the ‘increasing proclivity of separation and dismemberment’ of scientific 
pursuits ([Whewell], 1834: 59). In 1834, Whewell coined what he thought was a 
more accurate and more appropriate term to replace the ambiguous ‘natural 
philosophy’ as a ‘general term by which these gentlemen [of science] could describe 
themselves with reference to their pursuits’ – science ([Whewell], 1834: 59).  
Although the change of terms did not involve a change in content (the majority 
of scientists in the 1830s were, in practice, involved in the same kind of work as 
natural philosophers before them), unlike natural philosophy, science emphasised 
particular elements in the enquiry into the natural world. By the 1850s, ‘science’ was 
exclusively confined to describing the inductive, experimental and physical branches 
of knowledge (Ross, 1962); for the first time, special attention was being given to 
‘science as method’– a principle, supported in the BAAS, that science is not ‘matters 
known’ but a special mode of knowing (Goldman, 2002: 314; Yeo, 1993). 
This was made particularly clear in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse. 
Herschel argued that ‘the great and indeed only ultimate source of knowledge of 
nature and its laws [is] experience’ by which he meant not only the experience of 
individual scientist but the cumulative experience of generations of scientists in 
studying nature through scientific experimentation and observation, constantly 
revising and improving knowledge (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 76). Both observation 
and experiments necessitate the collection of data, or facts which form the basis of 
all scientific enquiry: 
 
Whenever, therefore, we would either analyse a phenomenon into simpler 
ones, or ascertain what is the course or law of nature under any proposed 
general contingency, the first step is to accumulate a sufficient quantity of 
well ascertained facts or recorded instances bearing on the point of 
question (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 118). 
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However, Herschel was clear that facts alone were not what science was about 
– science advances not only through better and wider access to relevant data but also 
through a better and more accurate way to describe or interpret these data. He argued 
‘it is principles, not phenomena – the interpretation, not the mere knowledge of facts 
– which are the objects of enquiry’ (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 13). A further 
elaboration of this idea comes from another major contemporary scientist, William 
Whewell, who was a good friend of Herschel and like Herschel was a faithful 
admirer of Francis Bacon. Whewell wrote a treatise on the philosophy of science 
called The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded upon Their History (1847 
[1840]) in which he attempted to outline an application of the plan of Bacon’s 
Novum Organum to the present condition of physical science. At the core of 
Whewell’s argument was the idea that all scientific knowledge is based on 
experience even though ‘experience is unable to prove a fact to be universal’ 
(Whewell, 1847 [1840]: 62-4). Whewell’s understanding of science as an activity 
that proceeds on the basis of hypothesis formulation and testing and that we can 
reject or accept hypothesis but never prove them, was later revised by Karl Popper, 
and is still the predominant logic used in science today (for a more detailed overview 
of Whewell’s views, see Buchdahl, 1971).  
Putting experience and collection of data at the centre of science makes it 
necessary to pay special attention to measurement. This was another definitive 
characteristic of science that was made explicit in Herschel’s and Whewell’s work. 
Herschel argued that: 
 
[…] it is not merely in preserving us from exaggerated impressions that 
numerical precision is desirable. It is the very soul of science; and its 
attainment affords the only criterion, or at least the best, of the truth of 
theories, and the correctness of experiments (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 122). 
 
Later, Whewell adopted and emphasised Herschel’s point that quantification is 
essential for the formulation of scientific laws and argued that the laws of greatest 
scientific value were the laws expressed in quantitative terms (Whewell, 1847 
[1840]; Ruse, 1975). 
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This takes us to another definitive characteristic of Victorian science – 
commitment to the discovery of laws. Herschel argued that scientists had come to 
understand that there was ‘little prospect’ that ‘in our investigation of nature we shall 
ever be able to arrive at a knowledge of ultimate causes’ and that scientific enquiry is 
limited to the discovery of laws (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 87-8). Herschel 
distinguished between ‘empirical laws’ – those ‘derived by the direct process of 
including in mathematical formulae the results of a greater or less number of 
measurements’ (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 178) and universal laws – those which have 
been verified by a deductive process and examination of how nearly they represent 
the observed facts.  
For the process of measurement and law formulation to work properly it was a 
necessary prerequisite that science is free from prejudices or values and kept separate 
from political speculation. Herschel distinguished between prejudices of sense (e.g. 
optical illusions) and prejudices of opinion. The latter was seen as especially 
damaging to science and Herschel recommended that: 
 
 […] before experience itself can be used with advantage, there is one 
preliminary step to make which depends wholly on ourselves: it is the 
absolute dismissal and clearing the mind of all prejudice, from whatever 
source arising, and the determination to stand and fall by the result of a 
direct appeal to facts in the first instance (Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 80). 
 
 
The exclusion of ‘prejudices of opinion’, however, did not mean that scientists 
could not, or should not speculate or theorise about their findings. Theory formation 
was considered an important step in the formulation of scientific laws that can even 
form a distinct branch within each scientific subject. It is normal, Herschel argued, 
that in those sciences which have achieved ‘a higher degree of consistency and 
generality’ the province of ‘the observer could be separated from that of ‘the theorist’ 
(Herschel, 1851 [1830]: 131). Moreover, using early Victorian geology as an 
example, Herschel emphasised that not only can observation be done separately from 
theorising but that the former can precede the latter – that is, there was nothing 
unscientific in geologists putting their efforts into collecting fossils and other kinds 
of data before they proceed with the formation of geological theories (Herschel, 1851 
[1830]: 131). 
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Last, but not least, it was understood that the application of the scientific 
method as described above was not limited to the realm of the natural world. The 
same principles which were being used to investigate nature could be used to 
investigate the social world: 
 
The successful results of our experiments and reasonings in natural 
philosophy, and the incalculable advantages which experience, 
systematically consulted and dispassionately reasoned on, has conferred in 
matters purely physical, tend of necessity to impress something of the well 
weighted and progressive character of science on the more complicated 
conduct of our social and moral relations. It is thus that legislation and 
politics become gradually regarded as experimental sciences […] (Herschel, 
1851 [1830]: 72-73). 
 
Although he did not use the term ‘social science’ (this term was first 
introduced into English by John Stuart Mill in 1836, cf. Senn, 1958), it is clear from 
Herschel’s statement that the application of the scientific method to social matters 
was not only thought possible, but desirable. Herschel was well acquainted with 
contemporary developments in statistics and probability – in his Preliminary 
Discourse he discussed in detail the advantages of the method of averaging; he wrote 
a detailed review of Quetelet’s work (Herschel, 1850) from which it was clear that 
Herschel was ‘deeply impressed by statistical regularities which indicated the 
possibility of a science of man governing aggregates without constraining individuals’ 
(Porter, 1986: 120).  
Herschel’s personal support for the potential of Quetelet’s statistical method in 
facilitating the scientific investigation of the social world, carried much weight in 
1830s Britain; but this would not be enough in itself to prove that statistics fitted the 
general conception and aspirations of science in this period. It is also necessary to 
examine the way British statisticians themselves thought about their work and about 
science and to check whether the views held more widely in institutions such as the 
SSL corresponded with the views of prominent scientists such as Herschel. If this is 
the case, then we have evidence that the development of statistics was part and parcel 
of the development of modern science and as such holds an important role in the 







The Statistical Work of the SSL and Section F of the BAAS: Between the 
Hammer of Politics and the Anvil of Science  
 
All the characteristics of science that were mentioned above – open and public 
character; basing knowledge on experience; measurement; formulation of laws; 
value freedom; acceptable division of labour between theoreticians and observers; 
application of the scientific method to all areas of human knowledge, including 
knowledge about society – are compatible in principle. However, when in the 1830s 
scientific thinking turned towards the realm of moral or social studies, it became 
clear that maintaining that the scientific method could be successfully applied to the 
social realm while at the same time making sure that social science is value-free, 
presented a significant challenge. Of all the characteristics of science, as it was 
understood in the 1830s, value freedom and freedom from politics was crucial when 
it came to the establishment of social science since, as contemporaries understood it, 
if social science was at all possible, it had to be value-free; otherwise, it would not be 
science. The following section follows the debates on this issue that took place in the 
BAAS and led to establishment of a social science Section in the BAAS with a view 
of showing that while keeping social science free from politics posed a significant 
challenge, hindsight allows us to reconsider our understanding of that challenge and 
see it in a different way from the way contemporaries, and even twentieth-century 
scholars, used to see it. 
The 1830s was a decade of intense political upheavals in Britain. Public 
support for parliamentary reform had never been greater and some major, even 
though not very effective, political reforms were carried through. The 1832 Reform 
Act almost doubled the electorate in England and Wales, extending it to some 
members of the middle classes and enabling nearly 18% of the adult-male population 
of England and Wales to vote. The vast majority of the working classes and women, 
however, were still disenfranchised and the Act brought little change to their lives. 
The Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834 aimed at fundamental changes in the poor 
relief system in Britain. Although the Act attempted to reduce the cost of poor relief 
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and improve the condition of the very poor by building workhouses, it is 
controversial to what extent it succeeded in bringing about positive change in the 
lives of the very poor. There were more than a hundred Royal Commissions 
supervised by Edwin Chadwick in this period (1832-1846). At the same time, 
through public protest and petition, the Chartist movement was fighting for the rights 
of the working classes and against the harsh working and living conditions brought 
about by the industrial revolution (Thackray and Morrell, 1981: 17). The Tory desire 
to preserve ancient privilege and the status quo and the Whig concern for limited 
stabilising change clashed dramatically during this period. Although they did not 
lead to any ‘revolutionary’ changes, parliamentary change had begun, causing 
enormous political tension among the classes. Politics had never been such a 
dividing issue for those who thought that a study of society is not only possible but 
desirable, and the question of how to produce unbiased, value-free knowledge of 
society with a firm basis in scientific facts was becoming ever more prominent.  
The rapid social change and upheaval in the 1830s created a fresh and more 
urgent need for a better, more ‘scientific’ understanding of society: interest in the 
social condition of England among the educated classes grew stronger and an 
institution like the BAAS, which was established at the beginning of the 1830s with 
the idea of bringing about progress in all human knowledge, could not prevent social 
issues being brought before them. But the intense social and political climate also 
posed great challenges to the production of scientific knowledge – the BAAS knew 
that if they set up ‘a social science’ division, they had to put emphasis on ‘science’ 
and that this, before all, meant making sure that ‘social science’ remains value-free 
and separate from politics. Through the work of William Whewell in particular, the 
BAAS had forged a consensus about natural science’s place in culture (Yeo, 1993: 
31); now the challenge was – could the same be done for social science? Could 
BAAS help social science establish a place in British culture from which to enhance 
knowledge about society whilst avoiding the promotion of particular political 
ideologies or doctrines?  
Given how the only existing branch of knowledge at the time that dealt with 
social questions, political economy, had developed to date, the prospects of success 
looked slim. In the 1830s, political economy was very much under the influence of 
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David Ricardo and based its knowledge on deductive methods and speculation; 
empirical evidence was considered occasionally, as, for instance, in Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations (1776) or Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798), but the evidence was neither collected, nor analysed 
systematically. Within the circles of the BAAS, Ricardian political economy was not 
seen as a ‘proper’ science – Whewell and Babbage disagreed with the deductive 
method of Ricardian political economy, which was based on abstract principles about 
human nature, not careful examination of empirical evidence; and Babbage, for 
instance, commented that political economists should be reproached for ‘too small a 
use of facts and too large an employment of theory” (cf. Goldman, 1983: 598). 
Within the circles of the BAAS, the state of political economy exemplified, very 
clearly, not only the dangers of a potential ‘social science’ but also the need to 
reform it. But how? 
The avalanche of printed numbers across Europe provided a novel opportunity 
– could these data be used to study society scientifically? The idea of using statistical 
data to study society was becoming increasingly attractive since it appeared that 
statistical data held the potential of answering two types of question that abstract 
political economy could not answer. Firstly, questions about ‘What is happening 
now?’; and, secondly, questions about ‘How what is happening now is different from 
what was happening in the past, or may be different from what will happen in the 
future?’ The modern industrial, urbanised world was a world of change, in which the 
grand theories of human nature or the theories based on absolute conditions that were 
the foundations of contemporary political economy, were becoming increasingly 
inept on their own. It was thought that statistics could help those interested in a 
scientific study of society go beyond political economy, substitute its methods with 
empirically based methods and thereby grasp social change. 
Some prominent men of science, who were attending the BAAS annual 
meeting in Cambridge in 1833 – Thomas Malthus, Adolphe Quetelet, Richard Jones, 
Charles Babbage, Colonel Sykes and John Elliot Drinkwater – thought that this could 
be done and that statistical data could help them not only establish an inductive 
social science based on empirical evidence but reform political economy into 
inductive economics (cf. Goldman, 1983). The way they envisaged this could be 
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done was to establish a statistical section within the BAAS. According to Babbage’s 
own account, the idea of the necessity of a statistical section in the BAAS came to 
him at a private meeting with Jones and Quetelet. The latter had come specially to 
attend the third meeting of the BAAS ‘with the most valuable budget of statistical 
information’ (Babbage, 1961 [1853]), for which, Babbage reckoned, there was no 
place in any of the Sections. When Babbage and Jones discussed the idea of the 
establishment of a statistical section, they both agreed that ‘unless some unusual 
course were taken, it would be impossible to get such a Section organised until the 
meeting of the following year’ (Babbage, 1969 [1864]: 433). Babbage and Jones 
decided, therefore, that it was necessary to present the establishment of a statistical 
section to the General committee as a fait accompli and attempt to convince them of 
‘the great advantage to the British Association of rendering such a section a 
permanent branch of its institution’ (Babbage, 1969 [1864]: 434).  Section F, as it 
came to be known, was thus established informally in 1833 – only afterwards was it 
approved officially by the BAAS’s general committee. 
The group who agreed to the establishment of Section F were individuals of 
high scientific and social reputation whose prestige and influence played a part in the 
decision of the BAAS to go ahead with the formal establishment of a statistical 
section. However, as Cullen (1975: 77-90) points out, Babbage, Drinkwater, Sykes, 
and Jones were all known to hold Whig political views and were all in one way or 
another involved in politics. At a time when an important characteristic of science 
within the circles of the BAAS was its separation from politics, the involvement in 
politics of Babbage and the men in his circle, would have triggered great suspicion in 
the BAAS regarding their intentions. It is therefore, more reasonable to assume, that 
the BAAS agreed to a Section F due to an increasing general pressure to engage with 
social issues scientifically, and that what Babbage and his circle did was to give the 
final push toward the realisation of this idea. 
The BAAS agreed to establish a Section F on the condition that statisticians 
restrict their work to collection and tabulation of data and do not engage in political 
opinions about data. However, the official statements of the scientists in charge of 
BAAS at the time indicate that there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding the 
difference between the interpretation of statistical facts in terms of more general 
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theoretical principles; and the expression of support for political doctrines on the 
basis of statistical facts. Adam Sedgwick’s presidential address to the BAAS in 1833 
shows this clearly. On the one hand, Sedgwick argued that: 
 
[…] if we transgress our proper boundaries, go into provinces not 
belonging to us, and open a door of communication to the dreary world of 
politics, that instant will the foul Daemon of discord find his way into our 
Eden of philosophy (Sedgwick, 1833 quoted in Cullen, 1975: 79). 
 
On the other hand, he also insisted that facts are of little value unless 
‘combined together so as to lead to some philosophical inference’ (Sedgwick, 1833, 
cited in Thackray and Morrell, 1981: 292). The 1833 report of the BAAS also seems 
to suggest that the formulation of general laws falls within the province of the 
statistical work of Section F, but that statisticians had to restrict themselves to 
studying 
 
those classes of facts relating to communities of men which are capable of 
being expressed by numbers, and which promise, when sufficiently 
multiplied, to indicate general laws (BAAS, 1833 quoted in Thackray and 
Morrell, 1981: 292). 
 
It is uncertain, however, that if the BAAS had spelled out more precisely the 
difference between theory and political bias, this would have prevented social 
statisticians in Section F from getting involved in political issues. The grave fears 
expressed by BAAS in 1833 quickly found justification in the work of the two major 
statistical organisations that came into existence in 1833 and 1834 – the Manchester 
Statistical Society and the Statistical Society of London (SSL). The latter had sprung 
into existence from Section F itself, with the majority of its founding members also 
being involved in Section F. Some of the most significant papers presented in the 
first few years of the Section’s existence, mainly by members of the London and 
Manchester Statistical societies, were politically engaged – prominent examples 
include Cleland’s 1834 paper discussing the operation of the Poor Law; Langton’s 
1835 and 1836 papers attacking the current state of education and Parliamentary 
returns; the 1840 debate between Alison and Chalmers on pauperism (Thackray and 
Morrell, 1981). The limited success of establishing a politics-neutral social science 
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also led to a quick disillusionment with social science among those who, at the 
beginning of the 1830s, were optimistic about the possibility of developing an 
inductive approach for social science and reforming political economy (cf. Goldman, 
1983). In 1837, William Whewell declared that “the statistical section ought never to 
have been admitted into the Association”; and in 1840, with regard to Chalmers’ 
paper on the destitution of the poor in Scotland, Whewell commented that it 
“involved exactly what it was most necessary and most desired to exclude from our 
proceedings” (Whewell quoted in Thackray and Morrell, 1981: 294). It does not 
appear, however, that Whewell provided much evidence to back up his critique of 
Chalmers’ paper and the extent to which Chalmers faithfully represented or deviated 
from his empirical data, indicating that, as he was getting involved in other projects, 
Whewell was perhaps losing his overall enthusiasm for working to improve social 
science. He was not alone – as Goldman (1983) explains, as the 1830s rolled on, 
Section F’s founding members directed their efforts elsewhere (Malthus passed away 
in 1834, Quetelet was in Brussels, Whewell and Jones took up various other 
intellectual activities and by 1839 both Babbage and Jones had left the SSL Council).  
The BAAS, however, could not so easily ignore what was happening in 
Section F and took immediate steps to redress the dangerous situation created by the 
publication of politically charged papers. The representation of the London and 
Manchester Statistical societies in the BAAS General committee was limited to only 
three delegates from each Society; cities of great social destitution, such as Glasgow, 
were to be avoided in the future; and a ‘firm president who understands our objects 
and will not permit his section to deviate from their straight path of numbers’ had to 
be installed in 1841 – Colonel Sykes, known as ‘a strict disciplinarian who 
denounced speculations unsupported by facts’ was perceived as the right man for the 
job (Thackray and Morrell, 1981: 296). Despite the early attempts of the founding 
members of Section F, and of BAAS more generally, to define the boundaries of the 
social science in the Section, as well as in the newly established statistical societies, 
in such a way as to conform with the boundaries of science, they appear to have 
underestimated the challenges they were facing.  
In the following decades, the importance of keeping social science strictly 
separate from politics remained a major preoccupation within the statistical Section F. 
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A decision was made in 1856 to change the name of the Section from ‘Statistics’ to 
‘Economic Science and Statistics’, which may be interpreted as a sign of growing 
confidence among members that political biases can, after all, be overcome in the 
name of an economic science. But presidential addresses in fact indicate that in the 
next few decades, the Section was still struggling to meet its own expectations. 
In 1856, Section F’s president, Lord Stanley, devoted almost his entire address 
to explaining the characteristics, procedures and aims of statistics. Stanley did not 
refer to economic science as, he explained, he had prepared his address prior to the 
meeting at which the decision was made to incorporate economic science into the 
Section. However, even the remarks he made with regard to statistics sounded like 
yet another plea to tread carefully when applying the results of statistical analysis to 
social questions:  
 
[statistics] proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison of 
registered facts […] from these facts alone, properly classified, it seeks to 
deduce general principles […] it rejects all a priori reasoning, employing 
hypothesis, if at all, only in a tentative manner, and subject to future 
verification (Stanley, 1856: 306). 
 
It is important to interpret a statement like this carefully – the idea was that one 
kind of thinking, the a priori abstract reasoning of the early nineteenth-century 
political economy, can be substituted for another one in which all conclusions derive 
from careful observation and are further verified by observation. The idea of testing 
a priori hypothesis was not fully formed yet.  
The dangers of mixing political bias and a priori assumptions within social 
science were the focus in the 1860 presidential address by Nassau Senior, at the 
beginning of which he explained that he had 
 
looked through the papers which since that time [1856] have been 
communicated to us, and I have been struck by the unscientific character of 
many of them. I use that word not dyslogistically, but merely distinctively, 
merely as expressing that the writers have wandered from the domain of 
science into that of art (Senior, 1860: 357). 
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Senior’s address does read a little like a guidance manual, in which he outlines 
as carefully as possible what a political economist is permitted and not permitted to 
do. He sums it all up as follows: 
 
The subject matter of Political Economy is, I repeat, wealth. […] 
Whenever he gives a precept, whenever he advises his reader to do 
anything, or to abstain from doing anything, he wanders from science into 
Art, generally into the art of morality, or the art of government (Senior, 
1860: 359). 
 
In 1864, another presidential address, by William Farr, began again 
emphasising that statistics is a science ‘of the relations of numbers of men’ (Farr, 
1864: 459). But Farr also gave examples of the ways in which, when combined, 
economics and statistics can produce adequate practical as well as scientific results – 
consideration of statistical data, for instance, had pushed countries towards free trade 
by showing that protective tariffs harm the economy; and the consideration of vital 
statistics have helped to improve the health and moral condition of the people (Farr, 
1864: 472).  
However, achievements like the ones discussed by Farr did not put a stop to the 
warnings issued with regard to the unscientific use of statistics. The President for 
1876, George Campbell, began his address by reminding the Section that its object 
was: 
 
to follow as far as may be a strictly scientific method of enquiry, not 
lapsing in the discussion of political details but attempting to ascertain the 
principles on which economics results are founded, and to define the main 
lines of economic truth (Campbell, 1876: 648). 
 
But neither the reported achievements, nor the presidential warnings prevented 
the issue from continuing to escalate and in 1877 a crisis loomed in the circles of 
Section F. The crisis began with deliberations within the BAAS council over whether 
Section F did or did not meet the scientific standards of the Association. Two reports 
were laid in front of the council, one for and one against the abolition of the section, 
by Francis Galton and William Farr, respectively. 
Galton criticised Section F for allowing papers of eclectic and unscientific 
character to be read before the Section. He provided a list of the papers presented 
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between 1873 and 1875, arguing that none of them dealt with the mathematical 
theory of statistics and that very few represented what science, in the strictest sense, 
was meant to be – ‘precise measurement’ and ‘definite laws’ (Galton, 1877a: 471). 
Galton did not analyse the papers he condemned as ‘unscientific’ so it is not 
absolutely clear if his objections were based purely on the subject matter of the 
papers (economic law of strikes, national debt, Indian railways, education, 
drunkenness, sugar trade, domestic service of gentlewomen, the cost and propriety of 
removing to England the Fallen Obelisk of Alexandria) or also on the method of 
investigation employed in the study of these subjects. His verdict, however, on the 
choice of subject matter was a condemnation: ‘few of the subjects treated of, fall 
within the meaning of the word scientific’; moreover, ‘the few of them that do, 
would be wholly insufficient to occupy the time of the Section’ (Galton, 1877a: 471). 
Alongside Galton’s paper, in which he advocated the closing down of the 
Section, the BAAS General Committee received another paper signed by William 
Farr and the two Secretaries of the SSL, who advocated the continuation and 
reformation of the Section. They admitted, as Galton had argued, that:  
 
Many unscientific papers have been brought before Section F and these 
have been reported and discussed to the neglect of really scientific papers 
on other subjects […] Its subjects are also those of practical politics and 
philanthropy, and this brings to the discussion people who are politicians 
and philanthropists but who are not men of science (Farr, 1877: 475). 
 
Unlike Galton, however, they did not think this was a good enough reason to 
close down the section; instead, they suggested that Section F devises and applies 
rigorously most stringent rules to prevent the admission of unscientific papers.  
Both Galton and Farr, therefore, agreed on the nature of the problem, but 
provided different solutions. Section F continued to exist but the clear and present 
danger of political bias continued to cast a long shadow over its work – a few years 
after the crisis was resolved, in 1881, the President, M. E. Grant Duff, insisted that it 
was ‘imperatively necessary’ to ‘refuse a hearing to all who wish to discuss burning 
questions of English politics even although they have a scientific side’ (Duff, 1881: 
659). The strong presence of such concerns displays a sort of an obsession among the 
statisticians and the economists in Section F to solve the problems that could result 
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from allowing political bias to influence statistical analyses; but it also indicates that 
they were aware themselves that progress in this respect was difficult and that they 
had to make continuous efforts to achieve it.  
What do we learn about social statistics from the debates in Section F? And 
what significance do they have for our understanding of the conditions in which 
British sociology later emerged? Our knowledge about the debates in Section F 
derives primarily from three major studies on this topic – Thackray and Morell 
(1981), Cullen (1975) and Goldman (1983) – on which I have partially relied to 
explain the establishment of Section F and the debates about the value-freedom of 
social science more generally and social statistics in particular. These historical 
accounts have a particular focus on the kind of values or political bias that was 
interwoven in the statisticians’ or economists’ science and aim to show that science 
has never been and could never be ‘pure’ or clear from political or any other kind of 
bias that arises from the social conditions in which science is being done. They aim 
to portray science as a social process governed by social factors that affect the 
decisions taken by scientists and their scientific work.  Cullen for instance, shows 
clearly that nearly all of the founding members of Section F held Whig political 
views, which would mean that they could use statistics to further the political aims 
that were associated with the Whig party. The importance of these factors should be 
acknowledged and Thackray and Morell’s and Cullen’s accounts have made a 
valuable contribution in this direction.  
However, such accounts tend to obscure other important elements of the 
historical significance of the work with which Section F was engaged. We need to 
ask ourselves – did the Whig views of Babbage and Whewell make them lesser 
scientists? Did these views interfere with their plans and aspirations to develop the 
scientific method and promote its application in the study of society? Thackray and 
Morell, and Cullen show no evidence that this has been the case. Over a hundred 
years later, we are still making efforts to separate values from facts – but that of 
course does not mean that statistical methodology has not advanced. At the time of 
Section F, just as now, there were people misusing statistics and people who handled 
them fairly and skilfully; and the ability to tell when statistics have been misused has 
constituted a great deal of the methodological advancement over the years. It is 
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important to acknowledge that the fact that Section F discussed values in the first 
place and acknowledged the danger of mixing values and facts is just as important as 
the existence of the danger itself. That the founding members of Section F were 
Whigs did not make them lesser scientists; it would have been unscientific if they did 
not recognise the danger of letting political values influence their judgment. 
Another important point that has been missed by historical accounts focusing 
on the social and political influences on the scientific work of the BAAS is what 
made the debates about value freedom possible in the first place? What led Babbage, 
Whewell, Malthus, Jones and Drinkwater to believe that a reformation of political 
economy into inductive economics was possible in the first place? We have seen that 
for them a social science could only be a science if it steered clear of political issues 
and controversies; but one subtle, but crucial, element that both Babbage and his 
circle, and Thackray and Morell and Cullen in their analyses, ignore is that the 
distinction between facts and values would not have been possible if statistical data 
about social phenomena were not available. Because the scholarship on the 
establishment of Section F has focused on the limited success of the statisticians’ 
attempts to distinguish between value-free and politically charged social science and 
thereby reform political economy, they have ignored the fact that in the 1830s such 
attempts were possible for the first time ever. One could have political economy 
before and after the avalanche of printed numbers; but one could have inductive 
economics only after statistical data had swept Europe. This was clearly grasped by 
Quetelet: 
 
Hitherto, the science of man has been limited to researches, more or less 
complete, respecting some of its laws, to results deduced from single or 
insulated observations, and to theories often based on mere glimpses […] 
(Quetelet, 1842 [1835]: 5). 
 
It was only in the early nineteenth century that this situation could be 
overcome; that another way of studying social questions became possible. As 
William Farr remarked in 1864, ‘it is only in civilised communities and in recent 
times, that it [statistics] finds adequate materials’ (Farr, 1864: 459). Before the 
avalanche, there were only ‘values’; after it, there were both ‘facts’ and ‘values’. 
What this meant was that, regardless of how successful Section F or the SSL were in 
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keeping values and facts separate, they were now able to produce genuinely new 
knowledge about the social world that was not possible before. We can see this now 
only in hindsight but, in cases like these, hindsight proves extremely valuable as it 
allows us to get a glimpse of the big changes that even the scientists of the day failed 
to fully recognise. It is this, rather than the awkward attempts of Section F to 
establish a value-free social science, that allows us to see why the rise of statistics is 







The Legacy of the Statistical Society of London – Aliis Exterendum and 
Nothing Else? 
 
As I explained above, in order to understand the impact of science on the 
development of the study of society, it is necessary to modify previous historical 
accounts by putting the work of Section F in the context of just what statistics had 
made possible – the arrival of facts changed knowledge of the social world in a long-
term and fundamental way that no political doctrine alone could ever have done.  
However, while Thackray and Morell, and Cullen emphasise the social and 
political context in which the work of the BAAS took place, scholars like Abrams 
(1968) have held the ‘focus on facts’ and the ‘absence of theory’ in the work of the 
Statistical Society of London as having been responsible for frustrating the 
development of sociology. But it is important to consider carefully whether Abrams’ 
focus on the SSL’s collection of statistical data did not prevent him from seeing 
some other important details of the SSL’s work (just as Thackray and Morell’s and 
Cullen’s focus on the particular political biases of the Section F members prevented 
them from seeing how novel the opportunities available to Section F actually were). 
In the following section, I examine the major developments in the SSL in the light of 
the nineteenth century idea of science, aiming to show that the SSL’s attempts to 
produce value-free work did not necessarily mean that they did not recognise the 
importance of theory in their work. 
The Statistical Society of London was established in March 1834, less than a 
year after Section F. According to Charles Babbage’s account: 
 
The interest of our discussion, and the mass of materials which now began 
to open upon our view, naturally indicated the necessity of forming a more 
permanent society for their collection. The British Association approved of 
the appointment of a permanent committee of this section. I was requested 
to act as a Chairman, and Mr. Drinkwater as secretary. On the 15th March, 
1834, at a public meeting held in London, the Marquis of Lansdowne in the 
Chair, it was resolved to establish the Statistical Society of London 
(Babbage, 1961 [1864]: 434). 
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The members of the newly established society and those of Section F were 
nearly identical (for a detailed list, cf. Rosenbaum, 1984). And, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Society was facing problems which were similar to the problems 
that Section F faced, particularly with regard to its position on science (facts) and 
politics (values): the problem was how to produce politically unbiased scientific 
work which was nonetheless socially relevant? The strategy that the Society 
employed to cope with this difficulty has attracted a lot of attention and is the most 
widely discussed issue from the Society’s early years (Abrams, 1968; Cullen, 1975; 
Hilts, 1978; Unknown Author, 1838). A full account of the events surrounding the 
decisions of the Society during the 1830s is available in these sources, particularly 
Hilts (1978), and it is not necessary to go into detail here. But a brief outline is 
necessary in order to make a couple of important points about the work of the 
Society with the aim of showing that Abrams’ 1968 account, which has been the 
most influential account in sociological audiences, requires modification. 
When the Society was established, it had to consider the condition under which 
Section F was accepted into the BAAS – that the Section will restrict its work to 
numerical facts and provide ‘the raw material for political economy’ (Sedgwick 
quoted in Hilts, 1978: 34) and avoid engaging in political issues. Although such 
restrictions were hardly compatible with the views of the Society’s members, many 
of whom were political economists, politicians and social reformers (Hilts, 1978: 36), 
the Society had to design some strategy that would help them monitor the work of its 
members and also convince the public that the work they were doing was not a 
product of political bias, but had a strong foundation in the ‘facts’.  
The strategy which was expressed clearly in the 1834 prospectus of the Society 
was that the Society ‘will consider it to be the first and most essential rule of its 
conduct to exclude carefully all Opinions from its transactions and publications’ and 
‘to confine its attention rigorously to facts’ (Statistical Society of London, 1834 
quoted in Bonar and Macrosty, 1934: 22). Later on, it was made clear how this 
would square with the fact that most of the Society’s members were political 
economists: 
 
The Science of Statistics differs from Political Economy, because although 
it has the same end in view, it does not discuss causes, nor reason about 
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probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange and compare, that class of 
facts which alone can form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to 
social and political government (Statistical Society of London, 1838: 1). 
 
This strategy was exemplified under the name of aliis exterendum, meaning ‘to 
be threshed out by others’, which was the motto of the Society in the period between 
1838, when the Journal of the Statistical Society of London was founded and 1856, 
when the motto was officially removed. 
It is this strategy, together with the closer affiliation of the members of the 
Society with the British government, that, according to Abrams, had a crucial role to 
play in perpetuating, what was for him, an essentially un-sociological tradition of 
enquiry – the SSL restricted itself to the collection and tabulation of statistical data 
and abstained from speculation. Since it grew to become the most influential civil 
society institution devoted to the study of society in nineteenth-century Britain, it 
suppressed any opportunity for other, more theoretical approaches, to develop. 
One important aspect that Abrams neglects but which is clearly recognised by 
Hilts is that, for all its shortcomings, the strategy of aliis exterendum ‘had its 
adaptive value’ by helping the Society meet the needs of the time: to deflect the 
accusation that its work was excessively political and to assert ‘objectivity worthy of 
science’ (Hilts, 1978: 43). 
But Abrams’ account not only fails to understand aliis exterendum as a strategy 
and in the context of the times, it also fails to grasp the Society’s own understanding 
of their work more generally. A closer look at the Society’s annual reports from 1838 
onwards suggest that it would not be correct to describe the Society’s work as a-
theoretical just because the Society had employed as its official strategy aliis 
exterendum.  
The 1836-7 annual report of the council expressed its growing concerns that 
‘the exclusion of all speculative matter from the enquiries of the Society deters many 
persons from offering their personal assistance’ (Bonar and Macrosty, 1934: 39). The 
Society was slowly beginning to realise that if the majority of the statisticians were 
also working within other fields, such as political economy, it would be hard, if not 
impossible, for them to totally separate their statistical work from their substantive 
work. An anonymous hostile critique published in 1838 in the London and 
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Westminster Review forced the Society to reconsider its position – the anonymous 
author argued that aliis exterendum prevents the Society from discovering new truths, 
deprives their labours from ‘definite purposes’ and turns their work into 
‘charlatanerie’ which would be ‘a mockery and a lie’ to ‘all the ends of science and 
usefulness’ (Unknown Author, 1838: 50, 68). The critique pointed to ‘the 
impossibility of adhering to the rule – of adhering to it and advancing statistical 
knowledge at the same time’, because statistical facts and tables would be useless 
unless they help in supporting or proving something (Unknown Author, 1838: 68). 
Thus already in 1838, that is four years after it was established, the Society was 
making a clear distinction between opinions or speculation and theory deduced from 
empirical data: 
 
Like other sciences, Statistics seeks to deduce from well-established facts 
certain general principles which interest and affect mankind; it uses the 
same principles of comparison, calculation and deduction: but its 
peculiarity is that it proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison 
of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation […] It is not, 
however, true that the Statist rejects all deductions, or that Statistics 
consists merely of columns of figures; it is simply required that all 
conclusions shall be drawn from well-attested data, and shall admit of 
mathematical demonstration (Statistical Society of London, 1838: 3). 
 
It remains unclear whether the distinction between opinions and theory was 
something that the Society implicitly had in mind in its earlier publications; what we 
do know is that from 1838 onwards, the Society was quite clear about this distinction 
and, as I show below, continued to make the case for it in many of its annual reports. 
Also, there are noticeable similarities between the Society’s understanding of 
the limits and procedures of their own work and the contemporary understanding of 
limits of science – namely, that scientific thinking proceeds first with the collection 
of empirical evidence and then engages with deduction from that evidence, not vice 
versa. But the deductions on the basis of ‘mathematical demonstration’ for which the 
Society allowed (nowadays better known as statistical modelling) were possible at 
the very basic level at this stage – we can now recognise the origins of statistical 
modelling in Quetelet’s Treatise (1842, [1835]), but the mathematical procedures 
that enabled statisticians to model social phenomena on the basis of statistical data 
did not develop till much later. For Hilts, the fact that the Society allowed for 
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deductions on the basis of ‘mathematical demonstration’ did not make much 
difference because of the limited mathematical development of statistics at the time – 
with this allowance or without it, ‘everything of a theoretical nature’ was ‘excluded’ 
from the work of the society (Hilts, 1978: 37). However, this interpretation is rather 
extreme – the average of a characteristic of a population is still an example of 
statistical modelling, albeit a most basic one; comparing averages can still tell 
statisticians more about social change than if they did not have access to this 
information (and, we should remember, gaining access to this information was an 
extremely time consuming and laborious process). Adhering to strictly scientific 
procedures may have posed certain limits to what the statisticians could do in the 
1830s, but it enabled them to achieve unquestionable progress in the long run when 
the mathematical procedures for inferential statistics were developed. 
In the 1840s and 1850s, the Society continued to make explicit its position 
towards using theory as opposed to opinions. Examples from the annual reports and 
minutes of the Society show how lucid their understanding of theory was and how 
close it came to our modern understanding of the role of theory in scientific 
investigations:  
 
Such was not the duty assigned to this society by its founders; - it was not 
to perfect the mere art of “tabulating” that it was embodied; - it was not to 
make us hewers and drawers to those engaged on any edifice of physical 
science; - but it was that we should ourselves be the architects of a science 
of sciences […] the first prospectus of the Society announced its intention 
carefully to exclude all “opinions” from its publications; not assuredly with 
the view of discouraging the proper use of a priori reasoning or of 
hypothesis […] but for the purpose of devoting its publications to facts, not 
systems (Statistical Society of London, 1840: 1-6). 
 
[…] the Council feel themselves called upon to congratulate its Fellows 
upon […] the augmented estimation in which they [statistics] are held as 
tests to and checks upon hypothetical reasoning in the moral and political 
sciences. […] Errors as to the facts which illustrate the actual condition and 
prospects of society are thus daily exploded and more just data are supplied 
for the exertions of the philanthropist, the judgments of the legislator and 
the speculations of the reasoner. The latter is compelled to amend his 
conjectures as often as they are irreconcilable with facts newly established 
by scientific observation (Statistical Society of London, 1843: 89). 
 
[…] a Society like ours which admits not merely tables but a discussion of 
those tables […] We may proceed like mere children, accumulating 
pebbles on the sea shore and heaping them into one useless mass, or we 
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may accumulate facts under the guidance of sound principles and make our 
accumulations more like the collections of the mineralogist or geologist 
putting together the various fragments he collects, but putting them 
together in order – collected with a view to an ultimate purpose.  
(Statistical Society of London, 1851: 101-4). 
 
It is always important to keep in mind that the perusal of such (statistical) 
tables in only one element towards acquaintance with the subject…. A 
person knowing nothing more than the table, would be, in fact, constantly 
drawing false conclusions […] (Lord Harrowby, 1851 quoted in Bonar and 
Macrosty 1934: 81). 
 
These examples show that whereas opinions were supposed to be excluded 
from the work of the society, theory was not. They also show that, long before the 
aliis exterendum motto was dropped in 1856, the thinking within the Society had 
developed in a different direction. Theory was conceived not as a grand system of 
speculative principles but as something to be checked by statistical information 
gathered systematically. Put in the context of the nineteenth-century understanding 
of modern science, the statisticians were advancing the scientific understanding of 
society to a considerable degree, and, more importantly, much more successfully 
than any other contemporary social science project based solely on abstract theory, 
such as Comte’s ‘sociology’ (see below). To accuse the Society of a shallow and 
naïve empiricism is to misconstrue their desire to put social science on a solid 
scientific basis in line with the standards of the time, to overlook their ambitious 
methodological rigour and to demean the practical contribution of their enquiries.  
These examples also indicate the overall significance of the aliis exterendum 
debate – it prompted the statisticians to reconsider their own position, but also to 
better define the role of the statistician in society. It also helped reinforce the view 
that arguments that have no empirical basis cannot be accepted as valid for the 
purpose of science. It is easy for us to criticise the early work of the Society because 
we have come to embrace this view in many areas of study and in our everyday lives 
– but back in the 1830s this understanding was still an innovation, which, however, 
was gradually becoming common practice due, at least in part, to the Society’s 
ambition and efforts.  
One clear example of just how beneficial the aliis exterendum debate was for 
making the statisticians and their audience think about, and re-think, their 
understanding of the use of empirical evidence comes from the 1838 anonymous 
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critique that I quoted earlier. The critique takes as an example an article by G. R. 
Porter in which he attempts to argue that people who can read and write are less 
likely to commit crimes. The unknown author proceeds to challenge Mr Porter on the 
following grounds: 
 
The argument of Mr Porter is, that […] the uninstructed in reading and 
writing containing the most criminals – the best instructed, the fewest; 
therefore the reading and writing are the causes of the inferior number of 
crimes and criminals […] His object is to prove that one is the cause of the 
other; he assumes that he does so when he shows that they co-exist in the 
same classes […] But there are many causes of a moral nature which 
adequately account for fewer crimes being among those who can read and 
write well than among those who cannot. The classes best instructed in 
reading and writing are also best instructed in morals […] (Unknown 
Author, 1838: 67). 
 
This critique contains one of the earliest examples of applying the idea that 
correlation is not causation, to the study of social problems. To this day, this idea is 
one of the pillars of statistical thinking and essential for the construction of statistical 
models. The invention of the techniques through which one can measure correlation 
and the impact of one social phenomenon upon another came much later with the 
work of Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. However, this example shows very clearly 
that the lack of mathematical techniques does not necessarily mean lack of deep 
understanding of how statistical, and social, analysis should proceed. And this is 
where the long-term significance of the debates surrounding aliis exterendum lies – 
by bringing to the fore the consideration of the role of theory in empirical statistical 
enquiries, the debate encouraged the statisticians and their audience to think more 
deeply about their work, and what would bring it closer still to the way science was 
conducted at the time.  
As I pointed out earlier, an important part of the contemporary idea of science 
was the belief that it should have a popular side to its character – reaching out to 
ordinary people and establishing scientific networks of which the BAAS itself was a 
prime example. The statistical movement took a similar shape – although I have 
focused on the SSL as the major and longest surviving institution, in the 1830s-1850s 
numerous statistical institutions were established across Britain, including the 
statistical department of the Board of Trade (1832), the General Register Office 
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(1836/7), the Manchester Statistical Society (1833) as well as numerous other 
provincial statistical societies in Glasgow, Bristol, Belfast, Newcastle and elsewhere 
(for a full record and more details, see Cullen, 1975). Many of them were short-lived 
but they were representative of a new way of thinking about how science should be 
done. 
Adolphe Quetelet’s lifetime projects are an even clearer representation of a 
shift in the understanding of science, and social science, as a team-effort (rather than 
the work of lone individuals). Throughout his life, Quetelet worked incessantly to 
establish statistical organisations across Europe and hosted the first General 
(International) Statistical Congress. ‘As much as social physics was influenced by 
ideas of probability and progress’, Quetelet’s latest biographer argues, ‘it was 
grounded in new forms of collaborative and professional data collection that marked 
a break with the Enlightenment understanding of scientific research’ (Donnelly, 
2015: 111).  
Neither aliis exterendum, nor the work of the Society, was ever all about facts 
and nothing else, as Abrams argued; it was about improving the scientific 
understanding of society to garner better facts that could then be used to find better 
solutions to difficult problems. The novelty of the Society’s work and the novelty of 
the debates inspired by that work is easily missed by focusing on isolated statements 
that the Society made (Abrams), instead of looking at what these statements meant, 
both in the short and long term. The long-term contribution of both Section F and the 
early work of the SSL is that they both worked in unique circumstances that 
produced unique debates, which were not possible before. Moreover, the lessons 
learnt from these debates have since become the foundation of our modern, 
empirically based study of society.  Just one example of that is Quetelet himself: 
 
Like Quetelet, we believe that explicating the principles of social order is 
the precondition for effecting rational social change. Like Quetelet, we also 
assume that the foundation for comprehensive knowledge is the ordered 
collection of data. But again like Quetelet, we believe that the order in 
question is external to the observer, both in the usual sense of not being his 
creation and in the more restricted sense of its apprehension being beyond 
the reach of purely empirical investigation. Our crucial premise, and 
Quetelet’s, is that the discovery of order, but not its fabrication, requires 
the use of analytic processes based in mathematics (Buck, 1981: 21-22). 
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It may be true, as Goldman (2002: 243) argued, that all social science projects 
that emerged in the early nineteenth century – Comtean positivism, socialism, 
Marxism, collectivism, laissez faire liberalism and statistics – thought they were 
scientific; but it is only of the statistical movement that we can say that it came close 
to being scientific in practice, as far as this was possible in the conditions in which 
they worked and according to the contemporary understanding of science; it was 
only statistics that could distinguish between facts and values, because the avalanche 
of printed numbers had made this possible; it was only statistics that proceeded first 
with active collection of empirical evidence and then followed, as best as they could, 
the principle of basing their enquiries and arguments upon empirical evidence; it was 
only statistics that accepted the scientific understanding of the role of theory in an 
empirical enquiry; and it was only statistics that embraced and helped to further the 
understanding of science as a public and shared activity across countries and across 
individual subjects. 
Once the early work of Section F and SSL is put into the context of the 
contemporary understanding of science and also the contemporary social and 
political context, it becomes clear that what they were doing was neither unusual for 
their times nor inadequate as Abrams argues. Understanding the early developments 
in social statistics in Britain contextually and with reference to the contemporary 
understanding of science also helps to put up a convincing case of why the ‘absent 
synthesis’ of statistics and ‘sociology’ matters. Goldthorpe’s analysis of the factors 
which contributed to an ‘absent synthesis’, to which I referred at the beginning of 
this section, has been very useful in enhancing our understanding of the interaction 
between statistics and ‘sociology’ in the nineteenth century; but it is only now that 
we are in the position to understand why this ‘absent synthesis’ should form a crucial 








The Role of Auguste Comte’s ‘Sociology’ in the History of British 
Sociology 
 
It is easier to recognise the significance of the contributions of Section F and 
the SSL in hindsight but at the time there were other ideas within social science 
movements which were influential and which did not recognise the work of the 
statistical movement as social science. Of the other movements that existed at the 
time (examples include Marxism, socialism, laissez faire liberalism) there was one 
philosophy whose ideas and orientation towards statistics was going to play an 
important role in the future development of academic sociology in Britain: the social 
philosophy of Auguste Comte, or Comtean positivism. Auguste Comte is well 
known as ‘the father of sociology’ – he was the first to introduce the term ‘social 
physics’ (1911 [1822]) and also ‘sociology’ (1839). His sociology was later to 
become the core philosophy of Britain’s first Sociological Society. But there are 
other important reasons why Comte’s philosophy and its reception in Britain are 
significant in the history of British sociology. 
 
 
Comte’s Positive Philosophy and his Idea of Sociology 
 
Auguste Comte first introduced the term ‘social physics’ in an essay in 1822 
but it was only in his Course of Positive Philosophy (1830-1842) that his ideas about 
a new social science were developed in great detail. At the centre of Comte’s 
philosophy was the idea that all sciences progress from a theological stage (during 
which scientific knowledge is based on the understanding that the universe is 
governed by the direct will of supreme beings, or gods) to a metaphysical stage (in 
which it is no longer gods that direct phenomena, but forces and powers) until 
eventually they reach a positive stage. The positive stage is ‘distinguished from the 
ancient […] by nothing so much as its rejection of all inquiring into causes, first and 
final’ and in which research is confined to the invariable relations which constitute 
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natural laws (Comte, 1875: 511). In his Course, Comte proposed that social physics, 
or sociology as he eventually called it5, will be the last positive science to emerge: at 
the time he was writing, social science was still in a ‘theologico-metaphysical 
infancy’ (Comte, 1875: 68) but, Comte believed, his work would help others ‘to 
recognise the character of positivity in social as in all other science, and to ascertain 
the chief bases on which it is founded’ (Comte, 1875: 2). The purpose of sociology 
was to extend the application of the ‘positive principle’ to the study of social 
phenomena and thereby help ‘to discover the natural laws of a final order of 
phenomena, remarkable in the extreme and never before examined in this way’ 
(Comte, 1875: 51). Sociology was to supersede previous and more rudimentary 
attempts to develop social science, such as in the work of Montesquieu or Condorcet, 
who did not make much contribution beyond recognising the possible existence of 
invariable laws in the social world.  
Sociology would also help unify all existing attempts to study society, as, 
Comte argued, ‘there can be no scientific study of society […] if it is separated into 
portions, and its divisions are studied apart’ (Comte, 1875: 81). He repudiated the 
attempts of political economy to study political and economic phenomena in 
isolation from all other social phenomena; because of its narrow focus, political 
economy was of ‘a merely metaphysical character, dressed up with special forms and 
a list of scientific terms’ (Comte, 1875: 61). 
But the utility of sociology went beyond the study of the social realm – in 
Comte’s analysis, sciences are classified according to the degree of complexity of the 
phenomena they study. In this classification, the first science to reach a positive state 
was mathematics, then astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and finally, sociology. 
As each science depends on the discoveries made in the science preceding it, 
sociology has the important task of: 
 
[…] completing the whole body of philosophy, and showing that the 
various sciences are branches from a single trunk; and thereby giving a 
                                               
5 Comte introduced the term ‘sociology’ to replace ‘social physics’ when he found out that Adolphe 
Quetelet used social physics to describe his own work for which Comte had little appreciation: “I 
must above all signal the abuse with regard to the first term [social physics], which was adopted by a 
savant belge in recent years as a title of a work with is about nothing more than simple statistics” 
(Comte, 1839 quoted in Donnelly, 2015: 203). 
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character of unity to the variety of special studies that are now scattered 
abroad in a fatal dispersion (Comte, 1875: 121-2). 
 
Since sociology examines the most complex phenomena of all, it is not only 
the last science to emerge but also the only science that will have a complete 
scientific grasp of the laws governing all phenomena, while the knowledge of 
mathematicians would be of the most limited type: 
 
If, then, scientific men should stand forward to represent the positive 
attainments made in their respective sciences, the sociologists would be the 
only ones who could be regarded as having a complete knowledge of the 
positive method, while the geometers would have a more imperfect 
conception of it than any others, precisely because they know it only in its 
rudimentary state, while the sociologists alone would have carried it out 
completely (Comte, 1875: 500). 
 
An important part of Comte’s discussion of sociology was his views on the 
logic of enquiry appropriate to sociology. According to Comte, the deductive 
approach on its own was not sufficient to produce positive sociological knowledge; 
the inductive approach was also necessary. But, as John Stuart Mill pointed out in his 
review of Comte, while previous scientific thinkers, such as Jeremy Bentham, 
regarded it as proper to first deduce positive sociological laws from the laws of 
human nature and then use induction to verify these sociological laws, Comte argued 
for the reverse approach: ‘in sociology, it is specific experience which suggests the 
laws, and deduction which verifies them’ (Mill, 1866 [1865]: 85). Consequently, 
Comte argued, ‘no real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible, except in 
as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by some theory’; and also that ‘all 
isolated empirical observation is idle, and even radically uncertain’ and that ‘science 
can use only those observations which are connected, at least hypothetically, with 
some law’ (Comte, 1875: 97). For Comte, therefore, although observation was a 
necessary element of sociological enquiries, it played a secondary role in social 
science, ‘subordinate’ to that of the ‘statical and dynamical laws of phenomena’, i.e. 
the laws that determine social evolution (Comte, 1875: 99). 
Comte does not specify what the precise objects of sociological observation 
should be; but from his discussion on the proper method for sociology it is 
understood that observation, and then the verification of that observation through 
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deductive laws, are going to be applied to the history of humankind. In Comte’s view, 
prior to sociology, history had ‘the character of annals’ and as a result had not 
attempted ‘the discovery of those laws which regulate the social development of the 
human race’ (Comte, 1911 [1822]: 214). This would be the methodological task of 
sociology: to perfect the historical comparison between societies and between 
different historical ages in the development of humankind. Comte argued that 
because the method of historical comparison ‘must prevail in all studies of which the 
living organism is the subject’ and do so ‘in proportion to the rank of the organism’; 
and because sociology’s object is the most complex organism of all – the social 
organism – the method of historical comparison should be regarded as the ‘chief 
scientific device’ of sociology (Comte, 1875: 101, 105). 
 
 
Differences between Comte’s Idea of Sociology and the Statisticians’ Idea of 
Social Science 
 
This brief overview already suggests that there were major differences and 
incompatibilities between Comte’s idea of sociology and the social science project of 
the social statisticians in Section F and in the SSL. Both Comte and the statisticians 
insisted upon a close relationship between natural science and social science. 
However, while Comte argued that sociology was the natural result of the laws 
governing the intellectual development of humankind which was manifested in the 
transition of science from a theological to a metaphysical to a positive stage, the 
statisticians argued that their social science was a product of their age, of the 
particular social conditions that emerged as a result of the industrial revolution that 
had prompted the gathering en masse of statistical data. The Comtean idea of 
sociology was not a response to a particular set of social problems; in contrast, 
statistics in nineteenth-century Britain developed as a direct response to social 
problems. This would have profound consequences for the self-identity of 
sociologists, as opposed to statisticians, throughout the twentieth century – while the 
former would regard themselves as holders of a unique intellectual power to reveal 
the general principles that govern, or condition human society, the latter would see 
 91 
themselves as helping to illuminate the interaction between social phenomena 
responsible for social change. 
There were further, more specific, differences between Comte’s idea of 
sociology and the statisticians’ idea of social science. As I explained above, Comte 
did not exclude the element of observation from sociology’s methodology; however, 
for him, observation meant primarily the observation of social evolution through 
historical sources for the purpose of comparison and, as such, it played a subordinate 
role to that of the deduction of sociological laws from the laws of human nature, in 
which the ultimate verification of any observation should lie. Comte repudiated: 
 
the practice of reducing science to an accumulation of desultory facts, 
asserting that science, as distinguished from learning, is essentially 
composed, not of facts, but of laws […] (Comte, 1875: 511). 
 
This view is in striking contrast to the view of the statisticians, who, together 
with Herschel and Whewell and other eminent scientists, argued that social enquiry 
proceeds first with the collection of empirical evidence about social phenomena and 
that laws about society are then deducted from these data, rather than from some 
abstract principles of human nature. For the statisticians, empirical evidence was 
prime; it was empirical evidence, not abstract deduction which eventually 
determined the veracity of any hypothesis. For the statisticians, the collection of 
statistical data was a welcome and extremely powerful and potent innovation; for 
Comte ‘the deepest want of modern society is, in its nature, eminently theoretical’ 
(Comte, 1875: 51) and statistical data collection was a grand and vain delusion: 
 
No examination of facts can explain our existent state to us, if we have not 
ascertained, by historical study, the value of the elements at work; and thus 
it is in vain that statesmen insist on the necessity of political observation, 
while they look no further than the present, or a very recent past (Comte, 
1875: 108). 
 
The differences between Comte’s idea of sociology and statisticians’ idea of 
social science boil down to a difference in their understanding of social change – 
while Comte understood social change as a grand historical phenomenon resulting 
from the evolutionary development of humankind, statisticians understood change 
 92 
statistically, as a result of the co-variation of social factors and changes in the mode 
of individual interactions between people: while the former could only be studied 
with reference to history, the latter could only be studied on the basis of large 
amounts of statistical data and, later, through statistical inference. 
But these two social science projects were not merely different or incompatible 
– for Comte, what statistics had to contribute to sociology was irrelevant; and for the 
statisticians, what sociology had to say about social evolution was also irrelevant. 
They were competing not only on two different grounds – they were competing on 
two parallel, but separate grounds. And, most importantly, each could ignore the 
other without consequences for its own credibility and development. The positions 
that Comte’s sociology and the statistics of Section F and the SSL took with regard 
to one another in the nineteenth century set a powerful precedent for generations of 
sociologists and statisticians to come. 
 
 
Comte’s Views on Statistics  
 
The fact that Comte’s idea of sociology and the idea of social science 
developed by the statisticians in Section F and the SSL were seen as irrelevant to one 
another, does not mean that there was not a sense of hostility between them. What is 
more remarkable and significant, however, is that even this sense of hostility failed 
to engage the proponents of each idea in a dialogue. The following examination of 
Comte’s views on statistics, as well as the reception of Comte’s sociology in Britain 
provides some kind of explanation as to why this proved to be the case. 
Comte was critical of any attempts to analyse social phenomena on the basis of 
principles which used mathematics. In the same 1822 essay in which he introduced 
the term ‘social physics’, he also discussed in detail his views on previous attempts 
to establish a social science, especially those which included a mathematical 
approach. One such approach, was the social mathematics branch of Marquis de 
Condorcet’s plan for a social science. Although Comte admired Condorcet (he saw 
his own work as a continuation of Condorcet’s ‘moral-science-as-history’ (to use 
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Hacking’s (1990: 35) phrase)), he was adamantly opposed to Condorcet’s idea that 
the calculus of probabilities can be of any use in sociology: 
 
[…] the application of Mathematical Analysis is in no degree necessary to 
render Politics a positive science […] such a mode of regarding Social 
Science is purely chimerical and, consequently, altogether erroneous 
(Comte, 1911 [1822]: 193). 
 
Moreover, in Comte’s view, the useful application of mathematical analysis in 
sociology was ‘impossible’ because one of the ‘leading characteristics of the 
phenomena peculiar to Organised bodies’, such as society, was their ‘extreme 
variability’; this extreme variability ‘excludes all hope of ever submitting them to 
real calculations, such as for example, as those relating to astronomical phenomena’ 
(Comte, 1911 [1822]: 194). Comte explained further that it would only be possible to 
apply mathematical analysis in sociology when ‘everything really interesting would 
have been discovered’, in which case the application of mathematics would be totally 
unnecessary and ‘would no longer have any real importance’ (Comte, 1911 [1822]: 
198). 
Comte’s discussion preceded Quetelet’s treatise (1835) by more than a decade. 
Quetelet had invented the concept of the ‘average man’ and had elaborately 
demonstrated how mathematical analysis can be successfully utilised not only in the 
empirical study of society but also in the discovery of general laws about society. So 
in that sense, it could be argued that Comte was simply unaware of what was 
possible when he was writing in 1822. His later writings, however, show no change 
of position towards the application of mathematics or statistics in sociology; if 
anything, his hostility increased. In the Course he mocked the attempts of ‘some 
geometers to render social investigations positive by subjecting them to a fanciful 
mathematical theory of chances’ as a mere ‘pretension’ (Comte, 1875: 120-1) and 
‘an extravagance which is wholly incompatible with the true positivity’ (Comte, 
1875: 501). In Comte’s views, the theory of probability, in the Laplacian subjective 
sense in which Quetelet understood it, was an ‘absurd doctrine’ that ‘has undergone 
no improvement, except in some matters of abstract calculation which it has given 
rise to; in fact it was ‘impossible to conceive of a more irrational conception’ (Comte, 
1875: 120-121). And last but not least, all those social scientists and mathematicians 
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who advocated the use of mathematical and probabilistic analysis in social science 
were characterised by a ‘disgraceful ignorance’ for not admitting that the 
‘comparative method proper to biology, and the historical method proper to 
sociology, are the two greatest of logical creations’ (Comte, 1875: 501) achieved in 
science. 
Therefore, Comte’s sociology as a positive social science did not involve the 
incorporation of statistics or the theory of probability. But what matters more than 
Comte’s own views on mathematics, statistics and probability is their legacy – by 
proposing a system in which statistics was regarded as irrelevant and useless in the 
production of valid knowledge of society, Comte created a strong obstacle that could 
influence the thinking of British scholars regardless of the state of the development 
of statistics and probability. Just as Comte could ignore the advances made by 
Quetelet, later followers of Comte in Britain could ignore the later advances in 
mathematical statistics, no matter the opportunities they provided. In his argument, 
Comte did not cite any concrete examples, nor make direct reference to studies that 
utilised a mathematical approach of some kind, his objections remained largely 
abstract in nature but what matters is that in the long term he provided an argument 
and an excuse for social thinkers to ignore or dismiss mathematics or statistics while 
at the same time claim authority over social scientific knowledge.  
 
 
The Reception of Comte’s Views in Britain in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Comte’s sociology cannot be said to have been so widely adopted in Britain as 
to create a more or less united generation of thinkers; nonetheless, Comte’s work 
‘was scarcely mentioned in French literature, when it was already working 
powerfully on the minds of many British students and thinkers (Mill, 1866 [1865]: 2). 
The reception of Comte’s sociology in Britain was mixed: scholars like David 
Brewster (1838), J. S. Mill (1866 [1865]), J. K. Ingram (1878), Frederic Harrison 
became well-known supporters; while others, such as William Whewell (1866), W. S. 
Jevons (1875), Henry Sidgwick (1885), T. H. Huxley (1869a, 1869b) were strong 
opponents. Others, like Herbert Spencer produced ‘sociological’ work which could 
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be viewed as following in the footsteps of Comtean reasoning; but Spencer was very 
clear that he conceived of himself as being a ‘dissenter’ of Comte because of 
differences in their views regarding the classification and development of science (cf. 
Spencer, 1864).   
One of the first influential accounts of Comte’s work in Britain was written by 
J. S. Mill in 1865. In his Auguste Comte and Positivism, Mill was generally 
appreciative of Comte’s work – he did not challenge Comte’s laws of three stages in 
the development of science, nor did he question Comte’s classification of the 
sciences. The issue about which he was most critical, was Comte’s argument about 
the logic underlying the method appropriate to sociology. While Comte insisted that 
sociologists should proceed first with historical observation which would only 
afterwards be verified by appealing to abstract general laws deduced from what we 
know about human nature, Mill was of the opinion that social science ‘is an abstract 
science and its appropriate method is the a priori method’ (Mill, 1877: 143-4). 
According to Mill, social scientific knowledge could not possibly proceed ‘while we 
look at facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has 
surrounded them’; any attempts to ‘elicit a general law by a process of induction 
from a comparison of details’ would be ‘altogether inefficacious […] as a means of 
arriving at any considerable body of valuable truth’ (Mill, 1877: 148-9, 146). Despite 
these differences, like Comte, Mill expressed his strong reservations about the 
possibility of utilising the mathematical theory of probability in the study of social 
science: ‘It would indeed require strong evidence’, Mill argued, ‘to persuade any 
rational person that by a system of operation upon numbers, our ignorance can be 
coined into science’ (Mill, 1973-4 [1843]: 1142- Appendix F). He found the calculus 
of probabilities was based on profound misconceptions, which to some extent 
justified the extreme views of such ‘a profound thinker, M. Comte’ (Mill, 1973-4 
[1843]: 1142- Appendix F). For Mill, improving one’s observation was a much 
sounder strategy than relying on the theory of probability to compensate for one’s 
ignorance or insufficient observation (Mill, 1973-4 [1843], Book III, Chapter 18, par. 
3). Therefore, although Mill and Comte differed in their views about the proper logic 
of enquiry in social science, their strategies had one important thing in common:  
both Mill and Comte regarded the work in which the social statisticians were 
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engaged, which proceeded from the collection of empirical data to the formulation of 
statistical laws and which was closely associated with the calculus of probability, (cf. 
Quetelet 1849 [1845]) as inappropriate and unfit for the purpose of social science. 
Just a year after Mill’s review of Comte was published, another prominent 
thinker, William Whewell, expressed his views on Comte’s philosophy. Whewell 
was one of the founding members of Section F and a strong proponent of an 
inductive political economy. Although he rather quickly became disillusioned with 
the work of Section F, he was nonetheless a supporter of an evidence-based social 
science in which statistics had a role to play and was strongly opposed to Comte’s 
idea of social science and his positive philosophy. Whewell could ‘in no degree 
share Mr. Mill’s admiration for Auguste Comte’ and saw Comte as ‘a person whose 
want of knowledge and of temperate thought caused his opinions on the philosophy 
and history of science to be of no value (Whewell, 1866: 353). Most of the review 
which Whewell wrote focused on what he argued were the inadequacies of Comte’s 
philosophy, calling Comte’s idea of the law of three stages ‘a radical mistake’ 
(Whewell, 1866: 354). Whewell was also critical of Comte’s vision of sociology, 
concluding that ‘the reader may read any page of his speculations to see how 
superficial he is’ (Whewell, 1866: 356). 
Whewell’s involvement with social science was brief and did not involve direct 
engagement with social scientific enquiries. But comments from other scholars, who 
were much more closely involved in social science reveal the same tendency that we 
observe in Mill and Whewell – association with statistics usually went with 
opposition towards Comte’s sociology (and vice versa). 
A further example comes from the economist and statistician William Stanley 
Jevons, President of Section F in 1870. Jevons was one of the best-known 
economists in Victorian Britain; he used his statistical and economic knowledge to 
produce a statistical atlas, as well as to establish the foundations of the mathematical 
approach to the study of economic questions in A General Mathematical Theory of 
Political Economy (1862). Although there are some important, even paradoxical, 
limitations to Jevons’s work (cf. Stigler, 1999) he is nonetheless one of the first 
economists to engage in serious economic analysis based on the careful 
consideration of statistical data. In 1875, after years of involvement with statistics, 
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Jevons wrote a review of the second edition of the English translation of Comte’s 
Course on Positive Philosophy. The review was critical, with Jevons raising three 
major objections to Comte’s work. 
First, he objected to Comte’s claim to have offered any new insights into the 
development of science, describing Comte’s law of three stages as ‘one of those 
vague hasty generalisations which have the worst scientific vice of being incapable 
of precise verification’ (Jevons, 1875: 492). One could stretch it ‘like india-rubber’ if 
one had to cover any difficulties with the analysis. Jevons also found that ‘Comte 
had very wide and general views as to the possibility of creating great bodies of 
social science’ but nonetheless he did not ‘have any true conception of the proper 
way of going about the work’ (Jevons, 1875: 492). A main reason why, according to 
Jevons, Comte had no proper idea as to how to go about doing social science was his 
rejection of the use of statistics and probability:  
 
he altogether abjured and ridiculed that branch of mathematical science, 
namely, the theory of probability, by which alone we can approach the 
scientific investigation of the complex condition of a nation. […] It 
becomes hardly possible to treat Comte’s pretensions seriously when we 
contemplate this intellectual freak by which he rejects the theory which is 
becoming more and more the basis of exact science (Jevons, 1875: 492). 
 
Attacks on the Comtean philosophy coming from eminent scholars such as 
Whewell and Jevons did not preclude others from associating themselves with 
Comte’s positive philosophy and insisting on it as the one proper way of doing 
sociology and any other social science. One such follower was J. K. Ingram, an Irish 
economist and poet, who became the President of Section F in 1878. Ingram’s 
address is regarded as one of the most memorable in the history of the section – 
partly because of its unusual proposals, partly because it was a response to a crisis 
that took place within Section F in the previous year. As I explained earlier, there 
was much discussion in the late 1870s in which Section F was accused of having 
failed to produce scientific work of high standards and the reaction to this failure 
came close to shutting it down in 1877 (Galton 1877a; Farr 1877;). Amid heated 
debate, it was decided that the Section should continue but that a reassessment of its 
approach and standards was urgently needed. A year later, Ingram’s address 
provided one suggestion as to how this might be achieved. He argued that what he 
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perceived to be the greatest problem of economic science – its exclusive focus on the 
economic aspects of social life – could be remedied by re-organising the Section as a 
sociological section grounded in the Comtean philosophy. According to Ingram, 
political economy would ‘cease to command unless it is subsumed under and 
absorbed into sociology’ (Ingram, 1878: 614), bringing all social scientific studies 
into one unified science and replacing their methods with the historical method. 
But despite the boldness of Ingram’s sweeping suggestion, there is nothing in 
his paper that suggests how these ideas could be put into practice and no convincing 
argument that taking such actions would actually turn political economy into a 
‘scientific’ subject. Towards the end of his address, Ingram expressed his 
disapproval of the importance that the Section had reserved for statistics: 
 
[…] it is plain that though statistics may be combined with sociology in the 
title of the section the two cannot occupy a co-ordinate position. For it is 
impossible to vindicate for statistics the character of a science, they 
constitute only one of the aids or adminicula of science (Ingram, 1878: 
628). 
 
And with a particular reference to the statistical work of the Section, Ingram 
was clear that: 
 
more frequently, social statistics are used not to assist us towards scientific 
generalisations but as subservient to the direct practical action of the 
statesman (Ingram, 1878: 628). 
 
However, it must also be acknowledged that Ingram was not totally dismissive 
of statistics: later on in his speech he stated his belief that ‘the importance of 
statistical enquiries will rise as the deductive method declined in estimation’ (Ingram, 
1878: 628).  
Ingram’s address stirred up some interest among the wider public; but, 
significantly, no one in the Section appears to have considered Ingram’s suggestion a 
feasible option; instead, the proposal was largely met with harsh criticism. Although 
subsequent attempts were made to broaden its focus, Section F was not reformed as 
Ingram had suggested. His speech, and the Comtean philosophy on which it was 
based, were severely criticised in 1885 by the political economist, Henry Sidgwick 
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who was then President of Section F. Sidgwick strongly disagreed with the 
arguments that ‘sociology […] is really an established science’ (Sidgwick, 1885: 
611-12). According to Sidgwick an established science could be characterised by 
consensus, continuity and prevision and sociology did not meet any of these criteria. 
Sidgwick compared Comte’s, Spencer’s and Schäffle’s (the leading social thinkers in 
France, Britain and Germany at the time) views on religion, industry and social 
evolution, exposing the great discrepancies between the works of these three scholars 
– they were a clear sign that sociology ‘must be still in its infancy’ (Sidgwick, 1885: 
613). It was ‘only too evident’, Sedgwick continued, that:  
 
each philosopher has constructed on the basis of personal feeling and 
experience his ideal future in which our present social deficiencies are to 
be remedied; and that the process by which history is arranged in steps 
pointing towards his Utopia bears not the faintest resemblance to a 
scientific demonstration (Sidgwick, 1885: 613). 
 
In addressing Comte’s work on sociology, Sidgwick was adamant that it was 
an example of: 
 
how completely the delusive belief that he [Comte] had constructed the 
science of sociology, could transform a philosopher of remarkable power 
and insight into the likeness of a crazy charlatan (Sidgwick, 1885: 615-6). 
 
Comte’s sociology was later criticised again by Farrer, President of the Royal 
Statistical Society in 1894, who denounced the potential and scientific credentials of 
sociology. Other records show, somewhat ironically, that the ideas in favour of 
widening the focus of political economy as part of its reform agenda, also contained 
in Ingram’s speech, helped strengthen the position of political economy, and not 
sociology. As Adelman (1971) argued, by the 1880s, ‘the economic lessons of Comte 
had been absorbed by most professional economists’:  
 
We have to thank the Comtist criticisms for forcing us to remember that 
the material truth of economic principles depends on complicated social 
conditions and that they have no independent validity (Cunningham, 1889 
quoted in Adelman 1971: 186). 
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Comte’s sociology was never accepted within Section F or within any other 
statistically minded circles. The main representative bodies of Comtean philosophy 
in Britain in the nineteenth century was the London Positivist Society, established in 
1867 and the closely related English Positivist Committee, whose President (1880-
1905), Frederic Harrison, was also president of the Sociological Society in 1910. 
These institutions endorsed Comte’s social philosophy but failed in their attempts to 
popularise it and achieved virtually no success in developing and adapting it to the 
British social, political and intellectual scene (Bryson, 1936). Notably, none of the 
people involved in the positivist circles were proponents of statistics – this was 
especially the case with Harrison who, as we will see in the next part, was adamantly 
critical of statistics in his Presidential address to the Sociological Society in 1910. 
The aim of this review of the reception of Comte’s philosophy and sociology in 
the UK has been not to evaluate the strength of the arguments of Comte’s supporters 
or his opponents in Britain but to show that those who supported Comte were 
generally sceptical or opposed to the idea of statistical social science; and those who 
attacked Comte’s views were generally open to, if not always strong advocates of, 
the use of statistical and probabilistic knowledge in social science. With the 
introduction of Comte’s views into Britain, a clear and remarkably consistent 
demarcation between these two sets of views was now possible. The few instances 
where Comte’s followers addressed statisticians and vice versa show how difficult it 
was to reconcile both views. But they also show that there was little desire to do so – 
Comte’s followers and the statisticians were two separate groups of people that threw 
criticisms at one another without engaging in meaningful dialogue. This consistent 
mutual un-attraction characterised the exchange of views between both groups 
throughout the nineteenth century; but it also set a remarkably persistent precedent 
that sociologists and statisticians followed all through the twentieth century.  
Regarding each other’s work as irrelevant; a lack of dialogue; throwing 
monologue-like critiques at one another or simple indifference are only some of the 
things that marked the interaction between Comteans or proponents of sociology and 
statisticians in both the nineteenth and, as we shall see, throughout the twentieth 
century. Of course, this is not to say that Comte’s particular views, or the views of 
the statisticians in Section F or the SSL, caused the mode of interaction we observe 
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between sociologists and statisticians in Britain then and later. But it is important to 
recognise that although Comte’s positive philosophy was largely forgotten by the 
mid-twentieth century, his example of a sociology still lives with us, even now: 
Comte proposed the first systematic and coherent idea of sociology which rejected 
quantification.  
The impact that Comtean philosophy has had on British academic sociology 
(see Part Two) has also masked the contribution of the statistical tradition that had a 
more fundamental and long-term influence on social studies. The pioneer of the 
study of the history of science, George Sarton, once remarked that a ‘great injustice 
is made when Comte is called the founder of sociology, for Quetelet has better 
claims to this title than he’ (Sarton, 1935: 14). According to Sarton, while Comte 
was the first to speak of social physics and sociology: 
 
Quetelet was not only saying what to do, but was actually doing it, and 
doing it much better than Comte could imagine, for the real differences and 
the crucial points only appear when one is tackling concrete problems and 
tackling them in large numbers humbly and patiently; they remain almost 
always hidden from the superficial and superstitious minds of philosophers 
[…] Comte was building proud castles of sands, Quetelet humbler 
constructions on bedrock (Sarton, 1935: 14).  
 
We have seen that Quetelet did enjoy great recognition among scientists even 
during his lifetime; but he has never been hailed as an important figure in sociology, 
at least not in British sociology. To this day, few British sociologists would even 
know who Quetelet is, let alone regard him as a founding father of their subject. 
Auguste Comte, in contrast, may indeed have built merely ‘proud castles of sands’ 
that sociologists have stopped visiting since the 1950s; but even though he did not 
create sociology, and even though what he created did not endure for long, Comte 
showed that it is possible to create a sociology of a non-quantitative type in which 
the main and superior element is theory of society. And it is precisely because he 
opened up this possibility that Comte’s sociology remains a crucial factor in the 







Methodological Development of Statistics in the Nineteenth Century and 
its Application to Sociology 
 
It can be argued that Comte and his followers in Britain regarded statistics as 
irrelevant to sociology because, even though statisticians were striving to follow the 
principles of contemporary science, statistics did not develop a great deal 
methodologically until the late nineteenth century. A closer look at what was 
possible to do with statistics and what was not, during the nineteenth century, will be 
useful here. 
In the 1830s, Quetelet developed the idea of the average and showed how it 
can be used to describe masses of social data in a way that made possible a new kind 
of knowledge about aggregations of data and statistical regularities that could not 
possibly be known merely by looking at individuals. The idea of averaging had been 
around before Quetelet but he was the first to fully grasp its wider applications and 
propose its systematic use for the analysis of data en masse. The idea was 
revolutionary, at the very least because it is based on an apparent paradox that ‘given 
a number of observations, you can actually gain information by throwing information 
away!’ (Stigler, 2016: 4).  
Not surprisingly, there was much opposition to averaging information about 
human beings, largely based on the assumption that this would mean the elimination 
of the free will of individuals6 (cf. Donnelly, 2015; Hacking, 1990; Porter, 1986). In 
medicine, eminent doctors such as Claude Bernard argued adamantly that nothing 
could substitute a doctor’s knowledge of his individual patients and that therefore 
averaging would be of no use (cf. Hacking, 1990); while in economics, some 
economists insisted that it was absurd to average data on the prices of different 
commodities in order to measure how prices change and therefore opposed W. S. 
Jevons proposition for index numbers of prices based on aggregate data (Stigler, 
                                               
6 In contemporary terminology, this kind of assumption that knowledge about an individual can be 
deduced from knowledge about the average characteristics of the group to which an individual 
belongs is called an ecological fallacy. It was not until the twentieth century that statisticians could 
properly explain why their work does not mean the end of all individuality and free will, exposing 
what were once seen as legitimate fears as fallacious reasoning. 
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1999, 2016). Regardless of the opposition, the application of the method of 
averaging flourished and became common practice in many areas of research, even 
physics: a few decades after it revolutionised the study of society, the method was 
used by James Clerk Maxwell to explain how molecules in gases move (cf. Porter, 
1986; 1994).  
But for all the potential uses the method of averaging offered, it was not 
enough to fully describe an aggregation of data – the average could tell scientists 
what is most common about a certain dataset, but it could not say anything about the 
way in which the data are dispersed. Aggregation is also limited because it does not 
say anything about the level of uncertainty of the conclusions based on the 
comparison of averages. For instance, in 1840 G. R. Porter had enough aggregate 
data to show that crime rates are smaller in areas occupied by better-educated people 
which led him to the conclusion that education could help eliminate crime. However, 
the comparison of averages that he used to back-up his argument could not tell him 
how certain he could be that this measure would work and how much of criminality 
could be accounted for by factors other than the level of education. We now use the 
theory of probability to measure this uncertainty, but as Stigler points out, ‘the 
application of probability to the measurement of uncertainty in the social sciences 
was unknown before the 1870s’ (Stigler, 1986: 194). 
Thus throughout most of the nineteenth century the work in the SSL was 
confined to the limited opportunities that the comparison of averages could offer. 
Even some of the most prominent and mathematically gifted statisticians involved in 
the SSL conducted their work at the basic level of analysis, as originally suggested 
by Quetelet. A good example is W. S. Jevons, about whom Stigler says: 
 
If there was any nineteenth-century empirical social scientist who could 
have been expected to develop the techniques of the theory of errors into 
tools for the quantification of uncertainty in social sciences, it is W. 
Stanley Jevons. But he did not (Stigler, 1999: 88). 
 




[…] even Guy’s work, which as late as 1881 was acclaimed as the ‘work of 
the principle writer on the methods of statistics’ was devoted to the nature 
and accuracy of the average and would now [1933] be regarded as 
elementary (Bonar and Macrosty, 1934: 178). 
 
One has to be cautious of judging the limits of knowledge of the early 
statisticians in the light of the more advanced techniques that came later. However, a 
review of the papers published in SSL between 1834 and 1908 reveals a general lack 
of interest in the methodological development of statistics.  Table 1 in Appendix I 
contains a summary of the topics of the papers published in the Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London in this period, showing that between 1834 and 1885, 
there was very little interest in methodological issues compared to other topics. This 
only changed after 1885, when, among others, F. Y. Edgeworth (1885, 1893) began 
developing mathematical statistics and Arthur Bowley (1906) developed the 
application of sampling in the British context; both of them publishing their 
contributions in the journal. 
However, the greatest advances in the mathematical development of statistics 
towards the end of the nineteenth century came from Francis Galton who introduced 
the idea of regression (Galton, 1877b; 1886) and correlation (Galton, 1888). With 
regression, Galton was able to explain how amounts and frequency of deviation from 
the average on a given characteristic of the population can remain stable through 
time. With correlation, knowledge of the ultimate causes of larger scale events was 
no longer essential – it became possible for large-scale phenomena to be conceived 
of as knowable on the basis of their relationship with other large-scale phenomena. 
Both of these techniques were further developed mathematically by Galton’s 
successor and the founder of biometrics, Karl Pearson, in the 1890s and early 1900s. 
Pearson also extended their application, by showing that they can be used to analyse 
and predict any kind of phenomena. But neither Galton nor Pearson were actively 
involved in the SSL: Galton had been a member of the SSL but made few 
contributions to the Society; and when in 1885 he discovered reversion to the mean 
(as he initially called regression), he presented his discovery not in front of the SSL 
or Section F, but in front of the Anthropological Section of the BAAS. Pearson was 
not even a member and had a low opinion of the kind of statistics that was done in 
the SSL, calling the statisticians there a bunch of ‘dilettantes’ (Pearson, 1894).  
 106 
There has been some speculation as to why the most fundamental statistical 
innovations came from within the circle of the biometricians and why the SSL 
(which became the Royal Statistical Society in 1885) had contributed so little to the 
methodological development of statistics. Magnello (2011) and Stigler (1986) have 
suggested that what made the innovations possible was Galton’s, Pearson’s and F. R. 
Weldon’s engagement with the Darwinian theory of evolution and their attempts to 
find statistical support for it; since social and economic theories, at that time, did not 
offer as solid a framework for statistical work and testing as that offered by Darwin’s 
theory, statisticians in the SSL/RSS had little motivation for going beyond the 
comparison of averages. 
However, a question that is of greater relevance to the history of sociology is 
whether and how statistical techniques were being incorporated by sociologists once 
they had been discovered. If we assume that the little that could be done 
methodologically with statistics throughout the nineteenth century played some role 
in making statistics look irrelevant to sociologists like Comte and his followers in 
Britain, did this attitude change with the advances in statistics? 
One way to find out is to examine sociological works from the late nineteenth 
century which also deal with statistics. An obvious example here is Emile 
Durkheim’s work Suicide: a Study in Sociology (2002 [1897]), which is still 
regarded as a classic in early sociology. Durkheim, like Comte, was French but he 
quickly became well known in Britain – he was one of the contributors to the first 
British Sociological Society which was established in 1903 and was highly regarded 
in its circles. Looking at his engagement with sociology and statistics cannot explain 
the engagement of British sociologists with statistics at the beginning of the 
twentieth century but it can give us an idea of what to look for later on. 
Durkheim’s work Suicide: a Study in Sociology introduced concepts such as 
social forces sui generis and anomie to explain sociologically what was usually 
conceived of as a private act, and for this reason it is regarded as one the first 
examples of a truly sociological analysis. In order to reach his conclusions, 
Durkheim made some use of statistical data but this has rarely been a topic of 
scholarly interest. A closer look at the role that statistical data played in Durkheim’s 
analysis, and the way Durkheim himself conceived of that role gives us a valuable 
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insight into why statistics could continue to be regarded as irrelevant to sociology 
despite important advances in statistical methodology. 
Durkheim’s analysis of statistical data on suicide was limited to the 
comparison of averages, regardless of the fact that, at the time he was writing, 
Francis Galton had already published his discovery of correlation (Galton’s works 
had not been translated into French but Durkheim read English and often referred to 
original works by other English authors, such as William James). However, 
correlation was still closely associated with a particular research context, that of 
evolution and heredity, and since it would have required some specialist 
mathematical skills to understand it, it may be assumed that Durkheim could not 
have seen its immediate relevance or even if he did, he may not have possessed the 
necessary skills to apply it. Even if we assume that this was the case, there is little 
doubt that the fact that Durkheim made use of elementary statistical analysis had the 
effect of making his sociological explanation appear more powerful than any 
explanation based on statistics. In addition, in his work, Durkheim made no 
suggestions whatsoever about possible ways in which statistical data collection or 
analysis can be improved for his purposes or more generally. This kind of attitude – 
using the contemporary limits of statistical analysis to put forward an argument that 
other non-statistical methods have to be used because they appear to be better – is an 
attitude that would continue to manifest itself in British sociology throughout the 
twentieth century (see Part Two and Three). 
Durkheim was, however, in the position to discuss the concept of the average, 
as it had been developed by Quetelet, and was very critical of it. ‘The average man 
does not kill himself’ argued Durkheim; he emphasised that a completely novel 
explanation of suicide is necessary (Durkheim 2002 [1897]: 266). If this was the case, 
why did Durkheim use statistics at all?  
Durkheim’s use of statistics had a dual role. First, he used statistics to 
legitimise the conceptualisation of suicide as a ‘collective’, rather than private 
phenomenon; (Durkheim 2002 [1897]: 100); and to show that suicide is manifested 
through a statistical regularity just like other, more ‘normal’, human phenomena 
(Durkheim 2002 [1897]: 273). It is crucial, but remained unacknowledged by 
Durkheim, that, without statistics, he would not have been able to know anything 
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about suicide beyond anecdotes about individual suicide cases. There cannot be a 
sociology of suicide without knowledge about its large-scale occurrence, i.e. without 
statistical data on suicide rates. Durkheim’s treatment of statistics represents another 
aspect of the kind of attitude that is commonly found in British sociology later on – 
of accepting the existence of statistical information without acknowledging how 
indispensable it actually is for simply knowing what is going on in a society. 
But there was another important reason why Durkheim used statistics.  
Durkheim argued that comparing averages is useless in helping sociologists explain 
the source of suicidal behaviour (Durkheim 2002 [1897]: 266-7). Durkheim 
compared suicide rates in countries with, for instance, different religions and 
climates, concluding that relying on such statistical comparisons does not provide 
adequate explanations of why people commit suicides. He introduced a variety of 
social forces, such as anomie, to explain, sociologically, the occurrence of suicide. 
By employing statistical techniques in his argument, only to criticise them afterwards, 
Durkheim was, in fact, trying to legitimise the need of a purely sociological 
explanation of suicide; he repeatedly used them only to prove that, if they had any 
explanatory power at all, it was not sufficient. Statistics may help sociologists see, 
but it could not help them to perceive, suicide.  
However, it is questionable why Durkheim did not consider it even possible to 
incorporate statistics in his sociological arguments as a form of building block; and 
why he considered it more reasonable to establish sociological arguments in 
opposition to, and on the basis of the complete rejection of, statistical knowledge and 
analysis. There was nothing inevitable about this decision – it would appear that 
Durkheim took it primarily because statistical laws were regarded as a type of natural 
law, while what Durkheim wanted to show was that suicide was a product of 
distinctly sociological factors. Durkheim’s treatment of statistics demonstrates 
another important aspect of the kind of attitude that could be found in British 
sociology later on – the understanding that sociology had to substitute and supersede 





Sociology and Statistics in Nineteenth-century Britain: Summary 
 
This chapter began with a question about the importance of the history of 
nineteenth-century social science in the history of British sociology – if there were 
no ‘sociological’ societies or ‘sociological’ departments or ‘sociologists’ before 
1903, when the first Sociological Society in Britain was established, then why should 
we study other nineteenth-century social science projects as part of the history of 
British ‘sociology’? I explained how different scholars have approached the 
question; and I focused particularly on the only sociological account, that by Philip 
Abrams, which remains to this day the most widely read work on the history of 
British sociology among sociologists in Britain. In his essay, Abrams argued that the 
significance of the development of nineteenth century social science, such as social 
statistics and social reformism, lies in the fact that they frustrated the development of 
sociology, depriving it of institutional opportunities to develop. 
It has been a primary goal of this chapter to expose the historical inadequacy of 
Abrams’ interpretation of the role of the nineteenth-century statistical movement 
(Lawrence Goldman (2002) has done this with regard to Abrams’ interpretation of 
the role of the social reformist movement). I have examined the development of 
statistical and probabilistic thinking and techniques and showed that in the early 
nineteenth century, the aims and structure of the statisticians’ work, as well as their 
own understanding of their contribution to knowledge, was closely related to the 
contemporary goals and understanding of science. Put in the context of the 
contemporary understanding of science, the events and discussions that took place in 
the two most prominent statistical organisations, Section F of the BAAS and the 
SSL/RSS, are an example of the very first attempts to establish precise, reliable, 
widely applicable and generalisable scientific knowledge about the social world. 
This was crucial since the power of science, in principle and in practice, comes from 
the fact that science works, not from the prestige that science may have at a 
particular point in time (science will continue to work regardless of whether it has 
prestige or not). Thus, the fact that the statisticians followed in the footsteps of 
science is important not because they were trying to associate themselves with a 




in social investigations that sooner or later produce knowledge that works. To focus 
on the limited success of Section F to separate values from facts and on the 
difficulties of the statisticians in the SSL to keep up with aliis exterendum, as most 
scholars have done so far, is to miss a point of longer-lasting significance – that the 
development of statistics made such discussions possible in the first place; made 
social science possible. And this is why the question about the relationship between 
statistics and sociology is historically important; this allows us to question British 
sociology’s attitude towards statistics in a way that is historically justifiable. An 
account of the history of British sociology that does not pay attention to these vital 
breakthroughs, and the context in which they occurred, is bound to be limited in what 
it can say about British sociology’s general history. And Abrams’ essay is a good 
example of this: the statistical movement did not frustrate the emergence of 
‘sociology’; it made social science possible, of which Abrams’ implicit notion of 
‘sociology’ – a primarily theoretical kind of study – is just one possibility.  
In addition to failing to make explicit his assumptions about sociology’s 
nature, Abrams also failed to recognise that the notion of sociology that he himself 
held originated in the nineteenth century in a social science project that received a 
great deal of attention in Britain at the time and since then has played a vital role in 
setting the conditions in which a sociology in Britain could develop. Comte’s 
sociology followed different lines of reasoning and different methods from statistics 
– it emphasised the importance of a grand theoretical understanding of social 
evolution and its use of empirical evidence was confined to the use of historical 
records for the purpose of comparison. The legacy of Comte’s work in the British 
context does not come from the fact that he somehow determined the later course of 
British sociology; the legacy of Comte’s sociology lies in establishing a coherent 
precedent for a non-quantitative, non-statistical sociology despite the fact that, ever 
since the nineteenth century, statistical thinking has formed a crucial part of the basis 
of scientific thinking more generally. The early reception of Comte in Britain was 
indicative of the beginning of another influential trend – we saw that Comte’s 
followers were at best sceptical and at worst hostile to statistics; but we also saw that 
the statisticians had very similar views about Comte’s sociology and that both groups 




and the Comtean projects for social science are important as two social science 
frameworks which are not only mutually incompatible, but also capable of existing 
together in a state of mutual indifference and disregard for each other. 
Apart from setting the institutional conditions and intellectual possibilities that 
existed prior to the establishment of sociology in Britain, this nineteenth-century 
overture to the history of sociology in Britain had another very important role. It 
served as an historical justification for examining the relationship between statistics 
and British sociology and why any conclusions about British sociology, more 
generally, which have been reached by looking through the prism of this relationship, 
deserve serious attention. This chapter showed that, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, statistics had not only paved the way for a social science closely following 
contemporary scientific practice, but had also provided it with a sophisticated 
methodology. With this methodology, statisticians could collect, summarise and, 
most importantly, assess the reliability of their data; they could get to know, but also 
control and predict, social and natural phenomena. However, the brief overview of 
Emile Durkheim’s milestone sociological work Suicide: a Study in Sociology 
indicated clearly that the social science called ‘sociology’ was heading on a different 
journey. Here, statistics played the role of a ladder that could be discarded 
immediately after sociologists had climbed up to their destination; concentrating 
exclusively on where they’ve arrived rather than how they could get there in the first 
place.  
This raises important questions about the twentieth-century development of 
sociology in Britain. Examining whether British sociology followed examples such 
as Comte’s or Durkheim’s with regard to statistics goes beyond any subjective 
curiosity about the relationship between statistics and sociology; the contribution of 
statistical discoveries, such as the method of aggregation or averages, regression and 
correlation techniques, and random sampling is indisputable on the larger scale of 
modern scientific development that began in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it is 
historically reasonable to at least assume that as statistics was already beginning, in 
the late nineteenth century, to revolutionise the way we do natural science, it was 
going to provide a viable way of doing sociology that sociologists in Britain could 




relationship with statistics tells us much more than might first appear – it tells about 
British sociology’s perpetual problems to define itself; about the consistent and 
systematic tendencies in its more general institutional and intellectual development; 
and about its peculiar ways of coping with the unusual challenges it faced in an ever-
changing academic climate. The first such challenge was the establishment of a 





















































The Sociological Society that was established in London in 1903 was not the 
first social science organisation to be established in Britain but it was the first 
institution to call itself ‘sociological’. Nonetheless, no broader social movements, 
public events or even other institutions are known to have been connected to, or 
involved in supporting, the idea of a Sociological Society at this time: the Society 
that was formed in 1903 had only weak institutional links with all the major social 
scientific institutions that had developed previously in the nineteenth century.  
The tradition of social reformist empirical enquiry developed by the Social 
Science Association (SSA) (1857-1886) was treated with indifference by the newly 
formed Sociological Society and direct links between the SSA and the Society are 
almost non-existent. In the archives of the Sociological Society in Keele the SSA 
receives two passing comments in the private documents of the Sociological 
Society’s organiser, Victor Branford (Branford, 1903a; Sociological Society [Victor 
Branford], 1903a); aside from this, the Society, as an institution, made no 
acknowledgement of, and paid no tribute to, the SSA, neither to criticise nor praise 
its contributions.  
Institutionally, the Sociological Society was also distanced from the Royal 
Statistical Society (RSS). The Sociological Society had its first meetings in the 
rooms of the RSS; and there were a few individuals who were members of both 
societies – but this is as close as the two institutions would ever be.  
The London Positivist Society, established in 1867, and the closely related 
English Positivist Committee endorsed Comte’s social philosophy which included a 
particular understanding of sociology as a general science that united all existing 
social science specialisms and used the comparative method to analyse the 
development of social evolution (Comte, 1875). The positivists, however, failed in 
their attempts to popularise Comte’s views and achieved virtually no success in 
developing and adapting them to the British social, political and intellectual scene 
(Bryson, 1936). And, just as with the SSA and the SSL, direct institutional links 
between the Positivists and the Sociological Society are difficult to find, except for 




in 1880-1905 also became the president of the Sociological Society in 1910. If, then, 
the Sociological Society was, at least institutionally, largely unrelated to any 
nineteenth-century organisations, how did it begin?  
The Sociological Society was established in 1903 on the initiative of Victor 
Branford, a business accountant who was a close friend of Patrick Geddes, the 
Scottish social evolutionist and city planner. It seems that Branford’s and Geddes’s 
own personal agenda played the primary role in its establishment – they wanted to 
use the Society as a vehicle for promoting Geddes’ ideas and for securing him a 
university post in London (cf. Renwick, 2012). But this tells us only part of the story, 
since the motives the Society presented to the public officially were not only much 
broader in scope and ambition, but had a more enduring impact. 
Branford’s official invitations highlighted the fact that Britain lagged behind in 
the ‘organisation of those general studies which – under the name of Sociology – are 
concerned with integrating the specialist studies of Man’ (Sociological Society, 
1903b). One of Branford’s core aims, which he fulfilled, and which survives to this 
day in the form of The Sociological Review, was the establishment of a sociological 
journal as, unlike other countries, Britain lagged behind in this respect. There were 
also no sociology courses offered at university level7 and, Branford argued, the time 
was ‘ripe’ to bring together those who seek to lay the foundations of clear thinking 
about social problems (Sociological Society, 1903b). The way the Society was 
planning to achieve this was by following the principles of sociology as outlined by 
Auguste Comte in his social philosophy: this is evident from the Society’s official 
publications, which emphasise the establishment of sociology as a general science in 
the Comtean style (for further details, see discussion below). Further evidence comes 
from Victor Branford’s own writings on the subject which are infused with 
references to the Comtean vision of sociology (Branford, nd [1903]; Branford, 
1904a; Branford, 1905a, Branford, 1928). The Society also organised a meeting in 
1907 to commemorate Comte’s fiftieth anniversary. At these meetings, papers were 
read by Victor Branford, L. T. Hobhouse, Benjamin Kidd, J. A. Hobson; all of whom 
held major positions in the Society. The papers made it clear that, although Comte’s 
                                               
7 A new piece by Christopher Husbands (forthcoming) reveals that there were a few sociological 




views were taken both critically and with approval, the Society overall was devoted 
to realising Comte’ ideal of sociology (Sociological Society, 1907). In addition, 
prominent followers of Comte’s social philosophy, such as J. H. Bridges, S. H. 
Swinny and Frederic Harrison, held high positions at the Sociological Society, with 
Swinny being a Chairman of the Council (1908-11) and Frederic Harrison taking up 
the position as President of the Society in 1910.  
While the society embraced, as its intellectual credo, Comte’s positivist view 
of sociology, they exhibited a dismissive attitude towards the intellectual 
contributions of the SSA and the SSL. Intellectual links with the social reformist or 
the statistical movements, which were engaged with what could be described as 
primarily empirically oriented work, were not part of the organisers’ plans: according 
to Branford, the Society had a higher goal, a vision of sociology that went beyond 
anything that could be achieved through empirical work: ‘We want to be able to say 
to the empirical sociologists – “there is a certain position in sociology, reach it and 
you will be amply rewarded” (Branford, nd. [1903]).  
The first official meeting of the Society took place on May 15th/16th 19038, in 
the rooms of the RSS, with social anthropologists, social theorists, social workers, 
politicians, economists, and others, present. An important figure was James Martin 
White, a Scottish businessman, who financed the founding of the Society, the first 
sociological journal and the first sociology professorship. The official goals of the 
Society were ‘scientific, educational and practical’. Following the Comtean vision of 
sociology as a general, all-inclusive science, the Society aimed ‘at affording a 
common ground on which workers from all fields and schools concerned with social 
phenomena may meet’9 (Sociological Society, 1905a). As a result, the Society had a 
very diverse membership. The three groups that made the most notable contribution 
in the Society’s first few, and most active, years were – the eugenicists under Francis 
Galton; the supporters of Geddes’s civics and a diverse group of social philosophers 
and reformers (cf. Halliday, 1968). Very soon, however, these three groups of 
‘sociologists’ each went their own way, exposing the shaky foundations of the 
                                               
8 According to Branford, this is also the date, which is ‘the most correct date for the founding of the 
society’ although subsequent accounts in the Sociological Papers point to different dates in that year 
(Branford, 1926).  




Society’s organisation. After the eugenicists left to establish their own Eugenics 
Education Society; and the social philosophers established themselves at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) under L. T. Hobhouse; Geddes, 
Branford and their allies continued to be the sole active force within the Society (cf. 
Evans, 1986). For the rest of its existence – until the 1950s – the Society operated on 
a small scale, virtually existing in name alone.    
Studies on the history of the Society are lacking in historical detail and 
accuracy of interpretation and have left fundamental questions un-probed. For 
instance, the underlying assumption guiding Abrams’ account is that what ‘was good 
for social reform was bad for sociology’ (Abrams, 1968: 106). As a result, his 
analysis of the Sociological Society is dominated by the idea that the Society would 
have been successful had it developed a general theory of society; it was due to the 
fact that neither Hobhouse, nor Geddes, nor Galton succeeded in this, that, according 
to Abrams, the Society ended up merely stimulating the ‘fissiparous growth of 
pseudosociological factions’ (Abrams, 1968: 119). In its emphasis on theory as the 
only element of social research that makes such research ‘sociological’, Abrams’ 
account is not only presentist – applying a 1960s view of sociology to the past and 
judging it accordingly – but it is also dismissive of legitimate, and, indeed, as yet 
unexamined, questions regarding both the historical background of the Society and 
its long term significance: for instance, how did the Society’s choice to take a 
different direction from the empirical tradition of social enquiry that developed in 
Britain during the nineteenth century affect the future of sociology in this country? 
And what was it that happened within the Society that contributed to its limited 
legacy?  
Compared with Abrams, a 2007 debate published in The Sociological Review 
took a more positive and appreciative look at the Society’s legacy by revisiting the 
contributions of Branford and Geddes. The debate aimed to ‘recognise anew the 
importance of these forbears’ (Savage, 2007: 429); reclaim the importance of the 
social theory of Geddes (cf. Studholme, 2007) and retrieve Branford from obscurity, 
praising him for ‘envisioning’ a ‘theoretically and empirically grounded sociology’ 
(Scott, 2007: 479). However, a comprehensive historical understanding of the legacy 




of their theories, ideas and vision, which we happen to see as relevant, but also an 
analysis of what they actually did with the opportunities that the establishment of the 
Society presented. Those theories endorsed by the leading figures of the Society 
certainly deserve our full attention but, somewhat surprisingly, the theoretical 
framework that has been left out of both older and more recent accounts, is Comte’s 
theory of sociology which, as I show below, played a fundamental role in the 
decisions made by the Society.  
The preoccupation with the Sociological Society’s limited contribution to the 
development of sociological theory, to be found in older and more recent scholarship, 
has reinforced a particular view of the Society’s position regarding the nineteenth-
century statistical tradition of social enquiry. As already discussed in previous 
chapters, Abrams argued that as far as a relationship between ‘sociology’ and 
statistics existed at the time the Sociological Society was being established, it was a 
relationship in which the development of statistics and the consolidation of the 
statistical movement during the nineteenth century served to frustrate the 
development of ‘sociology’ in the UK. Abrams argued that the SSL had a negative 
influence on the development of sociology in Britain since its work was not 
theoretical but, instead, endorsed empirical inquiries. For this reason, Abrams did not 
question the fact that the Sociological Society distanced itself from the work of the 
RSS; after all, a Sociological Society had to be about sociology, not statistics. And in 
‘blaming’ the ‘failure’ of British sociology on of British sociologists’ inability to 
produce viable sociological theories, the arguments of other scholars such as 
Anderson (1968) and Soffer (1982) have served to spread the impression that 
statistics was never a choice for sociology and for the Sociological Society.   
However, detailed archival research on the development of sociology in the 
first half of the twentieth century suggests that these interpretations are misguided 
and in need of improvement. Therefore, the following chapters examine in detail 
how it was that the Sociological Society took such a remote stance towards statistics: 
whether it was a result of a series of choices or whether it was driven by an 
inevitable course of events. This is not to argue that the Society ought to have 
embraced statistics; however, as explained in previous chapters, the fact that the 




social world using the same logical approach which has resulted in major advances 
in the scientific study of nature since the 1600s and, ultimately, has shaped modern 
society, provides historically legitimate reasons to examine the factors that 
































Chapter Seven  
 
The Limited Contributions of the Sociological Society to the General 
Development of Sociology in Britain  
 
 
I. First Formal Discussion about Sociology 
 
The Sociological Society was founded with a view to realising in practice 
Comte’s idea of sociology as a general science. However, at the time, Comte’s 
philosophy was still seen by many as dubious and impractical; and there was much 
hostility and confusion surrounding the Comtean idea of sociology. Sociologists, it 
was claimed in 1904, were a disjointed ‘company of mystics’ in which ‘every man 
has a different interpretation to give’; the general view was that there was not ‘any 
united thought or concentrated view to be learnt from sociologists’ and that ‘one 
comprehensive science’ would not take the social sciences very far (Speaker I in 
Branford 1904a: 124; Speaker C in Branford, 1904a: 122-123). 
When the Sociological Society attempted to organise the first formal and 
official discussion about sociology in Britain – its first limited contribution – that 
discussion failed to resolve the problematic issues at the heart of the Comtean idea of 
sociology discussed above. The first President of the Society, James Bryce, simply 
assumed that their vision of British sociology was not only feasible, but well-
grounded: ‘I trust, however, that it will not be difficult to justify the Sociological 
Society’ (Bryce, 1905: xiii). His justification was limited to repeating what was 
already well known – there was, as yet, no distinctly British sociological theories and 
there were no sociology courses taught in British universities. But Bryce made no 
attempt to explain why this was the case; why this situation should change and 
whether following Comte’s idea of sociology could deliver that change. 
Branford took a similar approach. He himself pointed to the ‘hostility’, 
‘indifference’ and ‘misunderstanding’ prompted by the very word ‘sociology’; and to 
the fact that while some acknowledged the need for a sociology but denied its 




social phenomena (Branford, 1905a: 10). This is an apt description of the problems 
facing sociology but neither Branford, nor anybody else in the Society took on the 
task of effectively addressing these problems and proving the critique wrong in 
practice. Branford instead assumed that following Comte’s principles was sufficient 
for the establishment of a theoretical and applied sociology as long as sociologists 
develop the ability to think both philosophically and scientifically (Branford, 1905a: 
16). But how the cultivation of these abilities would come about, how these abilities 
would become manifest in the methodology of sociology and how sociologists would 
on the basis of these abilities address the problems of modern society – is not 
discussed. In addition, the articles in the Sociological Papers, presented to the 
Society between 1904 and 1907, did not engage at all with the idea of sociology as a 
general science – contributors, including prominent members such as Galton and 
Geddes, do not even mention how the specialist subjects of their own study would 
contribute to the establishment of the ‘great’ science.   
The situation was not much different in 1907 when the most active period of 
the Society was coming to an end. In his inauguration speech, Edward Westermarck, 
the Finnish philosopher and ethnographer, who became a part-time professor of 
sociology at the LSE in 1907, acknowledged that sociology was still perceived as 
‘too vague’ and ‘too full of far-reaching but unproved generalisations’. He went on 
to confess that he considered ‘these objections to contain a great deal of truth’ but, 
like others before him, failed to suggest any constructive solutions (Westermarck, 
1908: 26).   
The only person who attempted to address some of these challenges and 
indicated a possible solution was the eugenicist and statistician Karl Pearson. 
Pearson was not an actual member of the society and had ‘a certain want of 
sympathy’ with it due to what he believed was the unscientific character of the 
subject (Branford, 1904b). Pearson reluctantly agreed to attend one of its meetings in 
order to preside over the reading of Galton’s first paper. In his address, Pearson 
called the Society ‘a herd without its leader’, expressing grave doubts that the 
Society could function effectively and sustain itself without an established leading 




Although Pearson’s argument had eugenicist connotations – putting emphasis 
on an exceptional individual who will create the rudiments of sociology – his 
suggestions were plausible and perhaps closer to a feasible solution of the problems 
sociology was facing than any of Branford’s ideas based on Comte’s strategy of 
creating a unified sociology. It was not so much an exceptional individual per se, but 
the kind of coherent strategy, the pulling together and effective co-operation that 
such an individual embodies that was needed. Branford, however, did not accept 
Pearson’s argument, calling it ‘good theology’, ‘bad science’ and ‘a creational 
hypothesis’ (Branford, 1905b: 26, 28) and re-stating that ‘the progress of sociology is 
in quite normal fashion’ and that ‘all is well with our science’ (Branford, 1905b: 40).  
Yet what happened to the Society in the next couple of years, proved 
Branford’s soothing remarks ill-judged and if it weren’t an exceptional individual, 
then British sociology was certainly lacking something. The discussions that took 
place in the Society either could not agree what this thing was or failed to 
acknowledge it in the first place. It is clear that despite the fact that the Society 
revived the discussion about sociology, its members merely re-stated the problems 
that sociology faced, without contributing much to their solution.   
 
 
II. Definitions of Sociology 
 
The second limited contribution of the Society is closely related to, but distinct 
from, the first. The Society offered a friendly platform for discussing the nature of 
sociology and presented an opportunity to come up with a suitable definition of its 
subject. However, various factors interfered with the success of these attempts.   
A selection of the definitions of sociology that appeared in a discussion in the 
Sociological Papers displays a remarkable diversity. It was claimed that sociology 
was ‘a specialism under physiological psychology’; ‘the science of history’; ‘the 
same as philosophy of history’; ‘the continuation of politics’; ‘the Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences’; ‘the science of General civilisation’; ‘a Method applicable to all 
social sciences’; ‘convertible with philosophy’ and ‘the science of social facts’; at the 




current stage because sociology was not yet developed and ‘definitions do not 
anticipate sciences, but they succeed them’ (Various authors, 1905: 211-258). 
The first report of the Society argued that the discussion, in which all these 
definitions appeared, successfully re-affirmed that sociology was ‘the corpus’ of all 
social sciences; an ‘endeavour to synthesise the researches of all social 
investigation’; and an ‘endeavour to construct a theory’ (Sociological Society, 
1905b: 20-21). But through what was a mere re-statement of the Comtean principles, 
the report obscured what had really happened in the discussion. A brief look at the 
definitions shows an obvious lack of agreement. A longer, more careful look, 
indicates even more remarkably, a lack of disagreement: definitions coming from all 
directions, without a single unifying thread or sense of coherence, showing just how 
little the participants had in common with each other. The members of the Society 
did believe that there was something out there called ‘sociology’, like the eighteenth-
century belief in a mystical Southern continent that was worth finding; but when 
asked where it lay, everyone pointed in a different direction.   
None of these definitions suggest that sociology should involve itself in the 
direct investigation of social problems on the basis of empirical – statistical or any 
other – evidence. Instead, as quoted above, the emphasis is on the construction of 
theory. Sociologists, such as Abrams in the 1960s, who approved of this idea because 
it corresponded to their own idea of sociology, did not see this episode in the early 
history of sociology as problematic. But when we look at the Society’s concepts of 
social science in the context of the previous history of social science in the UK, we 
see a fundamental rift between what was being proposed here and the tradition of 
social empirical inquiry in the UK that developed in the nineteenth century. The 
important point to grasp is not whether the Society’s understanding was right or 
wrong; better or worse; but the fact that it was not the inevitable route, or even the 
already well-established route, in the British context. The Society may not have 
reached a consensus on what sociology was; but if their definitions exerted any long-
lasting influence, it was to legitimise the choice that sociology in Britain was not 






III. Sociology in Academia 
 
The third limited contribution of the Sociological Society was the introduction 
of sociology into academia. Sociology was first introduced as an academic subject 
with this name at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1904. Lectures were 
given by Hobhouse; Westermarck; A. C. Haddon, an anthropologist; and Lafcadio 
Hearn who lectured on Japanese civilisation. All but Hearn were members of the 
Sociological Society. In 1907, Hobhouse became the first full-time professor in 
Sociology, while Westermack took a similar part-time appointment. Hobhouse 
occupied the Chair till his death in 1929 and Westermarck – till 1930. For twenty-
five years these two men were academic sociology in Britain10 and with them they 
carried the conviction that lay at the heart of the Society, that sociology is a 
philosophical and a theoretical subject.  
 
 
The First Sociology Courses 
 
As the person who sponsored the first sociology lectures, James Martin White, 
a friend of Branford and Geddes, had an important say in what these lectures should 
entail. Martin White had decided to invest in sociology because he thought it was 
vital for sociological knowledge to be spread among the public and members of 
parliament, who, in his own experience, appeared to be ignorant of the subject 
(Sociological Society, 1904: 21). He recommended ‘the study of the more general 
and philosophical aspects of sociological science’ and felt there was a need to ‘create 
a body of academic opinion in favour of re-organising the curricula of social studies’ 
in such a way that they more adequately recognise ‘synthetic sociological 
conceptions’ (Sociological Society, 1903c). Unlike others in the Society, Martin 
White did not hesitate to emphasise that in addition to constructing ‘a scientific 
theory of society’, sociology should aim to indicate the bearing of such knowledge 
on practical life (cf. Martin White in Fincham, 1975: 32).  
                                               
10 Empirical social science was simultaneously developing in other circles, such as LSE’s Social 





The ‘Martin White lectures’ were introduced according to plan in 1904. They 
focused on the study of ethnology and comparative psychology, social institutions 
and social ethics, essentially taking a Comtean approach – emphasising the 
comparative method and theoretical examination of the history and evolution of 
civilisation in different societies (LSE Calendars, 1904-1929). In addition to the 
Martin White lectures, in the period 1904-1930, under sociology, the university 
offered other, similarly oriented, courses as well as a course on Logic and Scientific 
Method a course on Methods of Social Investigation11.  
An insight into the understanding of sociology at the LSE and the role of the 
sociology courses in the social science curriculum can be garnered from the list of 
potential audiences. Despite their focus on social philosophy and abstract theory, in 
the LSE calendars the courses were not advertised as likely to be of interest to 
academicians but to professionals with a clear practical orientation, mostly future 
local state administrators (LSE Calendar, 1904). Sociology, therefore, appears to 
have played a kind of enlightening ‘liberal arts’, complementary role, to a variety of 
other core subjects, such as economics, finance etc. that would be preparing one for 
one’s profession.  
Fincham (1975) points out that the final make-up of the sociology courses 
depended less on what Martin White, on behalf of the Society, had to offer as 
sociology; and more on the academic situation at the LSE. According to Fincham, 
the LSE was initially reluctant to accept sociology because they were already 
teaching many ‘sociological’ subjects, such as economics, social administration and 
statistics. The LSE, Fincham argues, had little incentive to re-organise existing 
courses leaving sociology no choice but to fill a gap in the curriculum, that of taking 
up the task of teaching social theory and social philosophy.  
But Fincham overestimates what sociology had to offer at this early stage. 
Even if the Society wanted to compete with already established subjects at the LSE, 
the Society simply was not in a position to teach a variety of sociological specialisms 
                                               
11  The course on Logic and Scientific Method was largely philosophical. Methods of Social 
Investigation was more practically oriented but comprised of only three lectures on methods of 
sociological study common to other sciences (hypothesis, collection of data, statistics, verification) 
and peculiar to sociology (interview, documents, literature review). While Logic and Scientific 
Method was given continuously from 1905 to 1950, Methods of Social Investigation was relatively 




– it did not have the people to teach these specialisms (there were no statisticians or 
social administrators heavily involved in the Society); plus there was a limited 
number of people prepared to take up the post and deliver on the Society’s 
understanding of sociology – and those who were prepared, like Hobhouse and 
Westermarck, had already limited their work to the theoretical approach. As we saw 
earlier from the list of definitions of sociology, the Society had already agreed that 
sociology was not going to be about empirical investigation; there was little chance 
that they would have changed their mind and made a different choice, had the 
academic situation at the LSE been different. Paradoxically, in its attempt to 
encompass all social sciences and unite them in the Comtean mode, sociology had 
turned itself into a specialism that fulfilled the role of ‘liberal education’ – to provide 
broad knowledge of the world – a tendency that continued throughout the twentieth 
century. 
Some members of the Society welcomed the fact that the Society was able to 
successfully promote a non-empirical approach at the LSE. J. M. Robertson, for 
instance, argued that the fact that empirical and reformist social science was already 
being taught under a different title at the LSE meant that sociology could devote 
itself to philosophical and comparative analysis and that this provided a good 
opportunity for British sociology to go beyond the empirical work on ‘Drink 
Drainage and Divorce’, as he sarcastically put it, that originated in nineteenth-
century organisations such as the SSA and that, to his regret, had taken over 
American sociology (Sociological Society, 1904: 22-23). Similar views were 
expressed fifty years later at the closing meeting of the Institute of Sociology 
(established in 1930 as a result of the merging of the Le Play House and the 
Sociological Society; cf. Evans, 1986: 34), at which the empirical direction in which 
American sociology had developed was referred to as a ‘mistake’, which had led to 
American sociological departments being ‘limited to the handling of concrete social 
questions’ (Farquharson, 1957: 2). Ironically, American academic empirical social 
science had developed largely through the incorporation of empirical methods first 
developed in Britain; for British sociologists to brand it ‘a mistake’ at a time when 
American sociology was flourishing and British sociology was closing down one of 




deluded views of at least some leading sociologists at the time. There is every reason 
to believe that these attitudes persisted within British academic sociology circles 
long after the demise of the Sociological Society and its filial institutions. 
 
 
Hobhouse: Professor of Sociology 
 
After Branford had given up the idea that Geddes would be a suitable candidate 
for the chair (cf. Renwick, 2012), his attention turned to Hobhouse. He privately told 
a close friend that ‘something ought to be done to secure him [Hobhouse] for 
Sociology’ and that his ‘is the one personality round which the whole movement, at 
present inclining to be dispersive, might be crystallised and concentrated’ (Branford, 
1907). 
Branford’s motives in wanting Hobhouse were, it seems, largely driven by 
practical concerns. Geddes’ failure to win support in the Society combined with the 
fact that, in 1907, Hobhouse had lost his job and had by then some experience of 
teaching sociology, opened up the possibility of Hobhouse’s candidacy. However, 
when recommending him for the professorship, Branford did not point to 
Hobhouse’s sociological contribution or academic competence; he emphasised that 
Hobhouse would more easily accommodate the variety of sociological views that 
existed in the Society, and contribute to their successful co-ordination due to the fact 
that he was less strongly committed to one particular approach to sociology. It is 
perhaps ironic that, after rejecting Pearson’s criticism that the prospects for the 
Society are slim without an exceptionally capable individual, Branford’s decision 
was based on Hobhouse’s ‘personality’. The professorship was, therefore, not so 
much a sign of the increasing strength of sociology in academic circles, as yet 
another attempt to remedy problems of conflict within the Society and, ultimately, 
deeper problems within British sociology itself.    
A further indication of the weak and tentative beginnings of Hobhouse’s career 
and, indeed of sociology as an academic subject, comes from Hobhouse’s inaugural 
address. Instead of outlining his plans and ambitions for the future of sociology, 




focus and purpose to the ‘propagandist’12 pieces of the founders of the Society. It 
repeated the well-known Comtean principle  – ‘the problem before us as sociologists 
is to bring together in vital connection the inquiries which hitherto have been 
pursued apart’ (Hobhouse, 1908: 21) – but again, no suggestions are made as to the 
realisation of this ideal. When we also take into account Westermarck’s inaugural 
address as a part-time Professor of sociology, delivered at the same time as 
Hobhouse’s, in which he admitted that many of the criticisms sociology was facing 
were in fact accurate, it becomes difficult to view the academic establishment of 
sociology in Britain as a promising or auspicious event.   
With the professorships established, Hobhouse and Westermarck began 
teaching sociology as a special subject that was initially part of the BSc Economics. 
Not till much later, from 1920, did it become a separate degree. Their lectures 
changed little over the period of their professorships – Hobhouse taught ‘Social 
Ethics’, ‘Sociology and Ethics’ and ‘Social Evolution’, while Westermarck taught on 
early customs and social institutions. Their courses had a wide scope in the sense that 
they discussed social phenomena in general terms; but they were not an example of 
sociology reaching out to other social science fields and methods, with the view of 
incorporating them into one comprehensive science. The open approach to teaching 
sociology which derived from the Comtean understanding of sociology as a general 
science resulted in a situation in which any social science topic could be taught under 
sociology. And, so it happened, that over the course of the next twenty years, 
sociology taught courses on subjects as diverse as India, ancient Greece, social 
psychology and social structure. The upshot of these first attempts to establish 
sociology in this country were that sociology remained an ill-defined and 
marginalised subject that failed to establish its own clear boundaries.    
Apparently, Hobhouse himself did not feel at all confident in his abilities to 
promote sociology in academia. Up to ‘the early years of the war’ Hobhouse ‘had 
been wont to speak despondently about his own lectures on sociology’; he 
complained of ‘his failure to get the field of studies and research clear’ and even 
indicated ‘some thought of resigning the chair’ (Branford, 1929: 276). The event that 
                                               





is said to have changed ‘the sociological atmosphere’ in Hobhouse’s mind, was the 
completion of an encyclopaedic article on sociology (Branford, 1929: 276). Whether 
or not this article had a huge positive impact on Hobhouse’s psychological state, the 
article had little impact on the state of British sociology within and without academia. 
Ultimately, it said nothing new about sociology – Hobhouse maintained that 
sociology was ‘the synthesis of the social studies’; that ‘it may be taken to cover the 
whole body of sociological specialisms’ and that its ‘object of discovery’ was ‘the 
connecting links between other specialisms’ – all of which showed that sociology 
had changed or developed very little since it was first introduced into academia 
(Hobhouse in Hastings, 1920: 654). 
Hobhouse’s legacy is mixed – those, like his successor Morris Ginsberg, who 
value his contribution to social philosophy, maintain that he had the ‘rare power of 
combining metaphysical speculation with detailed painstaking empirical 
investigation’ and praise his work as ‘the most comprehensive and successful 
attempt in recent times whether in England or abroad towards a systematic sociology’ 
(Ginsberg, 1929: 144); while others, focusing on his role in establishing academic 
sociology, argue that his tradition of ‘theory and encyclopaedism’ was 
‘unfashionable’ (Sprott, 1957: 609) and ‘fatal to sociology in England’ (Soffer, 1982: 
792). Without committing to either of these rather extreme views, it is reasonable to 
say that Hobhouse’s contribution was limited to sustaining the rather dormant 
existence of sociology at the LSE. Since the introduction of sociology into academia 
was mainly due to Branford, with the financial support of Martin White, and not to 
the progress made by the Society, the professorships contributed little to the 
expansion and popularisation of sociology and even less to the fulfilment of the 
wider ambition of turning it into a general science. As with its other contributions, 
the Society’s attempt at establishing sociology as an academic subject had long-
lasting consequences for British sociology largely because of its limited success, 
exposing once again the shaky foundations of the Society’s idea of sociology and the 
difficulties surrounding its implementation in academia. 
 
 





The fourth attempted contribution of the Sociological Society was the creation 
of a sociology journal. From 1904 to 1907, the Society published three volumes of 
the Sociological Papers; and from 1907 onwards, it began publishing The 
Sociological Review on a quarterly basis.   
The founding of a journal on similar lines as the American Journal of 
Sociology or the Revue Internationale de Sociologie was seen as a ‘chief function’ of 
the Society (Branford, 1903b); as the achievement that justified its coming into 
existence, since ‘English students of sociology were seriously handicapped for want 
of such journal’ (Sociological Society, 1903d). In spite of the Society’s conviction 
that the Papers would remedy a serious problem that needed urgent solution, the 
publication of the Papers was met with mixed reviews.  
The press and a few popular foreign periodicals made positive comments, 
acknowledging that the Papers ‘secured a footing in the scientific world’ by ‘its 
collection of expert comment from all the leading countries’ and that they made a 
valuable contribution towards clarifying for the public the meaning of the term 
‘sociology’ (Sociological Society, 1906). But the reception of the Papers in academic 
journals was more negative.  
One British review acknowledged that the Papers brought together the work of 
social scientists from a variety of fields; but saw ‘the miscellaneous and tentative 
character’ of the contents as an indicator that the sociological literature was still 
uncoordinated (Jones, 1905: 440). Another review questioned the relationship 
between sociology and anthropology – ‘in what relation do we stand to the professed 
sociologists?’ and ‘How is their field of work going to be distinguished from ours?’ – 
and criticised the Papers for neither directly raising, not directly answering these 
questions (Burne, 1905: 120). An American review questioned the attempt to provide 
a common forum for sociologists: ‘In England there comes together a body of 
specialists in one or another social study, who discuss many problems, each man 
from his own standpoint’ (Davis, 1908: 152). And finally, a review in the Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, questioned the Sociological Society’s reluctance to 





But surely a sociologist, biologist, or meteorologist who handles the 
statistical data of his science in complete ignorance of statistical method is 
quite as bad as a statistician who deals with the data of a science of which 
he has no special knowledge? (Yule, 1907: 518). 
  
The idea of methodological co-operation between statisticians and sociologists 
was not completely absent from the discussions during the first few years of the 
Sociological Society (cf. Webb, 1907). But, it would appear that neither statisticians, 
nor sociologists, were able to give any clear indication of how this co-operation 
could be achieved in practice.   
The lack of co-ordination and of any clear sense of direction which emerged 
from the Papers and was reflected in these reviews, continued to manifest itself in 
The Sociological Review in the years that followed. Under the editorship of 
Hobhouse, between 1907-1910, the Review published on diverse subjects like crime 
and magic, Islam, Indian agriculture, vital statistics and so on; thereby struggling to 
build up its own distinct style and character. Hobhouse’s resignation from the 
editorship in 1910 was ‘accepted with great regret’ (Sociological Society, 1910) but 
with a general consensus that, despite his valuable work, his ‘general line of editorial 
policy tended to depart from the scope and aims of the Society’ (Branford, 1929: 
276). Once Branford took over as editor, the last strong link between academic 
sociology at the LSE and sociology at the Sociological Society was broken and the 
Society was by now reduced to a small circle around Branford and Geddes. But the 
journal itself could not resolve the essential problems that sociology was facing, 
including how sociology would differentiate itself from the many specialist 
disciplines that were already in existence; and how it would organise specialist 
knowledge into a coherent whole. The journal may have stirred up popular 
imagination and enthusiasm about the sociological ideal of an all-embracing social 
science, but it fell far short of turning this ideal into a reality; in fact, the journal only 









Chapter Eight  
 
The Influence of the Sociological Society on the Relationship between 
Sociology and Statistics 
  
The above discussion reveals how that the Society’s long-lasting legacy stems 
from the limited advances they made in trying to organise a clear and coherent study 
of sociology within their circles, in their promotion of academic sociology and in the 
founding of a journal.  However, there is another important aspect of the Society’s 
legacy that has to do with the choices that were made with regard to creating 
potential links with the statistical tradition of empirical enquiry. This last part pays 
special attention to what happened within the circles of the Society to influence their 
particular stance towards statistics. 
 
 
How the Sociological Society’s Idea of Sociology Shaped Their Attitude 
towards Statistics 
 
A good place to start is the Society’s general view and understanding of 
sociology and its tasks. In its first three and most active years, between 1904 and 
1907, the Sociological Society adopted the Comtean idea of sociology and, following 
Comte, the Society set themselves the task of providing ‘common ground on which 
workers from all fields and schools concerned with social phenomena may meet’ 
with a view to ensuring that co-operation between different groups of social 
scientists would improve understanding of social phenomena (Sociological Society, 
1905a). Given this claim of taking a wide and open approach, it seems surprising that 
no statisticians were involved in the Society’s work and that links, if they existed at 
all, between the Royal Statistical Society and the Sociological Society were 
extremely weak. So how was the Society’s ideal of universal co-operation between 
social scientists to be achieved without reaching out to all possible groups of social 




As I have already explained, according to Comte, the application of 
mathematics and of the mathematical theory of probability to the study of society 
was ‘inadmissible’ and could be reduced to a mere ‘pretension’ on the part of  ‘some 
geometers to render social investigations positive by subjecting them to a fanciful 
mathematical theory of chances’ (Comte, 1875: 120). For Comte the method ‘proper 
to sociology’ was the historical method (Comte, 1875: 501); the study of society 
through mathematics was not only incompatible with the principles of positive 
philosophy on which sociology should be based but it was also sheer ‘extravagance’ 
(Comte, 1875: 501). There is no evidence that any of the organisers of the 
Sociological Society strictly adhered to Comte’s understanding of the use of 
mathematics and probability in sociology, but the fact that Comte clearly denounced 
the value of statistics in sociological enquiry would have made it difficult for anyone 
who followed his philosophy to look at statistics sympathetically. 
Comte’s understanding of sociology, however, did have a direct influence on 
the Society’s attitude towards statistics and probability and their role in sociology. 
Comte’s sociology was to be a general science that could offer something above and 
beyond the existing anthropological, psychological, economical and, indeed, 
statistical explanations of social phenomena. The Sociological Society set themselves 
the goal of turning this idea into a reality – to achieve unification of the social 
sciences both intellectually and institutionally. The establishment of a statistical 
sociology, building on the work already done in this direction during the nineteenth 
century, was, therefore, against the very ideal which the Society aimed to follow. 
The Society argued that:  
 
The important thing was to bring home to people the differentia in the 
handling of a given problem by Sociology as against its treatment by those 
specialist sciences which also dealt with sociological phenomena, 
especially such groups as Economics, Statistics and Demography; 
Anthropology, Folklore and Primitive History institutions; Psychology, 
Child-studies, Ethics; Social Pathology, Criminology (Sociological Society, 
1903b).  
 
Even though the Society struggled to clarify the distinctive features of the 
proposed new sociological approach, it is clear that, in these circumstances, 




another sociological specialism, rather than preparing the ground for the founding of 
a general science.  
Although Comtean attitudes towards mathematical statistics and the Comtean 
idea of sociology may have created unfavourable conditions for the development of 
an explicitly statistical sociology, they did not totally exclude statistics from 
sociology – after all, the idea of sociology as a general science was supposed to 
include statistics, at least in some form. However, any prospects of the inclusion of 
statistics into sociology was stifled by the Society’s lack of a clear and workable 
strategy regarding the way in which the idea of a sociology as general science could 
be implemented – about ways in which statistics, or any other ‘social science 
specialism’, could be turned into a part of sociology. 
One way in which the inclusion of statistics into sociology as a general science 
could have been achieved in practice would have been to establish secure 
connections with the Royal Statistical Society. As it turns out, however, the only 
explicit link between the Sociological and Statistical Societies, was Edward 
Brabrook, who was chairman of the Executive committee of the Sociological Society 
in 1903 and Chairman of the Council in 1904 and had been Vice-President of the 
Statistical Society in 1900 and President of Section F (Statistics and Economics) at 
the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1903. In addition, Sir 
John Macdonnel, Vice President of the Statistical Society, was present at the Council 
of the Sociological Society in November 1904. There is no evidence, however, that 
either Brabrook, or Macdonnel, or anyone else, made any significant efforts to 
improve the connections between the Statistical and the Sociological Societies.  
This question was discussed in some detail by Beatrice Webb, who 
recommended that the Sociological Society proceed with care in order to avoid doing 
anything that might intimidate the existing social science institutions. Instead, the 
Society should ‘strive to enrol in it the very best brains of the Royal Economic 
Society, the Royal Statistical Society, and all the others’ (Webb, 1904: 25). However, 
the Society devised no strategy for action based on her recommendations.   
Another possible way of incorporating statistics as part of a Comtean sociology 
would have been a close co-operation between the Journal of the Royal Statistical 




was supposed to fill an important gap since Britain still had ‘no journal which 
continuously and systematically prosecutes the study of social phenomena in their 
totality and records the progress of such study in other countries’ (Sociological 
Society, 1903a). This statement was, strictly speaking, true, since all social science 
journals that existed in Britain at the time were devoted to a specific branch of social 
science. But without any acknowledgement that the existing journals had been 
contributing to the corpus of sociological knowledge, such a statement also implied 
that the material contained in these journals, including the Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, was perceived as ‘un-sociological’. Such an attitude of dismissal 
was unlikely to prepare the ground for future co-operation between the journals and 
their producers.  
Endorsement of the Comtean idea of sociology, resulted in less favourable 
conditions for the development of a close, productive relationship between sociology 
and statistics in the UK than would have been the case had the Society endorsed, say, 
ideas based on the English empirical tradition of social enquiry which had been 
developing throughout the nineteenth century. But what created even bigger 
obstacles was the Society’s lack of ambition and, indeed, willingness to establish 
secure connections with the statistical institutions that already existed in the UK. The 
fact that the Society made little effort to establish institutional co-operation with any 
other social science institutions, let alone the Royal Statistical Society, inevitably 
begs the question as to how genuine the society’s commitment to establishing a 
general science of society actually was. 
 
 
The Role of the Sociological Society’s Idea of Methodology in Shaping Their 
Attitude Towards Statistics 
 
The most straightforward way of incorporating statistics into sociology would 
have been as one of its methods. By examining the general discussion about the 
methods of sociology that took place in the first three and most active years of the 
Society, we can see whether statistics was part of these discussions, and if so, how its 




The Society’s early Sociological Papers (1905-1907) do not contain a specific 
discussion on methods. Even the details – advantages, flaws and application – of the 
comparative method, which was supposed to be the primary method in a Comtean-
style sociology, was not discussed at the first meetings of the society. The only 
insight we can garner about the Society’s attitudes towards any potential sociological 
methods comes from a variety of individual contributions.   
In the paper, which Victor Branford, chief organiser of the Society, sent around 
to advertise the proposed sociological society, he argued that sociologists should 
possess the ability to think both philosophically and scientifically. ‘The Sociologist’, 
Branford argued, ‘derives his general attitude, mental tendency and outlook from 
philosophy’, but he or she should not neglect ‘the ability to study society in the 
manner of the positive sciences’ (Branford, 1905a: 16). This would require 
knowledge in the mathematical or physical or biological sciences, which would help 
them to apply precise observation and rigorous logic to their studies. However, there 
is no sign that the Society ever followed up these recommendations; instead we see 
the emphasis placed on philosophical work and the teaching of social philosophy (cf. 
the work of L. T. Hobhouse and Morris Ginsberg); statistical training did not become 
part of the sociology curriculum until the early post-war period.  
Statistics is mentioned on a few occasions in the early Sociological Papers but 
the majority of comments show that the interest in it as a sociological method was 
superficial. For instance, in 1904 Branford acknowledged that there was such a thing 
as statistical sociology, founded, according to him, by Condorcet, De Witt and 
Quetelet (cf. Branford, 1904a: 111-112). But he did not explain how, if at all, this 
‘statistical sociology’ would form part of sociology in the UK, and his comments had 
no practical results for the incorporation of statistics into sociology.  
In their contribution to the Sociological Papers of the Society in 1905, 
Durkheim and Fauconnet wrote in a similar vein, but displayed a more sophisticated 
understanding of the role of statistics in sociology. According to them, the major 
contribution of statistics was to reveal how societies could be characterised by birth-
rates, marriage-rates, criminal statistics etc., showing that these do not depend on 
‘the capricious will of individuals, but express social conditions permanent and 




Their paper further acknowledged that sociology is ‘no longer the monopoly of 
sociologists alone’ (Durkheim and Fauconnet, 1905: 276); nonetheless, sociology 
was and could only be ‘the system of the social sciences’ (Durkheim and Fauconnet, 
1905: 268). In such a system, statistics would play some part; however, even 
Durkheim failed to make clear what this part would be and whether statistics would 
be considered a sociological method.  
Other commentators were not even prepared to consider a place for statistics in 
sociology. John Ingram, the Comtean who in 1878 had made an unsuccessful attempt 
to reorganise the Economics and Statistics section of the BAAS into a sociological 
one, argued that statistics ‘is not a branch of science at all, it is congeries of 
observations ancillary to several sciences’ (Ingram, 1905: 235). This comment may 
have been coloured by Ingram’s resentment at the way in which the political 
economists and statisticians had reacted to his suggestions for reforming the 
Statistics and Economics section of BAAS into a sociological one, a few decades 
earlier, but Ingram’s views were influential and should not be ignored – he was the 
second best-known and most active follower of Comte in the UK after Frederic 
Harrison (Harrison was also very critical of statistics, cf. Harrison, 1910). 
In addition, the Sociological Papers do contain a few positive remarks about 
the potential contribution of statistics to sociology. These comments at least show 
that some of the Society’s members had a clearer vision about the possibility of 
incorporating statistics into sociology. For instance, Winiarski, a Swiss scholar and 
professor of political economy, argued that the social sciences are evolving towards a 
positive stage, characterised by better precision and accuracy, and better ability to 
formulate general laws. Similarly to Comte, he also argued that none of the ‘special 
social sciences, in spite of their sturdy development, are able to formulate scientific 
general rational laws’ (Winiarski, 1905: 252) and that this would be the subject 
matter of general sociology.  However, in contrast to Comte, Winiarski also argued 
that the positive stage of the development of science, and general sociology itself, 
would be related to the further development and expansion of statistics: 
  
[…] general sociology is still in the intermediate qualitative phase; but, 




enter into the abstract quantitative phase, just as the concrete sciences will 
transform themselves into statistics (Winiarski, 1905: 253). 
 
Unlike anyone else in the Society, Winiarski recognised that quantitative 
methods had the potential to improve general sociology – a view that in Britain at the 
time was shared only within the circles of economists regarding economics. His 
discussion, however, was limited to a rather abstract outline of the possible 
development of social science without giving any clear suggestions as to how this 
would be practically achieved. Moreover, there is no evidence that his view was 
widely discussed within the Society, suggesting that there was little enthusiasm.  
Beatrice Webb’s comments on statistics, however, did receive some general 
feedback and, therefore, give a clearer indication of the Society’s attitude towards the 
role of statistics. Webb suggested that statistics is necessary in nearly all social 
observations in order to prevent ‘falling into the fallacy of the individual instance’ 
(Webb, 1907: 349). She argued that the potential of statistics to provide an insight 
into the spread, rate of occurrence or magnitude of the social phenomena should be 
utilised as far as possible, but she also argued that this should happen alongside the 
application of other methods:  
  
[…] it is the qualitative methods of observation – experiment and the use 
of documents and literature – which enables one to discover the processes 
of society, and it is the statistical method that enables one to check these 
observations, to see that they apply to a large number of instances instead 
of to one only (Webb, 1907: 350). 
 
Webb’s paper is the only contribution to the Sociological Papers that contains 
a clear plan outlining the role of statistics in sociology. The paper, however, received 
a rather cold reception, which focused on the potential problems related to the 
practical implementation of her views, rather than on the advantages it could bring. 
The discussants were rather sceptical towards any interference on the part of the 
statisticians. It was argued that statisticians could not do sociological work, because 
their competence in collecting and classifying sociological facts ‘was not beyond 
question’ (Unknown, 1907: 352). The possibility of training sociologists in statistics 
and mathematics was not discussed. Instead, following these comments, Webb 





[…] the statistician should never be allowed to collect his own data; he did 
not understand that the work of the sociologist was delicate observation of 
processes, each of which was slightly different from the rest (Webb, 1907: 
353).  
 
However, Webb also added that this situation could be remedied by an 
effective co-operation between a statistician and a ‘qualitative observer’ (Webb, 
1907: 353). The Society, however, did little to encourage such co-operation in 
practice. Overall, the unproductive and fragmented way in which the members of the 
Society discussed the methods of sociology and their ambivalence towards the utility 
of statistics meant that the establishment of the Sociological Society did little to 
improve the prospects for the development of a British statistical sociology. 
 
 
The Role of Branford’s, Geddes’ and Galton’s Personal Views in Shaping the 
Sociological Society’s Attitude Towards Statistics  
 
In addition to the intellectual and institutional factors discussed above, there 
were other factors related to the personal interests of the leading members of the 
Society, notably Victor Branford, Patrick Geddes and Francis Galton, that also 
played an important role with regard to the early prospects of a co-operation between 
statistics and sociology.  
Victor Branford was the main organiser of the Sociological Society and the 
chief decision-maker. His attitude towards statistics would have been vital in 
fostering good relations between the Society and the statistical institutions that 
existed in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, the statistics 
community was represented by two separate and distinct circles of researchers: one 
circle developing the so-called ‘new English statistics’ centred around Karl Pearson 
and his colleagues; the other centred around the Royal Statistical Society. There are 
some indications in Branford’s official writing and personal correspondence which 
suggest that he was sceptical towards the possibility, and indeed the value, of an 




For instance, Branford wrote a rather mocking reply to a criticism of the state 
of sociology that Karl Pearson had made at one of the meetings of the Society: 
  
We may anticipate that before long some industrious anthropologist will 
discover among “prehistoric remains” a curious document called “Cours de 
Philosophie Positive”. Seen as a survival of early culture, the document 
will arouse sufficient interest to be deciphered. It may even be 
comprehended. The statisticians will doubtless measure it, and – since 
there is no limit to the wonders of science – they may even read it 
(Branford, 1905b: 37). 
 
Since, at the time he made these remarks Branford was in the throes of a heated 
argument with Pearson, it could be construed that his comments are targeted 
particularly at Pearson and the type of statistics he was developing and not at 
statistics in general. Perhaps, then, these comments create an exaggerated and 
somewhat distorted image of Branford’s general attitude towards statistics in Britain. 
Nonetheless, Branford’s decision to make churlish remarks instead of challenging 
Pearson’s criticisms in a more constructive and professional manner, does suggest 
that his overall view of statistics was, to say the least, cynical. 
Karl Pearson may have been the leading statistician in Britain at the time but 
he himself had abstained from joining the Royal Statistical Society, partly due to 
intellectual differences and partly due to Pearson’s tendency to avoid affiliation with 
societies or clubs of any sort (cf. Pearson, 1894 for Pearson’s criticism towards the 
Royal Statistical Society). Therefore, although Branford and Pearson fell out when 
the Sociological Society was established, there was still a possibility that the 
Sociological Society and RSS might work together. As it turns out, however, 
Branford’s personal views of the RSS were also rather negative and his attempts to 
co-operate with them came to nothing. In a 1903 letter to Geddes, Branford 
mentioned that the secretary of the Statistical Society had unofficially ‘declared his 
belief in the need of a special sociological society’. But establishing a good 
relationship with the statisticians proved difficult and frustrating:  
 
Since I last wrote to you about the attitude of the statistical society, I have 
been trying to force their hand by constantly pressing on them the need for 
purchasing more sociological literature, and as they haven’t sufficient 




the alternative either of straining their resources, or disclaiming the 
pretension to oversight of sociological interests. From a recent talk I had 
with the Secretary, I gather that they are inclining to adopt the latter 
alternative (Branford, 1903c). 
 
It would appear, then, that from the very beginning the possibility of a 
productive relationship between the statisticians and those interested in promoting 
sociology was hindered by a lack of substantial interest in sociology on the part of 
the statisticians, on the one hand; and somewhat feeble efforts on the part of the 
sociologists to gain some practical support from the statisticians, on the other. Both 
Societies failed to get any closer than sharing the same building for a few months. 
Why this was the case is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
An important insight into Branford’s preferences for a particular type of 
sociology comes from a paper he wrote in 1904 on ‘the founders of sociology’. In 
this paper, Branford discusses at great length some of the contributions of the 
Marquis de Condorcet. Condorcet has been mentioned briefly in the previous 
chapters; he is regarded by historians as one of the first to formulate the idea of a 
social science, even though he contributed little to its realisation. What is peculiar 
about him is that he proposed a social science of a two-fold type – to use Hacking’s 
(1990) phrases, Condorcet conceived of social science as consisting of moral-
science-as-history which examined grand scale social evolution; and moral science 
as social mathematics. Both Comte and Quetelet admired Condorcet but for different 
reasons: while Comte took up moral-science-as-history and transformed it into an 
idea of sociology, Quetelet took up Condorcet’s social mathematics and transformed 
it into social statistics. As for Branford, he gave much praise to the idea of moral-
science-as-history and argued that it is because of this that Condorcet deserves a 
place among the founders of sociology; he hardly mentioned Condorcet’s idea of 
social mathematics. The Sociological Society’s sociology was, of course, not 
Condorcet’s moral-science-as-history; nor was early twentieth-century British 
statistics Condorcet’s social mathematics. But one could not help thinking that 
Branford’s choice to praise the former but not the latter as a foundation stone of 
sociology puts him, and with him the Sociological Society, in line with Condorcet 
the moral philosopher and Comte the positivist, rather than with Condorcet the social 




seem a problem to Condorcet in the eighteenth century – the existence of these two 
types of social science in harmony and co-operation – was to prove such a difficult 
task to the founders of British sociology and to future generations of British 
sociologists. 
Branford was not the only individual whose personal views would prove 
important for any potential co-operation between statistics and sociology. As 
Renwick (2012) argues, the Sociological Society was supposed to prepare the ground 
for the realisation of Patrick Geddes’ sociological ambitions: one of the major aims 
of the Society at its outset had been to secure Geddes’ popularity among 
sociologically minded intellectuals and thereby secure for him the first chair in 
Sociology. But Geddes too, it seems, had little interest in working to develop a 
statistical sociology that would include a close co-operation with the statisticians. 
Geddes had an old interest in statistics. Back in 1881, he had given a lecture on 
the proper classification of statistics, in which he gave suggestions as to how 
statistics from different countries could be better organised into comparable units (cf. 
Geddes, 1881). In this paper, he also acknowledged that statistics has the potential to 
enhance and improve social scientific enquiries. By the time the Sociological Society 
was established, however, other substantive and methodological interests had 
overtaken his work. In his first paper given to the Society, Geddes argued:   
 
[…] after many years of experiment and practice in teaching sociology, I 
still find no better method available than that of regional survey, historical 
as well geographical […] in my view, indeed, a sociological society has at 
least as much use for a collection of maps, plans and photographs as of 
statistics (Geddes, 1905: 108, 110). 
 
This and the subsequent papers Geddes gave at the Society’s meetings 
suggested that Geddes wanted to develop an alternative sociology that was not 
focused on, or limited to, well-established methods, such as statistics. The 
meandering and obscure style of his papers, however, failed to convince the 
members of the Society that the programme he was proposing was viable. But even 
if he had succeeded in persuading the Society to follow his plans, Geddes, it seems, 
would have done little to promote further co-operation between sociology and 




statistics; statistics is also absent in the Sociology Lecture Syllabuses that Geddes 
compiled in 1905-1907, which take as an example the city of London and attempt to 
analyse it via geographical, anthropological, economical, aesthetical, political, 
historical, psychological, idealist and social pathological – but no statistical – 
approaches (cf. Geddes, 1905-7; 1906, 1907). Nor does Geddes’ later work in the 
Sociological Society and at the Le Play house contain any reference to statistics.  
Francis Galton was both a pioneering statistician with a distinguished 
reputation and, at least for a short time, a member of the Sociological Society. His 
involvement in the Sociological Society might have improved the prospects of an 
effective co-operation between statistics and sociology but this failed to happen for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the correspondence between Branford and Galton (cf. 
Branford, 1902-1905) suggests that the relationship between the two men was rather 
superficial and that there was no intellectual bonding. Branford’s letters to Galton, 
are notably pretentious, exaggerated and flattering: 
 
I need not say how welcome was your allusion to your expanding the paper 
somewhat […] is it [eugenics] not the very crown and summit to which 
historical and theoretical sociology must ultimately lead? (Branford: 
1904c).  
 
Except for the lavish praise of Galton and his eugenics programme that 
Branford expressed in his personal correspondence, Branford did not compliment or 
seriously engage with eugenics in any other official writing. It seems likely, therefore, 
that Branford was not genuinely interested in eugenics but was merely trying to 
secure for the Sociological Society the endowment that Galton was planning to make 
in order to promote research into eugenics (see Renwick, 2012 for more details). Nor, 
it seems, was Galton’s interest in the Sociological Society and the sociology they 
were promoting, any deeper than Branford’s interest in Galton and his eugenics 
programme. In their correspondence, Galton’s brief and matter-of-fact hand-written 
notes stand in contrast to Branford’s flattering letters. Galton writes mainly about the 
revisions and presentation of his papers to the Society. Although grateful for the 
opportunity Branford was offering him, he did not express much concern, let alone 
praise, for sociology. This egocentric attitude on Galton’s part is also evident in the 




Sociological Papers. In his papers, which focus primarily on eugenics, Galton did not 
make a single reference to sociology or to the question of how eugenics research and 
its methods would contribute to general sociology – a clear enough sign that Galton 
had little or no interest in sociology for its own sake, but only in so far as it helped 
him in developing eugenics. More importantly, he does not discuss how statistics as 
a method in its own right could prove useful in sociology or how it could be 
incorporated into sociology, suggesting that Galton’s continuous presence at the 
Society would have done little to improve co-operation between sociology and 
statistics. As it turned out, the audience at the Sociological Society was not 
impressed by Galton’s plans for eugenics. Branford was forced to send his personal 
apologies to Galton for the cool reception and unsupportive attitude, putting the 
blame on his own failure to ‘bring forward a larger number of statisticians and 
biologists’ whom he had invited but who failed to attend (Branford, 1904d). 
Regardless of Branford’s apologetic gestures, Galton eventually left the Society in 
1905 and went on to establish the Eugenics Education Society in 1907 and a 
eugenics chair and laboratory at University College London.    
 
 
The Role of the Relationship between Statistics and Economics in Shaping the 
Sociological Society’s Attitude towards Statistics  
 
An examination of possible opportunities to establish close links between 
statistics and sociology at the time of the Sociological Society would not be complete 
without taking into account the contemporary development of statistics and the 
attitude of the statisticians towards sociology. Some important advances of the 
British statistical movement have already been mentioned in the introduction; and 
the attitude of the circle led by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, has been discussed 
at length. In this last section, I turn to the close relationship between statistics and 
economics that characterised the work of the other leading group of statisticians, 
those at the Royal Statistical Society, and that played a role in the way the 




During the nineteenth century, statistics in Britain developed a close 
relationship with political economy, later economics, at both an institutional and 
intellectual level.  As already discussed in previous chapters, an important part of the 
intellectual rationale for founding a statistical section (Section F) of the BAAS in 
1833 was the ambition of its founders to reform political economy, with the help of 
statistics, into an inductive social science (Goldman, 1983). A year later, in 1834, the 
founders of Section F founded the SSL as part of their ambitious plan. Implementing 
this plan in practice, however, proved more difficult than initially thought and, as a 
result, the then London Statistical Society modified their stance towards political 
economy. From 1834 to 1857 the motto of the SSL, aliis exterendum, reflected the 
Society’s intention to co-operate with the political economists as long as the 
statisticians’ work was perceived as distinct and separate, serving only to provide the 
data to be ‘threshed out’ by the economists. For two decades this remained the 
principle on which the Society operated, while in practice their work contained much 
analysis of the data they were gathering. But once statistics established itself on 
firmer grounds, the aliis exterendum policy became unnecessary and unsustainable – 
in the 1840s and 1850s, the Society published a few papers arguing in favour of the 
statisticians involvement in the analysis of the data they were gathering (cf. SSL 
Annual Addresses 1841, 1843, 1851); in 1856, Section F was renamed, changing 
from ‘Statistics’ to ‘Economics and Statistics’; and in 1857, the aliis exterendum 
motto was officially abandoned. Thus, after a short period in which statistics made 
some rather unsuccessful attempts to distance itself from economics, the links 
between the two subjects were again reinforced. By the 1880s and 1890s, in both 
Section F and the Royal Statistical Society, the indispensable links between 
economics and statistics were often explicitly affirmed by the Presidents of both 
institutions: 
 
[…] the statistical method comes in as an inseparable ally of economic 
speculation […] Nor have indications been wanting of a desire, still more 
recently expressed, to break down the wall of division between statistics 
as generally understood and political economy, and to treat the two, if not 
as identical, at least as so closely allied, as to be capable of similar or 





[…] the greatest mistakes which economists have made might have been 
avoided, if they had relied less on a priori reasoning, and had paid greater 
attention to the facts of human society, which it is the business of 
Statistical Science to furnish [...] If economic hypothesis is incomplete 
without statistics, statistics are meaningless without a hypothesis […] If 
therefore economic science must be incomplete without statistics, 
statistics are unmeaning and useless unless selected and digested by 
economic science (Farrer, 1894: 601-2). 
 
This close relationship between statistics and economics was to become 
formalised within academia – when the London School of Economics was 
established in 1895, statistics was one of the few main subjects that the School taught 
and statistics continued to play an indispensable part in the LSE economics degrees 
throughout the twentieth century (cf. LSE Calendars, 1895-1979).  
By the time the Sociological Society was established, therefore, both the 
statistical researchers working with Galton and Pearson, and those working at the 
RSS had little incentive for making extra efforts to co-operate with sociologists – the 
first group had their own distinctive fields of study, namely eugenics and biometrics 
and their own institution and journal; while the RSS enjoyed powerful links with 
economics and economics institutions. This is not to say that that statistics and 
sociology failed to develop a close cooperation because statistics already had well 
developed relationships with other subjects. But, at a time when sociology was 
looking to establish itself as a distinct and prominent subject, it was made less likely 
that it would chose statistics as its prime method, given that statistics was already so 
firmly associated with other subjects and institutions.   
However, the inherent challenges the Sociological Society faced had a much 
stronger influence on the course of sociology than the external influence of any other 
social science subjects. The ultimate failure, of a close co-operation at the beginning 
of the twentieth century between sociology and statistics depended on a number of 
factors. Among them was the type of sociology the Society wished to promote; the 
organisational problems within the Society itself, leading to a general lack of positive 
discussions; the personal motives of its leading members; as well as the position of 
statistics in relation to other fields of study, such as eugenics, biometrics and 
economics. Only by examining the interplay of these factors against the background 




the events which took place within the early Sociological Society, was that British 
sociology was to lose not so much its ‘biological roots’, as Renwick (2012) has 
argued; but the opportunity to grow on well prepared and fertile ‘statistical’ ground. 
This outcome was not inevitable: the combination of factors, examined here, do not 
add up to a clear and unambiguous anti-statistical position on the part of the 
sociologists; none of these factors alone would, inevitably, have distanced sociology 
from statistics at the beginning of the twentieth century when there was nothing 
inherently a-statistical about sociology and nothing inherently a-sociological about 
social statistics. It was the chance combination of a number of negative factors, 
forging the perception of an incompatibility that was to determine the subsequent 
course of events and shape the long-term future of British sociology.   
 
 
Sociology and Statistics in the Sociological Society: Summary 
 
The Sociological Society set itself a difficult and unprecedented task. In their 
aspirations, its founders were led by the noble ideal of creating a unified and co-
operative community of social scientists who could study society together. However, 
the conclusion of the Society’s most active period was marked by the bitter 
realisation that neither the Society itself, nor the founding of a sociological journal, 
nor the establishment of academic sociology could make this ideal come true. 
In 1911, in an open discussion on ‘the things one expected from a Sociological 
Society’, a critic proclaimed that ‘indictment’ of the Society could be regarded as ‘an 
act of ungraciousness’; but as someone who had waited ‘ever since the foundation of 
the society for elucidation by it of certain problems and month after month met only 
with disappointment’, they thought it necessary to speak out. Their forlorn hopes ‘of 
seeing this synthetic idea emerge’ have been ‘uniformly disappointed’ (Nivedita, 
1911: 244-245). 
Branford’s response to these critiques was ambivalent. He himself had already 
admitted that although the Society had ‘furnished a platform for the presenting of the 
results of independent investigation’ they could not ‘pretend to have carried out […] 




with reference to the proposals for co-operative research’ (Branford, 1908b). In 
response to these critiques, he acknowledged that they contained ‘much truth and 
relevance’ and even went on to question the whole legacy of the Society:  
 
Has the Society generated amongst its members the thrill of a common 
enterprise; or has it merely now and again gathered together manifold 
representatives for some temporary common end (Branford, 1911: 248)? 
 
But despite his frankly depreciative remarks, Branford was not prepared to 
hold the Society fully responsible for its own lack of success and instead argued that 
the problems they had had were due to ‘its social milieu’: 
 
Behind the question – What is wrong with sociologists and the 
Sociological Society? lies the deeper question – What is wrong with 
society itself? […] Are not indeed those shortcomings of the Sociological 
Society […] the very characteristics which make our contemporary 
occidental society so fertile in personal initiative, sectional amelioration 
and material progress, so sterile in unifying these partial achievements into 
collective spiritual uplift and concerned social advance? (Branford, 1911: 
249). 
 
It is not uncommon for sociologists to use such arguments to explain their 
problems at a time of crisis13. But even if the ‘social milieu’ was not favourable to 
the type of sociology it was promoting, the Society’s internal problems, as I have 
shown here, undoubtedly, played a major role in the Society’s lack of success and its 
ultimate fate.  
Thus, after only a couple of vibrant and eventful years, the Society led a quiet 
and marginal existence for the next few decades. During the 1910s it continued to 
hold meetings and organise various study groups and lecture seminars (Institute of 
Sociology, 1935). In 1920, the Society was incorporated into a bigger organisation 
called the Le Play House, together with the Civic Education League and the Regional 
Association. The Le Play House organised two conferences, one in 1922 on the 
‘Correlation of the Social Sciences’ and one on ‘Living Religions within the Empire’ 
in 1924 (Institute of Sociology, 1935). During this period the Society’s activities 
were almost exclusively confined to the civics approach to sociology. Eventually, in 
                                               





1930, the Society with its associated bodies was incorporated into ‘The Institute of 
Sociology’ which was dissolved in 1955. 
Why should the legacy of the Sociological Society be important, if its struggle 
to establish sociology in Britain resulted in disorganisation, fragmented scholarship 
and unrealised ideals? The course of development of British sociology during and 
after the most active years of the Society, was not inevitable – it was not entirely pre-
conditioned by the existence of other social science organisations preceding the 
Society, as Abrams argued; nor could it have been a direct product of the ‘social 
milieu’, as Branford maintained. It was the events, and, more importantly, the 
choices made by the Society, that played the major role. It was these choices – 
choices about a philosophical ideal on which to base sociology; about a definition of 
sociology; about a Professorship and a Journal; about an organisational strategy; 
about the position it took towards the statistical tradition of social enquiry – that had 
more influence on the course of sociology in Britain than anything that the Society 
ever did to act upon these choices. Once sociology was associated with a particular 
choice of words, of thought, of institutions established by the Society, regardless of 
whether these choices bore fruit or not, it was very difficult for sociology to re-
organise itself into something different. It took another fifty-sixty years before a 
different group of people could take advantage of the radically changing social and 
political environment in order to make fresh choices about what sociology would be, 















Chapter Nine  
 





As the most active period of the Sociological Society came to an end in 1907-8, 
British sociology entered what has been widely regarded as a dormant and 
unproductive period. Scholarly investigations into the most pressing social problems, 
such as social environment, poverty, population decline continued but not as part of 
what had been established as academic sociology under L. T. Hobhouse or as part of 
the work of the institutions that descended from the Sociological Society which 
focused primarily on regional surveys. An ill-defined, but nonetheless tangible, 
division was emerging and becoming more deeply entrenched between organisations 
working on empirical projects, including statistically based projects; and those 
working within a more abstract, philosophically based academic discipline named 
sociology. Different historians have tackled this issue differently: while some 
accounts are predominantly descriptive, aiming only to provide a general chronicle 
of all the work done with respect to the study of society in this period, others have 
used the historical evidence to evaluate whether British academic sociology was ‘a 
success’ or ‘a failure’. In the following chapter, I explain why, in my view, judging 
this period as a success or failure is neither historically justifiable, nor productive; 
afterwards I move on to explain how the course of development followed by 
academic sociology in the 1910s-1930s affected its prospects of establishing firm 
connections with statistics. 
In his account of ‘empirical sociology in Britain’, Kent (1981) describes the 
interwar period as a time of the expansion and improvement of social surveys, 
mainly in terms of the elaborations and extensions made in the use of sampling 
procedures. Kent’s account shows that the survey work done in this period was not 
done by researchers working in academic sociology – notable examples of such 




the replication of Charles Booth study on London life and labour carried out between 
1928 and 1934, New Survey of London Life and Labour; Rowntree’s own 1936 
replication of the study on poverty he originally published in 1901; and Caradog 
Jones’ 1934 Merseyside survey.  
As Kent’s examples suggest, most surveys conducted during this period 
examined poverty and living conditions. However, what is more peculiar about them 
is that despite the fact that some of them utilised the new techniques of sampling, 
they were still very much representative of the social statistical tradition prior to the 
development of the so-called new English statistics, which began in the late 
nineteenth century with Galton, Pearson, Yule, Edgeworth etc. who developed 
statistical testing and incorporated the theory of probability into statistical research. 
As Kent concludes, in the interwar period the social survey ‘remained an essentially 
practical undertaking, geared to specific questions and problems’; it was not 
‘concerned with any comprehensive sociological theory, but it did not even attempt 
to generate, still less test, specific hypotheses’ (Kent, 1981: 114). This trend can also 
be observed in the survey work on social mobility, as Goldthorpe (forthcoming) 
discusses in great detail.  
Although Kent’s account briefly mentions the institutional development of 
sociology in the interwar period, it is other accounts that have shaped our 
understanding of the history of sociology in this period. Among them is Evans’ 1986 
account of the development of the regional movement, as represented by the 
Sociological Society’s affiliate institutions, the Le Play house in the 1920s and from 
1930, the Institute of Sociology. Despite various initiatives and projects, these 
institutions did not leave a long-lasting legacy and, according to Evans, with their 
non-cooperative attitude towards the rest of social science, they contributed even 
further to the fragmentation of social science in Britain. Among the reasons that led 
to this outcome, but also to the decline of the LePlay House and the Institute, was the 
insistence of the organiser and chief executive officer of the Institute, Alexander 
Farquharson, that social research be carried out by amateurs – according to Evans’, 
the reason ‘why Farquharson rejected quantitative techniques was that they could not 
be carried out effectively by amateurs’; Farquharson’s ‘commitment to amateurism 




However, although Evans provides a large amount of evidence to support the 
argument that Farquharson was a supporter of amateurism, it remains questionable 
whether his beliefs about quantitative methods were directly linked to his beliefs 
about amateurism. What is more likely is that neither Mr Farquharson, nor his wife, 
Dorothea Farquharson who was also involved in the work of the Institute of 
Sociology, considered quantitative methods as something relevant and important to 
their work – in her speech at the closing-down meeting of the Institute, Mrs 
Farquharson argued that, as regards the development of sociology during the 
nineteenth century, ‘our best sociology was to be found in the English novel – Defoe, 
Thackeray, Dickens, Scott, Charles Reade, the Brontës, Jane Austin and George Eliot’ 
(Farquharson, 1957). Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the attitudes in the 
LePlay house and the Institute would have had a strong influence on academic 
sociology, especially since after the rejection of Geddes for the Martin White 
Professorship at the LSE, the LePlay house and the Institute treated academic 
sociology with ‘a certain measure of healthy scepticism’ and ‘always avoided 
becoming too closely involved with the Universities’ (Evans, 1986: 60-1). 
Kent’s and Evans’ accounts are aimed more at a description and less at an 
evaluation of the history of the period. However, there have been a few more 
powerful accounts that have left a strong impression on our understanding of the 
history of this period precisely because of their attempts to evaluate it. Soffer (1982), 
for instance, provides a scathing criticism of the development of British sociology in 
this period, arguing that the subject failed to develop a ‘uniquely sociological theory 
able to explain social events’ (Soffer, 1982: 781) that provided ‘incisive social 
criticism’, which Soffer takes to be the crucial element that sociology in the USA, 
France and Germany possessed and which turned sociology in these countries into a 
successful subject (Soffer, 1982: 767). Instead, British sociologists ‘uncritically 
endorsed existing social tendencies’, with Hobhouse and Ginsberg continuing ‘the 
nineteenth-century sociologists’ faith in the inevitability of progressive reform’ 
(Soffer, 1982: 781), holding to an ‘inadequate explanation of social phenomena’ that 
‘wasted their potential influence’ (Soffer, 1982: 796).  
By describing the early twentieth century development of sociology in Britain 




a general view or description of British sociology, and social science more broadly, 
in this period. Like Soffer, Anderson (1968) blames the failure of British sociology 
to expand on the absence of a strong and adequate sociological theory; while Abrams 
(1968) blames it more on the failure to establish itself institutionally and on the 
negative influence that traditions, such as the statistical tradition, had in ‘frustrating’ 
its development and the development of sociological theory in particular. More 
recently, Rocquin (2014) has challenged the widely accepted twentieth-century view 
that interwar British sociology was ‘a failure’; instead, he argues that British 
sociology has been ‘alive, and that its alleged institutional failure in the history of the 
discipline is more ideological than factual’ and that, on the contrary, it has been ‘a 
success’ (Rocquin, 2014: 190). 
However, to focus on the question whether British sociology was ‘a failure’ or 
‘a success’ is misguided. An answer to the question whether British sociology failed 
or not tells us very little about British sociology in this period – the question may be 
attractive to some historians but, in fact, all it does is push to the forefront the 
concerns of the historians at the expense of ignoring the questions and problems 
faced by sociologists of the day. Of course, one major drawback of such accounts 
lies in the ambiguity of terms such as ‘failure’ and ‘success’; moreover, to determine 
what constitutes ‘success’ in interwar British sociology is to bring into the analysis 
an arbitrary, inevitably presentist, element which only serves to get in the way of a 
proper understanding of what was going on. Another drawback of the success/failure 
analytical framework is that there is no way of knowing whether the things that 
Soffer and Abrams argue were absent from interwar sociology – a sociological 
theory, an early well-grounded institutional development of sociology (instead of 
statistical enquiries) etc. – would have produced ‘a successful’ sociology had they 
been present.  
It is much more fruitful and historically justified to examine the characteristics 
of the development of sociology in this period, not in terms of failure or success but 
in terms of the consequences that this development has had for a particular aspect of 
sociology. Instead of asking whether British sociology in the interwar period has 
been a success or a failure, we can learn and understand more by focusing on how 




how they fit together, what remained the same and what was different. To prepare 
the ground for answering these questions, I now move on to discussing the major 
developments in academic sociology in the 1910s and 1920s, with special reference 
to the impact that these developments had on sociology’s relationship with statistics. 
 
 
Debates in the 1910s – Is Sociology a Science? 
 
There is little direct evidence in the early twentieth-century history of British 
sociology relating to its relationship with statistics. Most of what we know about this 
relationship, after the active years of the Sociological Society, has to be inferred 
from the state of sociology itself, or from the intellectual choices made by academic 
sociologists at the time. 
One of the clearest statements that that the proponents of sociology in this 
period made against the application of statistical methods to sociological enquiries 
comes from the 1910 presidential address given at the Sociological Society by 
Frederic Harrison. Harrison was one of the most famous followers of Comte’s 
philosophy in Britain and a major figure in the positivist club in the late nineteenth 
century and he had little appreciation for the work of social statisticians and political 
economists. His address is openly hostile towards statistics: following Comte, 
Harrison argues that sociology is a science concerned with ‘the entire series of laws 
which apply to social phenomena’ but neither statistics, nor statistical laws have a 
place in this ‘entire series’ (Harrison, 1910: 97). He argued: 
 
the master term sociology should be limited to what Comte calls the 
fundamental laws of phenomena, and not observations of specific, local or 
temporary phenomena. I decline to call geology or geography a science 
and I decline to treat criminal or vital statistics, notes on experiments in 
cooperation, socialism or penal legislation as sciences, or even special 
scientific studies. They are certainly not the science of sociology nor are 
they even branches of sociology (Harrison, 1910: 100, my italics). 
 
He is here calling for a clear separation between statistical enquiries and 
sociology and for limiting sociology to the realm of abstract general laws about 




suggest that the frivolous association of statistical or empirical work with the name 
of sociology has been harmful: 
 
[…] those stupid jibes against sociology may be partly excused by the 
extravagant habit of some sociologists who are wont to dignify with the 
name of science loose guesses about things debated in Parliament and even 
bare statistics (Harrison, 1910: 102). 
 
Such overt determination to keep statistics separate from sociology is rare in 
the history of sociology in the early twentieth century; however, by virtue of being a 
presidential address representative of the Sociological Society, it remains one of the 
most explicit statements in opposition of any application of statistics in sociological 
study. 
Not everyone, however, shared Harrison’s conviction that sociology was a 
science. The continuation of the debate about the status of sociology long after the 
most active years of the Sociological Society indicates that the Society did not 
succeed in settling the issue. In 1914, a statement adamantly opposed to sociology’s 
claims of being a science was published in the Fortnightly Review. Paying special 
attention to the contributions of Herbert Spencer and Benjamin Kidd, the author, H. 
S. Shelton, rejected claims that sociology had advanced scientifically: 
 
To discuss other writers would but show the same characteristics, lack of 
scientific method and precision, lack of coherence and, possibly, 
extravagant claims. If anyone interested will examine (shall we say) the 
Sociological Review, or any publication professedly dealing with sociology 
as such, he would quickly discover how little there was to which the term 
scientific could, by any stretch of the imagination, be applied (Shelton, 
1914: 343). 
 
His conclusion was that, ‘at the present state of knowledge…sociology is not a 
science’ (Shelton, 1914: 345). However, Shelton does not exclude the possibility of 
sociology becoming a social science; on the contrary, he argues that ‘a study of the 
structure of society and of societies is both possible and actual, and that the 
organisation of such knowledge is an ever present necessity’ (Shelton, 1914: 344). 
Shelton includes statistics as a part of this social science: ‘Whenever exact and 
statistical knowledge is required, the gathering and formulating of such knowledge is 




344). It seems, however, that those individuals, and later on even whole institutions, 
who endorsed a view of sociology as a science and that included statistics as having 
a role to play were, almost always, not sociologists – this tendency will become even 
more apparent in the discussion of post-war British sociology. 
 
 
Hobhouse on General Sociology and Statistics 
 
Aside from contemporary discussions regarding the status of sociology, the 
clearest evidence we have about the position of sociology towards statistics in the 
early twentieth century comes from an examination of the work of L. T. Hobhouse, 
the only professor of sociology during this time. This section looks more closely at 
Hobhouse’s works with a view to examining in greater detail his understanding of 
sociology and how this affected sociology’s relationship with statistics. It also refers 
to his successor, Morris Ginsberg, whose main contributions will be discussed in the 
next chapter, but whose views about sociology differed little from those of his 
mentor, Hobhouse. 
Despite Branford’s decision to promote Hobhouse for the professorship of 
sociology at the LSE, based on his hope that Hobhouse would be a suitable character 
to unite the various strands of the subject, Hobhouse struggled for years to define 
sociology in such a way as to make clear its subject matter, methodology, academic 
practice and, more generally, the direction in which it was heading. Hobhouse’s 
discussion on the nature of sociology is dominated by attempts to define sociology 
on the basis of philosophical principles; but these remain vague, even confused, and 
show little progress in the definition and practice of sociology in the early interwar 
period: 
 
In a wider sense sociology may be taken to cover the whole body of 
sociological specialisms. In a narrower sense it is itself a specialism, 
having as its object the discovery of the connecting links between other 
specialisms (Hobhouse, 1920: 655). 
 
General sociology is neither a separate science, nor it is a mere synthesis of 




investigation…stimulating enquiry, correlating results […] (Hobhouse, 
quoted in Ginsberg (ed.), 1966: xiii) 
 
Sociology is one of the methods by which the human problem can be 
studied as a whole (Hobhouse, 1923: 62). 
 
Essentially, the subject-matter of Sociology is the interaction of individual 
minds, each in a manner cased in its own shell for ever divided from its 
nearest, yet reaching out to one another, responding and craving response, 
co-operating willingly and unwillingly, consciously and unconsciously, yet 
at the same time jostling, thrusting one another aside, tramping down the 
weaker, with partial aims vividly realised and deeper common needs 
imperfectly understood, moving in the mass on lines which no foresight of 
theirs has traced, yet not without eventual power of self-guidance and an 
emergent vision of the true goal (Hobhouse, 1924: 11). 
 
Hobhouse’s definitions prefigure some of the concerns that came to dominate 
British sociology later on (self and identity, the nature of communication in 
sociology, power and legitimacy etc) but at the time they failed to take the subject 
any further. At the time Hobhouse was writing, the Times Literary Supplement, 
complained that sociology ‘is a term with a content as vague or arbitrary as you 
please’; the ‘general impression of it […] is like the popular notion of a comet – a 
monster with an orbit from nowhere to nowhere’ (Unknown Author, 1924: 812). And 
some years later, Branford himself complained that sociology was still: 
 
a rather perilous word. It is often used, more often abused, and, in some 
quarters, uniformly boycotted […] or ignored as a pretentious claimant 
intruding into a field assumed to be covered by studies like economics, 
political philosophy, jurisprudence, history. Men of business rightly find it 
a difficult word for a difficult thing (Branford, 1930: 144). 
 
Despite the vagueness and confusion in Hobhouse’s definition of sociology, 
there was nothing in that definition itself – that sociology is a general science – that 
excluded statistical enquiries from sociology. On the contrary, it will be recalled 
from what was said earlier, that a few of the writers in the Sociological Papers, such 
as Branford, Durkheim and Webb mention statistics as one of general sociology’s 
specialisms. So the rejection of statistics was not inevitable; instead, lack of 
engagement with statistics resulted from Hobhouse’s (and later Ginsberg’s) choice to 
limit general sociology to philosophical enquiry. It is also significant that 




research questions. Therefore, although neither Hobhouse, nor Ginsberg spoke 
clearly against the use of statistics in sociological inquiry, the way they conceived of 
the subject – as an exercise in philosophical analysis, rather than as a research-
oriented discipline – made it very unlikely that either of them would do anything to 
establish links between sociology and statistics. 
If it was not the definition of sociology itself, then perhaps it was the method 
that Hobhouse and Ginsberg chose as sociology’s main method that made the 
incorporation of statistics difficult? Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s chosen method was 
the comparative method, as it was first developed by Comte. The comparative 
method was based on historical comparisons between different stages in the 
development of society or societies: 
 
Our method must be not so much historical as comparative. It must consist 
in a review of the multifarious forms of human achievement, with a view 
of scientific classification (Hobhouse, 1911: 111). 
 
There is some degree of difference between the principles on which the 
comparative and statistical methods operate and between their conceptions of society. 
The comparative method sees society as something that changes with the passage of 
time, looking at causal links between past societal forms and present societal forms; 
examining progress and evolution on a grand-scale. However, the statistical method 
sees society as something that not only changes in time but also as something that 
changes particularly as a result of the random, unpredictable variations in the actions 
of its members; it sees society as an emergent phenomenon and places emphasis on 
the interaction at any given point in time (which can later be compared to interaction 
at another point in time).  
But regardless of these differences, there is nothing in the comparative method 
itself that excludes the possibility of using statistical data and statistical techniques – 
in principle, both methods could be combined and used alongside each other. The 
comparative method was modern inasmuch as it rejected the abstract, deductive 
approach to studying society. But it was not suitable for studying what was going on 
in a rapidly changing modern society unless it used statistical data and analysis. 




modern society per se; they focused instead on things such as morals and ethics and 
grand-scale social evolution in which statistical techniques were not applicable.  All 
this shows that it was not because of their philosophy or method or definition of 
sociology that Hobhouse and Ginsberg did not initiate a statistical branch of 
sociology; neither their definition, nor their method were in principle incompatible 
with statistics. They focused on types of intellectual enquiry – aimed at describing 
social phenomena on the basis of general principles – for which statistics was 
irrelevant. But this was a matter of choice; and it was not a choice that was inevitable. 
An example showing that the two methods are compatible comes from 
Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s own work on The Material Culture and Social 
Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: an Essay in Correlation (1915). At first sight, 
this study may sound fairly statistical but, in fact, it is not and is, indeed, more of an 
example of a neglect of statistics. According to Fincham (1975: 55) it was Ginsberg 
who initiated this project: ‘[Ginsberg] had come to the LSE as a research student in 
1910 after graduating in philosophy at King’s College, and was working on the 
Material Culture of the Simpler Peoples’. The study is essentially a comparative 
anthropological study. Its purpose was to establish if there was an association 
between material culture in pre-modern [simpler] societies (1) – expressed as a 
means of obtaining food and divided into three categories Hunters, Pastoral societies 
and agricultural societies – and social institutions, such as Government and Justice, 
Family, War and Social Structure (2). Although the book is subtitled ‘An Essay in 
Correlation’, the statistical methods employed in it are crude and elementary and do 
not go beyond the comparison of percentages. At the beginning of the book there is a 
section entitled The Possibility of Sociological Correlation but there is no discussion 
of statistical methods and the word correlation is used as a non-statistical term. In 
addition, the methods it used were out-dated – they used techniques developed by the 
anthropologist Tyler in the 1880s, despite the fact that by 1915, more sophisticated 
statistical techniques for association and correlation had been developed. 
It remains unclear why Ginsberg, Hobhouse and Wheeler embarked on this 
study using out-dated techniques. Immediately after its publication, the book was 






the manner in which the [statistical] method is applied cannot, in view of 
the development of statistical science in recent years, be said to be 
sufficient. Percentages are used throughout but although this is certainly a 
means of indicating association it is insufficient since the coefficient of 
contingency was devised to deal with problems essentially similar in form 
to those discussed in this book, and it’s a matter of regret that this 
coefficient was not ascertained for at least a few of the most important 
tables (Snow, 1916: 69). 
 
Another review, this time of the second edition of the book, commented that 
the book owes its influence ‘less to the positive contributions than to its defects’; to 
errors of method and execution so obtrusive, even in 1915, that they ‘fairly shouted 
for correction’ (Murdock, 1966: 261-262). The book was also criticised for making 
no effort at sampling, which makes the correlations less meaningful. The book, they 
say, is ‘chiefly useful as an object of lesson of methodological error’ (Murdock, 
1966: 261-262).   
It is possible that Hobhouse, Ginsberg and Wheeler did not use modern 
statistical techniques because they did not know how to handle them. But then the 
question arises of why didn’t they get a colleague to help them? It is also possible 
that they did not use statistical techniques because they disagreed with the underlying 
principles of the statistical approach to studying society. There is some evidence of 
this in Hobhouse’s writings, although Hobhouse does not make specific reference to 
the Simpler Peoples. In his view, society as an existing entity is not measurable, only 
individuals are: 
 
Even if the idiosyncrasies of individuals could be in some measure reduced 
to law by the fiction of averages, the life of a society to which millions of 
individuals contribute each in individual ways is so unique that no 
generalisations apply to it (Hobhouse, 1920: 658; italics mine). 
 
According to Hobhouse, therefore, society consists of something which is 
beyond the millions of individuals which compose it and the results of statistics 
cannot take us to this level. Although statistical data can help in comparative 





[...] we may learn a lesson from the faith of Malthusianism. Mathematical 
arguments drawn from the assumption that human actions proceed with the 
statistical regularity that might be found in a flock of sheep are often 
exceedingly difficult to refute in detail yet they rest on insecure foundation 
[...] man is not merely an animal; he is also a rational being – reacts to new 
circumstances in a way that can only be determined my taking the 
possibility of rational purpose into account (Hobhouse, 1911: 15). 
 
According to this, statistics could be better used to study the behaviour of 
animals and not men. Mind and reason, the rationality with which people are 
endowed cannot be measured using statistics. All this suggests, at the very least, that 
for Hobhouse the application of statistical techniques in sociology was a minor 
concern. 
More evidence on Hobhouse’s methodological position comes from an 
argument he had with William Beveridge, who was a director of the LSE from 1919 
to 1937. Hobhouse, following Comte and Durkheim, maintained that the social 
sciences should employ their own methods, which are different from the methods of 
the natural sciences. While according to Beveridge, the only effective way of 
studying society is by using the methods employed in the natural sciences. In both 
his inaugural and farewell addresses, Beveridge argued that ‘the methods of all 
sciences are the same’, including observation, comparison and classification, 
deduction and verification (Beveridge, 1921: 3) and he was later to argue that 
economics, politics and sociology should be taught and learned ‘not from books but 
from observations, not from the positions of philosophers, but from the conduct of 
mankind’ (Beveridge, 1937: 470). The argument between Hobhouse and Beveridge 
arose at a time when at the LSE, in the late 1920s, there was already antagonism 
between the sociology department represented by Hobhouse’s social philosophical 
tradition; the applied tradition of social research in the Social Science and 
Administration (SSaA) department; and Beveridge’s idea of empirical, biologically 
based social science, which was eventually realised in the form of a Social Biology 
department (Harris, 1997). Beveridge was convinced that: 
 
the social sciences were still ‘too theoretical, deductive, metaphysical’ and 
that ‘the way ahead’ lay in empirical studies of social phenomena rather 
than in deductions based on analytical postulates about the nature of human 





According to Beveridge, neither the sociology nor the SSaA departments 
followed the principles which Beveridge believed in – Hobhouse frowned upon any 
attempts to model the social sciences on the biological sciences; whereas the SSaA 
department produced studies dealing with the alleviation of social problems rather 
than broad scientific discoveries. What exacerbated the controversy over the nature 
of the social sciences at the LSE was an attempt by Beveridge to impose his vision 
on his colleagues as well as his increasing intolerance towards all other kinds of 
social research. Beveridge insisted: 
 
To complete the circle of the social sciences, a third group of studies is 
required, dealing with the natural bases of economics and politics, with the 
human material and with its physical environment, and forming a bridge 
between the natural and the social sciences (Beveridge quoted in Harris, 
1997: 279). 
 
This was the basis of the new research programme, ‘Social biology’, designed 
by Beveridge and eventually funded by the Rockefeller foundation. Hobhouse, 
however, was critical of the programme and protested that the Sociology department 
had not been consulted; while privately, Beveridge believed that the tradition 
represented by Hobhouse “does not necessarily go with social science” (Beveridge 
quoted in Harris, 1997: 280). 
It would be an exaggeration to say that Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s work 
exerted any major influence on the development of sociology in Britain after the 
Second World War; in fact their legacy was limited, and they were hardly mentioned 
by the new generation of post-war sociologists who appeared to have more 
immediate concerns than Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s abstract philosophical 
sociology. But the divide between ‘general sociology’ and statistical investigation 
that began with the Sociological Society was perpetuated by Hobhouse’s and 
Ginsberg’s indifference towards statistical methods, even without a clear opposition.  
 
 





Many of the researchers developing the ‘new English statistics’ were also 
involved in the study of eugenics, with Francis Galton, Karl Pearson and his 
colleagues being the most obvious examples. Could it have been the case that the 
association of the ‘new English statistics’ with research in eugenics14 deterred those 
scholars, who objected to eugenics, from using statistics? Hobhouse was critical of 
eugenics from the very beginning. At the early meetings of the Sociological Society, 
he said of Galton’s paper on eugenics: 
 
 […] until we have very definite information as to what heredity can do, I 
think those of us who are only students of sociology and who cannot lay 
any claim whatever to be biologists ought to keep silence.  Both stock and 
environment are of fundamental importance. Until we have far more 
knowledge and agreement as to criteria of conscious selection, I fear we 
cannot, as sociologists, expect to do much for society on these lines 
(Hobhouse, 1905: 63). 
 
And in Social Evolution (1911) Hobhouse argued that explanations of social 
phenomena should be based on ‘the nature of society itself’ (Hobhouse, 1911: 17), 
not on the genetic nature of individuals. Hobhouse therefore opposed the underlying 
assumption of eugenics – that answers to biological questions are essential to solving 
social problems and understanding society. He also opposed some of the 
fundamental assumptions that eugenics made – mainly that it is possible to estimate 
genetic worth (the good characteristics that must be sustained through artificial 
selection or eugenics). He correctly pointed out that there was lack of sufficient 
knowledge as to how ‘good character’ is genetically produced. And he appears to 
have recognised that behind many of the claims eugenics was making was the 
aspiration to maintain class distinctions and the existing social order (Hobhouse, 
1911). 
It is unclear whether Hobhouse’s attitude towards eugenics was the driving 
force that determined his position towards statistics mainly because his discussions 
of eugenics do not contain any references to statistics.  One thing is clear, however: 
for Hobhouse, society was about social conceptions, historical change, laws, religion, 
ethics, rationality; for him social problems were philosophical questions, not material 
                                               




for statistical analysis. In the sociology of Hobhouse, statistics may occasionally be a 
useful addition, but it was not essential or even desirable. 
If the sociologists were not using the new English statistics, then who was 
using it? And was the use of the new statistical techniques limited to research into 
eugenics? Goldthorpe (forthcoming) suggests that the fact that techniques such as 
correlation and regression were developed by eugenicists such as Galton and Pearson 
is not the reason why others, including sociologists, did not use them. Goldthorpe’s 
study, focusing on social mobility research, clearly shows that those whose work 
would have benefited most from these new and powerful techniques but who, 
nonetheless, failed to utilise them, were both opponents and supporters of eugenics. 
And, to my knowledge, there is no direct evidence in the literature of any explicit 
statements of rejection of the new techniques because of a link with eugenics.  
One way to probe this question further would be to find who, if not sociologists, 
was using techniques such as correlation and regression in the period 1880-1940.  An 
indication can be found by examining the articles published in the Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society and The Sociological Review (the two main journals for 
statistics and sociology in this period). 
An online search through the publications in the Journal of the RSS in the 
period 1880-1940 which contain the term correlation in the main text suggests that 
the technique was applied to study a variety of subjects – topics in the field of 
economics, such as finance, price indexing, unemployment, national income, control 
of the quality of products, consumption of alcohol, the cinema industry, 
epidemiology, meteorology and vital statistics. There is also a vast number of papers 
which were concerned with the development and improvement of mathematical 
statistics and theory of statistics – these are predominantly technical papers. A brief 
look at these papers clearly shows that it would be wrong to exclusively associate the 
technique of correlation with eugenicist research.  
A search with the keyword ‘regression’ in the same publications in the same 
period brings fewer results, largely technical papers related to the mathematical 
development of regression and other closely related statistical techniques. It would 
appear that regression found less application in substantive disciplines in this period 




conducting a regression analysis at this time that required a great deal of resources to 
overcome. 
We can use a similar search to find out about the engagement with sociology in 
the Journal of the RSS. A search with a keyword ‘sociology’ in the same pool of 
articles from the same period as above, brings up a very small number of articles. 
The majority of these articles contain bibliographical material; while the rest are 
presidential addresses from Section F of the BAAS, which mention sociology as part 
of a list of social science subjects. Only one paper published in the Journal of the 
RSS between 1880-1940 actually discusses sociology – Sidgwick’s 1885 address in 
which he severely criticises the whole idea of sociology as a credible science. 
An examination of the articles published in The Sociological Review between 
1908-1952 with the keyword ‘correlation’ (appearing anywhere in text) brings up 25 
results in total; but only three of the articles use correlation in the statistical sense 
and apply it in the analysis. Two of the articles are by Pearl Moshinsky, who was 
part of the Social Biology department at the LSE and who examined intelligence and 
its relation to poverty, fertility, education and social class; the other paper is on 
business cycles in Australia. A search for ‘regression’ brings up two results, neither 
of which involves statistical analysis at all. The only sociological journal in Britain 
was clearly not a venue for statistical research. 
This is just a brief search that can only give us a general overview. It 
nonetheless shows that the use of statistics was spreading to other subjects and that 
the techniques developed by Pearson were not exclusively associated with eugenics. 
Sociology found no place whatsoever in the Journal of the RSS; neither did the new 
English statistical analysis based on correlation and regression, find a place in 
sociology’s only journal, The Sociological Review. 
 
 
Sociology and Statistics in Britain, 1903-1930: Summary  
 
The last two chapters covered the tentative beginnings of British academic 
sociology. Since the years 1903-1907 are a time of the first concentrated efforts to 




regardless of the real outcome of the Sociological Society’s efforts. In my account of 
the history of this period and the interwar decades that followed, I have distanced 
myself from the discourse about success or failure that pervades the most influential 
historical accounts previously published. I have argued, instead, that it is much more 
insightful and historically faithful to examine this period firstly, by putting it into the 
context of the development of social science in Britain in the nineteenth century and, 
secondly, by tracing its own meaning as a context for the development of sociology 
after the Second World War.  
With regard to the first point, I have shown that as social science developed in 
nineteenth-century Britain, it offered two broad traditions from which a sociological 
society could choose even if they did not necessarily associate themselves with any 
particular institution: there was the empirical statistical tradition, which offered to 
provide the scientific potential of studying the social world in a similar way to the 
natural world; but there was also the Comtean vision of a social science which 
offered  a systematic and coherent, but also non-quantitative, type of sociology. The 
Sociological Society turned out to be the stage for an interplay of factors that saw 
British sociology choose a ‘Comtean-like’ path, rather than the path laid out by the 
social statisticians. It is more significant that the Society made a series of decisions 
regarding the choice of path, than how far, or how successfully, they themselves 
actually walked that path.  
With regard to the second point about the importance of the early twentieth-
century development of sociology as the context for what followed: the significance 
of the legacy left behind by the relatively dormant existence of British sociology 
following the decline of the Sociological Society comes not so much from the fact 
that their work brought about success or failure; but from the fact that when more 
favourable social, political and academic conditions for sociology emerged 
immediately after the Second World War, this prior period of stagnation proved not 


























As discussed in the previous part, existing literature on the early twentieth-
century history of sociology in Britain has been dominated by a discourse about the 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ of sociology to develop institutionally and intellectually. The 
historiography of post-war British sociology has taken a similar form, although the 
focus of the debate has shifted from discussions of whether the development of 
British sociology has failed or not to whether the spurt of development that did take 
place was exceptionally late, or not. 
Thus there are scholars who argue that the nineteenth-century development of 
social, but not sociological, studies, such as statistics, social reformism and social 
administration, resulted in the failure of a ‘proper’ sociology to emerge in Britain. 
These scholars also argue that the establishment of the first sociological institution, 
the Sociological Society in 1903, and the academic expansion of sociology in the 
post-war years, signifies an exceptionally late arrival for sociology in Britain (cf. 
Annan, 1959; Abrams, 1968; Anderson, 1968; Soffer, 1982).  
In contrast, other scholars focus on what they see as ‘successful’ steps in the 
development of social science and sociology in Britain and tend to argue that the 
social science movements that existed before the institutional establishment of 
sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century should not be excluded from the 
history of sociology or seen as hindrances to its development (Goldman, 1987, 2002; 
Kent, 1981; Kumar, 2001). They also argue that the institutional development of 
sociology in Britain should not be considered ‘exceptional’ when compared to other 
countries and that British sociology’s ‘arrival’ in academia and its intellectual take-
off in the post-war period cannot be characterised as unusually late.  
Regardless of the differences in their interpretations, both groups of scholars 
have been obsessed with the ‘late’ arrival of British sociology, one arguing that it 
came ‘exceptionally late’, the other arguing that it is not unusually late; and both 
groups have been obsessed with the contrast between British sociology’s dormant 
early twentieth century existence and its post-war boom – either to justify this 




Consequently, other, potentially more illuminating, approaches to 
understanding the history of twentieth-century British sociology have been obscured 
in the historiography. One such neglected approach focuses on explaining how the 
social philosophical, non-quantitative tradition to which the Sociological Society and 
its affiliates adhered, could exist parallel to, but separate from, the more empirically 
oriented and statistical traditions of social enquiry. In Bulmer’s words: ‘almost all of 
the empirical social research undertaken in Britain between the wars went untouched 
by what then passed for academic sociology’ (Bulmer, 1985: 4). He has further 
emphasised that the difficulty in understanding these two parallel traditions is not 
resolved by treating one as a subset of the other and that we can achieve deeper and 
better understanding only by acknowledging the division and analysing what 
sustained it – something that has rarely been done. 
In this part, it is my intention to find out to what extent this divide persisted 
when other people and institutions took over where the Sociological Society and its 
affiliates left off and with what consequences for the relationship between sociology 
and statistics. I will examine how this divide was maintained in the rapidly changing 
academic environment that characterised the early post-war period; and why 
academic sociology could expand while remaining separate from the empirical 
















Chapter Ten  
 





The history of sociology in the 1930s and the early post-war period was rich in 
discussion about the character of sociology, its academic future and its 
methodological development. The aim of most of these discussions was to find the 
best way to turn sociology into a subject that was both academically respected and 
‘scientific’ (although the precise meaning of the word scientific varied among 
sociologists) and to close what was perceived to be an existing gap between 
sociological theory and research methods. The question of the role of quantitative 
methods in sociology was also widely discussed.  
This chapter analyses the major intellectual shifts and methodological concerns 
that characterise the period between 1930-1970. It surveys the intellectual 
development of sociology in this period and assesses how the changes that occurred 
influenced British sociology’s relationship with the empirical tradition of social 
enquiry and, more specifically, with statistics. The chapter pays special attention as 
to how sociologists reasoned about and justified their choices about the type of 
sociology they wanted to see established in Britain, especially after 1945.  
 
 
British Sociology in the 1930s 
 
In the 1930s, there was a widespread lack of clarity about what sociology was 
and what it aimed to achieve intellectually and academically. This period saw a 
number of attempts to redress this situation, most notably by Morris Ginsberg who 
became the Martin White professor of sociology at the LSE after L. T. Hobhouse 




social science, also made an effort to establish sociology at the BAAS and worked to 
set up a social science research council. Both attempts failed. A focused discussion 
on the methodology of sociology had not yet begun, although some of Ginsberg’s 
writings make it clear that incorporating a statistical worldview and quantitative 
methods should not be a primary aim for British sociology.  
As a professor in sociology at the LSE in 1930s, Morris Ginsberg wrote a 
number of books and articles in which he made an attempt to clarify the subject 
matter and methodological approach of sociology. Ginsberg’s Studies in Sociology 
(1932), Sociology (1934) and his later articles (Ginsberg, 1937; 1939) contain 
repeated attempts to define sociology; however, rather than making it easier and 
clearer to understand what sociology is, Ginsberg’s writings tend to leave the reader 
confused about the subject. For instance, in the scope of just a few pages, Ginsberg 
argued that sociology was ‘the study of human interactions, their conditions and 
consequences’ (Ginsberg, 1932: 1); that sociology was ‘the science which deals with 
social life as a whole in contradistinction from the special sciences’ but, also and 
somewhat contradictory, that it was not ‘more comprehensive’ than the special 
sciences, but dealt with their topics ‘from a special aspect’ (Ginsberg, 1932: 3, 7). 
Only to add to the confusion, Ginsberg then admitted that he doubted whether 
sociology ‘can ever be an independent science’ (Ginsberg, 1932: 8). His other works 
on sociology are no less convoluting and disorienting. 
Ginsberg’s position toward quantification was similarly ambiguous. His 
macro-sociological approach to sociology did not totally exclude empirical or 
quantitative study from sociology: one of the objects of sociology was ‘to formulate 
empirical generalisations’ (Ginsberg, 1932: 16) by studying ‘empirical associations, 
or correlations, of varying degrees of difference between concrete social phenomena’ 
(Ginsberg, 1939: 472). In a discussion of the specialist social studies that are to be 
part of a general sociology, he mentioned ‘social statistics as continued by the 
successors of Quetelet’ (Ginsberg, n.d.: 3). He also argued that any conclusions that 
sociology reaches always had to be ‘tested by appeal to the concrete facts of social 
life’ (Ginsberg, 1932: 8) and that the comparative method was partly based on the 
quantitative measurement of the interrelations between societal institutions (Ginsberg, 




sociological method par excellence – Ginsberg was clear that statistical studies are 
only suitable when sociologists study ‘without going outside [a particular] society or 
period’, a limit which was unthinkable for sociology as Ginsberg saw it (Ginsberg, 
1939: 476). The role of statistics was also limited to providing description – as soon 
as sociology moved from the descriptive to the analytic level, it was the comparative 
method that was ‘essential’ (Ginsberg, 1939: 476). And last, but not least, factual 
data, statistical or not, could not possibly be placed at the centre of sociology because 
it had no bearing on ethical issues, such as values, which were crucial for sociology.  
Thus Ginsberg would often make depreciative remarks about quantification, 
protesting that ‘while students are given careful instruction in marshalling and 
correlating factual data [which, in the LSE’s case could only have been true in the 
subject of economics], they have no parallel experience in weighing values’ 
(Ginsberg, 1937: 322). Two decades later, Ginsberg would still be arguing that 
‘sociology has most to gain from a comparative study of civilisation’ and that it 
should be closest with comparative law, comparative religion and morals and the 
comparative study of economic institutions (Ginsberg, 1956: xiii). And although 
Ginsberg’s own experience in working with quantitative methods – his 1915 study 
with Hobhouse and his 1920s study on social mobility – have been posthumously 
praised by MacRae (who had little quantitative knowledge himself) (cf. Marshall and 
MacRae, 1970: 360), both studies have been heavily criticised by quantitatively 
skilled social scientists (cf. Snow, 1916; Murdock, 1966; Goldthorpe, forthcoming). 
However, even if Ginsberg had ‘a keen sense of the factual and was capable of 
making shrewd remarks about the reliability of the observations reported by X and Y’ 
(Freedman in Fletcher, 1974: 270), Ginsberg rarely applied these abilities, if he 
indeed he had them, in his sociological practice and did little to encourage their 
development in students.  
As with his predecessor L. T. Hobhouse, Ginsberg made no contribution to 
foster an appreciation of quantitative methods in sociology and nourish the 
development of such skills among his readers or students during his time in the 
Martin White Chair. And, similarly to Hobhouse, Ginsberg made no attempt to 
address the parallel but separate existence of an empirical tradition of social enquiry 




Administration and the short-lived department of Social Biology. There is no 
evidence that either Hobhouse or Ginsberg saw the divide between the two traditions 
of studying social matters as problematic. A shift in this attitude occurred only after 
the Second World War.  
Commemorations of Ginsberg’s work tend to emphasise that the direction in 
which British sociology was moving from the 60s onwards was at odds with 
Ginsberg’s own vision; as a result of which, he very quickly came to be perceived, 
even caricatured, as an ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘outmoded’ figure who was ‘redolent of 
nineteenth-century sociology and philosophy’ (Fletcher, 1974: 1) and leading him to 
being written off ‘as a non-entity’ by his younger colleagues (Albrow, 1986: 338). 
But one aspect of Ginsberg’s views that remained unquestioned throughout the post-
war period was his ambiguous position and overall scepticism towards quantification. 
It is reasonable to argue that although post-war sociology moved away from 
Ginsberg’s ideal for sociology, it retained much of his passive and sceptical attitude 
towards quantification, more generally, and statistics, specifically. Even when he was 
seen as old-fashioned, aspects of Ginsberg’s approach remained a source of 
admiration in the 70s when dissatisfaction with quantitative methods was growing – 
‘It seems to me that Ginsberg’s greatest contribution was to preserve the tradition of 
the study of ideas and principles of the things which cannot be exactly calculated’ 
(Caine, 1974: 31-32). Therefore, even if Ginsberg did not openly oppose empirical 
quantitative research, he did little, if anything, to promote its development within 
sociology because he did not believe it was essential.  
Ginsberg’s efforts to define sociology were perceived from the outside as 
questionable, at the very best, and unsuccessful, at the very worst. It could be argued 
that this made it more difficult for quantitative social scientists from outside of 
sociology to consider engaging with sociology. In 1936, there was an attempt to 
establish a sociological section at the BAAS. The council minutes of the BAAS for 
6th June 1936 contain reference to a correspondence regarding the possibility of 
establishing a sociological section or subsection in the Association; but the council 
decided that this was unnecessary because sociological topics could be discussed in 
some of the already existing sections, like Section F (Collins, 1978: 133). It was not 




when Ginsberg approached the Association in 1937 with a proposal to change the 
name of Section F (Economics and Statistics) in order to make possible the inclusion 
of papers in social science15, his proposal was also turned down. Allowing for some 
prejudice on the part of the Association against sociology, which is not made explicit 
in their writing but was common in the 1930s, ‘the extent of the British Association’s 
real commitment to the social sciences is difficult to pinpoint’ (cf. Collins, 1978: 133, 
147). It is also likely that Ginsberg’s own writings, with their highly abstract and 
contradictory statements, played a part in the failure to convince the Association. 
When a sociological ‘Section N’ was finally established in 1960, this was mainly as 
a result of the academic popularity of the subject at that time and not necessarily 
because sociology had made clearer its subject matter and methodology (see next 
chapter for more details). 
Another sign of the difficulties that sociology was encountering in the 1930s 
was the lack of success in establishing a social science research council. Sociology 
was in a precarious position not only because it lacked a clear sense of direction but 
because social science was met, more generally, with suspicion and hostility: G. E. G. 
Catlin, one of the first supporters of a Social Science Research Council (SSRC), for 
instance, recalled that while ‘the social sciences have been regarded as wicked 
attacks on the humanities by the humanists’, they have also ‘been regarded as bastard 
little brothers by the physical and natural scientists’ (Catlin, 1942: 88). So; when in 
1930, Catlin obtained financial aid from the Hally Stewart Trust in order to set up a 
committee ‘to survey the social research work being carried out in Great Britain’ and 
decide on whether establishing a social science research council should be 
recommended (Catlin, 1942: 89), the prospects did not look very promising. William 
Beveridge, Alexander Carr-Saunders and Alexander Farquharson, among others, 
were on the committee. They reached the conclusion that a council was necessary 
and should be recommended. For reasons that remain unexplained, however, ‘the 
broader scheme [of establishing a council] was abortive’ and, partly due to the 
activity of Lord Stamp, a committee member, an Institute of Economic and Social 
Research was established instead. The original proposal was revived during the war 
                                               
15 An unsuccessful attempt that very much resembles John Ingram’s 1878 proposals for reforming 
Section F into a ‘sociological section’ (see Part One). This similarity suggests that little has changed 




and a new committee, which included Carr-Saunders, Sargent Florence and Morris 
Ginsberg in the Chair, was set up to reconsider it. This again proved unsuccessful, 
with Catlin and Robinson listing the following as main reasons: 
 
(a) that the Vice Chancellors’ Conference could handle the matter better; 
(b) that we didn’t want any Americanisation of British Academic Habits; 
(c) that the British tradition was, not to channel funds under a committee, 
but to encourage the individual scholar to go his individual way […] 
(Catlin and Robinson, 1962: 13). 
 
The reasons pointed out by Catlin and Robinson speak volumes about the 
climate in which Ginsberg, the leading sociologist in the country, struggled to thrive; 
throwing light on the difficulties sociology faced in trying to get itself established 
within academia. As Catlin and Robinson put it in 1962: ‘In this country, there being 
more xenophobia than common market, it appears to take 30 years to get an idea 
across’ (Catlin and Robinson, 1962: 13). One of the main ideas which was proving 
difficult to ‘get across’ was the idea of sociology itself. 
The process of establishing a SSRC, which began in the 1930s went through 
three unsuccessful proposals – the first two described above plus the Clapham 
committee of 1946 which recommended ear-marked grants for social science, but no 
research council. It was only in 1965 with Lord Heyworth’s positive 
recommendation, that a SSRC was established. As with the establishment of a 
sociological section at the BAAS in the 1960s, however, the setting up of a research 
council was more indicative of a profound shift in the general attitude towards social 
science from which sociology was benefiting, mainly manifested in an increasing 
student demand to study social science subjects; and not necessarily indicative of an 
advance which was internal to sociology. 
 
 
British Sociology in the Early Post-war Period 
 
This shift in the general attitude towards social science, and particularly 
sociology, manifested itself most clearly in the 60s but it had begun to gain 




and the public began thinking more seriously about the benefits of social scientific 
knowledge and of using that knowledge to make sense of twentieth-century society 
and the problems it faced (the Clapham report of 1946 into the state of social science 
education was a clear manifestation of that). Despite unquestionable progress in the 
natural sciences, advances in natural science had also made possible more efficient 
and larger scale methods of human destruction as in the Holocaust and the atomic 
bomb. However, since there was nothing inherent in natural scientific discoveries 
that determined how they were going to be used, the events of the Second World 
War triggered a strong concern about the mistakes that society had made in applying 
natural scientific knowledge: ‘If our social skills had advanced step by step with our 
technical skills, there would not have been another European war’ (Survey, 1947: 
254); moreover, ‘the disaster from which the European civilisation has barely 
emerged’ was seen as ‘a call to man to study himself even more than nature, to put 
economics before engineering, politics before physics’ (Beveridge, 1946: 236).  
But science was not entirely seen as a source of evil. For some influential 
social scientists, such as William Beveridge, scientific work relating to the natural 
world was not enough on its own for human progress; what was needed was more 
scientific work on society. According to Beveridge, the war experience had made it 
clear that in order to progress the study of society should actually follow in the steps 
of Science, not Art, and do away with abstract deduction as its basis and replace it 
with observation (Beveridge, 1946: 237). Beveridge insisted that, in order to achieve 
this, the social sciences should be taught together, not separately – an idea which 
resonated well with Ginsberg’s understanding of sociology – but the role of 
sociology and its ability to help in this process was not discussed by Beveridge. It 
was argued that although the study of sociology as it had developed in Britain 
appeared to share some of the ideals that were becoming increasingly popular at the 
universities after 1945, the universities were ‘reluctant to move ahead’, most likely 
because sociologists so far had ‘emphasised economic, political and social theory 
and philosophy to the neglect of empirical studies’ (McConnell, 1948: 657). 
Sociology, in its aspirations and self-understanding, was still out of tune with the 




This is perhaps why in the late 40s there was a growing sense among 
sociologists themselves that sociology should take a clear stance on the empirical 
tradition; something that, as I mentioned, Hobhouse and Ginsberg had failed to do 
earlier. How should the separate existence of this tradition be interpreted – as a 
troubling situation exacerbated by sociology’s neglectful attitude towards it or, given 
the intellectual aims of sociology, as something inevitable and normal; as a problem 
or as an irrelevant issue?  
One of Britain’s leading social scientists of the 40s and 50s, T. H. Marshall 
understood the situation as creating a dilemma for sociology – now that the social 
and political climate was changing and new academic opportunities were likely to 
emerge for social science, it was necessary for sociology to decide on a suitable road 
ahead. Marshall saw a crossroads, with two possible directions for sociology: firstly, 
the road towards abstract theory and the discovery of ‘universal laws’ and ‘ultimate 
values’ – the road ‘to the stars’; and, secondly, the road towards empiricism that was 
most likely to lead ‘to the expenditure of great energy on the collection of a 
multitude of facts with sometimes an inadequate sense of purpose’ – the road ‘into 
the sands’ (Marshall, 1946: 14-15). Both roads were challenging: on the one hand, 
efforts to develop a universal theory of society had led many sociologists to perceive 
of ‘a conceptual analysis of society as if it were a substitute for research’ (Burgess 
quoted in Marshall, 1946: 13); on the other hand, efforts to ‘bring the social sciences 
more into line with the natural sciences by making greater use of quantitative 
methods’ had already led many sociologists to slip into a state of mind from which 
they failed to distinguish between situations where measurement is used because ‘the 
relevant data can be measured’ and situations where they measured everything, 
indiscriminately, regardless of whether what is deemed measurable is, indeed, worth 
measuring (Marshall, 1946: 15). Marshall recommended ‘a middle road’ but fell 
short of a clear strategy on how to find this road and make it a practical reality. 
Overall, however, Marshall’s interpretation can be seen as recognition, perhaps the 
first recognition by a sociologist, that the separate existence of an empirical 
(quantitative) tradition was sociology’s concern. However, it must also be 




than the crossroads at which British sociology actually stood in 194616. If we were to 
substitute Marshall’s metaphor with an historically more accurate one, we could say 
that British sociology was standing not before a clearly defined crossroads; but rather, 
in front of a wide empty field with renewed hopes of the potential of that field to 
bring a richer harvest than the one that the Sociological Society, or Hobhouse, or 
Ginsberg had yielded in the previous decades. 
This was all the more obvious from the literature on sociology and other 
closely related social sciences in the late 1930s, early 1940s. In what is regarded as 
one of the first British textbooks of social science of this period, F. C. Bartlett et al 
(1939) pinpointed the major problem that the social sciences were facing: 
 
Everyone pays lip service to the vital necessity for a vigorous development 
of ‘social science’. Yet when ardent investigators, not satisfied by general 
exhortation and advice ask ‘What shall we do? and ‘How shall we do it?’ 
few serious attempts are being made to answer them. This lack of detailed 
guidance is perhaps least marked in economics and in the field of vital 
statistics; it is certainly most marked in the specifically human sciences of 
psychology, social anthropology and sociology. Nowhere have these three 
sciences been properly mobilised to deal with the social problems which 
yearly grow more pressing (Bartlett et al, 1939: vii). 
 
This was the contemporary view of the leading social scientists in Britain. A 
further indication of the uncertain position, particularly of sociology, at this time is 
the fact that most papers on sociology in the textbook were written not by 
sociologists but by specialists in, for instance, social science and administration, 
experimental psychology and industrial psychology. The only contribution made by 
a professed sociologist was by Morris Ginsberg, and he, too, lamented the position of 
sociology: 
 
Probably a great deal of the opposition shown towards sociology as a 
branch of learning is due to the fact that for the philosophers it is not 
philosophical enough and for the scientifically empirically minded 
scientists not scientific enough (Ginsberg, 1939: 438). 
 
                                               
16 However, these were the crossroads at which American sociology was already standing in the mid 
40s and it is not a coincidence that to back up his arguments, Marshall relied extensively on material 
from the American Journal of Sociology, an early sign that the understanding of the American 




Similar comments came from Marshall himself who admitted: ‘sociology has 
not enjoyed too good a reputation in this country and that even now it is still 
regarded in some quarters with a certain amount of suspicion’ (Marshall, 1946: 4). 
Tom Harrisson, another shrewd observer of the state of sociology, commented that 
‘much confusion has centred around the term ‘social science’ and especially its 
offspring ‘sociology’ – sometimes used to cover anything from socialism to social 
work’ (Harrisson, 1947: 10). In another, later attempt at explaining the opposition to 
sociology, Bottomore argued that the ‘opposition to sociology in its early phase came 
largely from the feeling that it aimed not at co-ordinating but at absorbing the other 
social sciences’ (Bottomore, 1962: 17). As time passed, it was becoming increasingly 
clearer that pursuing either course – co-ordination or absorption of other sciences – 
was not a feasible intellectual pursuit.  
The picture of sociology as seen from outside of academia in the 1940s was not 
much different. The Clapham report of 1946, the first in a series of government 
reports on the social sciences produced in the post-war period, also remarked upon 
the ambiguous status of sociology. A running theme through the report is that the 
social sciences are of a ‘great practical value’ (Para. 3), however it appeared that 
these sciences, perhaps excluding economics, still had not reached their full scientific 
potential. As regards sociology, the report refers to an anonymous comment by a 
holder of a Chair in Sociology17, according to whom ‘sociologists had not yet done 
the work that they ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental study’ (Para. 17). 
Things changed little in the early 50s, when, according to some sources, the general 
public still saw as a distinguishing feature of sociology ‘the cocksureness rather than 
the intellectual vitality, the exclusive self-righteousness rather than the pioneering 
spirit’ (Unknown Author, 1954: 727). British Sociology was suffering from ‘the 
collapse of language into jargon’ and from giving the layman ‘a feeling of being got 
at or spied on’; the subject was pressingly inviting its own ‘doom of ridicule and 
dislike’ (Unknown Author, 1954: 727).  
The American views of British sociology were similar. The American 
sociologist, Edward Shils, who came over to Britain in the 1940s, admitted that 
                                               
17 This comment must have been made by Ginsberg, as in 1946 there was no other chair in Sociology 




although some effort was being made in British sociology towards the incorporation 
of ‘systematic empirical analysis of contemporary society at undergraduate level’, in 
the late 40s there was much ‘justified scepticism about the usefulness of 
research/practical capacities of persons who have had the training in Sociology’ 
(Shils, 1948: 590). What is most curious, however, is that even those sociologists, 
who were aware of the most pressing problems that sociology was facing, excluded 
the possibility that developing a statistical side to British sociology could help 
alleviate these problems. Shils for instance argued that ‘an orientation towards 
immediate practical problems and an enthusiasm for field work and statistics’ will 
not alone suffice ‘to enable sociology to overcome its remoteness from reality’ and 
its ‘fragmentary and scattered concreteness’ (Shils, 1948: 592). A sense of passive 
acceptance was beginning to form and harden that the alleviation of British 
sociology’s problems was nowhere to be found. Shils’ comments with regard to 
statistics, more specifically, mark the emergence of an attitude towards statistics that 
would become increasingly prominent in British sociological circles – not yet 
explicit hostility but a sense that statistical methods are somewhat irrelevant to 
solving sociology’s methodological problems mixed with caution about the damage 
they can do to the subject. 
 
 
British Sociologists at a Crossroads, 1945-1965 
 
The intellectual make-up of British sociology which Shils encountered in the 
late 40s was soon about to change, as new fields of research developed. The change 
occurred in such a fashion ‘as to appear as a sharp break with the past’ and was 
reflected primarily in a change in the ‘type of mind’ which was attracted to sociology 
in the post-war period as compared to the interwar period (Banks, 1963: 47).  
Although the development of sociological theory remained a priority, sociology was 
no longer dominated by ‘men of primarily philosophical bent’, such as Hоbhouse or 
Ginsberg; according to Banks, sociology in the early post-war period was beginning 




interests are set in the framework of scientific rather than philosophical speculation’ 
(Banks, 1963: 47).  
Banks’ understanding of the change of direction in British sociology is 
supported by the conclusions of a series of surveys of sociological research from the 
late 40s, 50s and 60s conducted by Madge (1957), Little (1963) and Krausz (1969). 
These surveys show that broad evolutionary studies were gradually giving way to 
more precise and narrowly confined investigations in numerous sociological fields of 
enquiry such as education, social mobility, social stratification and social class. The 
change is also clearly reflected in the changes of the sociology syllabus at the LSE 
(see Chapter Twelve for more details).  
This shift was a sign that during the 50s and early 60s British sociology was, 
indeed, approaching the crossroads that T. H. Marshall was talking about in 1946. It 
was gradually being recognised that sociology could be extended to other fields of 
empirical enquiry, outside of Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s social philosophy even 
though there was not one organised way of doing it. More important than the fact 
that British sociology was approaching a crossroads between the road to ‘the stars’ 
and the road to ‘the sands’, was what was happening on its approach – did 
sociologists find one common middle road, or did they merely split in two groups 
carrying on along two separate roads? An effective way to find out is to consider the 
careers of some of the few, more prominent, social scientists and sociologists in the 
1940s-1960s, taking into account their views on the intellectual and methodological 
make-up of sociology and their mutual collegial relationships. The following 
analysis takes four such individuals, whose views can be taken as a clear indication 
of what was about to happen to British sociology when it reached Marshall’s 
crossroads and what implications this had for the possible incorporation into 





Tom Harrisson is most famous as one of the organisers of Mass Observation. 




Sociology? In this article, Harrisson defined the state of sociology in a very similar 
way to Marshall, arguing that sociology was standing at the bottom of two roads, 
both leading to extreme positions, with empty ground in between18. On the one hand, 
Harrisson argued, the ‘philosophical approach to sociology, in which great laws of 
human behaviour are produced without observation’ still exercised ‘a heavy high 
level influence on university curricula and research training’ (Harrisson, 1947: 10). 
On the other, there had been ‘vigorous’ attempts ‘to make the subject as objective 
and scientific as possible’ which in turn had led to ‘an absorption of quantitative 
methods which, with maximum impersonality, satisfy purely ‘mathematical’ criteria’ 
(Harrisson, 1947: 10). The result was that there was ‘a gulf’ ‘between the extremes 
of philosophical, subjective sociology, and statistical, quantitative sociology’ 
(Harrisson, 1947: 10).  
To fill this gap, Harrisson recommended for sociology what is today known as 
a qualitative methodology based on ‘the intensive study of basic human problems’ 
(Harrisson, 1947: 15) and on collecting what was regarded as real ‘human material’ – 
‘stuff of ordinary living’ and ‘descriptive analysis of people’, all ‘fascinating and 
illuminating without questionnaire, sample or formal interview’ (Harrisson, 1947: 
12). Harrisson was even reported to have argued that ‘the social investigator’s most 
neglected piece of equipment was a pair of ear plugs’ (Willmott, 1962: 341). 
Harrisson was much more explicit about sociology’s future than Marshall but 
they both were heading in a similar direction. Unlike Marshall, however, Harrisson 
was a vigorous opponent of quantification and statistics as applied to sociology. 
Following the American sociologists Howard Becker and Peter Sorokin, Harrisson 
insisted that “sociological problems are not quantitative problems at all” and that 
social scientists, educators and sociologists ‘found in measurement and computation 
a substitute for real thought’ (Harrisson, 1947: 20). 
In an attempt to criticise statistics, Harrisson argued that the results obtained 
through a questionnaire administered to a random sample of Grimsby fishermen 
would be just as subjective as the results obtained via any other method (Harrisson, 
1947: 19). Furthermore, according to Harrisson, surveys could never produce 
                                               
18 It would appear that just like Marshall, Harrisson’s views were grounded on impressions of 





representative knowledge because they can only say something about social attitudes, 
which respondents express verbally; they could not say anything about the actual 
physical behaviour of the respondents. Harrisson was convinced that quantitative 
research, obscured what was really going on in society – ‘Among thousands of 
figures, there nowhere appears the figure of a man’ (Harrisson, 1947: 11) In addition, 
he argued that the knowledge gained from a survey was bound to be misleading 
because the respondents are prone to lie in their responses. Harrisson’s views are 
echoed in more recent comments made by John Wakeford:  
 
The quality of what goes in statistics is usually extremely suspect. What 
was the response rate? In their responses, did people tell the truth? Why 
should they bother to tell the truth - they are trying to impress you! 
(Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). 
 
However, to argue that surveys are not representative because they cannot help 
us understand what is really going on in society is to misunderstand the meaning of 
representativeness in statistical sampling 19 . But also, and more importantly, 
Harrisson seems to be arguing that there is a method that can tell us what is really 
going on in society. However, no one can reasonably claim to have special, 
privileged access to people’s private inner world, what is ‘really’ happening to 
people (which is what Harrisson appears to be attempting to do by advocating 
observation of physical behaviour); this would be absurd given the fact that no one, 
not even people themselves, let alone sociologists, have any way of proving the 
existence of their inner world  (for more on the so-called ‘the scandal of solipsism’ 
and the development of a similar to Harrisson’s approach in the ethnomethodological 
tradition, see Gellner, 1979). While it does not make sense to put forward claims that 
some methods allow sociologists to see what is really going on in society and others 
do not; it does make sense to argue that some methods are better instruments for 
studying some aspects of society than others. The historical question then is why 
would Harrisson be so adamantly critical towards quantitative methods? Why didn’t 
                                               
19 In the statistical sense, the results from an analysis of a sample drawn from a population are 
representative if they reflect adequately the characteristics of the population from which the sample is 
drawn. How representative the results from the analysis of a sample are depends, above all, on how 
skilfully and adequately the sample has been drawn from a population and whether it has been 
analysed using the appropriate techniques – and not, as Harrisson’s argues, on whether surveys tell 




he make the case about the importance of the use of qualitative methods as 
complementing the knowledge obtained through quantitative methods and, instead, 
present them as two necessarily extreme and mutually incompatible approaches?  
The answer, of course, is that while Harrisson could present quantitative and 
qualitative methods as complete opposites, there was no need for him to do so; in 
other words, there is nothing inherently incompatible about quantitative and 
qualitative methodology. The importance of Harrisson’s article lies, therefore, in the 
choices of interpretation he makes rather than in whether he supports his 
interpretations with sufficient evidence.  
Firstly, like Marshall before him, he chose to portray the future of sociology as 
two distinct possibilities, two separate roads – had Harrisson, or even Marshall, 
attempted to produce historical evidence that British sociology had already been 
‘contaminated’ by a ‘quantitative obsession’ which enjoyed ‘undue dominance’ 
(Harrisson, 1947: 24), they would have struggled because, as this study has shown, 
this had never been the case in Britain. Harrisson’s interpretation is important for 
introducing into the more or less empty field of British sociology in 1947 the 
influential, but mythical, idea that British sociology needed to find a way out of a 
quantitative obsession that it never had experienced in the first place.  
Secondly – by choosing to portray quantitative and qualitative methods as 
incompatible opposites, Harrisson was setting a precedent in British sociology which 
would be followed to an extreme later, in the 1970s, during the so-called positivist 
disputes. It is with Harrisson that this kind of extremist rhetoric about methods – 
qualitative versus quantitative – really began, which had the effect of limiting the 
possibilities for a balanced and practically oriented approach based on effective 
communication between social scientists skilled in different methods. 
Finally, Harrisson’s essay had important implications with regard to attitudes 
towards quantification. He set another precedent, which would develop into a trend 
in the later post-war history of British sociology, of dismissing statistical methods 
out of hand, without having the requisite know-how to make a competent judgment 
about these methods and their proper use. An important part of this trend would be, 




indiscriminate quantification may inflict upon sociology, without taking into account 
any potential benefits. 
Harrisson’s writings are a clear indication that finding a middle road for 
sociology was increasingly becoming a remote possibility. A more likely scenario 
was that sociologists would split into two groups – those like Harrisson and, at least 
to some extent, Marshall, who may have acknowledged in principle that statistics 
may be important, generally, but advocated a non-quantitative future for sociology; 
and those for whom sociology could not be without quantification. This is well 
illustrated in the case of three prominent and quantitatively minded social scientists 
who ended up on the fringes of sociology despite their commitment to the subject; 





T. H. Marshall’s 1946 lecture on ‘Sociology at the Crossroads’ was first 
delivered as an inaugural address when Marshall became a professor in Social 
Institutions at the LSE in 1944. Competing against him for the post was Barbara 
Wootton (1897-1988), an economist by training, who, by the mid-forties, had 
widened her academic interests to include the broader spectrum of social science. In 
a recent biography of Wootton, Ann Oakley describes in detail the 1944 competition 
for the LSE professorship, concluding that ‘had Barbara got the LSE post, the future 
of sociology at the LSE might have been quite different’ (Oakley, 2011: 190). This is 
not an unreasonable suggestion, given that Marshall and Wootton differed 
significantly in their social scientific outlook even though neither of them held 
extreme views about what was the ‘right’ path for social science. As Oakley puts it, 
Marshall was ‘the man with a theoretical disposition’, while Wootton was ‘the 
woman whose mind turned on the empirical usefulness of the social sciences’ 
(Oakley, 2011: 189) after she became disillusioned with economics. Wootton 
remembered that at the time she graduated in 1919, almost ‘the whole of the work 
that occupied the academics of that period was of a deductive, not an inductive 




unfamiliar with the simplest techniques of social investigation’, ‘hopelessly ill-
equipped to undertake any kind of empirical social investigation’ (Wootton, 1967: 
210-211). Over the years, her dissatisfaction with economics grew even stronger – in 
1938, she published Lament for Economics, which ‘marked the official end of this 
career [as an economist] and her coming ‘from the cold [of economics] to the relative 
warmth of sociology’ (Oakley, 2011: 165). 
However, what Wootton encountered in sociology was hardly much more 
encouraging. It was not just a lack of training in the empirical methods of social 
investigation, but also the prevalence of the merely ‘critical’ as opposed to the 
actively ‘constructive’ attitude towards social scientific knowledge. Wootton 
recalled: 
 
I have been struck by the adroitness with which the clever student picks 
holes in other people’s theories or proposals and, at the same time, by his 
apparent lack of any sense of obligation to offer alternatives of his own 
(Wootton, 1967: 202). 
 
What people expected from the burgeoning social sciences in the early post-
war period were some new, fresh and potent alternatives for the solution of 
humankind’s problems. In her book Testament for Social Science, Barbara Wootton 
argued, in a similar vein to Beveridge whom I cited earlier, that the most effective 
way to achieve this was to employ the scientific method in the study of humanity’s 
most pressing social problems: 
 
It is no less obvious that this method, which has been so brilliantly 
successful in the natural sciences is not normally applied to the field of our 
most disastrous failures […] we ought seriously to ask whether the tool that 
has worked such wonders in the one job could not be used for the other 
(Wootton, 1950: 1). 
 
For her, the difference between the natural and the social sciences was a matter 
of ‘differences of degree, rather than of kind; and even these are easily exaggerated’ 
(Wootton, 1950: 3). Moreover, in a direct reference to Harrisson’s essay, which I 
discussed above, Wootton objected to Harrisson’s rather implicit suggestion that 




quantification in sociology. Indeed it was unthinkable that any analysis of anything 
could be totally devoid of some kind of quantification: 
 
Clarification and description, as in biology, normally precede the power to 
reach quantitative conclusions; but they definitely represent a more 
primitive level of achievement, if only for the reason that the significance 
of a qualitative conclusion cannot be assessed unless we have some means 
of judging how far it may be treated as typical. When Mr. Harrisson pleads 
the value of interviewing without formal questionnaires or the study of 
case histories of overhead conversations, as sociological tools alternative 
to quantitative methods, he overlooks the fact that the value of the results 
obtained by these methods entirely depends upon their quantitative 
significance. […] The social sciences are not at all the victims of 
‘quantitative obsession’. Like other branches of science, they cannot 
advance beyond quite elementary stages of development without the use of 
quantitative instruments (Wootton, 1950: 46). 
 
It is important that instead of merely evoking the usefulness and power of 
statistical analysis, Wootton pointed to the underpinning value of the statistical and 
probabilistic way of thinking about social and natural phenomena. After Wootton lost 
in the competition for the LSE chair and ended up teaching social studies in Bedford, 
the chances of her influencing the future of sociology diminished. At the same time, 
her way of thinking was becoming increasingly unpopular so that even those social 
scientists who had a more central position within British sociology than she did, 
struggled to influence the course of British sociology in a direction that that was 





One person, whose views about the scientific base of social science correlated 
with those of Wootton, but who, unlike her, made it into the LSE as a Professor of 
Sociology in 1949 (and took the Martin White professorship in 1961), was David 
Glass (1911-1978). Glass’ intellectual interests and academic background lay 
primarily in demography – he worked in the Population Investigation Committee 
from 1936 till his death in 1978; in 1944 he was appointed member of the Statistics 




Reader in Demography at the LSE (Wise, 1983: 205-9). He was, however, a broadly 
minded intellectual committed to social science and this is what led him, eventually, 
to an academic career in sociology. But Glass’ sociological profile is far from being 
straightforward. Throughout his career he remained on the threshold of sociology, 
not quite in, not quite out, always between sociology and what was informally 
known as the British empirical tradition of social enquiry. And so examining Glass’ 
career is important not only because of his legacy and contributions, but because the 
contradictions that we observe in his career represent in miniature the contradictions 
that existed in early post-war sociology as a whole. 
Glass himself wrote very little, if anything, on the state of sociology as an 
academic subject. Although there is no written records of his views of social science 
and understanding of sociology, there is one piece of evidence which is revealing – 
the lecture he gave at his inauguration as a sociology professor in 1949. The title of 
the lecture itself speaks volumes about Glass’ priorities –‘The Application of Social 
Research’ – and his corpus of work illustrated clearly that it was applied research 
that Glass found most fruitful and rewarding. It is unclear how his lecture was 
received at the time but, with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of the 
direction in which sociology was heading, we can imagine that his recommendations 
for closer working relationship between government and social research were not 
welcomed. It must have been awkward for Glass pursuing this credo as a sociologist 
– as Westergaard remembered in 1979: 
 
there were to be critics who read into this distinctive conjunction of 
problem and policy orientations with meticulous empirical investigation a 
piecemeal pragmatism unattached to theory, a boost for number crunching 
sociography more than for some autonomous sociology capable of 
capturing the essence of social relations (Westergaard, 1979: 173). 
 
Others remembered that at a time when the interest in sociological theory was 
gaining a strong momentum as the priority approach for British sociology (see 
below), Glass was ‘more interested in the discovery of new facts than in the 
construction of theories’ (Grebenik, 1979: 12); in his work, ‘he did not set out to test 
any grand theory but was concerned rather to measure, record and explain’ (Borrie, 




possible quantitative evidence, rather than theoretical constructs or preconceptions’ 
since this was the only legitimate basis of social and political judgment (Grebenik in 
Borrie, 1983: 551). This shows clearly in Glass’ message for the sociology students, 
which, again, was similarly at odds with the messages coming from the majority of 
professional sociologists. Instead of producing well-rounded intellectuals, Glass 
believed that the role of universities in providing a sociology degree was to enable 
‘students to develop an imagination which grasps the relevance of social research’ 
and encourage them to ‘acquire the knowledge and experience which qualifies them 
to undertake it’ (Glass, 1950: 29). In other words, students should know where best 
to apply their sociological knowledge and have the skills to do it. Some sociology 
students enthusiastically embraced his position: most notably, Glass was ‘the main 
influence’ on Olive Banks, who ‘was immediately attracted by his kind of sociology, 
particularly its combination of empirical rigour and social policy’ (Banks in Banks, 
Deem and Earnshaw, 1980: 70).  
The majority of younger sociologists, however, did not identify with Glass’ 
‘kind of sociology’; in fact, the empirical studies of social science ‘had been 
neglected by economists, and unfortunately also by many sociologists’ (Grebenik, 
1991: 19). With interests such as these, it was: 
 
hardly accidental that he should have been attracted to population studies, 
the branch in the social sciences in which the empirical tradition is 
strongest and measurement less difficult than in other fields’ (Grebenik, 
1979: 12).  
 
The number of obituaries written by colleagues and friends after Glass passed 
away that struggle to pin point Glass’ place in social science is representative of the 
uneasiness with which British sociology approached empirical social research, 
especially quantitative survey research, and vice versa. It would be misleading, said 
Westergaard ‘to distinguish between Glass the sociologist and Glass the 
demographer. The study of population for him was part of the social scientific 
enterprise inseparable from the rest’ (Westergaard, 1979: 176). But it had to be 
acknowledged that as British sociology developed and expanded in the post-war 
period, it became, at least as far as its mainstream circles were concerned, an 





[…] although he read widely in sociological literature, Glass did not 
cultivate an interest in that direction [i.e. sociological theory], and he was 
much less at home in the academic world of sociology in recent years than 
he had been in the early days of the British and the International 
Sociological Associations, in which he had taken part. He was extremely 
critical of some of the products of current trends, whose quality did not 
come up to his rigorous standards, and it must be admitted that his negative 
judgments were sometimes disconcertingly swift and uncompromising 
(Marshall and Laslett, 1979: 2). 
 
What Wootton’s and Glass’ experience shows is that the climate within British 
sociology in the post-war period was largely unwelcoming towards people with 
views like theirs; the way their careers developed in relation to sociology give a clear 






Another important example of this emerging trend is Alexander Carr-Saunders 
(1886-1966).  Carr-Saunders held two important posts in social science throughout 
his career – from 1923-1937 he was the first Chair of Social Science at Liverpool; 
and from 1937-1957 he was the Director of the LSE. He was also one of the social 
scientists involved in launching the Population Investigation Committee (1936) and 
played a major role in establishing the study of demography at the LSE (Blacker and 
Glass, 1966: 369). He wrote little about sociology per se, but it is possible to get a 
glimpse of his thoughts on the subject from a couple of reviews he wrote of Morris 
Ginsberg’s work in the 1930s when Ginsberg was the only sociology professor. 
In 1935, Carr-Saunders pointed out that it was difficult to ‘write shortly and 
clearly about sociology’ and that when one is dealing with sociology, ‘these 
difficulties are at their maximum, since whatever definition of the subject is adopted, 
it is of enormous scope and of infinite complication’ (Carr-Saunders, 1935: 499). An 
even greater problem was that many sociologists ‘get no further than attempting to 
prove that their own conception of sociology is theoretically valid and potentially 




understand the direction in which sociology was heading; he saw in the work of 
Ginsberg little more than repeated attempts to define sociology. It would appear, 
therefore, that quantitatively oriented social scientists were intellectually uneasy with 
sociology not simply because quantification was not perceived as essential in 
sociology, but because they had difficulties grasping the philosophical and 
theoretical aspiration of mainstream sociologists. The big question in the 1930s, for 
social scientists like Carr-Saunders was whether sociology, as portrayed by the 
academic sociologists, actually existed: 
 
[…] it [Ginsberg’s Sociology] is a sketch of a subject which can be called 
sociology. […] Is sociology wholly reflection upon the results of other 
social sciences, or does it engage in field work of its own as well? It is 
usually claimed that sociologists do both. If so, where is the field? It would 
seem that sociologists claim to wander freely of the whole territory of 
social experience. […] It is one thing to welcome a book like this, and 
another to admit that it is an argument for, and far less a proof of, the 
existence of sociology (Carr-Saunders, 1935: 499-500). 
 
Carr-Saunders’ views of social science were at odds not only with sociology’s 
intellectual development but also with how the subject, in the way in which Ginsberg 
conceived it, could possibly thrive in academia. The question of ‘how far is it 
possible and desirable to group together the study of the special topics and of social 
life as a whole?’ (Carr-Saunders, 1933: 93) found no clear answer in Ginsberg’s, or 
anybody else’s sociological writings and had the effect of discouraging quantitatively 
minded social scientists from engaging more seriously with sociology. But this is not 
to say that they completely rejected its value. In his Presidential Address to the Royal 
Economic Society in 1958, Carr-Saunders argued that sociology, as the general 
social science Ginsberg was advocating, did have a role to play in the study of 
society because ‘the social world is not readily seen as one world’ and sociology 
could make a contribution in this direction; but he also hastened to ‘calm’ the ‘fears’ 
of the economists by adding that this was not ‘that kind of sociology, which aims at 
transcendence over the special social sciences’ (Carr-Saunders, 1958: 448). But even 
in 1958 it was not immediately clear how quantitative social science would fit into 
sociology. ‘He was greatly curious, but also dubious, about sociology’, commented 




the position that many quantitative social sciences held with respect to academic 
sociology. 
What do these examples tell us about British sociology ‘at the crossroads’? 
There were other social scientists, in addition to Wootton, Glass and Carr-Saunders 
who also advocated the use of quantitative methods in sociology. Support for a more 
quantitative and empirical approach to sociology came from Tom Bottomore who 
insisted that ‘such advances as has been made in sociology have been due to the 
argued rise of the ordinary methods of science’ (Bottomore, 1962: 45); and from 
Quentin Gibson who insisted that the approach used in the natural scientific enquiry 
based on, among other things, reliance on empirical evidence, generalisation and 
aspiration for objectivity, not only applies to social science but is its only option, if 
social science were to have real impact on the lives of people in society (Gibson, 
1960: 3). Other contemporaries suggested that the first step to accommodate these 
principles into sociology was a change of attitude and disposition – students had to 
learn and be convinced that all sociological statements must ‘ultimately be related to 
empirical research’; ‘they must come to think in a factual-analytical framework’ 
(Liggett and Wakeford, 1964: 205).  
So Wootton, Glass and Carr-Saunders were not entirely solitary figures; but for 
all their importance in the history of sociology, they have rarely been ‘at its centre’; 
if they have exerted some influence, this has been done from a distance. And the type 
of understanding, manifested in the writing of those most avidly concerned with the 
future of sociology as a subject in the early post-war period, like Tom Harrisson and 
T. H. Marshall, has made it clear that one of the reasons why the Wootton-s and the 
Glass-es have remained on the sidelines is their insistence on the importance of   
quantification in sociology. 
In 1962, T. H. Marshall declared that his anxiety ‘lest sociology be swamped in 
a flood of [quantitative] studies’ ‘has diminished but has not entirely disappeared’ 
(Marshall, 1962: 32). He himself was now eager to find a more effective way of 
combining rigorous quantitative analysis with a solid underpinning of theoretical 
understanding, citing, most notably, some of the studies that were conducted on the 
subjects of social stratification and social mobility as examples where this had been 




‘sociological interpretation must go beyond statistical correlation’ (Marshall, 1962: 
37) was interpreted to mean that sociological interpretation must go without 
statistical correlation. Too often, the early debates on sociology’s path targeted 
quantitative methods as an extreme position, even though the advance of the 
quantitative tradition in British sociology was negligible; communication with the 
few social statisticians which existed at the time was not attempted and instead the 
focus shifted to the introduction of new methods for reasons that, as Harrisson’s case 
showed, had little to do with enhancing methodology and improving co-operation 
between theory and method. We could perhaps view Harrisson’s arguments as a 
strategy for making the case for ‘qualitative methods’ in British sociology. But not 
only was this done without any proper understanding of quantitative methods, it also 
relied for its success on a heavily distorted image of statistically based social 
research. Moreover, it was distorted for reasons that had no direct grounding in the 
British sociological experience but drew heavily on impressions of American 
sociology. It was this kind of uncommunicative, distorting, impression-based debates 
that were turning the development of statistical sociology in Britain into an ever 
more remote possibility. As Oakley points out, at the time Wootton’s Testament: ‘fell 
mostly on resistant ears’ and it was soon to be forgotten since the empiricism ‘of the 
kind the book recommended was well on the way to becoming a dirty word’ (Oakley, 
2011: 198).  
Thus, as the following chapters will show, in our journey through the history of 
British sociology we will encounter a majority of Marshall-s, who did not necessarily 
oppose quantification in social science but did not regard it as an essential element of 
sociology because the most important contribution of the social sciences lay 
elsewhere; an influential minority of Harrisson-s who were vigorously opposed to 
any sort of a quantification; and a handful of Wootton-s, Glass-es, and Carr-
Saunders-es on the borderline of sociology, who maintained that sociology, or any 







The Understanding of Methods and Theory in British Sociology in the Early 
Post-war Period 
 
An examination of the careers and ways of thinking of some of the major 
figures in British sociology in the early post-war period is an appropriate way of 
introducing the intellectual climate in which sociology was developing and the 
methodological choices that sociology was making. However, it is certainly not 
enough to explain why people like Harrisson spoke the language of mainstream 
sociology while the views of people like Wootton and Glass were rejected or only 
reluctantly accepted. What was going on in sociology more generally at the time? 
What kind of understanding of methodology influenced the path that British 
sociology would choose when it approached Marshall’s crossroad? 
A good way to find out is to examine how sociologists in this early period 
understood the nature and role of methods and how this influenced their way of 
thinking about quantitative methods. Contemporary observers have argued that, 
overall in the 1950s, there was a ‘strong philosophical bias which assumes the 
student ought to be interested in social philosophy and capable of considering 
philosophical problems raised in the study of methodology’ (MacRae, 1953: 80). 
Further insight comes from the 1956 BSA conference on ‘The Present State and 
Development of Professional Sociology’. The nature of sociology and the role of 
methodology was one of the most widely debated topics there. Some sociologists at 
the conference expressed a belief that sociology aught to provide students with an 
opportunity to learn as great a variety of skills as possible because: 
 
the type of person who was required for research and planning was one 
with a wide range of reading, verbal and social skills and a knowledge of 
research methods based upon a study of past classics of social investigation 
and upon a direct experience of empirical research (Tropp, 1957: 291)20. 
 
The reality, however, was quite different: Mark Abrams expressed ‘bluntly’ his 
disappointment that sociology graduates ‘were inadequately trained for any kind of 
independent empirical research’ (Tropp, 2011: 3). Only a minority of sociologists 
                                               
20 Asher Tropp wrote an account of the 1956 conference. Two versions of this account have been 




‘emphasised that sociology could not ignore the vocational aspect’ and that 
university departments ‘must necessarily consider the fields in which their graduates 
would be employed’ and design methodology teaching accordingly (Tropp, 1957: 
292). Other speakers, again in the minority, insisted that sociology ‘was essentially 
an empirical study’ and that instruction in ‘sociological methods of investigation 
could not then be left to the postgraduate stage’ (Tropp, 1957: 292). 
The majority, however, believed that the vocational element and with it, 
practical methods classes and instruction in how to do different methods, was not a 
priority for sociological education. It was argued that society ‘should not only be 
considered factually and empirically’ and that ‘social philosophy was an 
indispensable part of the training of sociology graduates (Tropp, 1957: 292). The 
overall agreement was that the sociology degree ‘was broad and humane and not 
narrowly vocational’ and that ‘the details of research techniques should be left to the 
graduate stage (Tropp, 1957: 292). The broad consensus, as summarised by Tropp 
was that: 
 
The university teachers were agreed that the correct syllabus for 
undergraduates and graduates had to be determined in the light of the 
universities’ duty to provide a general education and to train people to 
contribute to the advancement of sociology. Undergraduate training should 
continue to be broad and humane, leaving it to the graduate stage to 
combine a continuation to this broad education with the training in 
advanced sociological theory and research methods (Tropp, 1957: 293). 
 
Accompanying these well-balanced remarks were comments showing that the 
conclusions reached by the sociology teachers were based not only on rational 
deliberation but also on the idea that anything that does not contribute to an abstract 
and all-encompassing theory or philosophy of society is trivial and not a desirable 
path for sociology. So; Tropp reported that underlying some of the comments and 
coming up again and again in the discussion was: 
 
a deep concern […] with what some members considered to be a 
trivialisation of sociology and a retreat from the consideration of 
significant social problems into the waste-land of methodological rigour 





Therefore, in the 1950s, a majority of British sociologists not only regarded 
methodology as an unnecessary addition to the undergraduate curriculum and 
something that should be reserved for the postgraduate stage; they also showed a 
more general lack of appreciation of ‘methodological rigour’. It is such broad 
underlying views that would prove to be a powerful factor in the overall lack of 
appreciation of quantitative skills that would persist in academic sociology despite 
any changes in the specifics of the sociology curriculum21.  
It has been argued, albeit rather impressionistically, that the 1940s/1950s were 
a period in which British sociology was characterised by empirical, if not empiricist, 
work (for an overview, see Platt, 1981). Although, as I mentioned above, the early 
post-war period did see a shift away from the social philosophy of Hobhouse and 
Ginsberg towards more ‘social-problem-based’, empirical work, it was not long 
before this kind of work was coming under attack for making ‘no use of sociological 
theory, either in the problems selection or in their treatment of the problem’ (Little, 
1963: 91).   
There is, indeed, substantial evidence to suggest that throughout the post-war 
period, a primary concern for British sociologists was the development of a 
sociological theory, not empirical work. A survey of sociological research conducted 
in 1956 showed that ‘few research projects have methodology as their primary object’ 
and that 
 
analysis in terms of articles published in the two sociological journals 
[Sociological Review and BJS] or in terms of books reviewed in the same 
two journals might suggest that the extension of social philosophy was the 
primary activity of sociologists (Madge, 1957: 86-87).  
 
Despite the fact that Hobhouse and Ginsberg had been working on a type of 
sociological theory, their work was now beginning to be dismissed as irrelevant, 
leaving the impression that theory was an area of sociological enquiry that has been 
previously neglected: ‘it is perhaps an unfortunate thing that there has not developed, 
even within the universities, a body of sociological theory’ (Banks, 1954a: 50). Some 
                                               
21  This particular understanding of methodology was linked to sociologists’ understanding of 
sociology as an academic subject – more details of how this manifested itself in the academic 





of the first post-war British books on sociology were devoted to sociological theory – 
Donald MacRae’s Ideology and Society (1961) and John Rex’s Key Problems of 
Sociological Theory (1961). Although they were seen as an important step forward, 
they were also seen as a step that underlined the absence of work on this level. Given 
these circumstances, theory, it was argued, deserved sociologists’ utmost attention: 
‘the reiteration that the building up of an adequate body of theory is the vitally 
necessary step in the development of the subject’ (Banks, 1954a: 50); there was ‘an 
urgent demand for the creation of a more adequate theoretical approach to our work.’ 
(Simey, 1957: 128). It was a common view that ‘theoretically oriented studies are 
generally greatly superior to descriptive studies in their economy of effort’ (Cotgrove, 
1978 [1967]: 29) and that the job of a sociologist was to ‘build a body of theory to 
explain the behaviour of social systems’ (Cotgrove, 1978 [1967]: 38).  
A survey of sociologists conducted by Carter in 1967 revealed that similar 
beliefs were shared right across the sociological community. In 1967, about 28% of 
professional sociologists (i.e. members of the BSA and not members of the BSA but 
engaged in teaching and research in sociology) expressed interest in ‘basic theory’, 
compared to only about 12% who expressed interest in ‘methods and methodology’ 
(unfortunately, it is not clear if there was an overlap between these fractions, so it is 
not possible to assess how many sociologists, if any, expressed interest in both) 
(Carter, 1968: 15). In addition, theory topped the list of sociological fields that were 
perceived as having been neglected – 13.7% of respondents reported theory as the 
neglected field, compared to 3.6% who reported that ‘methodology’ has been 
neglected and 4.8% who reported that ‘methods and techniques’ have been neglected. 
Theory was also the field in which sociologists believed growth was most necessary 
– 20% of respondents reported this; while the proportion of those who believed that 
growth is necessary in ‘methodology’ and ‘methods and techniques’ was negligent, 
only 1.2% and 4%, respectively. Less than 1% believed that mathematical sociology 
has been neglected; only 3.4% thought growth in this field was necessary. ‘Research 
must be ‘theoretically problem oriented’ as opposed to ‘social problem oriented’, 
was one of the widely spread beliefs according to Carter’s survey (Carter, 1968: 35). 
So; if there was a shift in attitudes in the early post-war period, this was not a shift 




better theory of this special kind should be regarded as establishing the case for 
better experiment, rather than deeper contemplation’ (Simey, 1957: 128). It was a 
move away from the grand, abstract social philosophy developed by Hobhouse and 
Ginsberg and towards a more moderate, smaller-scale, theoretical work.  
Although many early discussions in British sociology contained a similar 
element of the importance of bringing theory and method together it remained 
unclear how ‘better’ experiments could be done or taught given the negligible 
amount of teaching of methods that persisted in sociology undergraduate curricula 
(see Chapter Twelve below) and the little interest in methods and methodology 
expressed by sociologists at the time. Nonetheless, it was not uncommon in the early 
60s to argue that: 
 
The future of sociology may depend more than anything else, on the 
question whether statistical survey techniques can be married to the 
complex but often inexplicit techniques of personal observation and 
description (Townsend quoted in Marshall, 1963: 26). 
 
But, often, the desire to bring theory and methods closer together was 
accompanied by an understanding that the development of sociological theory should 
come first and attention to methods, especially quantitative methods, later: although 
the marriage of techniques was something that was ‘certainly desired’, it itself 
‘cannot give birth to a science’; ‘something more was needed’ and that was the 
development of sociological theory (Marshall, 1963: 26). The ‘preoccupation with 
theory’ could be justified and was ‘reinforced by the increasingly urgent need for 
fruitfully oriented research’ (Fletcher, 1957: n.p). 
How can we explain the increasing attention given to the need to develop more 
and better sociological theory? An inter-play between two important factors was at 
work. First, as I briefly mentioned above, a common and widely held view was that 
British sociology had not produced any major theoretical breakthroughs in the first 
half of the twentieth century: it was argued that ‘British sociologists on the whole 
tend to be […] eclectic rather than particularist in the building up of theoretical 
schemes’ (Banks, 1954a: 50), with the theoretical work of the kind that Hobhouse 
and Ginsberg had been working on being seen as unsuccessful. Now that sociology 




chances for the development of theory were perceived as being greater, and as the 
above discussion showed, there was an overall agreement that the focus should be on 
theory.  
Intertwined in these views was also a perception that British sociology had 
already developed empirically. Banks commented that ‘British sociologists on the 
whole tend to be empirical rather than analytic’, (Banks, 1954a: 50) while Madge 
argued that in Britain there was ‘a substantial corps of empirical sociologists (Madge, 
1957: 87). Where did this impression come from, given that the work done under the 
name of sociology since the beginning of the twentieth century was primarily of a 
social philosophical type?  
A clue comes from the examples that Banks and Madge list to support their 
views. The advances that Banks and Madge argued were being made in empirical 
social enquiry were not made as part of ‘academic sociology’ and were not made by 
professional sociologists. For instance, both Banks and Madge mention the LSE 
Research Techniques Unit as an example of ‘a prominent exception to this disinterest 
in method’ (Madge, 1957: 87). This research unit, however, was established in 1949 
by Maurice Kendall, a professional statistician. The unit comprised mainly of 
professional statisticians (Claus Moser, Alan Stuart, James Durbin) and 
psychologists (William Belson) (Banks, 1959); other bodies, such as the Social 
Research Unit at the LSE and the Population Investigation Committee contributed to 
British empirical social science, but were not strictly sociological institutes; the PIC 
was a demographic organisation (Banks, 1954b). The rest of the bodies mentioned by 
Banks (The Medical Research Council, Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, 
National Institute or Economic and Social research) and Madge (Government Social 
Survey) were even further removed from academic sociology. Some sociologists 
even referred to the advances achieved within the British statistical tradition when 
they were trying to promote sociology: in a guide for intending students in sociology 
and social anthropology, one of the first such guides in the country, Banks and Tropp 
argued that sociology and social anthropology had their origins in the work of the 
political arithmeticians William Petty and John Graunt and in the work of the 




social phenomena took over from philosophical enquiries’ (Tropp and Banks, 1960: 
1).   
But the historical reality is that direct links between academic sociology and 
the nineteenth-century British empirical tradition of social enquiry have always been 
weak to non-existent. Thus although the British empirical tradition of social science 
cannot be ignored when we consider the study of society as whole, it is important to 
stress that in the history of sociology in Britain this tradition remained distinct from 
British academic sociology. Even Madge acknowledged that if one was searching for 
methodological findings, one would struggle to find them in sociology journals, 
which were ‘rather bare’ in this respect (Madge, 1957: 88); but one could easily find 
numerous contributions of this kind in statistical or even philosophical journals.  
It becomes clear then that the impression that some post-war sociologists 
shared about British sociology’s apparent preoccupation with empirical work comes 
merely from the fact that they were inclined to accept the contributions made in other 
areas of social science as part of a ‘common sociological heritage’. What is more 
important, however, is that the divide between this empirical tradition and academic 
sociology remained unquestioned; instead, the fact that empirical work was being 
done elsewhere was understood as a legitimate reason why sociology should direct 
its own efforts towards more theoretical, radical or critical enterprises.  
It could be argued then that, since Madge and many others were prepared to 
think, at least to an extent, of the contributions of empirical social enquiry as 
contributions to sociology, the divide between sociology and empirical social science 
is irrelevant; a historiographical fiction that is important in the world of pernickety 
historians but not the sociological community. However, the divide between the type 
of sociology that developed academically in Britain and the empirical social science 
that was being done elsewhere matters greatly when it comes to the teaching of 
sociology to undergraduate and postgraduate students, who would then go on to form 
another generation of professional sociologists. If sociology students were taught by 
sociologists who did not perceive empirical enquiry as essential and themselves did 
not possess adequate skills for conducting such an enquiry, especially quantitative 
empirical enquiry, then the students themselves would be likely to acquire similar 




that fact that they were continuously taught research methods. The chapter on 
teaching below explains exactly how this came to be the case for the majority of 
sociology students in the post-war period.   
 
 
British Sociology’s Views on Empirical Social Science in the Early Post-war 
Period 
 
Mixed with the view that, since empirical work was being done elsewhere, it 
was desirable that sociologists direct their efforts to the development of sociological 
theory, was a particular perception of empirical social science. British sociologists in 
the early post-war period were, on the whole, depreciative and sceptical about 
empirical enquiries, especially quantitative empirical enquiries. For instance, in the 
above example in which Madge acknowledged the contributions to empirical social 
enquiry made in the LSE Research Unit, he did not hesitate to criticise the value of 
such work to sociology:  
 
While much of value has emerged, the research techniques so far explored 
appear somewhat narrowly based, concentrating as they do on the 
statistical sampling and administrative problems of mass interviewing and 
displaying rather little curiosity about the art and science of asking 
questions or of the other methods of inquiry open to sociologists (Madge, 
1957: 87). 
 
However, what exactly is ‘the art and science of asking questions’? Were 
sociologists themselves able to offer their help to social statisticians in this respect? 
Madge does not make this clear; what is clear is that however imperfect empirical 
and statistical work was, sociologists like Madge tended to emphasise its 
imperfection rather than its potential. 
The 1957 BSA conference entitled ‘Sociology in Retrospect and Prospect’ was 
a fitting opportunity to discuss the role of empirical social enquiry in sociology and 
provides further insight. The views discussed at the conference show a tendency to 




scientists of the nineteenth and twentieth century, such as William Farr, Charles 
Booth, Seebohm Rowntree and Arthur Bowley. It was understood that: 
 
The dawn of the new empirical sociology turned out to be a false dawn, 
partly because the system builders went on to building systems, and to a 
large extent crowded the empiricists off the stage (Simey, 1957: 125). 
 
Note that Simey called the work of Farr and Booth etc. not empirical but 
‘empiricist’ which in this intellectual context is a derogatory term. Although he 
admitted that the application of random sampling in social surveys has undoubtedly 
been a step forward, Simey questioned the overall value of the empirical social 
studies: ‘when attempts have been made to develop scientific methods still further 
[…] the results have been more questionable (Simey, 1957: 125). 
Another good example that sums up this mood of suspicion towards past and 
contemporary empirical work in the 1950s, comes from W. J. H. Sprott, who 
criticised the empirical tradition of social enquiry, pointing to Hobhouse and 
Ginsberg as the only ones who managed to withstand its malign influence:  
 
Let us not rely in superficial appearances; let us find out the facts. This is 
the mood of British sociology: fact finding. […] Two figures, and I think 
only two, stand for something different. They are L. T. Hobhouse and 
Morris Ginsberg (Sprott, 1957: 608).  
 
However, since Hobhouse’s and Ginsberg’s work failed to attract followers 
and, it was argued, failed to bring any major theoretical advances to British 
sociology: 
  
Theory and encyclopaedism are for the moment unfashionable […] It is not 
the Hobhouse tradition that we follow, it is rather the fact finding tradition 
of Booth. Research is in the hands of the applied sociologists, not in those 
of the theorists (Sprott, 1957: 609).  
 
The ‘fact finding tradition of Booth’, Sprott argued, had been, for too long now, 
inhibiting sociology from realising its full potential especially with regard to 





I think myself that a study of sociological theory is important and it is 
neglected in this country. For its development we require […] sociologists 
who aim at making their research serve their theories, rather than hanging 
around making themselves useful. […] this is a minority opinion. […] My 
own hope is that among the increasing number of students who study the 
subject some may come forward, endowed with scientific imagination, 
who will refrain from knocking at doors and presenting questionnaires until 
they have formulated some theoretically significant hypothesis for 
verification (Sprott, 1957: 622). 
 
The study of sociological theory may have been perceived as important by a 
‘minority’, as Sprott says, but a minority of social scientists, not a minority of 
sociologists – in the 1950s there were still a lot more people involved in empirical 
research at research units and social science department than there were academic 
sociologists. The majority of academic sociologists in 1950s and early 1960s saw 
empirical work as ‘not-sociology’ but as mere fact-finding into ‘the condition of 
Britain’ question’ which aimed ‘to discover facts for governments and to influence 
policy and legislation’ (Cotgrove, 1978 [1967]: 29). It was argued that the 
application of statistics ‘has become a fashion, if not a cult’; that ‘more excessive 
reliance is placed on it’ and that ‘it represents perhaps the most misleading technique 
ever relied on by social scientists’ as a result of which many social scientists  ‘have 
gone far up blind alleys in this way and resolutely remained there’ because they have 
retained their belief that ‘there is something innately scientific about work of this 
kind’ (Simey, 1957: 126). In addition to being a product of almost entirely 
‘pragmatic’ concerns, such as the solution of social problems, empirical social 
scientists, especially those conducting survey research, were misguided in their belief 
that ‘the task of sociology was to establish statistical regularities’ and were thereby 
failing to offer an understanding of ‘the meaning which the action has for the actor’ 
(Cotgrove, 1978 [1967]: 34). In addition, it was argued that any attempts to 
understand society statistically, following procedures that were used in the natural 
sciences, could only make a very limited contribution to the advance of sociological 
knowledge – it was one thing, Cotgrove argued, to deal with millions of molecules 
‘which are relatively simple’ and a completely different thing to analyse ‘a system 
made up of a few hundred very complex men and women’ (Cotgrove, 1978 [1967]: 




to reach results of a much greater certainty, the study of the latter, due to their 
complexity, yielded results marked by a high level of uncertainty.  
Those with a much better-grounded knowledge in statistics would most likely 
disagree with Cotgrove, pointing out that the level of certainty of the results of a 
statistical study depends on the way the study has been conducted, not the objects of 
the study. But rarely, if ever, did sociologists refer to the work of statisticians or 
consult them before making their claims of inadequacy. It is not exactly clear what 
sociologists like Cotgrove based their statements on; but it is clear that in the early 
post-war period, little effort was being made to foster better communication between 
sociologists and statisticians that would have helped sociologists to improve the 
quality of their arguments about statistical methods. It may be true, as the statistician 
Claus Moser argued in 1954, that as far as good sociological practice is concerned, 
the conflict between theory and method is ‘entirely illusory’ and that ‘fundamentally, 
they should be complimentary to each other’; but, as he pointed out, in real life, there 
was ‘a lack of communication, if not actually a conflict, between them’ (Moser, 
1954: 90).  
The 1967 survey by Carter quoted above that showed a common and widely 
spread desire among British sociologists to encourage the development of 
sociological theory, also showed that scepticism and hostility towards empirical and 
quantitative work was common. Carter reported that ‘an interest in Methods and 
methodology has not been and it is not, a major feature’ (Carter, 1968: 16); although 
there were ‘signs that increasing numbers of sociologists are attaching considerable 
importance to both of these aspects [methods and methodology]’, there was a clear 
but ‘perhaps less powerful, current of opinion against what is perceived as the danger 
of ‘methods men’ taking over the subject and reducing it to ‘computerised trivia’ 
(Carter, 1968: 16). More extreme views were also expressed, going as far as to argue 
that empirical and quantitative research was not sociology at all and that it was not 
done by sociologists but by some researchers called ‘the hybrid type’ (Marshall, 
1953: 208). In sharing his impressions of the first BSA conference in 1953, Marshall, 
agreeing with Ginsberg, argued that ‘much of this work, useful and necessary though 
it is, ought not really to be called ‘social science’ at all, nor are those who do it in 




For contemporary statisticians, it was obvious that statements like these were 
misguided, based on insufficient knowledge and showed a clear lack of will to 
engage with statistics. One of the most prominent social statisticians of the time, 
Claus Moser, addressed sociologists’ claims, showing that their criticism of 
statistical practices was correct only as far as low quality social statistical research 
was concerned:  
 
The purpose of many surveys is simply to provide someone with 
information. […] In this early, fact-finding, stage of the social sciences 
there is virtually no limit to the range of topics covered by surveys. It must 
not be thought, however, that the purpose of surveys in social research or 
elsewhere, is always so straightforward. Many enquiries are aimed to 
explain rather than to describe. Their function may be theoretical – to test 
some hypothesis suggested by sociological theory – or severely practical – 
to assess the influence of various factors […] It is the ill-considered 
launching of surveys, leading to the waste of much time and money and the 
accumulation (often) of unwanted data, that has given rise to the scepticism 
with which some sociologists regard “door-knocking” research (Moser, 
1967 [1958]: 3). 
 
Sociologists who criticised statistical social enquiries were equating all 
statistical research with ‘ill-considered launching of surveys’, without 
acknowledging the advantages of the ‘well-considered’ launching of surveys. Such 
attitudes did nothing to help bridge the gap between theory and method but served 
only to make any potential co-operation between sociologists and statisticians more 
difficult. 
There is some evidence to suggest that those working in the field of social 
statistics were, generally, more open to improving communication with the 
sociologists than vice versa. Even before Moser’s explanatory remarks, another 
prominent statistician and holder of the new second chair of statistics at the LSE 
(1949-1961), Maurice Kendall, made some conciliatory remarks which were partly 
aimed at the sociologists. Kendall acknowledged that the statistical approach had not 
been regarded as particularly important to sociology; but he also expressed his views 






The statistician is not, and makes no claim to be, a sociologist, a politician 
or a moral philosopher; but he may, perhaps, be allowed to suggest that the 
statistical approach, in the sense I am using the term in this lecture, should 
not be overlooked in the subjects with which they are concerned (Kendall, 
1950: 136). 
 
In a similar vein, as part of a discussion at the Royal Commission on 
Population, David Glass, as a statistician who was also working in sociology, 
recommended that: 
 
[…] There needs to be a much closer link between the statistician and the 
sociologist in demographic investigation that has been general in the past. 
It is not just a question of handing to the sociologist the task of studying 
fertility in social context. It is equally important that the sociologist should 
help to frame concepts and definitions which may result in more 
meaningful indices […] (Glass, 1951: 44). 
 
There might not have been many social statisticians like Kendall and Glass 
who openly advocated for a better communication with sociology and made efforts 
to establish such communication. But there were fewer still, if any, mainstream 
sociologists prepared to be as conciliatory towards statistics. 
Whether British sociologists’ beliefs about statistics, surveys and empirical 
work more generally were well-founded or in any way justified, is a topic for a 
further discussion. For the purpose of the present discussion, it suffices to say that 
what British sociologists chose to believe about empirical social science in the early 
post-war period was bound to have important implications for the beliefs and 
attitudes of the generations of young sociologists to follow.  
 
 
Economics and Statistics in Britain in the Early Post-war Period 
 
In the early post-war period, British sociology was, at least to a degree, 
exceptional in its lack of willingness to develop an empirical programme and teach 
quantitative skills. Economics, for instance, was incorporating statistical techniques 
into research and teaching with much greater enthusiasm and vigour. Writing in 1950, 




economics had been changing rapidly in recent years, pointing out ‘the increasing 
use of statistical methods wherever they can be invoked’ (Cole, 1950: 34). Cole’s 
observations were corroborated by the findings of Guillebaud (1953) who, having 
analysed the contents of the economics degrees across higher education institutions 
in the 1940s (Cambridge, Oxford, LSE, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, 
Swansea) showed that statistics was a component of every economics degree. In 
most of these institutions, elementary statistics was a compulsory subject within the 
economics degree; the LSE set an important example with a compulsory statistics 
paper in the Intermediate examination (after second year) and a compulsory statistics 
paper in the final examination for BSc Economics degrees with special subject in the 
field of economics (as opposed to, for instance, history, sociology and social 
anthropology, where there was no statistics paper). All degrees in economics offered 
the students, if they wished, the opportunity to develop higher-level skills in statistics, 
going beyond introductory courses. In summary, Guillebaud reported that: 
 
There has been a very marked growth in recent years in the appreciation of 
the importance of knowledge of statistics and of statistical method and 
technique […] The number of teachers of statistics has increased rapidly 
during the last few years, and they constitute today an important element in 
the economics departments of universities (Guillebaud, 1953: 37). 
 
In contrast, it was observed that: 
 
[…] there has been very little statistical work or teaching of statistics 
related to either politics or sociology; yet statistics can be fully as useful in 
these fields, and statistical methods are needed in them in order to combat 
tendencies towards untested generalisation’ (Cole, 1950: 34).  
 
Cole went on to admit that the teaching of sociology was still ‘a very difficult 
question’ and made reference to a tendency that was starting to develop at the LSE 
(and other institutions offering sociology), and which he called a ‘bad habit’, of 
‘calling by the name of sociology all the odds and ends of Social Studies that we 
can’t conveniently bring under any main head’; anticipating the later expansion of 
sociology, Cole urged that the development of sociology ‘should be slow and 




But not everyone was prepared to distinguish between economics and 
sociology on the basis of the provision of methodological training. F. S. Stone, for 
instance, argued that the training in methods in the undergraduate curriculum of 
economics, sociology and politics alike is ‘rudimentary’ or ‘non-existent’; even a 
first-class degree was not a guarantee that the graduate will be able to undertake 
empirical investigation or even the most basic quantitative analysis (Stone, 1947: 
280). An analysis of the LSE curriculum (see Chapter Twelve) tends to support 
Cole’s and Guillebaud’s conclusions more than those of Stone, as least as far as the 
LSE was concerned. Unfortunately, a full survey of the teaching of economics is not 
possible here; and we should, of course, note, that Stone’s and Cole’s and 
Guillebaud’s accounts are a product of different observations and different standards 
as to what exactly constitutes ‘rudimentary skills’. But for the purpose of the current 
analysis, it suffices to say, that even if economics graduates were not coming out 
better equipped than sociologists, the systematic presence of quantitative analysis in 
Economics, at least in leading institutions such as the LSE, nourished an attitude 
which was much more appreciative of quantitative methods than was the case in 
sociology. The presence of quantitative methods was much less controversial in 
economics than it was in sociology. 
 
 
Intellectual Debates in Sociology and Statistics in Britain, 1930-1970: 
Summary 
 
This chapter showed that in the early post-war period there was a widespread 
fear, however unlikely this was, of British sociology falling into ‘an obsession with 
empiricism’. Empirical research and quantitative methods were portrayed as a 
fruitless path for the future development of British sociology and a distraction from 
what ought to be the real priority – the development of a sociological theory. This 
period was, in fact, dominated by a revival of interest in sociological theory (but a 
different kind of theory from the theory developed during the interwar period). It was 
also dominated by the rejection of the British empirical tradition in social research 




in spite of the fact that there was still little clarity as to what ‘sociology’ actually was. 
The advantages of the ability to think about and analyse sociological data statistically 
were rarely discussed; instead, quantitative methods were regularly equated merely 
with techniques for gathering information; as something that could wait until British 
sociology has grown theoretically. Thus, those like Barbara Wottoon, David Glass 
and Alexander Carr-Saunders who were positive about empirical sociology and 
emphasised the benefits of quantification were marginalised. 
The relationship between statistics and sociology was shaped first and foremost 
by sociologists’ attitudes towards statistics; there is no evidence in the historical 
record that discussion about the use of quantitative methods in this period ever 
reached a stage where the focus was on the practical requirements that would make 
empirical/quantitative research possible, such as the presence or absence of facilities 
for conducting such research. This suggests that a lack of students willing to learn 
statistics, or a lack of staff willing and able to teach it or a lack of computer 
technology to facilitate its inception played a role only in those places where 
statistical methods had already been accepted, where attitudes towards them was 
welcoming and positive. But, as the following chapters will continue to show, there 
were few places where this would have actually been the case even as British 

















Chapter Eleven  
 
The Expansion of Sociology in the British Education System between 1940 





So far I have looked at the early post-war debates about the nature and 
methodology of sociology and analysed the effect these had on the way empirical 
and quantitative research and techniques were received within sociology. Now I 
move on to discussing the rapid, large-scale expansion of sociology within the higher 
education system between 1940-1970 and how the circumstances of this expansion 
affected the opportunities for the teaching of quantitative methods and for the 
incorporation of these methods into sociological research.  
The expansion of higher education began slowly after the Second World War 
and peaked in the mid to late sixties largely, but not exclusively, in the aftermath of 
the Robbins report of 1963. This expansion is the single most powerful factor in the 
development of sociology in the twentieth century because it made sociology 
practically possible; the intellectual, human, financial and material resources on 
which sociology as a field of intellectual enquiry and as an academic discipline drew 
increased not only in quantity but also changed in kind. By the early 1960s, it was 
argued, two things were ‘certain’ about sociology – that it ‘has become accepted and 
it has expanded’ (Little, 1963: 64); it had ‘become an accepted constituent in the 
teaching and research of British universities’ and was now ‘deeply implicated in the 
public practice of doing good’ (MacRae, 1957: 98). ‘It would now be very difficult 
to get rid of us’, claimed MacRae: ‘in 1957 sociology is a magic word’ (MacRae 
1957: 98). 
Examining such an important historical shift poses certain challenges for the 
historian, one of which is finding the suitable contexts for a proper understanding of 




The expansion of sociology took place, firstly, within the context of 
sociology’s historical development prior to 1945. The previous chapters have 
examined this context in great detail, highlighting, among other things that academic 
sociology in Britain remained weak and ill-defined. This reveals a paradox at the 
centre of the general picture of the expansion of sociology: how did a subject which 
existed, both institutionally and intellectually in relative obscurity; which struggled 
to make itself relevant; and which, at least academically, had restricted itself to a 
philosophical study of society, suddenly rise to become one of the most fashionable 
and desirable of subjects? How did a subject that up to 1945 appeared so 
unpromising, come to be seen as holding out great promise for both university 
applicants and university vice-chancellors?  
From the context of the history of sociology, it is evident that sociology could 
not have not created the conditions for its own expansion. To help us understand how 
the expansion became possible, regardless of sociology’s past, we have to examine 
the expansion of sociology in the context of the general expansion of higher 
education in Britain after 1945. When looked at from this angle, the answer to the 
question ‘Why did sociology expand?’ might appear quite obvious – sociology 
expanded because the whole higher education system was expanding. But this 
provides only a partial answer to the question. We also need to ask – why did 
sociology in particular, expand? University subjects did not expand at an equal rate 
and the expansion period, especially in the post-Robbins era, was characterised, 
generally, by a swing away from scientific subjects and towards “softer options”, 
including the social sciences (cf. Mandler (2017) although I argue below that a slight 
modification of this view is necessary). But not only was the boom in the social 
sciences accompanied by a swing away from the natural sciences; of all social 
science subjects, it was sociology that benefited most. Explanations that limit 
themselves to the force of the general expansion of the higher education fail to 
address this more specific issue, which is vital for understanding what made 
sociology the subject we know today and what enabled sociologists to take a rather 
neglectful approach towards methodology and the role of statistical methods without 




Another challenging aspect of any historical examination of the expansion is 
paying proper attention to the things about sociology that changed as result of the 
expansion and the things that remained the same. This chapter pays special attention 
to both the differences and similarities, compared to the past, in sociologists’ 
approach to methodology, particularly quantitative methods. It shows that an attitude 
persisted in which methods training was not regarded as essential for a subject like 
sociology whose primary function was seen as the provision of a general education. 
And while previous chapters showed that in their debates about the future of the 
subject, sociologists did not consider competence in quantitative methods to be 
essential and did not put it up as a criterion of the sociology degree; this chapter 
explains why sociologists could not have raised quantitative methods training to an 
indispensable prerequisite in a sociological education if they wanted to sustain 
sociology’s popularity and avoid discouraging students. 
But together with the trends that persisted, there were also things that changed. 
The position of sociology in academia became more secure and the range of 
sociological topics studied in universities broadened significantly. A broader range 
of methods was introduced, mainly qualitative methods but, along with this, much 
pseudo-philosophical discussion about methodology emerged. We will see that the 
circumstances of the expansion allowed sociology to expand laterally, in terms of 
topics that could be studied, but not necessarily in terms of methodological 
competence to study these topics. 
These are challenges which no other history of sociology in Britain has 
attempted to address carefully and in great detail; most histories provide an account 
of the expansion that is limited to describing its positive effects (cf. Halsey, 2004). 
What has not been discussed is how to explain the historical meaning of this 
expansion, both for sociology and for its methodological character; and how to 
explain the problematic nature of the expansion and its consequences. Most texts 
focus on sociology in the background of the expansion, and not on the expansion in 
the background of the history of British sociology or the development of the 
education system as a whole. So; parts of this chapter will be devoted to exposing 
this attitude and showing that the complacency with which sociologists approached 




methods was perceived within sociology. It will also show that this perception of the 
expansion is still common today. 
What sociology achieved in the post-war period academically had little to do 
with what it had achieved previously; its expansion was not internally driven, the 
result of a building-up process taking place within the subject itself. This may sound 
obvious but the fact is that when sociologists have written about the history of 
sociology in the post-war period, the question of how it was possible for sociology to 
expand has almost always been obscured by the excitement surrounding the 
expansion itself. Examining this question, however, holds the key to the 
understanding of the history of the subject in the twentieth century.  
 
 
Overview of the Higher Education System Leading up to and during the 
Expansion  
 
The higher education system in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century 
was predominantly conservative: universities were regarded as ‘elite institutions’ 
whose purpose was not the education of the whole of society but the education of a 
very small proportion at the top; universities were there to educate ‘the leaders of 
society’ (Anderson, 2006: 122). This principle not only describes how people 
thought things should be; it was commonly believed that things could not be any 
other way – ‘there was a widespread assumption that the potential constituency for 
university was limited by innate ability to perhaps 5% of the population (Mandler, 
2015a: 2-3).  
This conservatism is also evident in the way in which universities were being 
financed – the University Grants Committee (UGC) was established in 1919 but it 
funded only about a third of the expenditure of the universities; the other two-thirds 
had to be funded privately, and research and teaching in the social sciences, in 
particular, was funded largely by American philanthropic foundations – Rockefeller, 
Carnegie, Harkness – with the Rockefeller funds playing a key role in expanding the 
LSE’s premises and library as well as funding a great deal of the research done there. 




and Labour in the 1930s (for a full account of the role of American philanthropies in 
social science funding in Britain in the interwar period, see Fisher (1980, 1983), 
Bulmer (1982, 1984) and Renwick (2014)). And although the UGC did not interfere 
with the way the universities spent the money they received, it exercised control on a 
different level by deciding which universities deserved to receive grants, with 
existing ‘elite’ universities like London, Oxford and Cambridge benefiting the most. 
Even before the war, however, it had been apparent that ‘the graduate output of 
the universities needed to be largely increased if the national need for men and 
women with university training was to be fully met’ (University Grants Committee, 
1953: 17). This growing concern was exacerbated by the large number of men and 
women returning to civil life from war service in 1945, wanting to continue their 
higher education which had been interrupted by the war (the driving force behind the 
first phase of the expansion in 1946/7-1952/3; cf. University Grants Committee, 
1964: 65). Suddenly, less than three years after the end of the war, the universities 
were seeing a 50% increase on pre-war student numbers: while in 1938/9 there were 
16 universities and 5 university colleges catering for ca. 50,000 students, in 1947 the 
same number of higher education institutions had to cater for ca. 77,000 students 
(Nuffield College, 1948: 85). 
Three government reports recommended specific measures to address this 
situation – the 1944 Goodenough committee on medical education; the 1946 Barlow 
report on education in science and technology; and the 1946 Clapham report on 
social science. As a result of the implementation of the recommendations of these 
committees, in the period 1946-1951/2, the number of Science students doubled, and 
the Arts (including Social Science) students increased by 60% (University Grants 
Committee, 1953: 17).  
Although there was a gradual expansion immediately after the war, there was 
little sign that the university system was changing its nature (Anderson, 2006: 131). 
That the early post-war expansion of higher education did not at first break with the 
conservatism that characterised higher education during the first half of the twentieth 
century is apparent from the tone of contemporary discussions of the state of higher 
education where the quality (not quantity) of students was raising major concerns. It 




reading arts subjects seems to be slightly smaller than before the war’ (University 
Grants Committee, 1953: 26) and this was interpreted as a warning sign:  
 
[…] no further substantial increase in student numbers could be expected 
in the immediate future without reducing university standards […] In most 
universities and colleges not many suitable candidates present themselves 
for whom places are not available and in some we have been told that “the 
margin of cultivation” has already been reached (University Grants 
Committee, 1953: 26). 
 
One of the most common complaints about the changes in the post-war 
curriculum was that students were ‘unduly preoccupied with examinations and that 
they fail to use their time at universities to broaden their minds’ (University Grants 
Committee, 1953: 45). The greater demand for higher education was seen not only as 
a challenge, but also – as the tone of the discussion suggests – as a problem, since, it 
was argued, if fifty years ago it could have been assumed that the general education 
of the university students ‘could be left to take care of itself’ since they ‘would have 
come from a home in which he [sic.] would have acquired cultural interests’, in 
1950s this was no more the case (University Grants Committee, 1958: 39). 
Another problem which inhibited the effective provision of high quality 
general education was the lack of communication which was observed to exist 
between the sciences and the humanities at all academic levels – ‘narrowness of 
outlook could be found in any specialist, irrespective of subject’; however, 
‘ignorance of science by arts students is probably more prevalent than ignorance of 
the humanities by science students’ (University Grants Committee, 1958: 37-8). 
These views received a much wider attention after C. P. Snow’s 1959 lecture on the 
two cultures which built on what the University Grants Committee had observed two 
years earlier. 
Although the ‘two cultures’ problem when understood as problem of 
communication between science and humanities did not disappear with the expansion 
of higher education, conservative attitudes did. The rapidly growing unsatisfied 
demand for higher education could only be met if the system was broadened to cover 
a larger spectrum of the population; simply enlarging the system as it currently was, 




1952/3-1961/2 when an increasing proportion of the 17-18 year-olds were staying 
longer at school and qualifying for admission to universities. As a result of this 
second expansion phase, termed ‘the trend’, ‘whereas nearly 80% of qualified 
leavers gained university places in 1956, by 1962 fewer than 60% got them’ 
(University Grants Committee, 1964: 65; Mandler, 2015a: 3). And finally, a third 
phase took place from 1961/2 onwards when, in addition to ‘the trend’, the 17-18 
year-old age group started to increase following the rise in the birth rate in the later 
years of the war. All this necessitated a much deeper transformation that we can 




The Democratisation of the British Higher Education System 
 
The process of democratisation was manifested in a variety of ways and 
understanding it is essential for the understanding of what made possible the 
expansion of sociology, particularly its expansion as a non-empirically and non-
quantitatively oriented subject.  
 
 
I. Changes in the Core Principles of Higher Education 
 
The democratisation of higher education was manifested first and foremost 
through a change in core principles. In 1939, a shrewd observer commented that the 
prevalent conception of education was still that ‘of a training for the upper classes of 
society in aristocratic accomplishments’ rather than ‘the principle of making 
education available to the mass of the people (Simon, 1943: 32). But by the 1960s, 
the university system was seen as an ‘essentially public’ system; part and parcel of 
the welfare state system (Anderson, 2006: 142). This was manifest in the remarkable 
                                               
22 I’m especially grateful to Professor Peter Mandler for an informative and stimulating discussion of 
the development of higher education in the post-war period, which helped me enhance and extend the 
arguments I present here. Peter Mandler has written extensively on this topic – for full details on the 




increase of public spending on higher education – while in 1938 only 38% of 
universities’ income was provided by the state, by 1953 this had grown to 70% and 
by the mid 60s – to 80%. Therefore, a shift in attitudes towards higher education was 
taking place even before the famous Robbins report of 1963; but what Robbins did, 
very importantly, was to legitimise and justify the universal provision of higher 
education not only for ‘for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to 
pursue them’ but also for those who ‘wish to do so’ (Robbins, 1963: 8). As one 
commentator later put it, Robbins’ greatest contribution was that it ‘validated past 
and stimulated future expansion’ (Scott, 1988: 35). The desirability of the 
democratisation of higher education embedded ‘as an axiom’ at the core of the 
Robbins report was also to be embedded in the principles of the whole of society and 
arguments which were expressed by the UGC just ten years earlier regarding ‘the 
pool of ability’, quoted above, were made to sound utterly implausible by Robbins 
(cf. Anderson, 2006: 148). 
 
 
II. Moving away from London and Oxbridge 
  
A second way in which the democratisation manifested itself was the moving 
of students away from London and Oxbridge and towards other higher education 
institutions across the country: between 1938-1970s, the proportion of students at 
Oxbridge halved, whereas the proportion of students in universities in England, other 
than London and Oxbridge, doubled (Appendix I, Table 2). This is particularly 
significant as far as sociology is concerned, as sociology was a largely ‘unwelcome’ 
subject in Oxbridge and the only place it was being taught properly before the 
expansion was London. The opening of new universities and expansion of 
universities other than Oxbridge and London meant not only that more places were 
available, but that there was for the first time an opportunity for the system of 
teaching and for the curricula to open up to non-traditional subjects, as new 
universities were competing to attract the new students. There was not only physical 





Everywhere we found evidence that the universities were regarding the 
years ahead not merely as a period of physical expansion but also as an 
opportunity to re-examine their aims and purposes’ (University Grants 
Committee, 1964: 85-6).  
 
We will see that it was not only the expansion but, to a large extent, the 
transformation of the education system that helped to transform sociology from an 
obscure and unpopular subject to one of the most desired and fashionable. 
 
 
III. The Power of Student Demand  
 
A third way in which the democratisation was manifested was through the 
power that student demand had on determining which university subjects were going 
to be most popular. In a recent extensive study on this topic, Mandler (2015a) argued 
that ‘the consumer was king’, showing that despite continuous efforts on the part of 
government and universities to encourage students to apply to the sciences, in the 
belief that there was a shortage of science and technology graduates, by the end of 
the sixties, ‘the agenda for higher education was being set by teenagers and their 
parents’ (Mandler, 2015a: 9) who were becoming increasingly more attracted to the 
arts and the social sciences. This created a disparity between the public discourse 
sustained by policy makers, which was throughout the whole post-war period 
dominated by an alleged insufficiency of science and technology graduates; and the 
discourse among students themselves which consistently emphasised the desirability 
of social science (for a full review, cf. Mandler, 2017).  
Similar disparity, with regard to quantitative methods training, can be observed 
between the discourse sustained by the official reports on the state of the social 
sciences (Pearson, 1947; Clapham, 1946; University Grants Committee, 1964; 
Heyworth, 1965; Rosenbaum, 1971; ESRC, 1987) and the discourse among 
sociologists during this period – while the former argued consistently for more and 
better quantitative methods training within the social sciences and especially 
sociology, the latter have consistently ignored such claims or if they responded at all,   




The Robbins report itself did not recommend a wider and more rapid 
expansion of the social sciences in particular; and it did not anticipate how quickly 
their popularity would rise among the ‘Arts and Social Science’ students and among 
all students. In the whole of the Robbins report there is just one reference to the 
social sciences: ‘More awards should be available for postgraduate study, 
particularly in the social sciences and the humanities’ (Robbins, 1963: para. 304). 
The ‘uppermost consideration’ in the planning of the expansion in this early period 
was the expansion of science and technology studies, because this was seen as 
important in restoring and growing the economy and the general prosperity of the 
country (University Grants Committee, 1973: 24-5). But the rationale behind this 
strategy was increasingly being questioned as during the 1960s the limitations of a 
narrow, vocation-oriented training became a growing concern; and a report of the 
OECD showed that although the UK had ‘the greatest concentration of science and 
technology in higher education and the biggest proportion of qualified scientists and 
technologists’, the UK economy ‘had been lagging, not leading’ (OECD, 1950: 67). 
In addition, the orientation of students towards the social sciences was not a 
peculiarly British phenomenon and was related to a ‘disillusionment with science’ 
observed more generally in the Western world; the Dainton report of 1968, although 
hesitant to describe it in either positive or negative terms, captured the presence of a 
subtle but pervasive cultural shift which manifested itself as ‘a concern for people 
rather things, a move away from doing towards feeling’ (Dainton quoted in Mandler, 
2017: 9-10). 
The statistics of higher education leading up to Robbins, and up to 1978, show 
a curious trend that could not have been observed at the time and could only be seen 
with the benefit of hindsight; a change perhaps more consequential, than ‘the swing 
away from science’.  
Separate statistics for undergraduate and postgraduate students by subject areas 
are not available prior to 1960. Table 3 in Appendix I contains the relevant statistics 
for all students, in the period 1919/20-1953/4, showing that even before the post-war 
expansion of higher education, the proportion of ‘Arts and Social Science’ students 
was rising; from about a third of all students in 1919, to a half by 1953/4. Since 




period, it is difficult to say the expansion of which individual subjects brought about 
the expansion of this subject area. It is likely, however, that the increase was due 
mainly to an increase in the popularity of arts subjects and economics, since none of 
the other social science subjects were academically well developed in this period. 
Meanwhile, between 1919/20 and 1953/4, there was an overall decline in the 
popularity of general science subjects from ca. 68% to 57% (Appendix I, Table 3). 
What is more interesting, however, is the trend in proportions of students within 
individual science subjects – we see that the decrease of science students overall is 
mainly due to a relative decrease in the number of medicine and applied science 
students, while the number of ‘pure science’ students increased by about 3 % points. 
It could be the case therefore that the rise in the popularity of ‘Arts and Social 
Science’ subjects was not necessarily at the expense of a decrease in the popularity 
of all science subjects, but only the more applied type, such as medicine23 and 
technology. We should be careful, therefore, about what we mean when talking 
about students’ ‘disillusionment’ with science. 
What does this suggest for the expansion of sociology? First, it suggests that a 
more favourable climate for the expansion of a relatively undefined and unpopular 
subject like sociology was already present; the expansion itself only assisted the 
further continuation of this trend by opening the doors of universities to greater 
numbers of students. And second, it suggests that a subject which contained more 
‘pure’ as opposed to ‘applied’ elements was more likely to benefit from this 
expansion, as the trend of moving to ‘pure’ subjects (arts, social sciences, pure 
science) and away from applied subjects (applied science, technology, vet science) 
was already gaining pace. 
How did things change when the expansion began to come into effect during 
the 1960s and 1970s? Since from 1960 onwards there are separate statistics available 
for undergraduate students by subject area, the rest of the analysis focuses only the 
distributions of undergraduate students. 
The decline in the popularity of general science subjects continued (Appendix I, 
Tables 4-7; also Appendix II, Figure 1). The proportion of general science 
                                               
23 It is the policy of the British Medical Association to control the number of medical students; a large 
part of the decrease in the relative number of medical students compared to students in other subjects 




undergraduates out of the total number of undergraduates was falling consistently 
and in 1978/9 was down 6.9% points from what it was in 1960/1. Meanwhile, the 
popularity of pure science subjects observed above, continued till 1972, despite some 
fluctuation in the proportion of pure science students during the 1960s. Compared to 
1960/1, in 1978/9 the proportion of pure science undergraduates of all 
undergraduates was down only 1% point. This suggests that whatever was affecting 
the popularity of general science in the 1960s and 1970s had negligible effect on the 
popularity of ‘pure science’ subjects. This trend is further supported by the 
distribution of the proportion of first entrant undergraduates – compared to 1966/124, 
in 1978/9 the proportion of general science first entrants of all first entrants was 
down 5.2% points; whereas in the same period, the proportion of pure science first 
entrants went down only 3.9% points (Appendix I, Table 7).  
What, therefore, could have had an impact on the development of the particular 
character of sociology as it was expanding, and on its preference for some 
methodologies and not others, was a trend in student demand that favoured ‘the pure’ 
over ‘the applied’ elements in a university subject. The evidence presented here is, of 
course, insufficient to establish with great confidence whether this trend was taking 
place and how consequential it was. To achieve greater confidence in this regard, it 
would be necessary to examine in further detail the development of science in 
universities in this period which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The evidence 
however, suggests clearly that we have to be careful when interpreting the meaning 
and range of the ‘swing away from science’. 
Compared to 1960/1, the proportion of ‘Arts and Social Science’ 
undergraduates out of the total number was up 5.3% points; the growth in the 
proportion of ‘Arts and Social Science’ first entrants out of all first entrants shows a 
similar increase (Appendix I, Tables 4-7; also Appendix II, Figure 1). The big 
differences between the period up to 1953/4 and the period from 1960 onwards, lie in 
the distribution of student numbers within this subject group; more specifically, the 
rising popularity of social science as opposed to arts. We see here the impact of the 
cultural change that took place in the post-war period; but just as with the ‘swing 
                                               




away from science’, we have to be careful how we interpret the ‘swing towards 
social science’. 
In the 60s and 70s, the proportion of social science undergraduates of all 
undergraduates grew consistently – compared to 1960/1, in 1978/9 it was up 12.6% 
points, making it the second biggest change in the higher education trends in this 
period (Appendix I, Tables 4-7). The third biggest change in the trends was the drop 
in the popularity of arts subjects – compared to 1960/1, in 1978/9 the proportion of 
arts undergraduates of the total number of undergraduates was down 7.3%. The rise 
of social science, therefore, meant not only a turning away from applied subjects of 
all kinds, but also, a turning away from the abstract non-science subjects, such as the 
arts.  
The relevant statistics of the first entrants social science undergraduates 
compared to the first entrants arts undergraduates show slightly different movements 
which help to modify our understanding of the popularity of social science. The 
popularity among first entrants of both arts and social science grew in the period 
between 1966/7-1978/9 (Appendix I, Tables 6 and 7). When taken together, the 
proportion of all art and social science undergraduates out of all undergraduates and 
the proportion of all art and social science first entrants of all first entrants, suggest 
that there was a move from the arts to social science after the first year – unless of 
course these results are an artefact of the way the statistics were collected, this 
appears to be the most plausible way to explain why the total number of arts students 
decreased over time, despite the fact that they enjoyed an increase in the number of 
first entrants over the 60s and 70s. This provides further support for the idea that 
even though the arts did not lose their lustre as first choice, eventually, many 
students were drawn to the more relevant and more fashionable social sciences. 
Further confirmation comes from the trends in the proportions of arts as 
opposed to social science undergraduates of all ‘Arts and social science’ 
undergraduates (Appendix I, Tables 4-7). Here we see the biggest change in the 
higher education trends – whereas in 1960/1 only 26.8% of ‘Arts and social science’ 




of 23.5%25 points. But, the proportion of first-entrant social science students of first 
entrant ‘Arts and social science students’, despite some fluctuation, dropped 
(Appendix I, Tables 6 and 7). This means that although many students were not 
initially attracted to social science, perhaps thinking that arts is a safer bet, many of 
them moved from arts to social science, increasing the overall proportion of social 
science students of ‘Arts and social science’ student in all years. 
What, then, could have made the higher education context, leading up to and 
during the higher education expansion, favourable to a subject like sociology – a 
subject that, as we have already seen, was vaguely defined and therefore had the 
potential to develop in more than one direction in regard to its substantive choices 
and methodological approach? To talk about a swing away from science and towards 
social science is to tell only half the story. The analysis of the statistics of education 
for the period 1919-1978 presented above is by no means conclusive; but it suggests 
a move away from subjects with pronounced applied and less socially relevant 
elements towards subjects with pronounced ‘pure’ and socially relevant elements – 
sociology could have benefited, and indeed did benefit, from developing into a 
subject that emphasised the ‘pure and socially relevant’ elements at the expense of 
‘applied and less socially relevant’. ‘Pure’ science did not lose its staunch supporters; 
but its popularity was nonetheless affected by the social sciences because they spoke 
about issues which were highly relevant to the socially active generation of the 60s 
and 70s. But applied science and the less relevant non-science subjects, suffered in 
this context. It was these conditions, as far as higher education is concerned, that 
could help explain not only why sociology could expand, but also why it did expand 
as, primarily, a non-empirical subject emphasising the development of theory which 
spoke about society with an irresistible charm.  
This tendency was not a sudden shock to the university system – it was well 
anticipated in the late 1950s; the mere fact that the UGC began collecting separate 
statistics for ‘Arts’ and ‘Social Sciences’ in 1959 (the first such statistics published 
by UGC in 1960/1) is a clear sign that from the late 50s onwards, social sciences 
                                               
25  The popularity of social science within the context of ‘Arts and social science’ fluctuated 
considerably during the 60s and the 70s; they were, in fact, most popular in 1966 when 51.2% of all 




were being taken much more seriously than before. A UGC survey of universities 
confirmed the importance of this trend: 
 
Within the category of arts and social studies we felt that there was certain 
to be an increasing demand for a substantial development of teaching and 
research in social studies. Their growth is of particular importance not only 
in their own right but as an important component in the education of 
scientists and technologists. Our view was shared by the universities. We 
were encouraged to find the universities aware of the need for increased 
development in this field and this was reflected in their development plans 
for the 1962-7 quinquennium. Most of them have recognized its growing 
importance by the establishment of separate faculty of social studies or 
social sciences. Progress has been hampered […] by the shortage of 
qualified teachers and research workers (University Grants Committee, 
1964: 82). 
 
As the survey suggested, the peak in the popularity of social sciences occurred 
in the mid 60s, just after Robbins. It is worth noting that the social sciences were 
considered valuable not merely in their own right but also as an important 
component in the education of pure and applied scientists; a component that could 
‘liberalise’ their education and broaden their intellectual horizons. The UGC 
believed that social science could indeed help in establishing a communication 
between the ‘arts’ and the ‘sciences’: 
 
We think that the role of the social sciences as an undergraduate discipline 
has an important role to play in the expansion lying ahead; we think, too, 
that they are a particularly important link between the pure and the applied 
sciences and the arts […] (University Grants Committee, 1964: 160-1).   
 
The UGC therefore welcomed ‘the growing introduction of the social sciences 
into engineering curricula’ (University Grants Committee, 1964: 161). It is 
noticeable, however, that the communication was flowing one-way – the scientists 
were receiving ‘general education’ through social scientific courses but there was no 
sign that the ‘arts’ students were receiving courses in science. The universities in 
general were prepared for the arrival of the social sciences – the UGC considered 
that their development ‘would be stimulated by the separation of this field of study 
from the other arts’ and suggested to the universities ‘that they might establish 




Grants Committee, 1964: 161). But, they were ‘glad to note that most universities 
now have such faculties (University Grants Committee, 1964: 161). Sociology could 
not have hoped for more favourable circumstances and, as I discuss later, given the 
roles that the social sciences as whole were perceived to fulfil, sociology turned out 
to have particular advantages compared to other social science subjects. 
 
 
IV. Demographic Characteristics of Incoming Students 
 
A forth way in which democratisation manifested itself was with regard to the 
demographic characteristics of the new generation of students. As Mandler (2017) 
argues, the expansion allowed for less academically qualified pupils who came from 
families with no previous experience in higher education to enter university and 
these students were more likely to see the social sciences as more attractive because 
they were perceived to be less difficult. So, in addition to being perceived, at least 
culturally, as more relevant to the zeitgeist of the 60s and 70s, the social sciences 
were also being seen as a safer bet on the part of students for whom higher education 
was an unusual and risky step. Another important change was the growing number of 
girls entering higher education, among whom the views I outlined above were more 
prevalent. As I show below, the increased participation of girls in higher education 
had an important role to play in making possible the expansion of sociology and in 




V. Labour Market Opportunities 
 
And finally, a fifth way in which the democratisation manifested itself was in 
terms of the labour market available to graduate students. The opportunities for jobs 
and the variety of jobs encouraged many students to pursue the study of subjects 
which were not vocational or leading straight into a particular job. The change was 




public sector, making it possible for students ‘to swing away from science without 
losing ground in the labour market’ (Mandler, 2017: 12); but also, as I showed, to 
move away from applied subjects of all sorts. This was another factor in 
strengthening the position of sociology, making it less important that the subject 
itself, being still quite underdeveloped academically, could not offer any particular 
job guarantees to students.  
 
 
Mapping the Expansion of Sociology 
 
This section summarises the evidence for the expansion of sociology within the 
social sciences and within higher education as a whole in attempt to fill a gap in the 
scholarship which so far has consisted, primarily, of sketchy and partial accounts. 
Four different areas are considered – the expansion of students, of sociology 
university teachers, of sociology departments, of sociology research. Collecting 
statistics on the expansion of sociology is a challenging task – official statistics on 
sociology are not available prior to 1966. Most of the following analysis is based on 
official sources; certain details, however, were only available from secondary 
sources, such as contemporary accounts on the expansion of sociology, or reports on 
various topics which discuss the expansion in addition to their main topic. Most of 
these secondary sources, however, very often fail to properly reference the sources of 
the figures they quote; the reader is urged, therefore, to treat the figures coming from 
non-official secondary sources with caution.  
 
 
I. Expansion of Sociology Students  
 
Separate statistics for sociology students are available only from 1966 onwards 
and so it is difficult to map the expansion of sociology properly before 1966. The 
only reliable source of evidence for the expansion of sociology prior to 1966 comes 
from the Heyworth report (1965). Heyworth shows a consistent large increase in the 




students obtained honours degrees in sociology, social administration and 
anthropology; by 1962/3, this has risen to 341 (Appendix I, Tables 8 and 9). The 
number of students obtaining honours degrees in economics also grew – 216 in 
1938/9, compared to 994 in 1962/3. However, the absolute growth of economics 
degrees offers a rather biased image of the growth of its popularity, because relative 
to sociology its popularity dropped. While in 1938/9 only 11% of all social science 
degrees were awarded to students in the sociology group, by 1962/3, this had 
increased to 22%. In contrast, while in 1938/9, 72% of all social science degrees 
were awarded to students in economics, by 1962/3, this had decreased to 64.7%. 
Clearly the social sciences were expanding even before Heyworth’s report; but the 
trend between 1938/9-1962/3 was more pronounced in the sociology group of 
subjects than in any other social science subject. Already in 1965, when the SSRC 
was established, the Times reported: 
 
University teaching and research posts in the social sciences are expanding 
more rapidly than those of any other faculty and the number of 
undergraduates reading them is growing faster than the total number of 
graduates (Unknown Author, 1965: 13). 
 
This trend, however, continued only till about the mid 70s (Appendix I, Table 
5). Between 1966/7 and 1973/4 the proportion of sociology undergraduates of social 
science undergraduates and of all undergraduates was growing, despite some 
fluctuation; but from 1974/5 to 1978/9 we see a gradual decrease to a level slightly 
below the proportions of 1966. The trend is further supported by proportions of 
sociology first entrants of social science entrants and of all first entrants – this was 
growing from 1966 to about 1973 and then dropped to level slightly lower than that 
of 1966. In contrast, the proportions of economics undergraduates of social science 
undergraduates and of all undergraduates and the proportions of economics first 
entrants of social science first entrants and all first entrants, were consistently 
growing in the period 1966/7-1978/9 (Appendix I, Tables 5-7). The increases are not 
large but signal a greater level of consistency in the popularity of economics. On the 
whole, however, sociology still appears to be as one of the subjects that benefited 
most from the expansion precisely because its share in the universities before 1938/9 




II. Expansion of Sociology Teachers 
 
Just like the expansion of sociology students, the expansion of sociology staff 
is difficult to assess because there is little information available in the official 
statistics records. From what is available, however, we see that, overall, staff trends 
mirror student trends; what’s more, staff statistics provide an even stronger 
indication of the rise in popularity of the social sciences.  
When the Clapham committee reported in 1946, ‘there were some 52 of these 
posts [full-time professors and readers] in the social sciences whereas in pure science 
there were 296 and 176 in medicine’ (Clapham, 1946: para.14). But the social 
science staff of all ranks, not just professors and readers, was not in the minority for 
long. In 1954, Banks reported that as a result of the Clapham recommendations, ‘the 
number of university teachers and research assistants of all grades in the social 
sciences had increased from 291 in 1937-8 to 604 in 1949-50’ (Banks, 1954a: 49). 
These were not all sociology posts, but it is likely, having seen the student trends for 
this period, the majority of these posts went to sociology and economics – the first 
rising faster and more pervasively than any other social science; while the latter kept 
its strong position (Appendix I, Table 8). A couple of years later, the expansion of 
social science staff was further confirmed by Heyworth who reported that between 
1938/9 and 1962/3 ‘the number of university teachers of all grades in the social 
sciences increased fivefold from 212 to 1025 (Heyworth, 1965: 8). In 1975, Smith 
(1982: 150) noted that Heyworth’s 1962/3 figure of 1025 had risen to about 7000. 
To put all this into perspective, while in the 60s and 70s the proportions of arts, 
pure science and general science staff all declined, the number of social science staff 
was rising both as a proportion of all staff and as a proportion of ‘Arts and science’ 
staff (Appendix I, Tables 10 and 11). The fact that the decline in staff numbers in 
general science and in pure science was highest, and that the rise in social science 
staff was also highest helps us further explain why such a big part of the discourses 
taking place in the 60s and 70s were oriented towards the dichotomy of science vs. 
social science. Perhaps it also partially explains why the rise of the social sciences, 
although fashionable and exciting among students, was perceived as a threat to 




But in other circles, the students’ excitement about sociology was, above all, a 
big challenge. Martin Albrow, a president of the BSA in 1986 recalled that when 
sociology was expanding in the 1960s, university vice-chancellors ‘stood in their 
doorways like hungry restaurateurs offering chairs to those who would enter and 
deign to call themselves sociologists’ (Albrow, 1986: 337). With these words 
Albrow summed up not only the facts of the expansion, but also the major challenge 
for sociology – a lack of trained sociologists. 
 
 
III. Expansion of Sociology Departments 
 
The expansion of social science university departments was a direct effect of 
the growing student demand for these subjects (Appendix I, Table 12). In 1945, there 
was only one university in Britain – the University of London (LSE) – teaching 
sociology for a first degree. By 1962, there were ten universities in Britain teaching a 
first degree in sociology (Fincham, 1975: 123). By 1989, this figure had risen to 
forty-five (Review Committee on Sociology, 1989: 15). 
Alongside the rise in sociology first degrees, sociology courses were also 
becoming increasingly popular. In 1945, such courses were taught only at the LSE 
and Bedford College. By 1954, between 11 and 14 universities across the country 
were teaching sociology courses, among them Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, 
Sheffield, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberystwyth, Exeter, Hull, Leicester, Swansea 
(Banks, 1954a: 49; MacRae, 1953). A report by Peel (1968) on sociology methods 
and theory courses collected data from 28 universities which taught sociology at an 
undergraduate level; and by the time of the next, comparable report in 1979 (cf. 
Wakeford, 1979) the number was 77 universities teaching sociology courses (only 
some of these taught sociology at postgraduate level). 
The expansion of sociology teaching would not have been possible without the 
establishment of social science departments in the new universities or expansion 
within the old. But there is some evidence to suggest that the expansion of sociology 
teaching was more strongly pronounced than that of any other social science subject: 




three centres to practically every university, including the new universities and the 
colleges of advanced technology’ (Heyworth, 1965: 11)  
 
 
IV. Expansion of Sociology Research Output 
 
The subject of sociology grew not only institutionally but also in terms of 
intellectual output. An important change was the establishment of a Social Science 
Research Council in 1965 (cf. Heyworth, 1965; Nicol, 2000) opening opportunities 
for many new funded research posts. Various extensive accounts of the development 
of new sociological research areas and the expansion of already existing ones are 
available (Madge, 1957; Little, 1963; Krausz, 1969) and there is no need to 
summarise them here. For an overview of the broader picture, it is enough to point 
out that the number of sociology projects increased threefold between 1945 and 
1967: there were 132 in 1945-60; 295 in 1961-66; and 340 in 1967 (Carter, 1968: 18). 
Social science monographs more generally increased at a similar pace: while there 
were 2774 social science monographs in 1950; in 1960 there were 5444; and in 1970 
– 9392 (Stewart, 1989: 179). Summing up the expansion of social science research, 
Stewart commented: 
 
What had happened in three phases over a period of forty years in science 
was covered in ten to fifteen years in the social sciences, which had, 
besides anything else, to discover an identity as an extended university 
faculty (Stewart, 1989: 179). 
 
We see that as we move from the expansion of student numbers, to teachers, to 
departments and intellectual output, there is an accumulation of doubts and a greater 
awareness of the challenges facing sociology. Behind Stewart’s comment lie 
fundamental questions: could sociology achieve academically in ten to fifteen years 
what science achieved over a period of more than forty years? Could sociology meet 
the challenge of the expansion and fulfil expectations? 
Now that we have a clearer view of the historical development of sociology 
prior to the expansion and have also reviewed the higher education context of the 




expansion from within – how the democratisation of education and the five ways in 
which this was manifested affected the way sociology thought of itself; how the 
intersection between the two historical contexts created conditions for the 
development of some types of methods training in sociology but not others. It will 
become clear that sociology’s biggest weakness – its lack of a clear sense of 
direction and limited achievement up to 1945 and its vague but nonetheless potent 
character – proved sociology’s greatest strength once the democratisation of 
education took place. Sociology could easily turn into what others perceived it to be, 
or what sociologists perceived sociology had to be in order to expand. But there was 
little in the conditions of the expansion that stimulated the incorporation of statistical 
methods or, more broadly, a statistical outlook among sociologists. 
 
 
Characteristics of Academic Sociology during the Expansion 
 
It is one thing to explain what conditions made the expansion of sociology 
practically possible – in our case this was this was primarily the expansion of the 
university system and the establishment of the SSRC in 1965 – and a completely 
different thing to explain what characteristics of sociology, as opposed to any other 
social science subject, helped it to take advantage of these practical opportunities.  
To explain this we need to take into account the broader cultural context which 
accompanied the expansion that was influencing people’s thinking about education. 
As I already mentioned the first way in which democratisation of the higher 
education system manifested itself, was through a change in its core principles – 
education was not to be a privilege for the upper classes, but a right for all. But 
together with the implementation of this principle, another very important and 
closely related aspect of the understanding of higher education also changed – 
namely, how students thought about their own education; what was education for?  
In 1927, H. E. Barnes, an American scholar, commented on the contemporary 
higher education system in the UK, describing it as ‘medieval’ and ‘humanistic’; 
aimed to train ‘the cultured gentleman in terms of the older criteria of “culture” and 




(Barnes, 1927: 46). This could no longer be the case once higher education was, at 
least in principle, supposed to reach all, regardless of their social status or class. So 
the purpose of education in the post-war period changed from preparing ‘cultured 
gentlemen’ to being part and parcel of attempts to understand social processes and 
tackle the most pressing social problems. Such attempts had been developing 
consistently since the early nineteenth century; but it was only in the post-war period, 
as a result changes in the core principles of education, that higher education came to 
be at the centre of these attempts. In this way, the change of priorities and of 
principles guiding higher education were an invitation to sociology – how could 
education be for society as well as about it, without a discipline whose object of 
study was exactly that – society? The fact that new universities were being set up 
made the process of re-orientation and implementation of these new principles in the 
higher education system easier and it was these newer universities that gradually 
became sociology hubs. So; if the principles behind the education system had 
changed and were being implemented in the newly established and expanding 
universities where the majority of students were, what was it that made it possible for 




So Attractive, so Quickly 
 
The British Sociological Association (BSA) 26 was established in 1951 as an 
organisation whose scope was deliberately ‘made very wide in order to bring all 
those who are interested in the sociological aspects of their special subjects’ (Banks, 
1967: 1). The people who signed the declaration establishing the BSA were people 
from a wide variety of backgrounds, such as demography, archaeology, social 
anthropology, social philosophy, economics and social psychology. Barbara Wootton, 
who was one of the people in the founding group, was reported to have given the 
                                               
26The BSA and the SSRC/ESRC both played an important role in the post-war development of 
sociology; however, a proper investigation of the role of these two large organisations in the 
relationship between sociology and statistics would have required more time that I had available and 




following comments regarding the eclectic approach employed at the founding of the 
BSA: ‘And none of you are proper sociologists. Look around you. You and you and 
you, none of you has ever studied sociology! You’ve all come in from somewhere 
else!’ (Oakley, 2011: 165). Wootton was, of course, right, and was stating something 
that Joe Banks continued talking about fifteen years later. But what matters 
historically is not the fact that the BSA was founded by a group of scholars all 
coming ‘from somewhere else’, none of whom were ‘proper sociologists’; what is 
important, is that none of them could have been ‘proper sociologists’, unless they had 
studied at the small Sociology department at the LSE or abroad, say, in the USA. 
How then could people be attracted to a subject that did not exist in Britain in a well-
defined and well-organised way? And how did the expansion of higher education 
turn into a golden opportunity when, given the history of sociology in the UK in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, it should have been sociology’s greatest 
challenge?  
The BSA meeting was a microcosm that was reflected in the state of the whole 
subject of sociology. The students, graduates and academics who were drawn to 
sociology in the early period of the expansion, did not all come from the same 
background, or for the same reasons, or with the same intellectual interest and were 
not all looking to get the same thing out of sociology. This made sociology very 
unusual compared to other subjects which did not usually accommodate such a great 
diversity of people. It was not as if sociology catered for one specific and predefined 
group of intellectuals or students or those who only got the opportunity to enter 
higher education as a result of the expansion. The education statistics discussed 
above show a trend of students moving away from applied scientific subjects to more 
‘pure’ and socially relevant subjects. But the real power of sociology was that it 
attracted students and academics from a variety of other subjects, who were 
disillusioned with these subjects, or who wanted a change for one reason or another 
and who were drawn to sociology expecting that it would provide them with better 
opportunities to understand and engage with the social world. How could sociology 
do this? 
For most of the period leading up to the expansion, and even during and after it, 




may look as a disadvantage, but on closer inspection we see that the subject 
benefited from this, mainly in the sense that it could easily adapt to the 
circumstances and offer what was in demand. Sociology could easily turn into the 
subject that others believed it to be or wanted it to be. 
Starting first with the public status of sociology, it was not uncommon during 
the 1960s to hear sociologists argue that sociology ‘has become an accepted 
constituent in the teaching and research of British universities’ (MacRae, 1957: 98) 
and that sociology was ‘a word of virtue and of power’ (Little, 1963: 64). But despite 
the fact that this enhanced feeling of security had some justification, the difficulty 
remained that sociology was ‘the discipline which people find most puzzling of the 
major social sciences’ (Heyworth, 1965: 3); perhaps even ‘a chimaera, disconsolate 
on account of its incompatibilities’ (MacRae, 1964: 24). Popular accounts of 
sociology did not lack in ‘mordant humour’ either – in an attempt to explain the 
difference between sociology and history, it had been claimed that ‘sociology is 
history with the hard work left out: history is sociology with the brains left out’ 
(Briggs, 1965: 26). But the bottom line of all these comments, be they serious or 
humorous, is that the subject of sociology ‘had acquired general respect’ and 
‘received widespread recognition’, even though ‘the public generally are not clear 
what it is all about’ (Banks, 1965: 109, my italics). 
But the lack of clarity about what sociology was continued during the 
expansion period even among sociologists themselves. Their struggle to define 
sociology in the context of its rising popularity within the universities and among 
students is nowhere as clear as it is in their attempts to define sociology in sociology 
textbooks and guides for students. Few of the attempts that were made by the first 
generation of professors of sociology in the 60s went beyond re-stating the general 
definitions of sociology that had been around since the nineteenth century – Tom 
Bottomore, for instance, author of one of the first British post-war textbooks of 
sociology defined sociology as the first science, together with social anthropology ‘to 
be concerned with social life as whole’ (Bottomore, 1962: 20). Another famous 
textbook, by Stephen Cotgrove, defined sociology as a social science that ‘places 
more emphasis on ‘how’ questions and on building general theories of social systems’ 




the University of Edinburgh, Tom Burns, went even as far as to question the extent 
to which sociology can be defined without reference to other core subjects: 
 
[…] substantive fields of sociology, many of them at least, go by titles like 
the sociology of education, the sociology of law, the sociology of politics, 
the sociology of medicine. In all these cases, the substantive area of study 
is defined by another discipline. The mapping has been done by it, not by 
sociology (Burns, 1967: 356).  
 
But even in the light of such evidence, it can be argued that we cannot judge 
the clarity of a subject based on its lack of success in defining its own subject matter 
in a couple of sentences, and that one needs to read the whole textbooks to find out 
what sociology was all about. But this does not mean that the problem of making 
sociology clear, especially to students, did not exist. Here is an attempt to describe 
the subject in the LSE Handbook of Undergraduate Studies of 1965-6: 
 
Sociology is in some ways difficult subject to describe. It is concerned 
more with the private relations of people, the kind of things that are not 
organised by governments […] The sociologist and the social 
anthropologist spend a lot of time describing and analysing family 
relationships and family organisations. They are concerned also with all the 
other ways in which people group themselves […] One object of the 
sociologist’s study which is familiar to most people in this country is the 
class structure of our society […] The sociologist is also concerned with 
the organisation of social welfare services […] The sociologist tends to be 
led on the study of psychology and the study of philosophy (LSE, 1965: 
n.p.). 
 
This meandering description is a confirmation that even in the setting of 
undergraduate teaching only approximation to clarity as regards definitions was 
possible; and that lack of clarity was, in fact, acceptable. John Rex, author of one of 
the first British textbooks on sociological theory had reached a similar conclusion: 
 
It is obvious then that we cannot conclude […] that there is a clear-cut 
subject matter for sociology which can be settled by some sort of ostensive 
definition. […] it is obvious that the definition of the field of sociology 






What all these examples show, is not merely the existence of confusion about 
sociology. More importantly, they show that although clarity as regards substantive 
topics and methodology was lacking, people also felt this type of clarity was not a 
necessary condition for the progress of sociology. It appears to have been enough to 
believe in sociology; to believe that sociology was about ideas that mattered to them 
– sociologists, sociology students, the general public. So for instance, with regard to 
the public, Albrow admitted that ‘more than any other discipline sociology 
represented that faith [in the re-organisation of education and social progress] for the 
educated public (Albrow, 1989: 203) and that sociology acquired its place ‘not 
primarily on the basis of intellectual argument, but because it was summoned up in 
an act of faith’ (Albrow, 1986: 336, my italics). It was ‘a novel set of circumstances 
that forced sociology in front of the public’, Albrow continued, and not ‘the sheer 
force of argument and demonstration of results’ (Albrow, 1989: 202). And with 
regard to the students, when Banks conducted a survey with 1966 sociology 
graduates, he found that: 
 
Excellence in sociological attainment, it would seem, is related in some 
marked fashion to an interest in ideas and it is therefore likely that a 
graduate’s orientation towards sociology as a vocation is linked in his mind 
with the extent to which he finds working with ideas more attractive or 
congenial than a practical encounter with the world of events and 
personalities (Banks, 1974: 300). 
 
And, as for the sociology teachers, Bechhofer recalled that they had ‘a 
missionary zeal’; that they believed there should be more sociology not because they 
thought there should be more sociologists per se but because sociology prepared 
students to work in business, management, civil service better than, say, history or 
English literature (Author’s Interview with Frank Bechhofer, 2017). Sociology, it 
was believed, was providing a better platform for the discussion of the most relevant 
ideas about society.  
But this would have been the case in many countries in Europe and also in the 
USA. The spread of sociology in Britain would not have been much different from 
the spread of sociology in other countries had it not been for the fact that sociology 




welfare state […] irrespective of what was on offer’ (Albrow, 1989: 202). Previous 
chapters have shown that sociology in Britain before the expansion did not, in fact, 
have that much to offer. 
But apart from having the reputation of a subject in which people believed, 
what gave sociology greater power was the fact that the lack of a clear definition 
meant that the ideas of students and of teachers about what the subject was could be 
projected onto the subject without any restraint from ‘a sociological authority’; 
projecting characteristics which one could not project on to other subjects with 
traditional approaches and fixed boundaries. It was in this way that the vagueness of 
sociology was turned from an internal problem into an advantage. So for instance, in 
the 60s sociology appeared to be offering novel approaches to understanding society 
and more interesting problems, compared to, say, history: 
 
What attracted me was that sociology seemed to offer up some interesting 
problems, like the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism; […] 
What put me off history was - I mean these people were superb scholars, 
they had great mastery of technique which I admired but it was not clear to 
me where they got their problems from and the problems they came up 
with were not very interesting […] sociology seemed to be asking more 
interesting questions than conventional history (Author’s Interview with 
John H. Goldthorpe, 2017). 
 
But, Goldthorpe continued, he ‘could not have been able at that point to say 
anything very general about sociology at all’, which tells us that the image of 
sociology offering up more interesting problems than history was one that he himself 
projected onto sociology even before he came to study the subject. 
Or one could study engineering but instead of developing further one’s 
interests in the engineering profession, one could take up ‘industrial sociology’ and 
study instead how the engineering profession was organised, how innovation was 
brought about and implemented in a variety of industries (cf. Author’s Interview 
with Frank Bechhofer, 2017). It was similar if one was training to be a teacher – in 
addition to classes on pedagogy, one would take a course on sociology of education 
that dealt with broader issues that permeated the whole education system, like social 
class and social mobility and find them more fruitful (cf. Author’s Interview with 




Sociology also offered an opportunity to reconsider the content and role of 
existing subjects, as for instance the new branch of sociology called sociology of 
science was able to attract science students from science faculties, not because there 
was something wrong with science, but because this was a novel aspect of the 
production of scientific knowledge that attracted students’ attention (cf. Author’s 
Interview with Donald MacKenzie, 2017). 
What we learn from examples, such as those presented here, is that there was 
not something wrong with subjects like history or engineering or science; rather, 
there were new opportunities for students who had considered studying these 
subjects or who studied these subjects and wanted to change, to find a more suitable 
outlet for their more immediate concerns stemming from these subjects. Sociology 
offered an opportunity to examine topics related to, or part of, other subjects, from a 
different angle or in a more interesting way. 
So far I have explained how it was possible for students to project certain ideas 
onto sociology and why it, as opposed to various other academic subjects, was better 
suited for this purpose. But I have not spoken about the particular kinds of ideas that 
students wished to have addressed in their education and also where they, and the 
students’ desire to address them, came from. For this purpose, we have to look at the 
broader – social and political – context which changed during the period of the 
expansion. The raised social and political awareness that we witness during this 
period explains why it was some ideas and not others that sociology became 
associated with in this particular period. The association of sociology with particular 
ideas gives us direct clues as to what the obstacles were for the incorporation of 





The cultural, social and political change taking place during the 60s in Britain 
involved aspirations to liberate people from the old and conservative ways of 
thinking about society. There was a strong desire to bring about big changes in social 




literature, film etc. Sociology offered space for discussion of all the relevant 
questions about society that young people were thinking about; it appeared to 
provide the intellectual support for the aspirational hopes for change in society. The 
expansion of sociology in the higher education system put sociology in a strong 
position to take advantage of the demand being created for knowledge of things 
social. 
Contemporary attempts to explain what had triggered the ‘sociology boom’ 
were limited in their scope but even this is revealing. A newly established sociology 
journal at the time, New Society, observed that a feasible explanation for the rise of 
sociology was ‘the evident need, with increasing change, for society and its 
institutions to have some system of criticism built into them’ which the social 
sciences were believed to provide (Unknown, 1963: 3). Another way of explaining 
the sociology boom was an apparent increasing uncertainty which many people felt 
about their relations with each other, so sociology was seen as being able to help the 
young generation cope in new situations. What is peculiar about such descriptions of 
the functions that sociology was supposed to fulfil is, first, their ahistorical viewpoint 
– both of these things, but especially the function of providing criticism of society, 
could just as easily been said about social statistics in the nineteenth century; and 
second, the complete lack of detailed discussion as to how exactly a subject like 
sociology was going to do that. We see so little discussion about ‘how questions’ - 
questions which are essentially about strategy and methodology – that one cannot 
help think about the expansion of sociology as similar to the spread of some all-
healing religious movement; a ‘cult’ even, as The Times described it in 1970 
(Unknown Author, 1970: 17). 
The explanations of sociology’s sudden expansion that followed in later 
decades continued emphasising that the subject’s rise was primarily a matter of 
providing a fresh platform for the discussion of society’s most prevalent problems, 
leading to the formation of a variety of social movements. The feature that was 
conspicuous in all social movements (campaigns for nuclear disarmament, student 
radicalisation, liberation of the young, unrest among the working classes, 
commercialisation) was the rejection of authority claimed by the established 




factors, such as the rise of the social welfare profession, the post-war socialist 
legislation of the Labour party, questioning the basic assumptions of the class 
structure, community awareness, recognition of societal problems etc. (Owen, 1979: 
93). The urgency to engage with these issues drew the attention of young people and 
academics to sociology: 
 
Sociology in the USA and Western Europe […] seemed for a time and to 
many to be the great source of Enlightenment on the conditions that 
actually existed in urban-industrial society. That was why departments of 
sociology were able to be established in the first place, why students were 
attracted to them, and why able people chose to make sociology their 
profession (Dennis, 1989: 420). 
 
Knowing that sociology had already developed in the US along similar lines 
also meant that a justification or elaborate explanation of why sociology was getting 
so popular so quickly was not necessary. In a recent interview, Donald MacKenzie 
recalled that: 
 
one did not have to explain it or justify it. It had happened. Social sciences 
were seen as important and probably relatively novel. People were aware 
that the social sciences, particularly sociology, had developed far further in 
the United States than in the UK (Author’s Interview with Donald 
Mackenzie, 2017). 
 
Once the process of expansion had begun, ‘Why sociology?’ or ‘How did you 
become interested in sociology? became very quickly, as Jennifer Platt recalled, 
‘silly questions’ because ‘everybody got into sociology then!’; even to this day, 
those who were students in the early stages of the expansion argue that they ‘just 
thought that was normal’; ‘it was the height of fashion’ (Author’s Interview with 
Jennifer Platt, 2017).  
The problematics of methodological training was not an issue back then; many 
of the first new generation of post-war sociologists did not receive formal training in 
methods; focus was elsewhere. Sociology spoke to emotions and hopes, rather than 
career ambitions or the acquisition of technical skills. In a recent interview, John 
Wakeford recalled that sociology was ‘new, it was radical, it questioned things’ 




were sceptical or even hostile to sociology, not seeing it as ‘a proper subject’, for 
students applying to study sociology it was an act of rebellion – ‘the public thought 
it was a waste of time but the rebellious teenagers thought “That’s just what I want 
to do then!” (Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). Using one’s education 
as an act of rebellion was facilitated by the fact that: 
 
one of the things about going to university in those days, was that you did 
not necessarily expect to get anything out of it […] If you were really 
interested in sociology […] well, you went and did a degree in it. And it 
did not have to lead anywhere because if you’ve got your degree, well you 
could go out and get a job (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). 
 
But, most importantly, this was not a rebellion against all of society but rather 
against its established structures, including established educational and career paths. 
During the expansion, ‘among the original interests and motivations with which 
students come to the study of sociology [is] the prevalence of a desire to remedy 
social ills here and now, to “work with people” or “to help people” (Neustadt, 1967 
quoted in Fincham, 1975: 175). Broady (1967: 408) also reported that many of his 
students believed that sociology would tell them how to make the world a better 
place and relieve people from distress; sociology was about ‘nice things’ such as 
families and ‘good things’ such as communities. The time of the expansion was seen 
as a time of unlimited opportunities – not only was the subject of sociology 
unconstrained by particular methods or older traditions; not only were universities 
answering the students’ demand for it unquestioningly, but there was little fear that 
sociology could fail students because of an expanded labour market. Wakeford 
summed up the emotional appeal of sociology as follows: 
 
Students loved it because it was…you know…it got away from the stuffy 
classics and science and philosophy; it was real, it was immediate, it was 
addressing real problems, social problems, political problems – so it 
became very popular (Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). 
 
What is the significance of this emotional appeal, of the image that sociology 
quickly created for itself, for sociology’s relationship with statistical methods and 
statistical thinking? At the very least it helps us see more clearly the way people, 




that was old and ‘stuffy’, regardless of how well established it was or how 
methodologically rigorous it was, could be rejected. In this social and cultural 
climate, and without facing any restrictions from within sociology, students ‘placed 
moral evaluation before empirical analysis’ (Broady, 1967: 408). There is no 
indication that, at the time, sociologists were, or perhaps even could have, made it 
clear to their students how the ability to handle adequately statistical data could help 
them do good for their society. As far as the students were concerned, statistics, like 
history, was seen as one of the old and stuffy subjects which were out of tune with 





But sociology’s popularity in the post-war cultural context was not just a 
matter of relevance or emotional appeal. Sociology was not perceived merely as a 
passive study of society but as a commitment to active engagement with social 
issues; not just a source for Enlightenment ideas, but enlightened action aimed at 
changing society. Helen Roberts, for instance, recalled that people were hopeful that 
social science ‘would have something to tell us about how societies might operate in 
a different kind of way’; ‘it was all about how […] people could change the world’ 
(Author’s Interview with Helen Roberts, 2017). These hopes were further fuelled by 
the fact that in this ‘progressive era’ there were a lot of new actual opportunities 
created to achieve a change for the better, manifested in the expansion of the welfare 
state and civil service (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). The aspiration 
towards social activism that sociology fed into was also mixed with political activism 
– sociology was the new politics. There was a common joke, Robert Moore recalled, 
that ‘if you were interested in politics, you did sociology, and if you were not, you 
did politics’ (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). There was a common 
understanding that sociology was a subject in which one could use both one’s 
intellect and one’s ideology (Author’s Interview with Helen Roberts, 2017) – 
sociology was not just a matter of understanding the social world, it was also a 




young people at the time ‘had got hold of the popular image that it was somehow 
either very socialist or very socially progressive and this is where they wanted to be’ 
(Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). At the same time, there was little to 
suggest that in order to act upon the social and political principles that students 
upheld, they had to possess empirical skills for doing social enquiry. In a section 
below I explain in greater detail how the common ideas about sociology clashed with 
the common ideas about statistical methods; but for the moment it suffices to say that 
sociology and statistics appear to have occupied the opposing ends of the political 
spectrum – while, generally speaking, sociology was associated with progressive 
politics, there was a widespread suspicion that quantitative methods were ‘in a sense 
reactionary’ and therefore of no great use to those who were working on sociological 





Finally, there was one other aspect of students’ and teachers’ understanding of 
sociology during the expansion that helped define the subject in this period. This was 
the idea that sociology was primarily a theoretical enterprise – that the relevant, 
immediate and political concerns that were at the forefront of students’ and teachers’ 
minds were supposed to be addressed using new radical and innovative theories. 
John Wakeford for instance, remembers that ‘social research methods was a low 
status activity’ and that the ‘high status activity was pure theory, abstract theory’ 
(Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). This kind of perception influenced 
what types of research or teaching were seen as appropriate. Rosemary Deem, who 
was an undergraduate student in the 1960s recalled that ‘one could not “get by” in 
sociology simply by reading nice little empirical studies’ and that ‘theory which 
[she] often found incomprehensible was the prestige’ (Deem in Banks, Deem and 
Earnshaw, 1980: 72). As a result, for those who thought of themselves as sociologists 
‘to go out there…out in the field was not something that anybody wanted to do’ 
(Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). Those, who did ‘go out’ like Deem, 




(Deem in Banks, Deem and Earnshaw, 1980: 73) or unworthy of attention as in 
Wakeford’s case: after delivering a paper on methods at a BSA conference, 
Wakeford was not given a chance to receive questions because the chair, who 
‘obviously thought [that Wakeford’s topic] was totally uninteresting’, urged people 
to break for tea (Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). Contemporary 
accounts also confirm the perception of theory building, and theory building alone, 
not in combination with methodological training, as the superior activity: ‘sociology 
is first of all concerned with the scholarly endeavour to establish a general theory of 
societies, and that this is our primary duty’ (MacRae, 1964: 24). The late 50s and 
early 60s saw the publication of a variety of books, including those of Peter Winch, 
John Rex and W. G. Baldamus which in different ways emphasised ‘the importance 
of the activity of “theorising” in its own right’ (Rex, 1966a: 529). In more general 
terms, there was a belief that ‘words are primary’ because they ‘can suggest finer 
shades of doubt or affirmation than any measure of significance’ (MacRae, 1969: 
601). It may be argued that methodological training and development of 
methodological techniques is implicit in such statements, but the fact is that this was 
rarely mentioned, and even if it was mentioned, details on how a coordination of 
theory and methods would be achieved were lacking – all of which signifies that at 
this vital period of the expansion the focus was largely, if not exclusively, on theory.  
By defining sociology as a subject that aims primarily at theory building, early 
sociologists (the majority of whom did not have training in empirical methods, let 
alone training in quantitative skills) were able to justify their own place in sociology 
departments and their own abilities; but, perhaps even more significantly, they raised 
up a generation of new young sociologists, that would eventually come to dominate 
the subject during the post-war period, who also lacked such skills and who saw no 
value in possessing such skills. This second generation of sociologists: 
 
at the start of their career were the students of people who knew no 
quantitative methods. They were given a vision and a conception of 
sociology, in which quantitative methods at best were ignored and at worst 
were decried. They have made their careers this way and it’s just a 






A similar orientation towards theory – seeing theory as something necessary 
but also as something that made sociology attractive – was also a factor in the 
changes that took place in social science and administration teaching. An 
examination of the development of the subject in the next chapter shows that the 
subject never lacked a theoretical part, albeit small. It has even been claimed that it 
was this theoretical facet of the subject that helped social science and administration 
expand in the early post war period: 
 
It was the emergence of a second facet of the subject, which, along with 
vocational need, resulted in the expansion of undergraduate courses. The 
scale and complexity of social provision has fostered a drive towards 
policy analysis, theory building and cross-national comparative studies 
which in turn made the subject ‘more attractive’ not only to students who 
wanted to pursue careers in the social policy and administration field, but 
more broadly (Review Committee on Social Policy and Administration, 
1989: 7). 
 
But not everyone was happy with this image of being a theoretical subject that 
sociology was building for itself during the expansion. A number of people saw it as 
unhealthy and unworthy; as ‘full of vacuous theoretical jargon which did not tell 
[them] anything about anything at all’ (Author’s Interview with Lindsay Paterson, 
2017). Writing in 1968, Andreski admitted that, unfortunately, among sociologists 
there was a common ‘addiction to nebulous verbosity’; that ‘under the cover of 
pretentious jargon we are served platitudes, trivialities and inferior versions of very 
old ideas’ (Andreski, 1968: 397). Others criticised the exclusive focus on theory, 
arguing that British sociologists’ attempts at theorising were falling short and were 
limited to ‘idea-shuffling’ while lacking in their ability to make a contribution ‘to the 
mainstream theoretical debate’ (Jackson, 1975: 27). In its attempt to theorise about 
the social world, sociology was offering ‘really uninteresting and badly written’ 
prose to those who could turn to the British empirical tradition of social research 
when they were looking for ‘precise thought which would be able to be generalised’; 
or who could turn to the great novelists, such as Dickens, Flaubert or Tolstoy if they 
‘wanted to find out, let’s say, about the lived reality of the social conditions let’s say 




these people, sociology was striving towards a middle ground – between literature 
and science – that actually was not there; at least not yet. 
 
 
Non-quantitative: Sociologists’ Views on Statistics and Quantitative Methods 
During the Expansion 
 
The vagueness of sociology, which facilitated its expansion; the uncoordinated 
manner in which the subject was expanding; the ideas with which sociology was 
associated – innovation and radicalism; political engagement; and preoccupation 
with theory – all played a role in creating more difficult conditions for the 
development of ‘statistical sociology’ or even a statistical side of sociology. But in 
order to explain more fully why the position of statistics in British sociology during 
the expansion became as marginal as it did, we need to know how sociologists 
thought of statistics at the time and how they understood its role in sociology. What 
was it about statistics that sociologists commonly believed, in addition to their 
related beliefs about the general nature of sociology, that made it difficult to accept 
statistics within sociology? 
The period of the academic expansion of sociology was rich in discussions 
about which methods are suitable for sociology and which are not. But unlike the 
discussions that took place in the 40s and 50s, which rarely focused on particular 
methods and followed more general terms such as quantification versus more 
qualitative approaches, the discussions during the 60s were more specific, singling 
out particular methods, most notably criticising the survey method, in an attempt to 
prescribe an appropriate methodological strategy for sociology (usually based on 
non-quantitative methods). The debates surrounding positivism in British sociology 
that took place during the late 70s and early 80s had their precursor in these earlier 
discussions and bear similar characteristics. 
One of the most striking things about discussions of the methodological make-
up of sociology in the 60s is that there is very little reference to statistical methods 




‘quantification’ in any sense, focussed on the survey method, something which 
persists to this day:  
 
I would speculate that people still associate quantitative methods with 
surveys […] I think people are not aware as they should be of the potential 
of those kind of imaginative and in a sense non-survey uses of statistics 
(Author’s Interview with Donald MacKenzie, 2017).  
 
Writing in 1961, Edward Shils, an American sociologist working in Britain, 
denied that academic sociology could benefit from associating itself with the 
empirical and specifically quantitative tradition of social research that had earlier 
developed in Britain. He argued that the tradition of political arithmetic ‘contains 
neither problems nor themes of investigation’ while the social survey ‘carries with it 
an almost inevitable superficiality and flatness’ (Shils, 1961: 5). The tradition of 
political arithmetic was further understood to be ‘partly responsible for the dryness 
of much of British sociological research today. Neither political arithmetic nor the 
survey fosters the study of actual working of institutions’ (Shils, 1961: 5). 
Thus from the early post-war period the survey method was not perceived as 
part and parcel of ‘scientific sociology’, even though at that time the idea of what 
comprises ‘scientific sociology’ was still unclear; surveys were more likely to be 
understood as an example of ‘scientism’27 rather than science. ‘Ours is an age of 
scientism’, argued MacRae, and ‘some of this scientism is involved with numbers, 
particularly statistics’ (MacRae, 1969: 601). And again, despite acknowledging that 
sociology cannot completely do away with quantitative work, a common conviction 
among burgeoning sociologists was that ‘to count is to reduce to units’ which either 
‘does violence to the richness of the data’ or ‘involves an ultimately destructive 
process of erosion to the validity of the statistical data’; and that statistics can only 
prove the existence of already known facts (MacRae, 1969: 601). Sociologists 
emphasised this distinction every time an external authority, such as the SSRC, 
attempted to influence sociological thinking and research by recommending more 
                                               




and better quantitative training28. At the time when the Heyworth committee was 
working on its report, Marshall, for instance, argued that the views of those in charge 
of that committee did not represent ‘scientific sociology’ but ‘rather social studies 
using scientific techniques to collect and present factual information’ (Marshall, 
1963: 26).  
These examples suggest that British sociologists were unwilling to engage with 
statistics for reasons that were epistemologically grounded; that they saw little value 
in statistical or survey work; and that they believed in the importance of resisting, 
rather than mastering, the growing power that statistical analysis was exerting in 
many fields of life. Not everyone, of course, shared these views – some, like Peter 
Townsend, argued that the future of sociology may depend ‘more than anything else, 
on the question whether statistical survey techniques can be married to the complex 
but often inexplicit techniques of personal observation and description’ (Townsend 
quoted in Marshall, 1963: 26); and Peter Abell was adamant that until British 
sociology realised ‘the symbiotic relationship between theoretical elaboration and 
research technique’ it would ‘continue in the type of sterile theoretical debate that is 
so characteristic of much sociology (Abell, 1966: 625). There is little sign, however, 
that the course of post-war sociology in Britain was influenced by views, such as 
Abell’s or Townsend’s. On the contrary, ‘the dominant people in sociology had no 
interest in statistics, so it was rather like hiring a technician’ (Author’s Interview 
with John Wakeford, 2017).  
And, indeed, to many sociologists during the expansion, survey research was 
no more than mere technical work, to be done by ‘technicians’. Moreover, survey 
work was being described as a technical menace that was threatening ‘to take over 
the discipline, leaving little scope for a discussion of its fundamental theoretical 
problems’ (Rex, 1966a: 529). According to Rex, there was some hope that the 
‘simple technicians’ who were merely engaged in processing interview schedules on 
a computer might retaliate and that sociologists like C. Wright Mills, Peter Berger 
and Aaron Cicourel, who were said to have effectively exposed ‘the inadequacies of 
the sacred methods of survey research’ will take charge (Rex, 1966a: 529). Such 
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views were not peculiar to the period of the expansion but continued into the 70s – 
Roberts who entered sociology in the 70s still remembers that among sociologists 
there was 
 
a slightly arrogant dismissal of [statisticians’] skills in the same way in 
which in the nineteenth century the middle classes treated doctors…as if 
they were sort of a slightly higher class of servants (Author’s Interview 
with Helen Roberts, 2017).  
 
Attempts to make ‘real’ sociological contribution by using the survey method 
were not denied or actively sabotaged; Rex, for instance, points out that there are 
areas of sociology where this could be done. However, such work was not 
encouraged and was being left, more or less, to chance – ‘By all means let 
mathematical sociologists make their contribution where they can’ (Rex 1966b: 661), 
leaving the impression that any such contribution would be of little relevance and 
importance to sociology which needed, first of all, ‘a sociological theory far less 
insular in outlook’ (Rex, 1966a: 529; Rex 1966b: 661). Even though there was little 
active suppression of survey work, attitudes towards surveys, defining it as 
scientistic, merely technical and arid, help to explain the root of the problem with 
teaching quantitative and survey methods to students in this period.  
Surveys were also seen as distorting the image of sociology in the public 
perception. During the 1960s, the fear spread that, lest sociologists take some action, 
their subject would become unduly associated with survey work – with ‘what’ and 
‘how many’ questions, but not sociological ‘why’ questions. In a reflection on the 
development of survey research, Mark Abrams pointed out that: 
 
In short, never before has so much survey research been carried out in 
Britain in the social sciences and never before has its discipline-scope been 
so wide – from geography to criminology, from political science to 
sociology, from education to business management; and never before has 
there been so much survey research aimed at policymakers (Abrams, 1974: 
3). 
 
It could be argued that the abundance of social survey research conducted in 
the commercial, governmental and local authority sectors, encouraged sociologists to 




claim authority over the use of different approaches, for instance, theoretical 
approaches. The anxiety was that that unless sociologists assist them, the public 
would not be able to make the distinction between sociology and mere fact-collecting 
and would identify the whole subject of sociology with ‘the technique of survey 
research’ (Bechhofer, 1967: 838). Some damage, it was feared, had already been 
done: ‘the sociologist has become identified in many people’s minds as a man who 
carries out surveys to obtain the factual information about people which everyone 
knew in advance anyway’ (Bechhofer, 1967: 838). It was high time that sociologists 
reverse that trend; making it ‘common knowledge that sociology is concerned with 
the structure of society and the working of social systems, rather than with the 
obtaining of facts about people as an end in itself’ (Bechhofer, 1967: 838).  
Contributing to the ‘bad image’ of surveys among sociologists was the 
tendency to quote examples of bad quality survey research (for insightful examples, 
see Petersen, 1966: 11) and to consistently ignore the fact that there was also good 
quality survey work being done. Although it is important to be wary of any 
possibilities that methods are being misused, it is worth noting that, to my knowledge, 
there are no existing record of discussions or commentaries on any other methods 
apart from the survey method that outline in such great detail, through bad examples, 
the potential harm that misuse can cause. The point is, therefore, not that sociologists 
were wary, but that they were disproportionately more suspicious of quantitative 
methods, especially surveys, than other methods. This strategy had a pervasive 
impact on the general opinion about such work among sociologists and was openly 
criticised by statisticians:  
 
While anti-quantitative social scientists undoubtedly can find ammunition 
for their views, to observe and concentrate on a few cases of abuse is 
hardly good evidence in general. Anti-quantitative attitudes can lead to 
situations where large amounts of data remain unanalysed, when even 
simple analyses would provide insight into the subject matter. […] I once 
had the salutary experience of being criticized for using a decision theory 
model on the grounds that similar models had been used by the US military 
in Vietnam! (Goldstein, 1984: 264). 
 
In a more recent interview, Goldstein reaffirmed these observations (Author’s 




sociology in the 1970s, still argues that ‘the quality of what goes in statistics is 
usually extremely suspect’ (Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017); the 
quality of what goes into qualitative methods, however, does not get questioned. 
Where did the idea come from that survey work is scientistic, dangerous and 
misleading? Where did the idea come from that futile and blind survey research was 
in danger of taking over British sociology? These ideas could not have come from 
the earlier British experience with sociology for two very good reasons. Firstly, 
British sociology’s development as an academic subject was stagnant up to the point 
of the expansion when these views on surveys became especially prominent. In 
addition, British sociology had developed and continued to develop in parallel to, but 
separately from, the tradition of social empirical research practised in other 
university departments. Therefore, there is little to suggest that the views on surveys 
discussed above were established on the basis of British sociology’s own experience 
with surveys or with quantitative methods more generally; there is also little to 
suggests that sociologists were competent enough to criticise surveys, given their 
lack of experience in this kind of research. Material from recent interviews with 
sociologists, who were active at the time, confirm that British sociology’s experience 
with quantitative methods was barely sufficient for reaching such uncompromising 
conclusions: Paterson reports that quantitative social research was ‘almost like a 
ghetto […] of rather arcane activity, completely separate from the mainstream 
sociology’ and that if ‘we look at the thing called sociology, then I doubt that there 
was ever an overwhelmingly quantitative past’ (Author’s Interview with Lindsay 
Paterson, 2017); while Bechhofer is clear that: 
 
If someone said to me that sociology moved […] out of a quantitative past, 
my response would be what quantitative past? Show me! Because how many 
quantitative studies can you name from that period (Author’s Interview with 
Frank Bechhofer, 2017). 
 
If not from sociologists’ own experience with quantitative and survey methods, 
then, where did this hostile attitude come from? A major factor in shaping the 
attitude of British sociologists towards quantitative work was their perception of the 
state of American sociology and the role of quantitative and survey work in 




potentially harmful survey methods cited by British sociologists relates to the 
American experience and comes from American sources. For instance, in discussing 
surveys, Donald MacRae, who in 1963 was the editor of the British Journal of 
Sociology, commented that it was  
 
one of the most frequent errors of sociologists in America to force their 
students into what is believed to be the mould of say, physics, and assume 
that the banal, trivial, or irrelevant thus takes on worth and significance. It 
is despite of this that American sociology now leads the world (MacRae, 
1963: 6). 
 
What we see in MacRae’s comments is not only a rushed generalisation that all 
quantitative or survey work is a failed attempt to merely imitate ‘natural science’ but 
also a conviction that such attempts can only hamper the progress of the discipline – 
if America can succeed in spite of this, MacRae hints, this might not be so easy for 
British sociology which had not yet established itself firmly enough. The 
denunciation of quantitative and survey work was here justified as being a way to 
avoid the ‘mistakes’ that sociologists were making in the USA. It was on the basis of 
the perception that there was too much survey work being done in the USA and that 
too much of it was of poor quality that British sociology could claim, regardless of 
the lack of first-hand experience, that, there was overall ‘too much faith in the 
quantitative, and, in the quantitative, too blind a belief in the identity of science with 
the metrics of probability’ (MacRae, 1963: 8).  
Such views were fuelled by UK publications of American critiques of survey 
research. Writing in New Society, William Petersen from the University of California, 
Berkley, argued that ‘some survey research is ethically dubious’ and that ‘some is 
expensive nonsense’; that a great part consists of ‘reported opinion and reported 
attitudes’; that data are collected mostly by ‘amateurs’; that survey research not only 
often ‘distorts reality’ but that it ‘itself creates the facts it analyses’ leaving behind an 
‘indigestible mass of unrelated facts’ (Petersen, 1966: 11). However, even if there 
were research in the USA matching the characteristics that Petersen outlined, it is 
only realistic to believe that there was a lot of ‘good quality’ research being done 
alongside it; the records of New Society, however, show that they did not publish 




some truth, but could also be dangerously misleading for British sociologists when 
taken on their own. Margaret Stacey, for instance, fully agreed with Petersen, 
replying that ‘we should take this timely warning from the United States before we 
are overdone with surveys’ (Stacey, 1966: 31). And this is still the belief nowadays:  
 
I think it was the…almost the domination of quantitative research in the 
American journals that really put people in Britain off quantitative methods 
[…] one of the elements, I think, in British resistance to quantitative 
methods was a feeling that there was this awful tradition in American 
sociology which was very quantitative and functionalist at its best and 
trivial at its worst (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). 
 
America, of course, became more and more and more and sometimes 
stupidly quantitative. There were years when the American Journal of 
Sociology and the American Sociological Review were well-nigh 
unreadable because it’s just so boring sociology (Author’s Interview with 
Frank Bechhofer, 2017). 
 
Whether American survey work was of the predominantly ‘unreadable’ and 
‘boring’ and un-insightful type is not for us to judge here. Suffice it to say, however, 
that impressions of the existence of such work in America, in whatever proportion, 
helped fuel an overall negative attitude towards survey work as a whole in Britain; 
and that British publications, like New Society, and sociologists discussing surveys 
were receptive to the bad survey press, using it to justify sociological work based on 
other approaches that did not contain quantitative data collection or analysis. It was 
as a result of the receptiveness towards the bad survey press coming from America 
that British sociology could adopt a negative attitude about statistics without having 
to first experience statistics itself. In the 1960s, surveys were the new ‘Drink, 
Drainage and Divorce’ (which was used as a derogatory term for empirical social 
research in the early twentieth century).  
If these were the attitudes of British sociologists towards survey work during 
the period of the expansion, what about their quantitative skills? It is hard to say 
anything conclusive and precise about the actual abilities of British sociologists in 
doing statistical and survey research due to lack of primary evidence. The evidence 
that is available, however, suggests that lack of ability was not the main reason why 




possibility; often, lack of ability was normalised and legitimised using such views, as 
outlined above:  
 
for a long time there has been this…dangerous conflation of two separate 
things: first of all, that to do statistical work you do need a reasonable 
mathematical background which many people studying sociology and 
indeed teaching sociology don’t actually have; together with [...] the 
suspicion that there is something conservative about quantitative methods; 
of course, the second of those can act as a source of legitimation for the 
first of them (Author’s Interview with Donald MacKenzie, 2017). 
 
One of the most common arguments about the lack of statistical abilities in 
sociologists and sociology students in Britain is that this results from mathematics 
anxiety and lack of basic mathematical skills. However, what is more important than 
the existence of such anxiety, assuming such anxiety did indeed exist, is that in the 
crucial period of the expansion, when a whole new generation of sociologists was 
being educated, there were plenty of opportunities to legitimise lack of quantitative 
skills on the basis of epistemological and political views, such as views that 
quantitative and survey methods are conservative or positivist. 
 
 
Non-quantitative: How did Student Characteristics and Expectations Affect the 
Incorporation of Statistics in Sociology during the Expansion? 
 
As I mentioned previously, the democratisation of education and the changes 
that went with it created conditions that were particularly favourable to the expansion 
of the social sciences; specifically, sociology. An important change, as far as student 
demographics was concerned, was that as a result of the expansion of education a lot 
more women were entering higher education and there is evidence to suggest that a 
disproportionate number of women entered university to study sociology, compared 
to other subjects or subject groups. Evidence for this is presented in Appendix I in 
Tables 13 and 14 and in Appendix II in Figure 2, showing that consistently 
throughout the 60s and 70s, the women/men ratio in sociology was more similar to 
that in the art subjects than in science subjects or economics; and that the proportion 




factor that stimulated the expansion of sociology was that there was something in the 
image of sociology that made it more attractive to girls; and something about girls 
that made them more likely to be attracted to sociology. What was it? 
A partial answer could be derived from the ideas with which sociology was 
associated. It is well known that women are more likely to be attracted to the arts 
than the sciences; the fact that, as I explain below, sociology promoted itself 
consistently as a general education subject, with similar objectives to arts subjects, is 
likely to have played a role in attracting young women. The theoretical, radical, 
holistic and innovative subject characteristics that sociology boasted, gave sociology 
a general appeal across both genders. But for girls, many of whom were from 
families where young women did not study for a higher degree, sociology held out a 
more special promise: 
 
sociology has become for girls […] what English literature was for the last 
generation at university – safe because everyone you know is doing it and 
no one can be actually ‘bad at it’ (Unknown Author, 1970: 17). 
 
Adding to this, there was a widespread belief that a degree in sociology, unlike 
a degree in English literature, would help women ‘do good’: throughout the 60s and 
the 70s, women choose to study sociology with some thought of becoming social 
workers (Smith, 1982: 152; Stewart, 1989: 151). But there is also some evidence 
suggesting that another important factor in young women’s choice to study sociology 
was the lack of requirement to possess quantitative skills or engage in quantitative 
data collection or analysis. The evidence below does not specifically refer to women, 
rather it talks about sociology students as a whole; but, knowing that the majority of 
sociology students has consistently comprised of women, it could at least be 
hypothesised that students’ gender influenced the expressed opinions; and that the 
fact that sociology in Britain has consistently been a ‘women’s subject’ could also 
partially explain why, in the absence of stronger factors influencing the situation in 
the other direction, sociology in Britain has also tended to be non-quantitative. 
The first piece of evidence that points in this direction comes from a survey of 
undergraduate sociology students conducted at the LSE in 1968. Two thirds of all 




third considered statistics as an essential sociology subject (LSE, 1968). Two years 
later an investigation by The Times reported that ‘many [sociology] undergraduates 
are horrified to be confronted by algebra, computer techniques and the often 
(pseudo) scientific jargon of the sociologist’; the view common among sociologists 
that ‘methodology has become an obsession among sociologists today and for many 
it has become an end in itself’ have certainly had an effect among the students too 
(Unknown Author, 1970: 17). A report by the Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Computer Education confirmed these tendencies, specifically among social science 
and arts students: 
 
For these students, motivation is particularly important. Many of them have 
thankfully given up mathematics, and the supposedly entirely formal 
thinking that goes with it, at least two years before entering university. To 
show them how a computer can be made to do things which they do not see 
to be valuable is of little use. It is also unwise to assume that the 
mathematical competence of these students remains at the level reached 
when they ceased to study the subject; a great deal would have been 
forgotten. […] But the main difficulty remains as lack of motivation. Most 
of these students intend to specialise in economics, government or 
sociology. In their first year they do not see the reason for studying 
statistics or computing, and many of them would prefer not to know about 
these topics! (Computer Board for Universities and Research Councils, 
1970: 17-18). 
 
During the expansion period, sociology, more than any other subject, relied for 
its academic existence on student demand and the preferences of students, mostly the 
female students, who came to sociology; making quantitative modules compulsory 
would have had a negative effect. Donald MacKenzie, for instance, described how 
after he taught statistics as a compulsory subject, in the 70s, he had little choice but 
to make the statistics course optional, because he felt that ‘you’re better off having a 
class where the people doing it really want to do it rather than are being forced 
reluctantly to do it’ and that the compulsory statistics course was ‘dragging down 
second year numbers’ making him think that the department was ‘killing sociology 
by putting something into second year that students don’t want and don’t see the 
need of’ (Author’s Interview with Donald MacKenzie, 2017). Another example 





I suspect that quite a few students come into sociology because they don’t 
want to do any subject that involves numbers…they don’t want to do 
science, they don’t want to do maths, they are really in flight from numbers 
because they want to talk about society and human activity and some of 
them wanted to talk about theory, they wanted to understand how the world 
worked but they didn’t want to do numbers. So we had always a significant 
number of what you might call number-averse students. [...] I can’t 
remember when there weren’t number-averse students (Author’s Interview 
with Robert Moore, 2017). 
 
What is noticeable, although highly speculative and hard to prove, is the 
mutual legitimation of, on the one hand, the views of the first- and second-generation 
professional sociologists who in the majority were either dismissive or hostile to 
quantification of any sort, and, on the other hand, the understanding of the students 
about their own abilities and their expectations of sociology: 
 
The view was, well, if students really wanted to do that kind of thing, they 
can, but it doesn’t form an essential part of sociology, why should they 
have to do this sort of thing? And that of course was coming from quite a 
few members of staff, who themselves couldn’t do that kind of work and 
you could see them switch off if you talked about a confidence interval 
(Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017). 
 
There have even been even cases in which students have outwardly rejected 
sociology teachers’ attempt to teach them anything quantitative. Platt reported that 
when she was a young sociology teacher in the 60s, a student came to her after a 
methods teaching section in which she discussed surveys, and told her: 
 
‘Of course, what you were doing was just trying to make us be sort of 
hapless tools in hands of the state, weren’t you?’…Every seminar was ‘A 
critical approach to…’ [but] it was this violent ideology that was applied 
irrespective of whether it actually fitted the circumstances which was a bit 
hard to deal with (Author’s Interview with Jennifer Platt, 2017). 
 
It is possible that these views towards quantification were widely observed 
because sociology was primarily a ‘women’s subject’ – at least as far as 
undergraduate students were concerned. But in the absence of data for the period 
under investigation, this remains a speculation. What we do know, however, shows 
clearly that as the expansion of sociology was taking place, the self-image that 




sociology had to offer, together made it more difficult to introduce statistical training 
into sociology. ‘The consumer was king’ (to use Mandler’s 2017 phrase) not only in 
the higher education system more generally during the expansion, but also in 
sociology, especially when it came to its methods choices. 
 
 
Beyond the Expansion 
 
This chapter examined the expansion of sociology in the post-war period from 
both the perspective of the expansion of the education system and the perspective of 
the historical development of sociology prior to 1945 and showed what the effects of 
the expansion were on the possibilities for achieving some degree of incorporation of 
statistics into sociology. It also attempted to modify and improve our understanding 
of the expansion itself through the lens of the historical relationship between 
statistics and sociology. We have learned new things about sociology’s expansion by 
looking at its relationship with statistics; and new things about sociology’s 
relationship with statistics by looking at its expansion. 
Unlike existing accounts which concentrate on the expansion primarily as an 
opportunity, the present analysis shows that this period also posed unexpected and 
unusual challenges for a subject that was underdeveloped and undecided about its 
subject matter and methodology. This is clearly seen in comments that some 
contemporary sociologists made while reflecting on the expansion. As early as 1963, 
Little argued that the ‘eclectism’ that was emerging as a result of the uncoordinated 
expansion was a big ‘disadvantage’ that was responsible for the amateurish nature of 
much of social and sociological research’; ‘amateurism in design, methods and 
conceptualisation’ was rife (Little, 1963: 69). The variety of ideas, approaches and 
methods that mushroomed as quickly as the number of professional sociologists 
resulted in many researchers lacking even ‘basic training in the social sciences’; and 
a sociological curriculum which by ‘emphasising the diverse traditions and strands 
among British sociologists’ was producing graduates who had ‘contact with a wealth 
of approaches to the study of society but insufficient expertise to utilise any of them 




In retrospect, it was also reported that unconditional expansion allowed any 
previous commitments to empirical research to falter, especially under extreme 
forms of both ethnomethodology and neo-Marxism (Westergaard and Pahl, 1989: 
379). One argument was:  
 
With the large increase in faculty members, many sociology groups were 
able to become rather more autonomous […] As a result, the position of 
SST [Social Statistics Teaching] within the sociology curriculum gradually 
came under scrutiny in many departments […] An eclectic borrowing of 
both personnel and theory was therefore occasioned by the postwar growth 
of academic sociology […] (Irvin and Miles, 1979: 20-21). 
 
By 1970, even in the eyes of the public, sociology was seen to be ‘riven with 
discontent’, with departments reported to have been failing to ‘agree on what 
constitutes sociology’ (Unknown Author, 1970: 17). And this was expected to have 
negative consequences for one of British sociology’s most valued assets: incoming 
student rates. As I explained earlier in the chapter, the majority of students had 
chosen to study sociology in the belief and with the hope that sociology would fulfil 
their aspiration to change the world for the better; as early as 1970, it was becoming 
clear that it was very likely that sociology had raised student expectations so high, 
that it could not possibly fulfil them:  
 
Unreasonable hopes for sociology make disillusion with it all the more 
profound. Just another God has failed, said a gloomy dropout. But it’s not 
only dropouts that expect too much of sociology. There is disillusion 
among staff as well as students (Unknown Author, 1970: 17). 
 
In such precarious circumstances, sustaining the subject’s growth was 
becoming more difficult: because ‘sociology raised student expectations in the early 
1960s beyond those it either could or should try to meet’ by the early 70s sociology 
faced the risk of becoming ‘imprisoned in its sudden popularity’ (Westergaard and 
Pahl, 1989: 379).  
Whether such a strong degree of fatalism was justified or not is a matter for 
another enquiry. What we do know, is that the expansion of sociology could not have 
happened without external educational reforms, which in turn played a fundamental 




freedom to associate itself with almost anything that was new, radical, female-
friendly and politically progressive; anything that inspired faith in sociology as an 
academic subject. Because it was a subject which relied heavily for its existence on 
student demand, sociology could hardly afford, even if such attitudes were present, 
to establish statistical competence as an essential, an indispensable requirement. 
Positive, embracing and encouraging attitudes to any sort of quantification, including 
survey work, were absent in this period; moreover, it was primarily attitudes, not 
ability or lack of ability, that were the main reason why the incorporation of 
quantitative methods and thinking into sociology remained only a remote possibility. 
It was the way British sociology expanded, not the fact that it expanded, that had the 
major influence on the subject’s relationship with statistical and, more generally, 
with quantitative research.  
The 60s expansion of sociology was a phenomenal event, but it was neither 
unique nor unusual, at least as far as the history of social science in Britain is 
concerned. The 1830s and 1840s, where the history of social science proper begins, 
was a time of similarly radical and rapid social change; a time when the very idea of 
social science emerged and was for the first time discussed and practised not just by 
philosophers and reformers, but also by statisticians, with the hope that it will 
provide the source of Enlightenment needed to grasp all social change and to bring 
about outcomes which were socially desirable. The emergence of social science in 
this period was characterised by a belief in social science before social science had 
proved it was capable of bringing about social Enlightenment – a belief which is very 
similar to the 60s belief in sociology, which rose regardless of the fact that sociology 
had little to offer on a practical level. So the 60s expansion of sociology has a clearly 
recognisable precursor in the 1830s/40s emergence of social science. In both cases, 
however, statistical techniques and the statistical way of thinking about society were 
in the periphery of the strictly sociological project. Numerical facts alone do not emit 
light, ideas are necessary – and sociologists, in particular, both in the early nineteenth 
century and the early post-war period were looking for light, for hope, for new 












The Teaching of Sociology to Undergraduate Students in Britain, 1904-
1979 
 
This chapter examines in greater detail the development of the academic 
characteristics of sociology as taught to undergraduate students throughout the 
twentieth century. Unlike previous chapters which were limited to a particular time 
period, this chapter requires a different approach – as changes in teaching tend to 
occur slowly over time, pervasive trends can only be observed over longer periods. 
The analysis of the teaching of sociology to undergraduate students in this chapter 
therefore spans from 1904 to 1979.  
The chapter begins with an analysis of the understanding of the nature of 
sociological education as sociology developed from a relatively obscure academic 
subject in the interwar period to one of the most popular academic subjects. Was 
sociology going to be more like an ‘arts’ subject, providing a general education; or 
was it going to be more like a ‘science’, focusing on methodological instruction and, 
where suitable, vocational opportunities? Discussion in previous chapters has already 
suggested that the first option was the more likely of the two but this chapter 
provides further evidence to reveal how this came to be the case.  
After establishing what the overall academic characteristics of sociology were 
throughout the twentieth century, the chapter continues with an examination of how 
sociology curricula were structured and what they contained; what the place and role 
of methods courses in curricula was; and what proportion of the curriculum was 
devoted to statistical and survey methods. The analysis is based on evidence from the 
LSE curricula, comparing sociology, social science and administration and statistics 
courses; and from the collections of sociology methods courses syllabuses compiled 
by Peel (1968) and Wakeford (1979) and from material from the student guide 
Which University/ Which Degree (1969-79). The amount of material available for 
this type of analysis is limited in its scope; but combining information from the LSE 
calendars and the syllabus collections should allow us to establish with reasonable 




how it compared to other relevant subjects. Many aspects of the teaching of 
sociology at undergraduate level changed over the twentieth century, but as this 
chapter shows, there was also a remarkable amount of continuity.  
It should be made clear that instead of focusing on the types of research or 
research fields or methodological approaches to research that are most common (cf. 
Madge, 1957; Carter, 1968; Collison and Weber, 1971); or on the development of 
whole degrees (Fincham, 1975); or topics that were prominent in the curriculum, this 
chapter focuses on sociology as a set of skills and asks what skills sociology students 
were required to learn as part of their sociology degree; what they were expected to 
be able to do in order to become qualified sociologists. Although the amount of 
attention this issue has been receiving lately might give the impression that this is a 
more recent concern (Williams et al, 2004; Williams et al 2008; MacInnes, 2010; 
Platt, 2012), this chapter shows that it is an issue with a history, a history as long as 
the history of British sociology itself. Evidence that this has indeed been the case 
emerges from an analysis of the discrepancy between the recommendations of 
official reports with regards to quantitative teaching and sociologists’ views on this 
issue; and also from an analysis of the American view on sociology teaching in 
Britain, both of which are discussed towards the end of the chapter. 
 
 
Perceiving Sociology as General Education  
 
The analysis of the views expressed by sociologists in Britain during the first 
half of the twentieth century and in the early post-war period in previous chapters has 
already provided a clear indication that, throughout this time, British sociology has 
been continuously, and almost without any exception, oriented towards a liberal 
education aimed at broadening the mind with philosophical investigation and theory 
building. Particularly in the early post-war period, we have seen that there was a 
clearly pronounced methodology outlook among sociologists that assumed that 
methods training, or any potential vocational elements that sociology may have, were 
not viewed as essential and, if necessary at all, could be provided at the postgraduate 




sociology in Britain was continuously understood as a subject aimed at providing a 
general education? If this was indeed the case, then this could help to further explain 
how the conditions in Britain throughout most of the twentieth century made it 
difficult to establish a close and secure relationship with statistical methods – such 
methods would have been, at best, seen as a topic sociology students could learn 
about; and, at worst, seen as incompatible with the understanding that sociology 
should provide a general, liberal education. 
There are numerous historical documents produced between 1914 and 1983 
that help us understand more clearly what sociologists thought sociology should 
offer to students, with the majority of evidence suggesting that sociology in this 
country was developing as a general or liberal education subject.  
The 1914/5 LSE calendar, for instance, contains a description of some 
sociological courses taken by the students studying Social Science and 
Administration (SSaA). The role of the sociological courses in the SSaA degree was: 
 
not to teach them to theorise but to deepen their intelligent interest in 
everything connected with their subsequent practical work. It is necessary 
that students desiring to take the full course should possess a good general 
education (LSE, 1914: 92-3). 
 
This is a clear statement of how sociology was seen by social science 
colleagues working in the SSaA. Similar descriptions continued to appear in the LSE 
calendars throughout the twentieth century, supporting the idea that their 
understanding of sociology was as a useful addition providing a general education 
element to more vocationally oriented subjects.  
The first time the topic of the teaching of sociology was formally debated was 
at a 1936 symposium called The Social Sciences – Their Relations in Theory and 
Teaching. At this symposium, it was argued that although certain political and 
cultural changes affecting the health and well-being of large populations can be 
measured using statistics, this does not go very far in enabling sociologists ‘to solve 
the weighty and more general problems of the art of government’ (Hobson, 1936: 19). 
Furthermore, in discussing the place of sociology, Morris Ginsberg and Karl 
Mannheim confirmed, yet again, that sociology is a general social science. Even 




might have been expected to conceive of statistical investigation as an essential part 
of sociology, described it as vital but, nonetheless, external to sociology: ‘Statistical 
sociology is for the sociologist what archivalism and archaeology are for the 
historian’ (Carr-Saunders, 1936: 211). But Marshall, who reported on the provision 
of sociology courses, was less conclusive: ‘the present position is chaotic’ and ‘we 
have not really made up our minds what it is that we are trying to do’ (Marshall, 
1936: 55). In the light of such comments, one cannot not help but wonder whether 
previous and later attempts to define sociology as a ‘general’ or ‘liberal’ education 
were not, at least partly, attempts to disguise the chaos, confusion and ambiguity that 
dominated sociological thinking. 
Thus, when the expansion gained momentum, instilling unprecedented 
optimism into the sociological community, talk about the ‘chaotic’ position of 
sociology ceased but talk about sociology-as-general-education did not. The 1960 
Guide for Intending Students prepared by Asher Tropp and Joe Banks for the BSA 
asserted that sociology provided ‘sound liberal education’ (Tropp and Banks, 1960: 
11). In 1963, Little observed that sociology was ‘certainly’ the ‘type of general 
education that many of the supporters of new universities […] hope to see offered’ 
(Little, 1963: 70). This suggests that the idea of sociology as general education was 
seen as instrumental in sociology’s expansion, as facilitating that expansion; 
providing undergraduate students with: 
  
…precision of thought and reasoning, an acquaintance with moral and 
value problems, a historical perspective and detailed knowledge of the 
variety, complexity and problems of contemporary societies (Little, 1963: 
70).  
 
In addition to helping sociology expand in universities, sociology-as-general-
education would help the subject secure a place at other, more vocationally oriented, 
higher education institutions, such as Colleges of Advanced Technology and 
polytechnics, since: 
 
…students at these institutions must spend part of their time in general or 
liberal studies and already various aspects of sociology are being used in 





It is of course impossible to say with any certainty that perceiving sociology as 
a general education subject led to an unappreciative attitude towards methodology, in 
general, and quantitative methods, in particular, but such a perception would 
inevitably create an atmosphere conducive to such attitudes. For instance, a survey of 
sociology undergraduate students done at the LSE in 1968 shows that, when asked 
about five subjects that should form the core of the sociology syllabus, 80% of 
respondents answered ‘theory’, 69% ‘philosophy’, 56% ‘social psychology’ and only 
30% ‘statistics’ (LSE, 1968).  Given that the response rate of the survey was 58%, 
we can conclude that of the nearly two thirds of undergraduate sociology students 
who filled in the survey, only one third considered statistics an essential sociology 
subject. The view that statistics is not essential to sociology is also confirmed by the 
answers given by the students who studied sociology as a special subject as part of 
another degree (BSc Economics with Sociology & BSc Economics Part 1; and BSc 
Geography students taking ‘Elements of Social Structure’). An even smaller 
proportion of these students reported that statistics was a core element in sociology – 
14% and 12% respectively. Part of the explanation could be that these students 
received statistical training as part of their economics training, or even separately; 
but these results also show that students, coming to sociology from different subjects, 
also shared the notion that sociology is not a subject with a strong statistical element. 
Less than a decade later, Clarke (1976), conducted a survey with first-year 
sociology teachers on the conceptions that first-year sociology courses were 
attempting to convey. He was interested in finding out whether there was a 
consensus on these conceptions and whether first-year courses attempted to portray 
sociology as a ‘liberal humanistic subject’ or ‘as a science’ or ‘as a profession’. He 
found that, according to sociology teachers, the main difficulty in teaching sociology 
to first-year students, was trying to put across ‘complex issues and sophisticated 
ideas’, ‘the personal and non-technical nature of the subject’ and the necessity for 
‘thinking critically about social reality’ (Clarke, 1976: 89). Clarke’s results show 
clearly that, for the teachers, sociology was far from a technical subject; teaching 
sociology with the aim of providing a general education need not involve statistical 




Further evidence comes from teachers’ answers to the question ‘How would 
you summarise the conceptions of sociology the course tries to convey?’ (Clarke, 
1976: 91). The majority of answers pointed to: ‘the sociological perspective’, 
‘thinking sociologically’, ‘think critically’, ‘recognise the givens in society as 
problematic and sociology as worthy of critical imagination’. There are some 
answers suggesting a desire to claim empirical relevance for sociology; but nothing 
in the responses suggests that sociologists were aiming at preparing their students for 
the idea that sociological research is more than thinking critically nor is there any 
mention about acquiring the ability to conduct empirical research. 
Similar attitudes are to be found at postgraduate level. A 1971 survey by Mark 
Abrams shows that ca. 60% of social science postgraduates who had received SSRC 
grants, regarded ‘any statistical training’ as ‘relevant’ (Abrams, 1974: 4). Although 
the proportion of students who thought statistical training relevant is bigger than 
those did not, the results are ambiguous because they do not specify the rate for 
sociology students in particular and also what kind or level of statistical training 
students thought was essential. The survey, however, also revealed that the majority 
(ca. 60%) of those who thought statistical training was relevant described it as ‘either 
mediocre or poor’; only 7% described it as excellent (Abrams, 1974: 4). It is difficult 
to say whether sociologists’ views of statistics influenced the poor quality of 
statistical training offered to students or vice versa; regardless of the direction of 
influence, the end result for a couple of generations studying during the post-war 
period was a poor ability to do quantitative research and a lack of enthusiasm for 
engaging with it at all. Later on, in the same report, Abrams showed that only 14% of 
the PhD theses written by the interviewed social science postgraduate students could 
be classified as ‘certainly quantitative’ (Abrams, 1974: 4); with another 16% as 
‘possibly quantitative’. A similar exercise was done in 1974, using a BSA register of 
PhD Theses in Sociology from that year (ca. 1000 theses).  Results were very similar, 
showing that the percentage of quantitative work across social science subjects was 




could be classified as ‘probably quantitative’, 26% as ‘possibly quantitative’ and 
66% as ‘almost certainly not quantitative’29. 
Abrams’ report also revealed that both students and staff regarded social 
science as closer to the liberal side of education than to the scientific and the 
vocational and that among sociology staff there was an outright hostility towards any 
attempts to change that. Abrams remarked on the ‘contempt with which some senior 
social scientists regard the skills of numeracy’; he also recalled that when the SSRC 
advertised financing for research similar to the Detroit Area Study, 75% of British 
universities showed no interest. When Abrams visited some of them, he was met 
with comments amounting to “There will be no survey research in this department 
except over my dead body” (Abrams, 1974: 4). This experience resonated well with 
Jackson’s (1975) more general view that:  
 
British sociologists are rarely very numerate individuals. In spite of the 
widespread use of computing facilities […] there is a remarkable lack of 
interest and training in quantitative measures among many postgraduates 
(Jackson, 1975: 26). 
 
Statements like these, however, do not appear to have raised any alarms among 
leading sociologists. The 1986 BSA presidential address re-affirmed the value of a 
sociological general education arguing that while ‘a few people’ who have studied 
sociology could ‘actually say that in the jobs they do they are ‘sociologists”, this did 
not mean that they did not use it in their work (Albrow quoting Urry and Waton, 
1986: 339). For Albrow, sociology as ‘a more liberal education’ taught students how 
to ‘think through problems rigorously, systematically and fully’; it was their ability 
to ‘think in terms of concepts’ that helped students fair well in their chosen careers 
(Albrow quoting Urry and Waton, 1986: 339). Sociology, Albrow was adamant, ‘has 
a leading role to play in asserting the breadth of a humane education’ (Albrow, 1986: 
345). Little had changed from the early days of the expansion when the idea of 
sociology as a general education was justified as a way of strengthening the position 
of sociology and facilitating its expansion; the climate in the 1980s had changed – in 
Albrow’s opinion this was a climate in which ‘the narrowest and most vocational 
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possible construction is placed on higher education by government’ – but the general 
education that sociology aimed to provide, his address shows, was perceived to be 
just as vital. Whether sociology was ‘frighteningly fashionable’ (Willmott, 1968: 
341) or under the threat of Thatcherism, providing general education seemed to 
remain an unquestioned solution.  
Examining this evidence helps explain why it was possible that many 
sociologists developed a neglectful attitude towards methodology – in a liberal arts 
degree, methodology would be understood as another aspect to broaden one’s mind, 
not an opportunity to specialise in a particular know-how. This, it could be argued, 
would reduce the chances that methods teaching reaches its optimum aim – to teach 
students new skills that they can apply in practice. The perception of sociology as 
providing a general education can also, albeit partially, explain why empirical skills 
were not the focus of teaching at the LSE and why the continuous teaching of 
quantitative and survey methods in the early post-war period failed to resolve the 
problematic divide that existed between the sociological and empirical social 
scientific traditions and between sociology and statistics more generally (see below).  
The view that sociology is a ‘liberal arts’ subject has therefore been present in 
British sociology throughout the twentieth century with remarkable continuity and 
persistence. These views may have gone unquestioned among the majority of 
mainstream sociologists but they were met with resistance elsewhere, most notably 
in the official reports on the state of social science and sociology teaching prepared 
by government and other official bodies since 1945. 
 
 
Reports on the Teaching of Sociology and Statistics in the Post-war Period 
 
The understanding that sociology teaching should be organised with the aim of 
providing a general education was not shared right across the spectrum of social 
scientists and policy makers involved in higher education. During the post-war 
period, this view met opposition, consistently and systematically, from a minority of 
sociologists and intellectuals interested in the teaching of the social sciences in the 




reports on the topic. A number of these reports show considerable contrast with 
many of the views coming from sociologists and sociology students discussed earlier. 
They also show a remarkable degree of similarity and consistency, even 
repetitiveness, in recommendations. With few minor changes in wording, a report 
from 1965 could easily be used to describe the situation in the 1980s and even 2000s. 
The first major official report that commented on the academic status of 
sociology as well as the role of statistical training in the social sciences was the 
Clapham report of 1946. This report was the first major step towards securing more 
adequate funding for the social sciences: although the committee did not recommend 
the establishment of a funding body, they were clear that in terms of both staff and 
research funds, the social science departments in British universities are ‘under-
staffed and under-endowed’ (Para. 3-25). As I mentioned earlier, Clapham expressed 
certain reservations towards sociology: the report revealed doubts about certain 
advances in the development of sociology and confusion over its nature. In contrast, 
when addressing the role of statistics in the social sciences, the Report stated 
categorically that ‘an adequate supply of statistical competence is quite fundamental 
to the advancement of knowledge of social and economic questions’, and went on to 
suggest that ‘there was a chronic struggle […] for the services of a supply of 
statisticians’ (Para. 18).  
Another report by Egon Pearson (1947) took the matter further with some 
clearer suggestions as to how the teaching of statistics could be improved. The 
conclusions of Pearson’s report regarding the importance of statistics as applied to 
all sciences are similar to those in Clapham’s report. In Pearson’s view: 
 
[…] the statistical approach is so fundamental to the modern way of 
looking at things – the affairs of everyday life as well as scientific theories 
and experiments – that it should form part of the mental equipment of the 
educated man, which it is not at present (Pearson, 1947: 53).  
 
Pearson argued that statistics has been neglected by all sciences, while the 
social sciences in particular appeared to take a rather narrow view of their use, 
‘almost as another term for quantitative economics’ (Pearson, 1947: 52). The report 
recommended the establishment of elementary statistics courses to familiarise 




techniques, as well as more advanced courses ‘to enable students to utilise properly 
statistical methods as developed for application to their chosen discipline’ (Pearson, 
1947: 54). There is little evidence to suggest that these recommendations were taken 
up; instead, Clapham and Pearson began a post-war ‘tradition’ of giving out 
recommendations which were consistently at odds with what sociology teachers and 
students wanted and believed in. 
Heyworth’s report of 1965 did not differ much from Clapham’s – sociology 
appeared to be ‘the discipline which people find most puzzling of the major social 
sciences’ (Heyworth, 1965: 3). Heyworth did not show any increase in confidence in, 
or respectability for, sociological research. The report showed only a general 
increase in enthusiasm for the social sciences overall. But just like his predecessors, 
who commented on the provision of statistical training, Heyworth was clear that:  
 
[…] Without mathematics and statistics the social sciences as a whole 
cannot flourish. […] and it is essential that these methods be also 
developed in universities and colleges so that no student will in the future 
graduate in the social sciences without a good working knowledge of 
statistics. […] Our evidence was emphatic that much still remains to be 
done in respect of the provision, co-ordination and publication of social 
statistics […] (Heyworth, 1965: 32, 43).  
 
And little had changed by the beginning of the 70s when another report was 
published, making similar recommendations and remarking upon the failure of 
universities to endorse such views as were expressed by Clapham, Pearson and 
Heyworth. Rosenbaum’s Report on the Use of Statistics in the Social Sciences30 
(1971) aimed to help ‘increase the quantity and improve the quality of statistical 
research within the social sciences (Rosenbaum, 1971: 535). In evaluating the 
contemporary situation, the Report was clear: the quality of the applications for 
research grants that came before the SSRC Statistics Committee (est. 1970) was 
‘poor’ and their number – ‘disappointingly low’ (Rosenbaum, 1971: 535). As regards 
the quality of the statistical research that was conducted in the social sciences, 
Rosenbaum found that despite general familiarity with the main statistical techniques, 
on the whole, ‘unsophisticated techniques were used’. Collaboration between social 
scientists and statisticians was rare and, if it happened at all, it took the form of 
                                               




consultation and nothing more (Rosenbaum, 1971: 539). Innumeracy among social 
science students prevailed, a weakness that was thought to have originated at school 
level. There was a disorganised variety in what was taught and in the manner of 
teaching; a major problem being how to determine who were best suited to do the 
teaching – mathematicians or social scientists. In fact, the problem of who would be 
best to teach statistics in social science departments was one of the most debated, 
although notably it was always debated by social statisticians (in addition to 
Rosenbaum (1971), see Conway, 1976; Kalton, 1974; Goldstein, 1984). And 
although Rosenbaum’s is by far the most extensive report on the teaching of statistics 
in social science from this period, neither the problems he identified, nor the 
recommendation he made, were novel. 
We find further repetition of well-known but unsolved problems in relation to 
the incorporation of statistics into sociology in the next official report on the state of 
the social sciences in Britain (ESRC, 1987). The report praised the strengths of 
British sociology, saying that it is ‘generally respected abroad and seen as 
outstanding in some areas’; but like its predecessors it recommended that substantial 
progress was still needed in the field of quantitative sociology in which the UK was 
seen as ‘weak’ compared to the US (ESRC, 1987: 1). The ‘numeracy problem’ 
which British social science was facing was again identified as ‘a very real worry’, 
particularly with respect to researchers in sociology and political science who were 
‘not as numerate as their colleagues overseas and the gap is widening’ (ESRC, 1987: 
7). Just like Rosenbaum, the ESRC noted that the root of the problem was often that 
social science applicants usually had had little mathematics training in school; but 
the report was vocal too about the problem of attitudes pervading the sociological 
tradition: ‘at worst some social scientists appear to show not only indifference but 
disdain for statistical training’ and that it ‘would be very dangerous for the future 
health of social science to allow this situation to continue’ (ESRC, 1987: 7). With 
regard to the assessment of statistics and demography, the 1987 report differed little 
from Heyworth and Rosenbaum by pointing to the small, insufficient number of 
statisticians and demographers of outstanding quality; although they were producing 
work that was envied worldwide, lack of resources would ‘severely hamper the 




worry was the extent to which the power of computing was being utilised in the 
social sciences, particularly sociology, as reported by the Computer Board for 
Universities and Research Councils (1970) and by the Review Committee on 
Sociology (1989). Although such worries were not explicitly related to the problem 
of numeracy, both were largely a product of an underlying attitude common among 
sociologists that it was best to avoid or disregard quantitative research and/or training.  
Overall, it appears that every subsequent report was simply better at stating 
more clearly, or more vocally, the on-going problems identified by its predecessors – 
although progress was mentioned with regard to other developments, progress on the 
development of quantitative sociology was not reported. What, then, is the legacy of 
these reports? Why are they historically important if they repeat with different words 
and phrases the existence of one and the same problem? 
Firstly, the reports show that, unlike the first half of the twentieth century when 
the direction of academic sociology was a matter of personal decisions of 
sociologists in a couple of departments, from 1940s onwards the overall academic 
characteristics of sociology became a matter for public enquiry and debate. 
Secondly, the reports are important precisely because they repeat the same 
problematic issues, thereby indicating the existence of a consistent trend in British 
sociology charactersised by an inability to resolve the complex issues involved in the 
development of quantitative research and training within academic sociology. 
Thirdly, they are important because their remarkable repetitiveness can be 
interpreted as a sign that the direction of their recommendations was consistently at 
odds with what social scientists thought or wanted for themselves – this is clear from 
the contrast between the discussions in the reports and the discussion of the nature 
and methods of sociology which was analysed in previous chapters. The problem of 
numeracy, although identified as a problem by those writing up the reports and those 
giving testimonies, was rarely, if ever seen as an urgent problem among mainstream 
sociologists.  
The legacy of the reports is also important because they reveal the practical 
difficulties in incorporating the teaching of statistics into the social science 
curriculum. Although this thesis does not examine in great detail the complexity of 




sociology, it has been my aim to show, that British sociology rarely reached the stage 
of attempting to tackle pedagogical issues because of a deeper-lying conviction that 
statistics was neither necessary nor desirable. The analysis of the reports is also vital 
because it shows, in contrast, that where such attitudes and beliefs about the 
usefulness of statistics in social science were not present as a barrier, namely among 
the social statisticians and a minority of statistically minded social scientists involved 
in the preparation of these reports, much more attention was paid to these practical 
issues31. Statistics has many potential areas of application and given that it was being 
adequately incorporated into other disciplines, notably the natural sciences and 
economics and in other social research institutes, solving the problems of getting it 
incorporated into sociology was, perhaps, not seen as urgent on the part of the 
statisticians. On the other hand, sociology in the post-war period received plenty of 
support and encouragement – it did not have to worry about proving itself 
statistically savvy. Allowing for some prejudice on both sides regarding attitudes to 
each other’s disciplines, the analysis of these reports provides at least some support 
for the idea that, overall, it was the social statisticians and the statistically minded 
sociologists who employed a more sober, rational and practical approach to the 
issues involved in the relationship between both subjects by looking at the merit of 
statistical investigation beyond its mere application in surveys or other types of 
research: 
 
The statistician is a scientist or, more exactly, he is an expert in the 
methodology of science especially as it relates to dealing with uncertainty 
and variability. Since the social sciences abound in both there is a prima 
facie case for a substantial statistical presence. The possibility of social 
science thus depends on whether the phenomena of interest can be 
classified and quantified in a meaningful fashion and on whether the 
patterns and relationships observed are sufficiently persistent 
(Bartholomew quoted in Goldstein, 1984: 266).  
 
Moreover, social statisticians have more often admitted that the divide between 
‘those who regard themselves as numerate and those who do not’ within the social 
sciences is a problem that needs to be resolved and the ‘hostility and 
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incomprehension’ between both groups – to be eliminated (Goldstein, 1984: 262-3). 
Social statisticians were also more likely to admit that the problematic situation is a 
result of such attitudes coming from both sides:  
 
At one extreme the non-quantitative social scientist often tends to reject 
quantitative techniques on the grounds that reality is too subtle to be 
captured by the crudity of any measurements which could be made and that 
any attempt at measurement is distorting. At the other extreme, statistically 
oriented social scientists or statisticians sometimes seem to be claiming 
that even if the measurements are inappropriate, subsequent manipulation 
can be expected to extract something useful. Both these views have some 
substance (Goldstein, 1984: 262-263). 
 
In contrast, sociologists commenting on views coming from the research 
councils and other official bodies, which formed the basis of many of the reports 
quoted above, were continuously expressing their discontent, attacking the councils 
and their recommendations as being more responsive ‘to the needs of government 
than to a student audience’; modifying their approach ‘only to make themselves 
available uncritically for the purpose of policy research’ and promoting ‘old-
fashioned forms of research design; as a result, the SSRC was ‘resented for the 
influence it does exercise by many sociology teachers’ (Rex, 1978a: 415; Rex, 
1978b: 296).  
It may have been true that the position of the councils was skewed in one 
particular direction, but views like these are one-sided too, unwilling to admit that, if 
not totally true, the recommendations contained some truth.  Lack of dialogue was at 
the heart of the problem. What the discrepancy between the views expressed in the 
reports and the views expressed in mainstream sociology discussed in previous 
chapters meant for sociology teaching in practice, and how both sets of views 
manifested themselves in the design of sociology curricula at the LSE and other 
universities across the country, is the subject of the following sections. 
 
 
Sociology, Social Science and Administration (SSaA) and Statistics Courses at 





The character of academic sociology in Britain in the twentieth century is 
nowhere so clearly seen as in the development of sociology at the LSE. The LSE has, 
undoubtedly, played a vital role in the history of UK sociology as an academic 
subject. The very first academic courses under the name sociology were set up there 
in 1904. Soon afterwards, in 1907, the first British sociology professorships were 
established and from 1907 to 1920 sociology was taught as a special subject that was 
part of the BSc degree in Economics. Again, it was at the LSE that the first sociology 
degree was set up in 1920 and, until 1945, it was the only institution in which 
sociology was taught as an undergraduate degree (MacRae, 1953) and where a 
variety of social sciences could be studied extensively32.  
However, the influence of the LSE on the development of sociology in Britain, 
for a number of reasons, remained strong even after the post-war expansion. Since, in 
the early post-war period, the LSE sociology department was the largest sociology 
department in the country, it followed that many of the junior teachers recruited 
during the early fifties had been students at the LSE (Little, 1963: 68). In the same 
period, many of the newly established sociology departments in other institutions 
taught a LSE external degree. It is therefore reasonably justifiable to treat the results 
from an analysis of sociology at the LSE as representative of academic sociology as 
a whole; similarities of teaching trends in sociology at the LSE with that of other 
universities in the post-war period, as detailed below, provide additional support for 
the contention that the LSE is a strong representative example. 
The analysis of the teaching of sociology at the LSE examines whether 
sociology in the UK has been taught as an ‘arts’ subject, placing emphasis on the 
development of skills in analytical thinking and writing; or whether it has been 
taught as a ‘science’ subject, with emphasis being placed on empirical research skills, 
including statistical skills. To answer these questions, the analysis focuses on the 
types of courses, according to the skills they teach, that were predominant in 
sociology at the LSE and also on whether any important changes occurred in this 
respect in the period between 1904-1979. The Social Science and Administration 
(SSaA) courses at the LSE (1912-1979) are also examined in order to shed light on 
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the relationship between the two subjects – sociology and social science and 
administration – and find out how they influenced one other and whether they were 
teaching the same or different skills.  Finally, the analysis looks at the particular 
methods courses, including statistical courses, which were available to sociology and 
other social science students.  
The data for this analysis come from the LSE calendars from the period 1895-
1979. Each calendar contains a list of courses sorted by subject area. The lists 
contain the following information about each course: name, course convener, the 
term in which the course is given; timetable of the lectures; classes; syllabus and 
recommended literature.  
All courses are given equal weight, regardless of the length of the period in 
which they were taught. This is because the purpose of the analysis is to establish 
what types of courses, according to the skills they teach, were predominant. If the 
focus of the analysis had been to examine what sociological fields were predominant 
in the curriculum, then it would have been important to take into account the 
duration of course existence. 
Classes are excluded from the analysis as almost all classes were provided as a 
supplement to main courses and adding them to the analysis would not have changed 
the results.   
This analysis is quantitative in the sense that it uses numbers to describe an 
historical trend; it is, however, not strictly statistical, since it does not employ 
statistical techniques to test the significance of the findings.  
The findings should be treated with caution, since examination formats remain 
unknown, making it impossible to draw any conclusions about the specific skills in 
which students were examined. Also, as the data provide no evidence as to the 
quality of teaching and course organisation, I can draw no conclusions in this regard; 
nor am I able to tell if the courses covered all the material in the syllabus. There is 









The analysis of sociology courses makes an important distinction between 
courses which aim to teach students practical empirical skills; and courses which do 
not, although they might discuss published empirical research and the skills 
employed in that research. The classification of sociology courses into types was 
made using the “Syllabus” section and the “Books recommended section” and can be 
seen in Appendix I, Table 16. Statistics courses have never been listed in the list of 
sociology courses but those statistics courses which were part of the sociology 
degree have been incorporated into the analysis in order to analyse the relationship 
between sociology and statistics. 
 
 
I. Sociology as a Special Subject in the BSc Economics, 1904-1923 
 
Sociology was established as an honours subject, optional for the BSc in 
Economics and BA in Philosophy in 1904-5, thanks to the benefaction of James 
Martin White, a Scottish businessman.  Sociology courses then included ethnology, 
social psychology and philosophy, the comparative study of social institutions and 
social evolution.  
It is not entirely clear how the sociology subjects were chosen. Fincham (1975: 
32) argues that because courses on statistics and social administration were taught in 
the so-called School of Sociology33, the precursor of the SSaA department, the 
emphasis in sociology had to fall on something else; as well as fit with Martin 
White’s own vision of sociology.  
This seems a reasonable explanation, assuming that such a decision would 
have been made with a view to determining how best to promote sociology to 
prospective students. However, lack of people with statistical and social 
administrative skills available to teach sociology in the LSE at this time is also an 
important factor that should be taken into account. Although the 1904 negotiations at 
                                               
33 The School was led by Charles Loch of the Charity Organisation Society. It is not clear why they 
chose to call it a ‘sociology’ school, but the School had very little in common with the Sociological 
Society and it is possible that they used the word sociology differently; in fact, when Branford, chief 
organiser of the Sociological Society, gave a paper in front of the School of Sociology in 1904 on the 




the LSE were important in deciding what exactly was going to be in the sociology 
curriculum, the available options were pre-conditioned by an assumption of what 
sociology is not, and this assumption had been formed long before. As I showed in 
Part One, by 1904, it was clear that sociology was not going to follow in the 
statistical and social reforming tradition that had developed in the UK during the 
nineteenth century. It is hard to imagine that if the so-called School of Sociology did 
not exist, statistics or other more practically oriented subjects would have 
automatically become part of the sociology curriculum.  
There were few sociology methods courses within sociology in this period. 
‘Logic and scientific method’, although not always listed under sociology, was an 
integral part of the curriculum and was the only subject in the ‘Principles of method’ 
exam paper. The course taught the philosophy of scientific inquiry rather than the 
teaching of skills concerned with how to do scientific enquiry. 
An attempt in this direction was made in ‘Methods of Social Investigation’, a 
course set up by Beatrice Webb, which taught how to pose a hypothesis, collect data, 
conduct interviews and examine archives. The course, however, did not last long and 
the teaching of practical skills in scientific research languished. Only 1 out of 47 
courses in this period taught some empirical skills; the rest were courses teaching the 
study of society using theoretical or philosophical approaches (Appendix I, Table 18).    
 
 
II. The BA Sociology Degree, 1924-1952 
 
During the decade beginning in 1910, there had been discussions about the 
possibility of establishing a sociology degree. This option was debated at a meeting 
of the Board of Studies in 1914 and a number of problems were highlighted (cf. 
Fincham, 1975). The subject was deemed ‘too difficult’ – it was noted that students 
in BSc Economics with special subject ‘Sociology’ performed rather badly and had 
to spend disproportionately more time working on sociology in order to perform well, 
which, in turn, discouraged future students from specialising in sociology. It was 
recognised that the subject was vast and although some steps had been taken to try to 




difficult to decide how best to address the situation. It was suggested that the root of 
the problem was that the students did not have enough time to focus on sociology, 
which would only be possible if sociology were made a degree in its own right. This 
was also seen as a logical solution, since sociology was viewed as “an attempt to 
conceive the social problem as a whole” (Fincham, 1975: 51) in which economics 
was only a special field. Since it would have been more difficult to reform the 
economics degree, the plans for a new degree went ahead and the first examination 
for BA Sociology took place in 1924. ‘At this stage, the degree writers seemed to be 
looking at the subject very much as an art subject; no economics or statistics were 
included’ (Fincham, 1975: 54).  After the establishment of an independent sociology 
degree, in the 1930s ‘sociology’ was being taught only at the University of London – 
there were sociology courses at Bedford college but the only place where professed 
sociologists worked was the LSE (Marshall, 1936: 30). There was teaching of social 
science more generally going on at other universities, such as Liverpool, Edinburgh, 
Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds and Nottingham but this did not include the 
material taught as ‘sociology’ at the LSE, which at the time was predominantly 
philosophical.   
Until 1952, when the BA Sociology degree was again re-organised, it proved 
more popular with women than men; and was less popular than the BSc Economics 
with Special subject Sociology (Marshall, 1936). In addition, while economics 
students specialising in sociology were taught statistics as part of their economics 
training, the BA Sociology did not include any statistical courses.  
In 1924-1952, the number of purely theoretical courses increased – from 38 to 
47 (Appendix I, Table 18). However, the proportion of these courses diminished, 
from 80% to 58%, suggesting decreasing influence. In addition, the majority of the 
courses in this category were replaced by new, but similar courses. These changes 
can be explained by the growing influence of Morris Ginsberg, a disciple of L. T. 
Hobhouse who replaced Hobhouse as Professor of Sociology after Hobhouse’s death 
in 1929. Ginsberg’s courses differed little in terms of content and approach – with 
the same emphasis on the comparative study of social structure, social evolution, 




New courses were also introduced by the American sociologist Edward Shils, 
who joined the LSE sociology department in 1947, bringing in the American 
advances in theoretical sociology. New staff and new courses, however, did not 
mean much change in the general approach to the study of society or the skills taught 
to sociology students. 
The change came from a different direction. More courses dealing with 
contemporary issues were added to the sociology curriculum after 1945. These 
courses were introduced into sociology from the SSaA lists of courses, and together 
with the sociology courses on contemporary issues, they constituted 24.6% of all 
courses. But although the range of topics that counted as sociology was extended, the 
broadly theoretical approach towards the study of society and the teaching of 
theoretical/analytical skills remained predominant. 
One important change was the introduction of a number of methodological 
courses, including some statistical courses (ca.15% of all courses). Shils introduced a 
course on ‘Sociological Research’, which included ‘the assessment of the techniques 
and results of modern sociological investigation’ and focused on ‘the relationship 
between empirical social research and sociological theory’ (LSE, 1947). It is 
doubtful that this course taught any practical empirical skills; however, judging by 
the description, it is more likely that it taught critical discussion of existing methods. 
A course on population was taught in 1932-1937 by the staff working in the 
newly established department of Social Biology. It is likely that this course would 
have required some statistical knowledge (in vital statistics, for example) but there is 
no indication as to whether the course involved the teaching of practical statistical 
skills.  
A step in this direction was made in 1951-2, when statistical courses on 
elementary statistical methods, survey design, demography and sources of statistical 
data were introduced. These were not new courses, specially designed for 
sociologists; they were courses that were already part of the BSc Economics and BSc 
Commerce. The teaching of statistics to sociologists in 1951-2 and 1952-3 remained 
at an elementary level: not going ‘beyond the simplest ideas of sampling and 




The first statistical course for sociologists was introduced in 1947 by Claus 
Moser. It taught ‘the planning of social investigations’, ‘methods of collecting 
information’, ‘practical sampling techniques’, ‘contemporary social work’ (LSE, 
1947). The course taught relatively sophisticated ‘practical sampling techniques’, 
based at first on Yates (1946) and later on Moser (1958). There was a considerable 
amount of mathematics involved in the course, but it is difficult to judge how the 
course was perceived by sociologists and sociology students at the time. The course 
ran for two decades (1947-1971) before coming to an end. It may be speculated, that 
its rather narrow focus somewhat distorted the image of statistics within sociological 
circles, making it look as if statistical knowledge is not useful for anything else 
except surveys. Had the statistics curriculum perhaps put more emphasis on the 
benefits of acquiring a basic understanding of the statistical characteristics of the 
social world as whole, which is useful whatever the research method or question, a 
more widespread appreciation of statistics among all sociologists might have resulted.   
Two optional courses on demography were also introduced. These courses 
required working with official statistics and already collected data on vital statistics, 
which was perhaps enough to inspire students who already had an interest in 
demography. Although these courses provided a good overview of various types of 
statistical data and how it could be used for analysis, it is not clear how they would 
have been perceived by students with no or very little interest in statistics or 
mathematical knowledge. There was an additional course on demography called 
‘Mathematics of Population Growth’, but this course was for economics students 
only. 
The only methods course taught by a sociologist was Ginsberg’s course ‘The 
Theories and Methods of Sociology’ (1933-1972), which only included discussion of 
the comparative and historical methods, with no practical work. Methods were a 
topic of philosophical discussion rather than a set of techniques that require practice. 
Fincham’s examination of this period confirms these conclusions – ‘the impression 
was that non-quantitative subjects predominated and that theory took precedence 






III. Sociology Courses, 1953-1979 
 
In 1953 there were 15 universities where sociology/social studies were being 
taught and where social science research was being done; the LSE still retaining its 
foremost position in the education of sociologists (MacRae, 1953). MacRae’s report 
shows that of these 15 universities, 11 taught or carried out research using some 
statistics and 4 did not (Appendix I, Table 15). Could this be an indication that the 
teaching of statistics became an essential feature of sociological teaching once the 
expansion was under way? Not necessarily, as the scale, quality and type of this 
statistics provision remains unclear and highly questionable – the information in 
MacRae’s report is not easily comparable, especially as it also covers other subjects 
such as psychology and social anthropology; and since the data give insufficient 
clues as to how much statistics was offered in each university, the analysis makes no 
assumption as to the level of sophistication or quality of the statistical/survey 
teaching in the universities in which this was practised. Examining the LSE 
sociology courses in this period (Exeter, Hull and Leicester taught the LSE external 
degree at the time) would therefore allow us to establish with greater confidence the 
extent to which the mere presence of ‘statistical’ or survey elements in the 
curriculum meant that sociology students were being taught how to collect and 
analyse statistical data. 
The LSE sociology degree regulations were changed in 1952. Two sociology 
degrees were now available: the old BA degree, which required knowledge of Greek 
and Latin; and a new BSc degree in Sociology, which did not. The two degrees were 
otherwise the same and included three specialisation options. In the first option, the 
emphasis was on ‘pure’ sociology, and the teaching of the old theoretical courses, 
catering for those students who would later become teachers in sociology in higher 
education institutions and academic researchers. The second option, in which the 
emphasis was on the teaching of SSaA courses catered for well-qualified social 
administrators. And the third, in which the emphasis was on social anthropology was 
designed to prepare potential candidates for Colonial Service.  
Sociology’s scope was expanding but this did not result in many changes in the 




courses decreased a little, from about 58% to about 52% (Appendix I, Table 18). But 
regardless of the substantial changes in teaching staff, university expansion and the 
social conditions that had apparently made sociology more popular, pure theory 
courses were still prevalent. 
The proportion of courses on contemporary conditions increased noticeably 
after the reconfiguration of the degree – from about 15% in the period 1904-1923, to 
36.5% in 1953-1979 (Appendix I, Table 18). But these courses too, taught little, if 
any, empirical skills.   
In addition, there was a decrease in the proportion of methods courses of all 
kinds, including a slight decrease in the proportion of statistics courses (Appendix I, 
Table 18). This overall decrease, however, reflects a diminishing proportion of 
methods courses relative to the overall increase in sociology courses, not an absolute 
decrease of the number of methods courses. While the scope of the sociology 
curriculum was expanding in order to accommodate a growing interest in 
contemporary issues, the methods courses expanded very little.  
All three options within the sociology degree included statistical courses, as the 
new syllabus was designed to provide fuller opportunity for training in quantitative 
methods (Board of Studies in Sociology, 1947-9). But a closer inspection shows that 
these courses had a limited impact. Moser’s course continued to run unchanged until 
the 70s, under a new name – ‘Survey Methods of Investigation’ – that corresponded 
more accurately to its narrow focus, compared to the newly introduced general 
statistical courses – ‘Social Statistics’, and ‘Statistical Methods (sociology)’, which 
were designed specifically for sociologists.  
‘Statistical Methods (Sociology)’ was the major statistical course in the degree. 
Compared to previous courses, it was a more advanced course, which in the 1950s 
taught frequency distributions, averages, elementary theory of regression and 
correlation, background of sampling theory, calculation of sampling errors and 
design of samples. It was also a more practically oriented course that paid attention 
to the application of statistical methods to sociological problems and so it could be 
seen as a positive effort to bring sociology and statistics closer together.   
In the period 1966/7-1968/9, however, the course was divided in two – one 




the sociology degree, which included only the teaching of basic descriptive statistics; 
and another for the students taking the ‘social administration’ option, which taught 
basic descriptive statistics and more sophisticated material, such as statistical 
inference, correlation, regression, significance tests etc. A joint course for all options 
was again introduced in 1969, but the more sophisticated part of the course was 
dropped. 
The number of demography courses increased. These were taught consistently 
between 1953-1979 and were part of a special set of courses taught by a strong team 
of demographers (Glass, Grebenik, Langford, Hajnal). However, while sociology 
students were taught the basic, descriptive, demographic courses, the more 
sophisticated courses such as ‘Mathematics of Population Growth’ and 
‘Mathematical Techniques for the Manipulation and Analysis of Demographic Data’, 
which taught the essentials of how to do demographic research – were offered only 
to economics students and students specialising in demography. Consequently, the 
demography courses came to represent yet another element of sociologists’ ‘general 
education’, broadening their worldview but not contributing much to the acquisition 
of practical quantitative skills. 
Overall, the courses teaching theoretical analytical skills have been dominant 
(59.8%) in the period 1904-1979 (Appendix I, Table 18). If we add courses on 
contemporary issues and philosophy of methods or science, which teach similar 
theoretical, analytical, but not empirical, skills, then this figure rises even further 
(Appendix II, Table 18). It could be argued that this merely reflects the fact that there 
were many courses on a great variety of special topics that had to be taught in 
sociology and that are included here. This is true; but it nevertheless shows that 
sociology has been more interested in teaching ‘topics’ and that the teaching of 
empirical skills has not been a priority34 . A few empirical courses, including 
statistical courses were offered on a regular basis in the post-war period, but they did 
little to change the overall character of the subject. As far as statistical skills are 
concerned, it is unlikely that statistics courses would have produced cohorts of 
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anthropology, or politics was much different. A contrast could be made with economics, but only with 




statistically literate sociologists since the majority of them provided sociology 
students with only elementary knowledge. 
 
 
The Teaching of Social Science and Administration at the LSE, 1912- 1979 
 
The teaching of SSaA provides a useful opportunity to examine how 
sociological teaching at the LSE was different, or similar to, the teaching in the 
broader spectrum of subjects under the title ‘Social Science’. The teaching of SSaA 
independently from sociology is one of the manifestations of the parallel but separate 
tradition of empirical social enquiry that existed in Britain throughout the twentieth 
century. Knowing how this developed will afford us a better understanding of the 
factors that sustained this divide. 
As with the analysis of sociology courses, I have relied on the information in 
the LSE calendars under the headings ‘Syllabus’ and ‘Recommended Reading’. The 
rules for allocating the SSaA are the same as the rules for allocating the sociology 
courses described in Appendix I, Table 16. 
I make a distinction between Theoretical/philosophical/historical course for 
SSaA only and Theoretical/philosophical/historical course for SSaA and Sociology 
to determine if and, if so, when sociology students became more engaged with the 
contemporary issues that were being taught in the SSaA; through what type of 
courses this was achieved; and whether this provides us with an indication of any 
changes in the character of sociology (cf. Appendix I, Table 19).  
The SSaA department was established in 1912 and was oriented towards the 
improvement of social conditions and devoted to preparing students to ‘engage in 
many forms of social and charitable effort’ and to give students ‘first-hand 
experience in social work’ (LSE, 1912). This was organised through the 
department’s close links with associations such as the Children’s Care Committee, 
Skilled Employment Associations, Labour Exchanges and the Charity Organisation 
Society. The SSaA department was not as narrow-minded and ‘practically biased’ as 
is generally portrayed (Fincham, 1975: 98), at least not as far as their curriculum is 




taught courses on social philosophy and theory, the aim being not to teach students 
‘to theorise, but to deepen their intelligent interest in everything connected with their 
subsequent and practical work’; they believed it was ‘necessary that students desiring 
to take the full course should possess a good general education’ (LSE, 1914). 
What was the relationship between the SSaA and the sociology department? 
The SSaA’s view of sociology has been remarkably consistent. As the 1914 calendar 
suggests, sociology was perceived as fulfilling a ‘general education’ role, because 
sociology was associated with theorising about the social world; in a similar vein, in 
1979, John H. Smith, a student at SSaA and later a lecturer there, recalls that in the 
1950s-1960s ‘less emphasis was placed on sociology, at any rate in its more 
theoretical and suspect manifestations’ but, he did not hesitate to emphasise, ‘the 
empirical study of contemporary social problems was included’ (Smith, 1979: 444). 
Throughout the twentieth century the SSaA taught about the nineteenth century 
initiatives that had been quickly dismissed as ‘not sociology’ within sociology itself 
– the statistical societies, the Poor Laws, the charities etc. The SSaA’s wide scope 
and close engagement with contemporary social issues could perhaps explain why 
the SSaA was attended by much larger numbers of students and candidates for 
qualifications than Sociology, even though it only offered a certificate (Fincham, 
1975: 59).  
It has been argued that, over time, the prestige of the SSaA department 
increased – partly due to the fact that it was often approached by the government on 
various issues – while the prestige of the sociology department did not. Fincham 
explains this by suggesting that the prestige of the SSaA department had ‘the effect 
of attracting away from sociology men who might have become professional 
sociologists, but who wanted to combine an academic role with social action’ 
(Fincham, 1975: 60). However, it appears that Fincham was misdirected to this 
untenable conclusion after reading Abrams’ (1968) on the origins of British 
sociology, in which he blames sociology’s early lack of successful development in 
this country on the success, or simply the presence, of other social science 
institutions. It is reasonable to assume that if students had an interest in practical, as 
well as theoretical social science, they would apply to the SSaA, not the Sociology, 




students from another, given that both departments offered very different courses and 
a substantially different education.   
To analyse the make-up of the SSaA courses, I have divided the material into 
two periods – 1912 to 1950 and 1951 to 1979. In 1951 Richard Titmuss became head 
of the SSaA department and his arrival proved to be a turning point in the history of 
SSaA. Together with his colleagues, Titmuss revamped the SSaA and, arguably, 
enhanced its overall reputation, its relevance and public role. Titmuss and his 
colleagues were heavily involved in the ‘building’ of post-war welfare state 
institutions in the UK and at the LSE they provided the necessary knowledge of the 
principles and mechanisms which were essential for the welfare state to work. 
Two trends are noticeable when we compare the two periods (Appendix I, 
Table 19). Firstly, over time, the SSaA became less philosophical and more oriented 
towards the teaching of contemporary issues: in 1912-1950, nearly one third (27%) 
of SSaA courses were purely philosophical; in 1951-1979 this number almost halved. 
Although predominance of purely theoretical/historical courses in the first half of the 
twentieth century is observed in both sociology and SSaA, the focus of this type of 
course differed in both subjects – the SSaA courses focussed on economics theories 
and social history, while sociology focussed on social evolution, principles of social 
development, religion etc. 
Secondly, in 1912-1950, only 2% of SSaA courses were offered to sociology 
students; in 1951-1979 – more than half of SSaA courses (55.6%) were offered to 
sociologists. The bulk of these courses (45%) were on contemporary issues 
(Appendix I, Table 19).  
The amount of methodology teaching in both these periods was very low and 
the level was elementary. Few statistics courses were available which taught basic 
descriptive statistics and none taught data analysis. But while the SSaA courses were 
no more empirical in their approach to methods and methods teaching than sociology 
courses, they provided professional and practical skills via placements, internships 
and direct communication with staff in government departments and other agencies.  
Thus, the SSaA department, and what was being taught there, played an 
indirect but significant role in the development and understanding of sociology in 




nearly half of SSaA courses were incorporated into the sociology curriculum, which 
suggests that, at the very least, the two subjects had a distinct understanding of 
themselves and of each other. The SSaA department represented the British tradition 
of investigation into the social conditions, largely brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution, that began in the nineteenth century with the work of Chadwick, Booth, 
Rowntree and other social reformers – a tradition that has never been recognised as 
sociology or sociological enough, perhaps because it lacked the ‘more theoretical and 
suspect manifestations’ Smith (see above) recognised as characteristic of ‘true’ 
sociology. But the SSaA department did more than produce people to work in 
governmental and public institutions: ‘if you asked what we taught, the answer 
would not be social administration’; their teaching was focused on ‘the significance 
and interdependence of economics, social history and psychology’ (Smith, 1979: 
444).  
Although on the surface the incorporation of SSaA courses into the sociology 
curriculum might look like the long-awaited merging of two traditions, the two 
subjects remained divided – in the topics they taught, the level of abstraction at 
which they taught them and in the fundamental attitude they had towards the study of 
society. In SSaA, students had to study contemporary social conditions and the 
working of institutions in order to understand how society worked; in sociology, 
students had to grasp the theories and principles of social development. And, even 
though the incorporation of SSaA courses into sociology was not very successful in 
merging the two traditions of social inquiry, it seems reasonable to assume that one 
effect it did have was to contribute to the myth that sociology in Britain was 
somehow ‘positivist’ in the early post-war period, where ‘positivist’ is understood as 
having little engagement with abstract theory and focus on ‘the facts of society’. 
 
 
The Teaching of Statistics at the LSE, 1895-1979 
 
If statistical courses in sociology and SSaA were present in certain periods but 
were also basic in terms of the skills they taught, then in which subject and to what 




could the provision of statistical courses in other subjects tell us about the provision 
of statistics subjects in sociology? 
The LSE introduced statistics courses when it was first established in 1895. Up 
until 1920, they were listed under ‘Economics’; from 1920 onwards, they were listed 
in a separate section, together with mathematics. In 1958, computational methods 
were added to the section, gradually becoming more and more specialised. In 1958-
1961, among the computational methods courses, there were courses on advanced 
statistics and mathematics which were recommended to economics students 
specialising in statistics and which have therefore been included in the analysis. 
From 1962 onwards, the courses listed under computational methods included only 
specialist computing and software courses, and those have been excluded from the 
analysis. It is important to note that while computing courses very quickly became an 
intrinsic part of the education of economics students, they were not recommended to 
sociology students. 
To analyse the types of statistical courses offered, I use the information in the 
calendars about content as well as the recommended reading list and the 
degree/subject of which they are part. This allows us to distinguish between statistics 
courses for sociology, as opposed to economics, students. Details about this 
distinction are available in Appendix I, Table 17. 
Less than 10% of all statistics courses offered at the LSE between 1895-1979 
were available to sociology students (Appendix I, Table 20). We saw earlier on that 
statistics courses represented only a minority of the total of sociology courses. Now 
we see that the statistics courses for sociology students represented only a minority 
in the total of statistics courses. It is very unlikely, therefore, that the number of 
statistics courses in sociology was small due to a lack, more generally, of statistical 
courses or suitable resources.  
We also saw that the majority of these courses appeared in the late 50s and 
taught elementary35 statistical techniques, mostly data collection, with little evidence 
to suggest that students were being taught how to do statistical analysis. In 
comparison, the statistical courses for economists taught students how to do data 
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analysis using regression models, multiple partial correlations, probability theory, 
different types of distributions etc. In addition, there were statistics courses devoted 
to specific branches of economics; for instance, econometrics, national income and 
capital, and macro-economics, bridging the gap between the two subjects. Extra 
mathematics courses were also offered. It is clear, therefore, that a vast amount of 
statistical knowledge and teaching, especially in data analysis skills, was available at 
the LSE, but largely being offered to economics students and not to sociology 
students. Without being taught more sophisticated practices, it seems unlikely that 
sociology students would have benefited very much at all, even from the elementary 
techniques they were being taught. 
The wide availability of statistics courses offered to economics students shows 
that the necessary resources were in place to do the same for sociology students but 
the fact that such courses were not offered to sociology students suggests that the 
reasons why this was not the case ran much deeper. Arthur Bowley, the first UK 
Professor of Statistics, who created and sustained statistical teaching at the LSE 
during the first half of the twentieth century, suggests that one deep-lying reason is 
the way sociology had defined itself, as something that includes ‘the knowledge of 
all groups of actions and relations past of present, measurable or not’ (Bowley, 1923: 
3). One possibility was to talk about ‘modern statistical sociology’ but that was 
different from saying that sociology, in itself and as whole, was a statistically 
oriented subject. 
Furthermore, when Bowley accepted the professorship in 1914, he “set to work 
to find out what “Statistics” meant as a branch of economics or mathematics” 
(Bowley, 1945 quoted in Fincham, 1975: 54) – he does not mention sociology. In his 
approach to teaching and choice of topics, Bowley remained economically, not 
sociologically minded, even though he covered a wide range of material, including 
the teaching of mathematics, official statistics and history of statistics (Bowley, 
1922-23). But if Bowley’s lectures were to be compared to Hobhouse’s or 
Ginsberg’s, it would be very difficult to even imagine that they would be teaching 
the same subject. Sociology and statistics, from early on, were defined as 




and more suitable resources, such as computers, at the disposal of sociologists and 
sociology students.  
This is not to suggest that statistics was a narrow specialty. In the first half of 
the twentieth century, the great majority of the statistical courses were courses suited 
for all economics students; not only those specialising in statistics. More specialist 
courses developed only during the 50s when it became increasingly necessary to 




The Teaching of Social Science at the LSE: Summary 
 
The analysis of undergraduate sociology teaching at the LSE throughout the 
twentieth century shows that sociology was taught as a subject whose aim was to 
provide a general or liberal education. As a result, training in statistical or any other 
quantitative methods was continuously perceived as unnecessary or irrelevant; and 
where statistics was taught, this was done merely to introduce students to the 
existence of the methods and rarely to train them to do quantitative research. These 
results support the argument developed in previous and subsequent chapters that, at 
its core, the relationship between statistics and sociology in Britain has been shaped 
not by practical concerns or by rational or deliberate discussion but by implicit, and 
even unequivocal, attitudes among course conveners, and perhaps even among the 
students themselves, as to what sociology is and is not. The availability of good 
quality statistics courses open to economics students but not to sociology students is 
only one indication that the lack of more comprehensive statistical provision in 
sociology was not necessarily a matter of lack in expertise or opportunity. Such 
attitudes, prevalent at the LSE, both reflected and reinforced general attitudes and 
                                               
36 Thorough examination of the computing courses, which first appeared in the 1950s, show that they 
were available primarily to economics students specialising in statistics. The lack of proper computing 
training, or even access to computing machines, which was necessary for sophisticated statistical 
analysis, only exacerbated the view among sociologists that statistics is not ‘a sociological skill’. First 
attempts to turn computing into a universally applicable skill, and draw attention to its general 
advantages, were made in the 70s; but these attempts fell on deaf years in the sociological community 
(cf. Computer Board for Universities and Research Councils, 1970 for a more detailed discussion of 




assumptions in the wider sociological community that persisted throughout the 
period studied and which continue down to this day. To obtain an even clearer view 
of the extent to which the teaching trends at the LSE were present in sociology 
teaching to undergraduate students more generally, the next section turns to 
examining the teaching of methods courses including statistics and survey courses to 
undergraduate sociology students in all universities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
 
The Teaching of Methods Courses, including Statistics Courses, within 
Sociology First Degrees in British Universities, 1967-1979 
 
Although the LSE data provide a relatively representative example of the 
teaching trends in twentieth-century British sociology, an analysis of the teaching 
trends in sociology across the whole country would be preferable in order to situate 
the LSE findings within a general picture. The only accessible and reliable sources of 
raw data on sociology curriculums, including sociology methods curriculums, are the 
Peel (1968) and Wakeford (1979) collections of syllabuses and sociology degree 
summaries in the student guide Which University/Which Degree (1969-1979). While 
the Peel’s and Wakeford’s collections were discussed at the 1981 BSA conference on 
Research Methodology, this is the first time that the data they contain is analysed.   
 
 
The Teaching of Methods in Sociology First Degrees across the UK According 
to Peel (1968) and Wakeford (1979) 
 
John Peel’s syllabus collections was compiled for the 15th conference of 
Teachers’ Section of the British Sociological Association (BSA) in 1968. The 
Teachers Section of the BSA flourished in the 1960s – it was a period of continuous 
expansion of sociology courses and degrees in the universities, going hand-in-hand 
with an increased interest in the teaching of sociology.  
Peel collected syllabuses of methods courses from 26 sociology departments. 




University, which only taught courses to postgraduate students, has been excluded. 
Peel’s compilation contains syllabuses of both theory and methods courses37 but the 
present analysis focuses only on the methods course syllabuses. 
Wakeford’s collection was conceived as a continuation of Peel’s and was 
prepared for the session The Teaching of Methodology in Sociology in the 
Conference on Methodology and Techniques of Sociology, held in Lancaster in 
January 1979. 
Wakeford collected data from 53 universities and polytechnics (out of the 77 
he initially approached). From these 53 universities, data from only 49 have been 
analysed here. Data from the London Graduate School of Business Studies, Imperial 
College, Manchester Business School and Oxford University have been excluded 
since these institutions taught only postgraduate courses. 
The structure of Peel’s and Wakeford’s collections of syllabuses is similar and 
allows for a reasonable comparison between the state of methods teaching in 
sociology departments in 1968 and in 1979. In both collections, some universities did 
not strictly follow the structure for reply suggested by Peel and Wakeford but, with a 
small number of exceptions, they have all provided the necessary material for the 
present analysis, including syllabuses, reading lists and sample exam papers. 
The purpose of the analysis of the collections is to compare in a systematic 
way the research methods that were taught in sociology undergraduate methods 
courses in the late 60s to the late 70s, particularly the teaching of statistics. This is 
organised around three main questions. 
First, how many universities in the UK offered at least one methods course that 
included statistical training in 1967 compared to the situation in 1978? The aim is to 
find out how many universities regarded the teaching of statistics (regardless of 
quantity and level of sophistication) as a necessary component and whether, between 
1968 and 1979, the number of universities where statistics was taught diminished. To 
answer this question, the total number of methods courses offered at each university 
was counted. Where courses have the same name but are separated between 
                                               
37 Attached to the Peel collection is another collection of syllabuses on the ‘Details of courses mainly 
concerned with Social Structure and Comparative Social Institutions in British Universities and 
Colleges’. This collection was compiled in 1962 by John Peel and John Wakeford. Data from it have 




academic years as in, for instance, Research methods I, Research methods II and 
Research methods III, they have been listed as three courses.  
The number of methods courses in each university that contain some statistics 
teaching were also counted. At this initial stage, no differentiation was made between 
the amount of statistics or level of sophistication of the statistical material in the 
courses; but courses which only contained a discussion of the survey method were 
not considered as providing statistical training if there wasn’t clear evidence that the 
teaching of this method was accompanied by the teaching how to do statistical 
analysis of survey data.  
Lastly, the number of universities which offered separate statistics courses 
were counted; it being reasonable to assume that a separate statistics course would 
provide students with the opportunity to acquire more advanced skills and longer 
time to practise them. 
Second, what methodological techniques are taught in undergraduate methods 
courses? After a preliminary examination of the syllabuses in both collections, I 
made a list with the following methodological techniques: statistical techniques and 
computing; survey method and questionnaires; observation (including participant 
observation); interviews; documentary and content analysis; experiments; and 
philosophy of science/method. The universities in which methods courses discuss 
‘positivism’ were also counted in an attempt to trace the popularity of the usage of 
this term and to try to gauge how influential the debate surrounding positivism had 
been on methods teaching. No inferences were made about the quality of teaching of 
methodological techniques; this part of the analysis is limited to indicating whether 
particular techniques were mentioned in the syllabuses. No comparison of the 
teaching of methods between universities was made, except in the case of statistics 
and computing, where the analysis distinguished between universities that taught 
courses containing little statistics (with no sign of practical work exercises) and those 
where sociology methods courses contained advanced and more intense statistics 
teaching (usually indicated by the teaching of more sophisticated techniques, 
practical workshops in computing and the use of more advanced statistical 
textbooks). It could be hypothesised that the teaching of statistical techniques and 




due to increasing popularity of feminist and ‘anti-positivist’ approaches to sociology, 
which claimed that statistics was not an adequate tool for doing sociological research.  
Third, what was the level of sophistication of the teaching of statistics in the 
universities where statistics was taught? Did courses involve the teaching of practical 
statistical skills, or did they limit themselves to introducing the students simply to the 
existence of the method? In this part of the analysis, only statistics teaching in 
different universities was compared. Three main criteria were used to assess the level 
of sophistication of statistics teaching in methods courses. The types of statistical 
techniques (e.g. descriptive, inferential) that were mentioned in the syllabuses were 
examined – for instance, more sophisticated statistical modelling, inferential 
statistics etc. are taken as a sign of deeper engagement with the subject. I also noted 
the statistical textbooks that were mentioned in the syllabus and, from an 
examination of the contents of those textbooks, it was possible to determine which 
would best facilitate the teaching of practical statistical skills. Lastly, computer usage 
was examined, which has been taken as a sign of a more sophisticated level of 
statistics teaching. 
Although the contents of the syllabuses is a reliable indicator of what was 
being taught on a particular course, it is not a guarantee that all of the mentioned 
material was actually taught. The results of this enquiry are conditioned by how 
much universities chose to report, what they chose to highlight in their syllabuses 
and how they described it. Any conclusions from this analysis are limited to the 
period under investigation.  It is, of course, possible that new trends in the teaching 
of methods in British sociology emerged after 1979. However, no systematically 
collected original data on sociology methods teaching exists for the period after 









The number of methods courses expanded nearly three-fold between 1967-
197838 (Appendix I, Table 21). This was partly due to the expansion of the number 
of higher education institutions teaching sociology in this period, and partly due to 
the fact that the number of methods courses on offer within universities also grew – 
the vast majority of universities in 1967 offered just one methods course, by 1978 
many offered two or more. So it is clear that by 1978, the teaching of methods had 
become an essential part of the undergraduate sociology degree. 
The number of methods courses that taught statistics as a proportion of the total 
number of methods courses reported decreased slightly, from 67.9% to 56.1%, 
between 1967 and 1978 (Appendix I, Table 21). There was also a relative decrease in 
the number of separate statistics methods courses (Appendix I, Table 21). Does this 
mean that statistics was becoming a less popular subject in methods classes? Not 
necessarily. By 1978 the total number of methods courses within each university had 
expanded while the number of methods courses teaching exclusively statistics 
remained stable. This suggests that the general expansion of methods courses was 
aimed at establishing new courses devoted to the teaching of methods other than 
statistics. Therefore, the drop in the proportion of methods courses which contained 
statistics is best explained not as a result of sociology departments deciding not to 
teach statistics, but rather as a result of their decision to expand methods courses in 
other areas and their ability to put this decision into practice. 
This assumption is further supported by the fact that the proportion of 
universities teaching at least one methods course that contained statistical training 
changed very little in this period: in 1967, 76% of universities taught at least one 
methods course that contained some statistics while in 1978, this was 75.5%. The 
proportion of universities teaching at least one separate statistics course also shows 
little change: 28% in 1967 as opposed to 26.5% in 1978 (Appendix I, Table 22).    
It is extremely difficult to estimate how much statistical training might be 
regarded as being ‘enough’ to produce statistically literate sociologists in this or any 
other period. From an historical point of view, the important result that arises from a 
study of this vital period of consolidation of academic sociology in Britain, is that 
                                               
38 Peel’s and Wakeford’s collections were published in 1968 and 1979, respectively. The syllabus 
data, however, refer to methods courses taught in the academic year, previous to the publication of 




sociology students were not deprived of opportunities to learn some statistics as part 
of their undergraduate degrees; more importantly and, perhaps surprisingly given 
common assumptions about what was happening during this period, those 
opportunities did not diminish in any way. The evidence shows that there was 
virtually no change. 
 
 
Methodological Techniques in Sociology First Degrees, 1967-1978   
 
There was little change in the overall amount of teaching of statistics and 
computing between 1967-78 – 76% of universities in 1967 taught statistical 
techniques, as opposed to 72.9% in 1978 (Appendix I, Table 23). We get similar 
results when we restrict the comparison to those universities which taught statistics 
and computing at a more practical and advanced level – in 1967, only 48% of 
universities taught advanced statistics, as opposed to 54.2% in 1978. This shows two 
things: firstly, that the continued academic growth of sociology that took place 
between 1968 and 1979, notably the rise of the polytechnics, was not accompanied 
by a decrease in the teaching of statistics in sociology methods courses; and secondly, 
that if the rise of feminism and the spread of debates on ‘anti-positivism’ had any 
effect at all on the character of sociology in the UK (for further details see Chapter 
Thirteen below), this effect did not spread as far as the teaching of methods to 
undergraduate sociology students. If these movements did indeed nurture any 
scepticism, even hostility towards statistical methods, the practical effects of such 
attitudes lie outside the circles of the research methods teachers and their classrooms.   
An overall stability is further manifested by the lack of change in the 
proportion of universities which taught the survey method as part of their methods 
courses – 92% in 1967 as opposed to 89.6% in 1978. The lack of change in the 
proportion of universities teaching the survey method in sociology methods courses 
is remarkable given that during the 70s it was a common belief that British sociology 
had already gone through ‘a positivist’ past, characterised by an overuse of survey 
and statistical research methods, and that it was now emerging from this past and 




data from the teaching of research methods reveal that there was no so-called 
‘emergence’ and that the very idea of a positivist past is itself a myth (this had been 
further supported by Platt, 1981). Neither the epistemological debates nor any 
growing movements within British sociology in the 1970s that may have been anti-
statistical and survey methods, had any practical effect on the teaching of surveys.   
It is, however, worth asking what was fuelling and sustaining this common 
perception that British sociology had been committed to positivist research practices 
from which, it was apparently, struggling to emerge in the 1970s. An article by Platt 
from 1981 is the only systematic critique of this argument. The article, however, is 
limited to an examination of the use of research methods in published sociological 
research. Platt shows that the amount of published sociological research using 
quantitative, i.e. ‘positivist’ methods cannot be said to have been predominant in the 
period 1950s-70s and that it remained consistently stable throughout this period. But 
what about methods teaching? Examining the question at this level allows us to 
distinguish between the effects that the teaching of statistical techniques, on the one 
the hand, and the teaching of survey method, on the other, may have had on 
supporting and sustaining the myth of a positivist past and anti-positivist present in 
the 1970s.   
First, the above analysis on the teaching of methods at the LSE in the 1940s 
and 1950s showed that the teaching of statistical methods was done at an elementary 
level and limited almost entirely to the teaching of surveys and sampling. Whatever 
in the 1970s was fuelling British sociologists’ beliefs about a ‘positivist past’, it 
cannot have been related to the teaching of statistics per se. The analysis of Peel and 
Wakeford further reveals little or no change in the proportion of universities teaching 
statistics at a practical and more advanced level in 1967 compared to 1978 
(Appendix I, Table 23). So British sociology had never been as statistically obsessed 
as adversaries of statistical sociology were arguing in the 1970s; and neither has it 
been as deprived of statistics teaching from the 1960s onwards, as supporters of 
statistical sociology have argued. If there were problems with the teaching of 
statistics in sociology, these problems were not due to the absence of statistics from 




We can also see that the misconception about positivism could not have been 
fuelled by an ‘obsession with experiments’, either – experiments remained 
consistently the least popular methodological technique in the sociological 
curriculum and experienced negligible rise – from 36% in 1967 to 39.6% in 1978 
(Appendix I, Table 23).  
If the misconception was fuelled at all by anything that was happening in the 
classroom, then it is most reasonable to assume that it was fuelled by the all-
pervasive presence of surveys teaching in the methods curriculum, both before 1967 
and in the period 1967-1978. This makes it easier to understand why there was a 
mismatch between what was commonly believed about the relationship between 
quantitative methods and sociology among a large proportion of sociologists and 
what was said about this relationship in the official reports on the state of social 
science (see above) – while the first group could believe that British sociology was 
‘positivist’ because of the impression created by the wide-spread teaching of 
surveys; the second group, the writers of the reports, supported by a small group of 
sociologists interested in the teaching of statistics and statistical analysis, have 
repeatedly insisted that British sociology has not been sufficiently empirical and 
statistical, despite the strong presence of survey methods teaching.  
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to reliably compare the level of survey 
teaching between universities and so it is difficult to judge how much of the teaching 
of surveys resulted in acquisition of practical empirical skills for conducting a survey. 
We could speculate that, since statistics is the main methodological technique used in 
the preparation and analysis of survey data, those universities, which taught practical 
and more sophisticated statistics, would also engage more closely with surveys. 
However, since conducting a survey is more than doing statistics; and doing statistics 
is more than conducting a survey, it is not possible to go beyond mere speculation.  
Another important question concerns the teaching of qualitative methods. The 
data in Appendix I, Table 23 show a marked rise in the teaching of ‘qualitative’ 
methods. This was part and parcel of the establishment of new sociology 
departments and the growth of old sociology departments within universities that 
took place in the 60s. In the first part of the analysis, we saw that the number of 




accompanied by any proportional increase in the rise of courses containing an 
element of statistical teaching. It was suggested that this was due to a rise in the 
teaching of methodological techniques, other than statistics, and we can see now that 
there is sound evidence to support this suggestion. It could be argued, therefore, that 
the rise of ‘anti-positivist’, and other alternative movements in the 1970s had at least 
one substantial effect – to increase the presence of ‘qualitative’ methods teaching in 
the sociology curriculum. However, two considerations need to be addressed before 
reaching any such conclusion.    
First, ‘qualitative’ methods were not a small minority in 1967 – they were well 
represented in the curriculum and their rise was not accompanied by a decrease in the 
teaching of statistics and surveys. As already pointed out, between the late 1940s and 
early 1960s the survey method was not only the most predominant technique taught 
in sociology methods courses; it was the only one. But the Peel data suggest that by 
the late 1960s, this had already changed – university departments were already 
teaching a variety of research methods and that by 1967 there was already an 
existing and consistent trend towards a gradual increase in the teaching of qualitative 
methods. It seems likely that this trend emerged and gained momentum before 1967 
and would have continued without the support of the ‘anti-positivism’ movement. 
This is not to say that the ‘anti-positivism’ movement did not play any role in 
helping to support this increase, possibly by providing a theoretical and 
epistemological justification for it. But it was neither the instigator nor the motive 
force that sociologists believed it to be.  
The increase in the teaching of qualitative methods can also partly be explained 
by a cohort effect. As the late 60s and 70s were a period of consolidation after rapid 
expansion, it is reasonable to expect that more sociology graduates became available 
to work as university teachers in sociology, unlike earlier cohorts of sociology 
teachers, who were graduates of a variety of other subjects. These new cohorts would 
already have received some introduction to a variety of ‘qualitative’ methods in the 
late 60s and early 70s and therefore would be able to teach them at undergraduate 
level during the 70s. A greater diversity in the make-up of sociology graduates helps 
to explain the expansion in the amount and variety of methods courses that we 




By far the most remarkable increase can be observed in the number of 
universities which taught a philosophy of science/philosophy of methods component 
– there was a nearly three-fold increase in their proportion, from 28% in 1967 to 77% 
in 1978; and in the number of universities which discussed ‘positivism’ as part of the 
curriculum – their proportion rose from just 4% to 35.6%. It is here, and only here, 
that the ‘anti-positivism’ movement may be said to have had an effect on what was 
going in methods teaching in sociology between 1967 and 1978 – they added a 
philosophical tinge to the teaching of methods in that period and, to an extent, 
influenced the type of philosophical issues, such as ‘positivism’ that were being 
discussed. Overall, however, the epistemological debates and new methodological 
fashions that emerged in the 1970s had little immediate effect on what methods were 
taught in sociology. Essentially, the so-called ‘paradigm wars’ (cf. Oakley, 2000) do 
not reflect what was going on in practice in sociology teaching. 
 
 
The Teaching of Statistics in Sociology First Degrees, 1967-1978    
 
About half of universities in 1967 and 1978 offered methods courses which 
contained an element of advanced or practical statistical training; this was almost 
always complemented by a list of recommended textbooks to assist the learning of 
practical statistical skills (compare the columns ‘Advanced Statistical Training’ and 
‘Practical Textbooks’ in Appendix I, Table 24). 
By far the greatest change in the teaching of statistics between 1967-78 was the 
spread of the use of computing facilities. In 1967, only about 9% of universities 
which taught statistical methods used computers; in 1979, this rose to around 40% 
(Appendix I, Table 24). But the significance of this result lies not so much in that it 
shows a rise in computer use but in the fact that while at the same time computer use 
rose, the number of universities teaching advanced statistics remained, 
proportionately, about the same. This suggests that computing at this time, at least 
when considered on its own, did not play a decisive role on whether and what level 
of statistics was being taught in sociology methods courses. Although it is reasonable 




easier to comprehend and practise, it is more likely that only those universities which 
were already committed to teaching a more advanced level of statistics in 1967, took 
advantage of the newly developed computing facilities.  The better availability of 
computers itself could not have been a powerful enough factor to convince 
universities teaching little or no statistics in sociology methods courses to take up 
statistics. And, of course, it should be borne in mind, that the 1970s was a time when 
computing itself was a skill that had to be learned on top of any other skills included 
in the curriculum. If computing made the acquisition and practising of statistical 
skills easier, it did so only for those staff and students who already possessed 
computing skills or who were in a position to learn such skills.  
A revealing report published in 1970 by the Computer Board for Universities 
and Research Councils suggests that few social scientists were eager or even 
prepared to learn computing skills. Computing was still being seen as ‘an esoteric or 
specialised activity’, not as ‘a versatile tool useful in any work with a factual or 
intellectual content’ (Pierce quoted in Computer Board for Universities and Research 
Councils, 1970: 5). With specific reference to social science and art students, the 
report emphasised that that by far the biggest problem with teaching computing to 
social science students was attitude:  
 
To show them how a computer can be made to do things which they do not 
see to be valuable is of little use […] they do not see the reason for 
studying statistics or computing, and many of them would prefer not to 
know about these topics! Strong support from the staff of the Department 
covering their main interest in essential (Computer Board for Universities 
and Research Councils, 1970: 17-18). 
 
The teaching of statistics, or lack of it, in sociology is, it seems, much more 
deeply influenced by factors other than technical skills and computing facilities. 
Engagement with statistics appears to depend, above all, on the presence or absence 
of a general disposition to teach and learn statistics, nurtured by the attitude of 
sociology teachers themselves. If sociology’s engagement with statistical methods in 
this country changed during the post-war period, this did not happen in the decade 
between the late 1960s and late 1970s. The level of sophistication and rates of 




epistemological debates or by the spread of computing, suggesting the existence of 
much more deep-rooted and shiftless attitudes than has hitherto been recognised. 
 
 
The Teaching of Methods in Sociology First Degrees in the UK, 1969-1979 
according to Which University/Which Degree 
 
Although the Peel and Wakeford syllabus collections are the major and most 
detailed sources of primary information on trends in the teaching of quantitative 
methods, slight modification of our understanding of these trends is necessary in the 
light of the findings from an analysis of the guide Which University/ Which Degree. 
The aim of the analysis of the guide Which University/Which Degree is to examine 
how many universities/HE institutions in the UK offered at least one sociology 
degree that contained a statistical course/course element and/or a methods 
course/course element in the period 1969-1979. The following analysis begins at 
1969, because earlier issues of Which University do not contain details on sociology 
degree syllabuses. This is also a convenient year to start with because it means a 
comparison can be made with results from the analysis of the Peel data. Also for 
convenience, the analysis ends in 1979, when Wakeford’s collection of syllabuses 
was published. There are differences between the data from Which 
University/Degree on the one hand; and from Peel and Wakeford, on the other (most 
notably in the total number of universities and HE institutions); but cautionary 
comparison will, at least to some extent, allow us to double check and verify our 
conclusions.  
Which University? was first published in 1963. In 1977 it was renamed Which 
Degree? but with no changes to the content or format. Its purpose was to offer a 
comprehensive guide to all full-time and sandwich first degree courses in the UK; it 
was a popular guide with students considering applying for university who wanted to 
know what degrees were available and what they could expect to study in these 
degrees. 
The guide contains a short description of degree subjects, followed by a list of 




the UK. A typical description of the degree includes: the university/HE institution 
name; type of degree; and breakdown of the degree structure into years or stages. 
This is followed by a brief summary of the syllabus of the degree as a whole (i.e. not 
broken down into syllabuses for separate courses), most often in the form of key 
words.  
Which University/ Which Degree lists all types of sociology degrees available 
in a particular university or HE institution; so, under each university/HE institution 
there are usually a couple of entries (e.g. BSc, BA, MA degrees or joint degrees with 
other subjects; or degrees in which sociology is a special subject). The unit of 
analysis here, however, is universities, not sociology degrees. Therefore, the analysis 
does not include the actual degrees that contained statistics course/course element or 
methods course/course element, or both. Statistics and/or methods have been marked 
as present at a university, as long as at least one sociology degree in that particular 
university contained such courses/course elements.  
I have chosen to focus on universities, as opposed to sociology degrees for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, there are significant differences between the degree types 
in which sociology is present; the great variety of degree types and the lack of 
detailed information in the guide make it very difficult to compare degrees. Secondly, 
it is not my aim to distinguish between universities on the basis of how much 
statistics and/or methods were offered as part of a sociology degree (this would not 
be possible in any case since the description in the guides is too short). What I really 
want to find out is how many universities offered even just the prospect of studying 
statistics/methods in their sociology degrees.  
Since the degree summaries describe a degree as whole, it is not possible to 
distinguish between courses and course elements within a degree syllabus – a key 
word or phrase mentioning “statistics” or “methods” in a degree summary may refer 
to a whole course in one degree, but only to an element within a course in another 
degree. At best, therefore, the summaries are an indicator of a minimum engagement 
with statistics or methods. There is no information as to the quality, type, content or 
length of either statistics or methods courses/course elements; therefore nothing can 
be said about their role in the sociology courses/degrees; about how well they are 




However, Which University/ Which Degree remains a useful and important source of 
data since it collected syllabuses from universities and HE institutions consistently 
and systematically and presented them in a uniform manner. In fact, Which 
University/ Which Degree is the only source of this type of information that could be 
used for a systematic analysis, year by year, of the contents of sociology degrees 
across the UK during the 1960s. Contacting each and every university and HE 
institution in the UK and asking them to provide syllabuses from that period may 
have provided me with more detailed/reliable information, but it would have been 
extremely time consuming, with no guarantee of success.  
The description contained in the degree summaries allows us to distinguish 
between statistical courses/statistical course elements and methods courses/ course 
elements since very often statistics and methods are listed as separate key 
words/phrases. My experience in the analysis of course syllabuses from the period 
also suggests that it was not uncommon to treat statistics as a category separate from 
methods; plus in the period under investigation, there was no sharp distinction 
between the various qualitative methods, which were usually listed as one category. 
Of course, it is possible that the universities which offered only ‘methods’ may have 
failed to specify statistics as a separate category and, unfortunately, I have no way of 
finding out how often this might have been the case.  
The presence/absence of statistics and methods courses/course element in 
universities HE institutions has been marked in Appendix I, Table 25. Given that this 
analysis is based on rather limited data, it would be best to think of these figures as 
an indication of the minimum statistics/method teaching, i.e. not as an indication that 
the universities that offered sociology degrees containing them actually produced 
statistically or methodologically capable students. 
Tables 25 and 26 in Appendix I show that a fair amount of universities in the 
period 1969-1979 offered at least one sociology degree which contained a statistics 
course/statistics course element; we also see a slight decrease in the amount of 
universities which offered at least one sociology degree that contained statistics 
course/course element in 1969 as compared to 1979, from ca. 60% to ca. 50%. These 
proportions are smaller compared to the results from Peel (1968) and Wakeford 




methods, while in 1978 this number had diminished to 81.3% (Appendix I, Table 27). 
How do we explain the difference in proportions and the larger decrease in the 
numbers of universities teaching statistics/surveys shown in Which University/ 
Which Degree?  
Which University/ Which Degree collected data from more universities than 
Peel and Wakeford. As I concluded in the analysis of the Peel and Wakeford data 
above, if there was a decrease, this was more likely due to the expansion of 
sociology in new universities where the focus was on the teaching of other methods, 
rather than because universities where statistics and/or surveys were taught suddenly 
stopped teaching these methods. That the expansion of sociology in existing 
universities and in new universities created more space for the teaching of non-
statistical and/or non-survey methods is also evident from the overall rise in methods 
teaching shown in the Which University/ Which Degree (from ca. 70% to ca. 83%); 
and from the decrease in the amount of universities offering only a statistics 
course/course element. If we allow for the fact that with the rise of methods teaching 
during the 70s many more universities may have included statistics teaching within 
methods teaching (thus failing to put ‘statistics’ or ‘survey’ as keywords in the 
description and only putting ‘methods’) then we can reasonably conclude that the 
decrease in the teaching of statistics/surveys was a bit smaller than 10% (the 
difference between Which university (1969) and Which degree (1979)) and a bit 
larger than 3% (the difference between Peel (1968) and Wakeford (1979); which is 
far from a dramatic drop. 
There are only three universities that offered a joint degree Sociology and 
statistics/quantitative methods in this period. In the background of many other types 
of joint degrees, the combination of sociology and statistics appears to be rather rare, 
which, apart from anything else, is an indication of a low demand on the part of 
student applicants, and thereby of a rather weak link between both subjects.  
 
 





The analysis of Peel’s and Wakeford’s syllabus collections and the material in 
Which University/ Which Degree shows that by 1978, the teaching of methods had 
become an essential part of the undergraduate sociology degree. However, it has also 
shown that as new sociology degrees emerged and the old ones expanded, methods 
teaching developed in a direction which ascribed increasing importance to non-
quantitative and non-survey methods, including ‘qualitative methods’, teaching of 
philosophy of methodology and discussions on ‘positivism’ in methodology.  
Although the provision of quantitative methods teaching in sociology first 
degrees was consistently present and stable in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, the 
mere presence of some statistics in sociology degrees does not necessarily mean that 
UK universities were producing statistically literate sociologists. Failure to make this 
distinction, and also failure to distinguish between elementary survey teaching and 
the teaching of statistical methods and thinking per se, helped to fuel a powerful, but 
as I have shown, misguided, conception in the late 1960s-1970s that British 
sociology had been, and was continuing to be, obsessed with empiricist or ‘positivist’ 
types of teaching and enquiry. The analysis of Peel’s and Wakeford’s collections, 
shows that this was illusory – the level of sophistication of most statistics courses 
was elementary and with a subject matter like statistics, this is crucial – statistics is 
probably one of the hardest and most demanding39 elements that could possibly 
feature in a sociology degree; a little exposure to statistics cannot easily be seen as 
being of much use to the student; no more than merely letting them know about the 
existence of statistical methods. The understanding of sociology as a subject intended 
to provide a general education, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is, 
therefore, clearly manifested in the teaching of methods. 
 
 
US Views on the Teaching of Sociology in British Universities 
 
                                               
39 Methods skills are of course learnt best through practice; what I mean by saying that statistical 
methods are ‘one of the hardest’ elements in a sociology degree, harder than qualitative methods, is 
that, allowing for some variation on individual level, on average students would need a lot of extra 
preliminary knowledge about mathematical statistics and computing software even before they can 
begin to practise statistical data collection and analysis; this preparatory stage in qualitative methods 




The analysis of the teaching of sociology at the LSE, as well as the analysis of 
the methods teaching in sociology based on the material from Peel’s and Wakeford’s 
syllabus collections and Which University/Which Degree, strongly support the 
argument that the teaching of quantitative methods in sociology was generally basic 
and could not have produced cohorts of statistically literate sociology students. A 
question then inevitably arises as to how the teaching of sociology was seen by 
sociologists from other countries, such as the USA, where sociology had developed 
much earlier and much more extensively than in Britain40. In the remaining part of 
this chapter, I examine American sociologists’ views on the teaching of sociology in 
Britain. The aim is not to portray such views as commendable but, just as in the 
previous discussion of the official reports whose recommendations were consistently 
at odds with mainstream sociology, this discussion should serve to show that there 
existed an alternative and legitimate viewpoint on the relationship between statistics 
and sociology in Britain.  
The sociological background of the American sociologists who visited Britain 
and commented on the state of sociology during the twentieth century differed 
greatly from that of their British colleagues. A strong link between American 
sociology and statistics was forged during the ‘formative period’ in the history of 
American sociology between 1890-1940 (Camic, 1995: 1005). Clear understanding 
that collaboration between the two subjects is not only necessary but vital is evident 
in a number of the most prominent American sociologists from that period, such as 
Richmond Mayo-Smith, Franklin H. Giddings and William F. Ogburn (cf. Mayo-
Smith, 1902; Ogburn, 1927; and Goldthorpe, 2007). More importantly, this idea got 
support and was realised on an institutional level – sociology departments such as 
Columbia but also Chicago (see Bulmer, 1984) became well known for advancing 
quantitative sociology (for an extensive account on the early incorporation of 
statistical methods in the social sciences, see Walker, 1929). It has been argued that 
the expansion of social science in American universities at the beginning of the 
twentieth century actually stimulated the incorporation of quantitative methods 
across social science subjects such as sociology, psychology and economics by 
                                               
40  I acknowledge that understanding the significance of the British situation in comparative 
perspective would require examination of the views of sociologists from other countries, too; but this 




creating a competitive environment in which these subjects had to quickly and 
effectively prove their scientific status and claims; and indeed, the evidence is clear 
that social science departments invested a lot of time and effort into incorporating the 
latest developments in statistics (ironically, almost all, if not all of them were being 
invented in Britain, not in the US). 
The ‘statistical turn’ in American social science has been interpreted as having 
been a result of a ‘boundary work’ taking place within social science departments; 
but also boundary work between social science departments and departments of 
natural science (cf. Camic and Xie, 1994; Camic, 1995). Statistics offered a solution 
to ‘the newcomer’s dilemma’: faced with the question of how much to conform and 
how much to differentiate, social science subjects could rely on statistics as a way of 
conforming to the established understanding of what it was to be scientific; but also 
use different statistical techniques to develop innovative and attractive approaches 
that would make them exciting and attractive. But although there were in the USA 
favourable conditions for the development and sustaining of a tradition of 
quantitative sociology, this resulted in a series of complications and problematic 
situations that persist in American sociology to this day – Goldthorpe (2007) points 
out that although American sociology has had the willingness and resources to 
engage in serious quantitative work, an effective and fruitful merging between 
sociological theory and statistical methods remained unaccomplished; throughout the 
twentieth century there has been a ‘working’ but nonetheless ‘loose’ consensus about 
the factors responsible (‘failure of interests to converge; embracing of critical 
positivism, psychologism etc. – for a full explanation, see Goldthorpe, 2007). Others, 
such as Bannister (1978), have developed more radical arguments, pointing out the 
role of early incorporation of statistics in American sociology as a source of 
American sociology’s ‘scientism’; while Turner (2014) has associated the 
quantitative tradition with the emergence of what is perceived as ‘elite sociology’ in 
the American context, bringing further division and misunderstandings. 
It is clear from what has been written by a variety of scholars about the 
relationship between American sociology and statistics that although it would be fair 
to say that this relationship has thrived in particular circles, it was a product of 




distinctive challenges. But possessing general knowledge about the development of 
American sociology can help in our understanding of the British situation. For 
instance, only after we observe how the incorporation of statistics into American 
social science was instrumental in solving a ‘newcomer’s dilemma’ are we alerted to 
the fact that in the academic situation in Britain in the post-war period, sociology 
was a newcomer without a dilemma – the subject became popular and demand was 
rising unconditionally; British sociology did not have to fight the fight that scholars 
have argued took place in the USA. Of course, this is not to say that had sociology in 
Britain been faced with a similar ‘newcomer’s dilemma’ this would have 
automatically meant that British sociology would have been more receptive to 
quantification. 
Knowing of the American experience is also valuable because it shows that a 
quantitative tradition was a genuine option for sociology; and that it was an option 
even if intellectual resources had to be borrowed from elsewhere, as was the case 
with the new English statistics, developed towards the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth centuries which the Americans borrowed and began using 
almost immediately. What this tells us is that the mere existence of a well-developed 
tradition of statistical enquiry, like the one we see in Britain in the nineteenth century, 
is not enough on its own to stimulate the incorporation of this tradition into 
mainstream or general or academic sociology. A more powerful, and indeed vital, 
factor was receptiveness; including, at the very least, an open attitude to statistical 
knowledge and statistical methods – the British had the home-grown statistical 
knowledge, but did not have the receptiveness. In the USA, it was vice versa. 
Last, but not least, this comparative overview of the American background can 
help explain why the American observers had the views they had with regard to 
British sociology (see below). But it can also show that their evaluations, albeit using 
the American situation as their measuring stick, were driven by legitimate concerns – 
they did not just see British sociology as odd because it was unlike American 
sociology with respect to quantification; they saw British sociology as odd because it 
had rejected a legitimate path that they themselves had found fruitful. 
American sociologists first commented on the state of sociology in Britain as 




fathers of American sociology observed that ‘the sociological movement’ was 
burgeoning in all western countries but that it was ‘perhaps least in England’ (Ward, 
1901:1454). ‘Aversion to theory’, rejection of the thought of those who had become 
prominent but struggled to facilitate a sociological movement, like Herbert Spencer; 
the fact that enormous responsibility in investigating and organising social life was in 
the hands of the British government and municipal authority, were all cited as 
possible reasons as to why Britain was lagging behind other countries. This list of 
reasons which, among other things, neglected the British tradition of empirical social 
enquiry and the opportunities that it held for sociology, shows a parallel way of 
thinking between Ward and the future founders of the first British Sociological 
Society; but while in America, at the time Ward was commenting on Britain, there 
were sociologists working towards a more statistical sociology and a more 
sociological statistics (Mayo-Smith, Giddings), in Britain there were none.  
Some years later, Palmer (1927: 360) observed that regardless of the efforts of 
the Sociological Society, this situation had changed very little, with the London 
sociology department, the rather dormant LePlay House and the so-called 
‘Edinburgh school’ comprising all the sociology that was being done in Britain; 
while Barnes (1961: 794) 41 commented that the two professorships established at the 
beginning of the century were ‘a fortunate academic accident’ in spite of which 
sociology was still ‘almost as rare as gold in sea water’. Harper (1933: 335) 
described its condition as ‘moribund’ and ‘undeveloped’.  
As time passed, it seemed that the list of reasons why British sociology was 
lagging behind was growing but no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming. Barnes, 
for instance, argued that the root of the problem was in the British higher education 
system. With the exception of London, Barnes argued, British education was ‘still 
primarily medieval’ and ‘concerned chiefly with the classics, dialectic and 
metaphysics’ (Barnes, 1927: 46). It appeared that a subject like sociology had no 
place in universities whose chief goal was ‘to educate gentlemen’; to train men ‘how 
to argue with charm and lofty detachment rather than how to investigate with 
                                               
41 Barnes (1961) is an almost exact copy of his 1927 article with some further but negligible additions. 
It is unclear why it has been decided to reprint this article without notifying the reader that the 
material in it dates back to the 1920s. Americans reading in 1961 would have been misled by this 




precision’; the whole process of British education was summed up as ‘a dignified 
and seductive flight from reality’ (Barnes, 1927: 46). Examining the development of 
sociology in Britain in greater detail reveals a situation more complex than this, 
although, just as we would have expected if we followed Barnes, once the higher 
education system was reformed, there was suddenly plenty of room for sociology. 
But, as I have shown, as time went on this created new problems and brought old 
problems into prominence. America began to pay less attention to the late arrival of 
sociology in Britain and more to what had become of British sociology once it 
arrived. 
Harper suggested that the strategy embraced by Hobhouse and Ginsberg was 
the crucial factor – the ‘catholicity’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ of their approach to 
sociology had led them to minimise rather than accentuate the difference between 
sociology and other social sciences and to assume that sociology’s primary functions 
were ‘philosophical and integrative (Harper, 1933: 339). It was because of this that 
sociology had failed to expand academically and gain for itself ‘any wide acceptance 
as a distinct scientific technique’ (Harper, 1933: 339). But in addition to this, Harper 
noticed that part of the problem had to do with the lack of integration of the 
empirical tradition of social enquiry that had developed in Britain during the 
nineteenth century and that had continued to develop quite separately from sociology. 
A lot of what in Britain was called ‘social science’ or ‘social study’, said Harper, 
‘might well pass as sociology in the US’, bringing attention to this rather odd split 
that would continue to surprise Americans commenting on British sociology. It is 
ironic, but also illuminating, that British sociologists themselves rarely pondered on 
this question. If this was done at all during the twentieth century, it was always by a 
minority of sociologists with a specialist interest in methods such as in the 1981 BSA 
conference (cf. Burgess and Bulmer, 1981); or in official reports. A further 
confirmation of this is, of course, the fact that the present thesis is the first time this 
question has been examined in detail and in depth. 
Later American commentaries elaborated upon Harper and Barnes. Burns 
(1951) was not as radical as Barnes in his comments but presented the peculiarities 
of the British education system as a major factor in the backwardness of academic 




their function was ‘to train the powers of the mind, not to give much positive or any 
professional knowledge’, social sciences faced twice as many difficulties as other 
subjects – not only had they to prove that they are ‘not professional’ but they also 
had to show that ‘as a training of the mind, they were equal to classics and 
mathematics’ (Burns, 1951: 232). The analysis in previous chapters has shown that 
once an expansion of the education system was under way in the post-war period, 
this is exactly the path that British sociology chose to take. But Burns’ account is 
even more valuable because it identifies a deeper and, as I have shown, a more 
pervasive element determining the character of British sociology – its attitude to 
research methods training. Such training, Burns noted, ‘had developed but slowly in 
Great Britain’ and ‘was regarded as the pastime of the enthusiastic individual’ (Burns, 
1951: 245). This was also picked up by Selvin (1965) who related such general 
attitudes towards research training to the more striking issue of the non-quantitative 
character of British sociology. Selvin was: 
 
surprised to find out that the British not only lag behind America in their 
teaching of methodology and in their training for research but that they are 
also far behind many European countries (Selvin, 1965: 73). 
 
The backwardness that has persisted in Britain was ‘all the more surprising’ 
despite ‘the long British tradition of empirical social research (Graunt, Sinclair, Farr, 
Booth, Rowntree)’ and ‘the pre-eminent place that Britain occupies in the 
development of modern statistics as a set of tools for research (Pearson, Yule, 
Edgeworth)’ (Selvin, 1965: 92). This was the first time that the development of 
sociology in Britain was questioned not so much on its ‘late’ development, but 
because of its failure to utilise the advances made by the empirical tradition of social 
enquiry that preceded it. British sociology ‘may well ponder the reasons for its 
failure to exploit its past opportunities’ but also ‘the changes that might be made in 
the future to bring it in step with sociology elsewhere’ (Selvin, 1965: 92). British 
sociology may have differed from the sociology in other countries in the sense that it 
arrived relatively late; but what was becoming increasingly more obvious and urgent 




American experience was not there to be emulated but to help put things into 
perspective – an important perspective, as Selvin’s account makes clear.  
 
 
The Teaching of Sociology to Undergraduate Students in Britain, 1904-1979: 
Summary  
 
This chapter analysed the practical consequences of British attitudes and 
arguments about the nature of sociology and its methods for the teaching of 
sociology. These attitudes, and the arguments they gave rise to, dominated the 
discussions within sociology throughout the twentieth century. The chapter showed 
that just as statistics was present in these discussions but was met with indifference, 
or disapproval or sometimes even outright hostility, so statistics was also present in 
the sociology curricula, especially in the early post-war period but was far from 
adequate to produce cohorts of statistically literate sociologists. It is in the teaching 
practices that the impact of the views and attitudes of sociologists is most strongly 
felt – with remarkable consistency throughout the twentieth century, British 
sociology has been producing successive generations of sociologists who have little 
familiarity with quantitative methods, let alone enthusiasm. The lack of incorporation 
of statistical methods and thinking into sociology has been affected not only by 
explicit action against quantification taken in vital moments in the history of British 
sociology (for instance when contents of curricula was being decided during the 
expansion); but also implicit acceptance on the part of students and younger 
researchers that the sociology they have been taught is of the right kind, perhaps the 
only kind. Not having been taught statistics at all, or only superficially, or even to 
have had statistics disparaged by their mentors is bound to have affected their own 
work and teaching and reinforced the idea in their own minds that sociology is, 
indeed, a non-statistical subject. The next chapter turns to the period of the 1970s and 
early 1980s to show that although this was ‘a difficult decade’ for British sociology; 
‘something of a crisis of confidence’ (Review Committee on Sociology, 1989: 12) 
the change in sociology’s public status and self-perception had little effect on the 






Positivism and Statistics in Sociology in Britain, 1970-1990 
 
The Disputes about Positivism42 in British Sociology – Overview of the Context 
 
The 1970s was a difficult period in the history of British sociology and has 
been described as ‘something of a crisis of confidence’ (Review Committee on 
Sociology, 1989: 12). Pressure was mounting on all sides – there was pressure from 
outside due to the ‘unrealistically high expectations that were imposed on the subject’ 
during the expansion period; there was pressure from the SSRC striving to get 
sociology to engage in more ‘fundable research’; and there was intellectual pressure 
from rising groups, such as feminism, Marxism and ethnomethodology, 
‘undermining empirical research and leading to the disputes on positivism’ (Review 
Committee on Sociology, 1989: 12). The younger generation, it was argued, ‘talked 
phenomenology and Marxism and their students were switched on to little else but 
theory’ (Rex, 1978b: 295). But the new alternatives failed to provide instant 
solutions to British sociology’s intellectual problems: the dominant influence of 
Marxism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology and the like was understood to be 
hardly due to ‘the internal validity’ of these new approaches; it was rather due to the 
fact that they fitted well with the new social movements (Rex, 1978b: 295). Thus it 
was not only the students’ choice to study sociology that had a religious tinge to it, as 
described in Chapter Eleven; it was also sociologists’ choices on what and how to 
research, leaving them, in Rex’s words, with ‘dogmas and cults, even with 
intellectual wars of religion’ (Rex, 1978b: 295).  
Regardless of all this, it was still commonly believed that the empirical 
tradition of social enquiry and also the functionalist movement of the 1950s were 
‘the enemy’, and that the ‘best way to make our point against the traditions was to 
fight for a more theoretical approach’ (Rex, 1978b: 295). The presence and 
increasing influence of new philosophical alternatives that emphasised theoretical 
                                               
42 I have put ‘positivism’ and ‘positivist’ in inverted commas only in those cases in which I refer to 
‘positivism’ and ‘positivist’ as terms. In all other cases, I use these words (and derivatives of them) 




work at the expense of empirical enquiry resulted in a situation in which critiques of 
empirical and quantitative research became more vocal and direct. Attitudes towards 
quantification changed little, but they now existed in a more polarised climate and 
those who subscribed to the empirical tradition were labelled ‘reactionists’ or 
‘positivists’ and were effectively marginalised. Clearly sociology was about 
something else that was beyond empirical enquiries: 
 
How many now dare own up to being an empiricist in the tradition of 
Booth, Rowntree and the Webbs? In general, sociologists today believe 
that gathering information, in the hope that this will make the world a 
better place, is an activity more appropriately performed by civil servants 
and social administrators (Pahl, 1974: 504). 
 
The identification of quantitative studies almost exclusively with surveys 
remained consistent – it was commonly argued that by survey research one usually 
‘finds out at considerable expense what can be discovered by looking things up in a 
book’ (Unknown Author, 1971: 833). In addition to the perceived inability of survey 
research to produce new and surprising knowledge, the validity of the knowledge 
coming out of survey research continued to be seen as highly questionable, because 
of its dependency entirely on ‘the precision of the question’ and ‘the honesty’ of the 
answers (Unknown Author, 1971: 833). Like earlier critiques which were discussed 
in previous chapters, these too failed to explain how, if at all, any of the other 
methods available to sociology were different or better in this or other respects. How 
and why sociologists thought that they could have special access to the social and 
internal world of people in society, thereby overcoming the problems of having to 
ask people questions and rely on the honesty of their responses, was never properly 
addressed. 
Although it has been a running theme of the third part of this thesis that 
discussions and decisions regarding the methodological development of sociology 
were rarely based on practical concerns and rational arguments (of the sort that all 
methods are equal and that the choice of research method necessarily depends on the 
research question), in this last chapter this trend becomes more pronounced; it was 




methods. This is nowhere as obvious as in the disputes about positivism that took 
place in British sociology in the 70s and 80s.  
In the following sections, I examine these disputes, paying special attention to 
how the disputes played out – who the involved parties were and what they were 
trying to achieve – and less attention to the strength of the arguments used. Unlike 
existing accounts of these disputes, which focus more on which side appear to have 
presented a stronger case, it is my aim to show here that the way in which these 
disputes happened and the kind of influence they had historically, particularly with 
regard to the relationship between sociology and statistics, is more important than 
who ‘won’ them. 
 
 
What is Positivism in Sociology? 
 
The disputes about positivism in British sociology took place in a context in 
which there was much confusion as to what positivism as a way of thinking about 
sociology and practising it actually meant. One of the clearest explanations comes 
from Kolakowski (1972) according to whom a positivist philosophical outlook was 
an outlook that fulfilled three criteria: phenomenalism and nominalism which 
together imply that all knowledge derives from experience and not from a deeper 
reality (such reality was understood to be impossible); and separation of facts from 
values. In British sociology in the 1970s, these philosophical principles have been 
understood as a belief that ‘the goal of sociological analysis can and must be to 
formulate laws’; that ‘methodological procedures of natural science may be directly 
adapted to sociology’ and that the findings of sociological research can be value-free 
(for a fuller summary, cf. also Giddens, 1974: 3-4). 
It is important to note that, historically, statistics had not been understood as a 
positivist method. Auguste Comte, who first formulated and explained what 
positivism is, argued that a positive sociology is a sociology aimed at the formulation 
of laws. But according to Comte, statistical enquiries had no place in positive 
sociology because statistics was based on and could only reveal uncertainty, leading 




philosophical Vienna circle at the beginning of the twentieth century was more 
strongly related to quantification but, overall, any association between ‘quantitative’ 
or ‘statistical’ and ‘positivist’ that we might find in British sociology in 70s and 80s 
would be a result of particular factors in the post-war development of the subject and 
not necessarily a result of the historical meaning of the term ‘positivism’ as it was 
used in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Defining positivism in abstract terms and on paper was easier than describing it 
with reference to real examples from sociological teaching and research. There was 
great difficulty in trying to find somebody in post-war British sociology who was 
actually doing sociological work in line with the positivist criteria described above. 
Some sociologists were being described by others as positivist usually without 
concrete examples to support such allegations; but positivism was ‘almost never a 
self-applied label’ (Marsh, 1982: 48). In addition, Marsh did not believe ‘that the 
story would contain much reference to the printed word’; rather it seemed to be ‘part 
of the conscience collective of sociologists’ (Marsh, 1982: 48). Giddens observed 
that positivism ‘has been used so broadly and vaguely as a weapon of critical attack 
[…] that it has lost any claim to an accepted and standard meaning’ (Giddens, 1974: 
2). Phillips followed, arguing that ‘while the word is full of sound and fury, it 
signifies nothing’ (Phillips quoted in Oakley, 2000: 30). And a study by Platt showed 
that deeply entrenched perceptions, common within British sociology in the late 70s, 
that a ‘positivist’ tradition had existed in British sociology in the earlier post-war 
period, were largely unfounded (Platt, 1981). These examples suggest that the overall 
confusion arose due to a gap between certain beliefs about the existence of positivist 
sociological research and the actual existence of positivist practice, and in mistaking 
one for the other.  
The problems with using terms such as ‘positivist’ and ‘positivism’ are further 
explained by Bryman who observed that the disputes were characterised by a 
‘tendency for philosophical issues and technical issues to be treated simultaneously 
and occasionally to be confused’ (Bryman, 1984: 75). This meant that if the 
arguments in the disputes are taken to the level of the teaching of methods and the 
use of methods in research, then it would quickly become apparent that it was 




epistemological positions, which were the focus of the debates, and research and 
teaching practices. 
More recent comments on the positivist disputes do not differ much from these 
contemporary evaluations. Goldthorpe remembers that he has ‘never been able to get 
from people who talk about positivist sociology any coherent definition of what they 
mean’; that they have been ‘quite incapable of explaining what it means’ (Author’s 
Interview with John H. Goldthorpe, 2017). One could guess that in some cases the 
anti-positivist attacks were aimed at quantitative sociology, and so ‘positivist’ would 
simply mean ‘quantitative’; other times one was under the impression that the attacks 
were trying to assert the importance of a sociology that has ‘some humanistic 
meaning and significance’; but Goldthorpe, at least, did not see how this should have 
led to a rejection of quantitative sociology which could also have ‘some humanistic 
concerns’ (Author’s Interview with John H. Goldthorpe, 2017). And, in Moore’s 
view, ‘the people using the word “positivism” were misusing it and […] did not 
understand what positivism was’ (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 2017).  
Positivism, therefore, may have begun as an important and relatively clearly 
defined philosophical debate about the unification of all science, as in the Vienna 
circle; and also as a debate about the source and production of knowledge, as, for 
instance, in the debates between Popper, Habermas, Adorno, Gellner etc. But, when 
it came to sociology in Britain in the 70s, the debates turned into disputes which 
were not at all aimed at bringing about more clarity, unity and improvement of 
methodological competence in the next generation of sociologists.  
Evidence for this comes, for instance, from the analysis of the Peel (1968) and 
Wakeford (1979), syllabus collections and of the material in the guide Which 
University/Which Degree, which was presented in the previous chapter. The analysis 
showed clearly a remarkable continuity through the 60s and 70s in what sociology 
students were being taught in methods courses. It showed that the number of 
quantitative methods courses remained the same; while a rise in qualitative methods 
teaching was apparent before the advent of the positivist disputes. All this challenges 
the claim that the rise of feminist, symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological 
movements, that together were said to have amounted to an anti-positivist movement, 




disputes about positivism had little real impact and changed little in practice for 
sociology students in this period, except, perhaps, for infiltrating methods courses 
with discussions about positivism.  
If there was overwhelming lack of clarity about the meaning of the term 
‘positivism’; if there was very little, if any, reference to real examples from research 
and teaching in the disputes about positivism; and if these disputes had little practical 
impact on what was being taught in sociology methods courses, then what sustained 
these disputes? Why did they become influential and how come there was so little 
done to disperse the confusion?  
Part of the explanation lies in the function that these disputes had in the 
development of sociology. Positivism in British sociology in the 70s differed from 
other intellectual movements that had been popular previously, such as Marxism or 
functionalism, in that, unlike them, the terms ‘positivism’ and ‘positivist’ were used 
less as a description and more as an insult. The term had very quickly become ‘one 
of opprobrium’ (Giddens, 1974: 2); ‘a term of abuse first and foremost’ (Marsh, 
1982: 48); it was ‘widely used as a generalized term of abuse’ (Phillips in Oakley 
2000: 30); and was ‘just a convenient…and slightly abusive label to hang onto 
people who …actually collected and analysed data’ (Author’s Interview with Robert 
Moore, 2017). The fact that the terms ‘positivist’ and ‘positivism’ were used as an 
insult suggests that ‘anti-positivist’ arguments did not actually need to make 
reference to reliable evidence about the existence of positivist sociological work. 
This explains partly why the disputes could spread regardless of the fact that they did 
not refer to real examples.  
Another explanation of the spread of the disputes about positivism refers to the 
close links that existed between philosophical positivism (as described by 
Kolokowski above) and the rise of feminism and the arrival from the USA of 
movements such as symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology. Oakley (2000) 
has argued that those who mounted anti-positivist critiques referred to three 
particular works on methodology for the basis of their critiques and in making 
alternative suggestions: Cicourel’s Method and Measurement (1964), Glaser and 
Strauss’ The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) and Garfinkel’s 




social movement which infiltrated academia and also had a great deal to say about 
methodology’ (Oakley, 2000: 32), these developments brought about a state of 
‘epistemological anomie’ (Bell and Newby, 1977) and gave rise to ‘paradigm wars’ 
(Oakley, 2000). The ultimate aim was to make room for feminist and other non-
quantitative approaches by stirring up a particular polemic within the sociological 
community. This polemic aimed at creating a sense of solidarity among disparate 
groups of not-quantitatively minded sociologists and at serving their 
professionalising agendas, especially the agendas of emerging feminist sociologists. 
Thus by the late 1960s and early 1970s, qualitative research came to be highlighted 
quite unambiguously as the preferred, non-positivist paradigm, with quantitative 
research being ear-marked as the work of the ‘patriarchal devil’ (Oakley, 1999: 249).  
In this sense, it would appear that it is not quite so surprising that the disputes 
on positivism had little effect on the contents of the methods curriculum in the 70s 
and that they spread despite the lack of clarity about the meaning of positivism. The 
world of the positivist disputes and the world of methods teaching were, it would 
appear, two separate worlds – one was a world of polemics and epistemology, the 
other a world of methodological techniques; one was philosophical and abstract, the 
other – practical and precise; one was a world of research, the other – a world of 
teaching. We simply could not expect, Oakley argued, ‘the paradigm argument to 
make much sense on a practical level’ (Oakley, 2000: 42). 
If the disputes about positivism were aimed at discrediting the view that 
sociology’s ultimate aim was the formulation of general laws; and if they had little 
practical impact beyond creating intellectual space for feminist, ethnomethodological, 
and symbolic interactionist movements, were they in any way important in the 
relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain in this period? What impact, 
if any, did they have on this relationship? 
 
 
The Disputes about Positivism and Their Impact on the Relationship between 





The disputes about positivism are particularly important for understanding the 
relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain because they turned a long-
standing disagreement among British sociologists regarding the roles of theory and 
methods in the development and teaching of sociology into a bitter antagonism, 
sustained by lack of dialogue and lack of mutual understanding. 
The discussion in previous chapters has shown that even before the disputes 
broke out in the 70s, for the majority of British sociologists, theory was a primary 
concern and was the highest status activity in sociology. This continued to be the 
case in the 70s and 80s: ‘There was this sort of feeling of ‘We must be theoreticians” 
John Wakeford remembered recently; the idea that the ‘real sociologists were the 
theoreticians […] the people who wrote treaties without any reference to data 
collection’ was exerting a strong influence on how methods teaching was perceived 
and on sustaining a divide between theory and methods, especially in teaching 
(Author’s Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). Post-modern, interpretivist and 
feminist sociologists, for instance, understood theory as a self-sufficient 
philosophical exercise and methods, usually qualitative methods, as something that 
merely demonstrates theory. Partly as a result of this understanding, prevalent in 
British post-war sociology, methods remained a secondary concern. The teaching of 
methods, for instance, was an unpopular task usually done by somebody who was 
often forced to do it: 
 
[…] very often in sociology departments the last person to get appointed 
got asked to teach the methods course. […] When more staff were 
recruited or replaced, then somebody else will get recruited to do that. 
[…] methods teaching was not of high status [...] I remember talking to 
colleagues who said ‘Oh, the last thing on Earth I want to do is to teach 
research methods’ (Author’s Interview with Robert Burgess, 2017). 
 
Further evidence comes from the planning of Wakeford’s (1979) and Burgess’ 
(1979) syllabus collections to which I referred in the previous chapter. These 
collections were prepared for a conference on the teaching of methods that was held 
in Warwick in 1979. Although at first glance it might appear that the conference was 
a sign that increasing attention was being paid to methods and methods teaching 
across the sociology community, including those for whom theory was primary, 




influential beyond the small community of sociologists who were already interested 
in methods and who took part in the conference (Author’s Interview with Robert 
Burgess, 2017). And with regard to his syllabus collection, Wakeford recalled that 
the initiative did not arise from greater attention being paid to methods teaching but 
rather: 
 
because we were getting contacts from people in the new universities [...] 
who decided to launch sociology and methods and they sort of kept 
sending things saying ‘What’s taught elsewhere?’. So I think that’s the 
origin of that. We just put it together and then, say, if anybody wants to 
know what is taught elsewhere, there is this compendium (Author’s 
Interview with John Wakeford, 2017). 
 
There were sociologists with strong interest in the role of methods in the 
development and teaching of sociology but, as in previous decades, they remained a 
small minority. Even smaller was the group of sociologists specialising in, and 
advocating the use of, surveys and statistics. They saw theory differently from the 
majority of sociologists and similarly to the way most natural scientists see it – as a 
network of falsifiable generalisations. And they saw methods as serving the role not 
of merely demonstrating theories but of testing them; and for them quantitative 
methods especially were a primary concern and a means by which sociology would 
be able to advance in this respect.  
The disputes about positivism did little to shift the balance between ‘theorists’ 
and ‘quantitative sociologists’; overall, the former remained in the majority and the 
latter – in the minority. However, these disputes played an important role in 
exacerbating this divide and providing a justification for it. 
 Anti-positivist critiques did not target just any type of empirical sociological 
work – they were specifically addressed to social science and sociology that used 
survey and statistical methods. In these cases, confusion about the contents of the 
label ‘positivist’ did not stop some anti-positivist sociologists from applying this 
label to groups of researchers by association. Up to 1970s, statistics and surveys 
were unpopular, unfashionable and seen as far from being a priority; during the 




Examples of the association between positivism and survey and statistical work 
comes from a variety of sources. Oakley (2000) who examined the feminist anti-
positivist movement in particular, argued that: 
 
The statistical dominance of men and the use of quantitative methods 
may not have been intrinsically related; but they were seen to co-exist in 
a (more or less) unconscious conspiratorial alliance (Oakley, 2000: 33). 
 
Other feminists referred to the presence in quantitative research of such things 
as ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘technical expertise’ (cf. Stanley and Wise, 1983: 8) along 
with the notion of the existence of an objective reality in order to explain the 
association between positivism and quantitative research. Anti-positivist feminists 
objected to quantitative research (and thereby to positivism) by arguing that 
objectivity is: 
 
an excuse for a power relationship every bit as obscene as the power 
relationship that leads women to be sexually assaulted, murdered and 




positivist reality as invalid – but only for us. What we mean by this is that 
positivist reality isn’t just reality for positivists […] positivist reality is 
their generalized, universalized view of our realities. We object to our 
lived experiences being turned into generalized mush (Stanley and Wise, 
1983: 111). 
 
But who are the positivists? Whose is this reality? It appears as if the rejection 
of evidence and facts that the authors hold to be commendable is responsible for their 
own failure to support their own statements with evidence. Perhaps providing 
evidence for their arguments would have been against their own beliefs. And other 
critics of positivism argued that ‘much of the statistical work done in social science 
has been based on a positivist view of science’, quoting as an example Emile 





A clear association of quantitative techniques with positivism, and therefore 
with anti-feminism, has been noticed even by those who would not necessarily agree 
that there was much sense in the claims that quantitative social research was 
somehow male or automatically at odds with feminist causes: 
 
So it came as a bit of a surprise to me to find later on that there were 
some women, some feminists – and therefore some men as well – 
arguing that quantification was an intrinsically male way of looking at the 
world and the reason it was astonishing was that I already knew dozens 
and dozens of extremely good, intellectually acute women, working in 
quantification, for whom it would have been deeply insulting to be told 
that what they were doing was intrinsically male. So, I’m afraid I had a 
prejudice against this particular kind of rhetoric. [...] And I’ve never 
really been able to take it seriously because I’ve never seen any serious 
development of that idea (Author’s Interview with Lindsay Paterson, 
2017). 
 
[…] that was enormously influential as an idea […] But the idea that 
women in particular are being constrained by having fixed questions in a 
questionnaire, just seems to me silly. But things that were not much 
grander than that seemed to me to form part of what was becoming an 
orthodoxy […] people had developed rationales for the kind of method 
that was compatible with their sort of feelings (Author’s Interview with 
Jennifer Platt, 2017). 
 
Ironically, the apparent legitimacy of the association between quantitative 
methods and positivism was reinforced by the replies that quantitative sociologists 
gave to counteract critiques such as those raised by feminist sociologists, even 
though in most cases the purpose of these replies was to disprove the existence of the 
association altogether. A study by Platt (1981), for instance, used an analysis of the 
quantitative sociological research published in the three leading sociological journals 
in the early post-war period in Britain to argue that ‘the existence of a clearly defined 
positivist style is highly questionable’ (Platt, 1981: 76, italics mine). Although Platt 
provides a summary of the philosophical positivist principles and acknowledges that 
these are more relevant to an abstract discussion than to describing sociological 
research practices, she is nonetheless forced into the assumption that one could look 
for these principles in quantitative research. This is not saying that Platt herself 
believed this to be the case. Her article does not prove that quantitative research is 




in the early post-war period, therefore there was also little positivist work done. 
Inadvertently, Platt ends up equating the two and legitimising the assumption of an 
association between them.  
It was Catherine Marsh’s studies (1979, 1980, 1982) that aimed to prove wrong 
the association between survey and statistical work and positivism. Her aim was to 
‘relieve surveys (and the scientific method more generally) from the accusation of 
positivism’ (Marsh, 1979: 293) by showing that that surveys are not ‘inherently’ 
positivist and that one does not ‘have to buy this unsatisfactory epistemological 
package to get the free gift of survey methods’ (Marsh, 1982: 51). How successful 
Marsh’s attempt to do this was is beyond the scope of the current analysis; however, 
because of the character of the disputes about positivism and because of the shape 
they took, the mere assumption that it is possible that surveys and positivism may be 
inherently related was more likely to leave a legacy than, say, if this possibility was 
proven ungrounded by sociologists like Marsh.  
Therefore, what changed when the disputes about positivism broke out was 
that quantitatively minded social scientists, such as Goldthorpe, Goldstein and Marsh 
(effectively the intellectual descendants of Wootton, Carr-Saunders and Glass, whose 
difficult relationship with sociology was described in previous chapters) had to 
defend, exonerate and justify their work. John Goldthorpe, a prominent sociologist 
and a strong proponent of quantitative methods in sociology, has described a rather 
bitter experience with British sociology because of his methodological views. He 
recalled that since the mid-seventies he has ‘felt a complete outsider as far as British 
sociology was concerned’ (Thompson’s Interview with Goldthorpe, 2013: 63-4). 
Another example is Harvey Goldstein, who is not, strictly speaking, a sociologist, but 
who shared a similar experience, recalling that he 
 
was labelled as a positivist and that was enough to condemn me – from 
qualitative researchers…So, positivist: what they meant was someone 
who just believed in numbers (Author’s Interview with Harvey Goldstein, 
2017). 
 
Another example is Catherine Marsh – although she has not spoken about 




the survey method against anti-positivism and, by virtue of the work she was 
producing, she was herself a small minority.  
Inevitably all this led to a situation in which the divide was felt more strongly 
on an institutional level – only a small minority of sociology departments, such as 
Nuffield College, Oxford, together with organisations and institutes promoting social 
research, such as the short-lived SSRC Survey Unit (1970-1976), the Social 
Research Association, the RSS, the Market Research Society (cf. Marsh, 1980: 4) 
developed and taught more advanced quantitative methodology as part of their 
sociology teaching. 
While in the early post-war period quantitative sociologists were simply a 
minority, when the anti-positivist rhetoric was added to the existing theory/method 
divide, they became a marginalised and ostracised minority. Those defending the 
use of survey and statistical methods were being seen as sociologists committing a 
scholarly ‘sin’43 (Marsh, 1982: 51). This situation emerged regardless of the fact that 
mainstream sociologists, or sociologists who were part of particular intellectual 
groups, such as feminism or Marxism or ethnomethodology, made depreciative 
remarks about survey and statistical methods without having the knowledge 
necessary for the understanding of even the basic characteristics of such methods.  
The widening of the divide between mainstream sociologists and sociologists 
oriented towards quantitative research and teaching, which resulted from the spread 
of the disputes about positivism, had pervasive impact on the intellectual culture that 
characterised British sociology in the late 70s and 80s. The spread of ‘anti-positivism’ 
created conditions that reinforced clear anti-quantitative attitudes which were also for 
the first time examined in more detail.  
Discussions from a 1979 conference on the teaching of methodology to 
sociology students shows clear evidence of this.  A number of sociologists with a 
particular interest in methods described the existence of an anti-quantitative culture 
on a variety of levels. Burgess and Bulmer argued that a more clearly defined and 
‘general anti-quantitative culture within British sociology’ was emerging in the 
1970s and early 1980s (Burgess and Bulmer, 1981: 480). There was weaker 
                                               
43 This is Marsh’s (1982) description; she was arguing that everyone, even survey researchers are in 




quantitative orientation among sociology graduate students compared to graduate 
students in other social science subjects (cf. Marsh (1972) in Burgess and Bulmer, 
1981: 479); and a lack of articles based on quantitative research in British sociology 
and a predominance of articles based on non-empirical research (Bechhofer, 1981: 
499-500). Other scholars reported in similar vein that there was ‘little interest in the 
potentialities of official statistics for sociological analysis’ and ‘disinclination to 
undertake large-scale empirical research’ (Bulmer, 1980: 505); and that the teaching 
of quantitative methods in most departments has been done as ‘a concession’ 
(Husbands, 1981: 88). 
Coming to the fore in the discussions of the 1970s was a partial explanation 
that a certain attitude that existed very early on in the post-war period, but which had 
been more subtly expressed, was becoming slowly and gradually more entrenched in 
the minds of sociologists and their students. This was a tendency, Bechhofer (1974: 
78) observed, ‘to regard statistics as something useful to but somehow extraneous to 
sociology’; as something ‘totally separate’ and ‘optional or of only peripheral 
importance’.  
Empirical, especially quantitative, methods were widely perceived as an 
exercise in the production and analysis of ‘facts about society’ by ‘social technicians’ 
(cf. Rose, 1981: 515). The idea was ‘convincingly argued’ that surveys ‘are in any 
case manipulative and convey a calculating bureaucratic stance’ (Wakeford, 1981: 
509). In the 1970s, sociology had already turned into ‘the science of debunking’ in 
which, it was believed, ‘no one but the permanent and unremitting critic of society 
can be an effective sociologist’ (Dennis, 1989: 430, 433). Statistical and survey 
research was unnecessary and unhelpful to such a sociology; and would indicate 
submission to ‘facticity’ which was ‘one of the tyrannies to be broken’ (Dennis, 
1989: 434).  
Two studies, one in the late 80s and one in the early 90s, confirmed that the 
production of quantitative research by British sociologists continued to be neglected 
– Bulmer reported that less than a half (24) of the 52 articles published in the British 
Journal of Sociology in 1986/7 contained systematically collected empirical data but 
also that, out of these 24, only 8 were by British sociologists (Bulmer, 1989: 394). In 




Sociology, Sociology and the Sociological Review, showing that while 51% of the 
articles were based on the analysis of empirical data, less than one third of them used 
quantification and the large majority of those who did use quantification, used it at a 
very elementary level (Bechhofer, 1996: 585). In the end, it all came back yet again 
to the issue of linking effectively sociological theory and statistical data – the 
theoretical tradition which expanded during the post-war period did not pay ‘much 
attention to the links with empirical investigation’ (Bulmer, 1989: 397) and also: 
 
far too many sociologists are preoccupied with types of theory which 
neither derive from problems actually encountered in the conduct of 
empirical enquiry nor result in propositions of the empirically testable 
kind (Goldthorpe (1990) quoted in Gartrell and Gartrell 2002: 649) 
 
There were some attempts in the 70s and 80s to redress this situation. As an 
unprecedented number of young sociologists were graduating and entering the job 
market, it became an increasing concern that employers demanded graduates that 
were not only well educated in the ‘liberal arts’ tradition but also possessed the 
technical skills to analyse empirical, including statistical, data while very few 
sociology students, in fact, had such skills. Smith (1975: 312) reported that ‘many 
organisations which offer employment or funds for research workers […] are 
dissatisfied with the technical competence of sociologists, with a particular problem 
being ‘the low level of expertise in survey method’. But while there was an 
agreement that the situation of sociology graduates ‘would be more competitive if 
they were more competent in the survey method’ (Smith, 1975: 315), there was less 
agreement on how this situation could be improved.  
The SSRC Survey Research Unit had been set up as a way of advancing 
quantitative sociological research and training; but some, like Bulmer, disagreed that 
this was a good solution. Initiatives of this kind appeared to be treating the symptoms 
but not the causes of a much more deeply rooted problem – the gap between theory 
and empirical methods: 
 
A proposal to institute survey research training without making sure that 
an integral part of the course is concerned with how to translate 




particular danger of emasculating postgraduate work in sociology 
(Bulmer, 1972: 269). 
 
Although technical competence was necessary, it was a mistake, Bulmer 
argued to equate methodological training with technical skills training – an important 
part of the problem was that methods teaching was ‘more technical, less intrinsically 
interesting and something to be tolerated rather than to get excited about’ (Bulmer, 
1974: 244) which fuelled not only non-constructive disputes about positivism but 
also a dislike of methods among the students themselves. 
The introduction of simply more quantitative training at postgraduate level was 
also seen as ineffective in tackling another issue which was exacerbated during the 
disputes about positivism. The majority of sociologists, it was said, ‘tend to favour 
different [i.e. non-quantitative] methods’ (Bulmer, 1972: 269, my italics) – a 
poignant recognition of the fact that the methodological culture in British sociology 
was built on preference and belief; and that unless the power of preferences and 
beliefs was effectively neutralised, setting up new research units would not do much 
to overturn the anti-quantitative culture that prevailed in British sociology. 
 
 
The Legacy of the Disputes about Positivism 
 
How could we explain the association between positivism and statistics that we 
observe in British sociology in the 1970s? Was it historically inevitable that the 
disputes about positivism created conditions for an anti-quantitative culture, or could 
we explain this course of events with reference to some particular characteristics of 
the post-war development of sociology in Britain? 
Oakley’s ‘make-room’ argument about the function of the ‘positivist’ debates, 
which I discussed earlier, provides only a partial explanation of the character and 
impact of the disputes about positivism – it can explain why the disputes took place 
on a polemical/rhetorical level; why their effect was limited to that sphere and why 
they took the form of attacks which were largely unsupported by the evidence. 
However, the ‘make-room’ argument does not explain why a quantitative, empirical, 




the scapegoat in these debates in the first place. In addition, I have shown in previous 
chapters that quantitative methods, and statistics more generally, did not take up 
much ‘room’ in British sociology anyway for them to be shoved aside to make room 
for anything else. Why then were quantitative methods specifically targeted? 
To understand why the disputes about positivism targeted 
quantitative/empirical/policy-oriented social research, we need to look at the 
historical conditions that made this choice possible in the first place. A major role in 
these historical conditions was played by the difficult relationship that British 
academic sociology had with the empirical, including quantitative, tradition of social 
enquiry that existed in parallel, but separately, from academic sociology. We have 
seen that throughout the twentieth century this divide has been a topic for discussion 
among sociologists as well as an issue they had to deal with during the expansion 
and in their teaching practice. British sociology has been in its own peculiar way 
obsessed with quantitative methods, not in the sense of using them unquestionably 
but in the sense of continually putting forward argument after argument as to why 
sociology should remain focussed on other things such as theoretical development. 
It could be argued, therefore, that it was the separate existence of the empirical 
tradition and the fact that British sociology had not found an effective way to deal 
with this separate existence, that created the right conditions for the positivist 
disputes of the 70s and 80s to target empirical and quantitative social research. The 
positivist disputes were British academic sociology’s way of coming to terms and 
dealing with the parallel existence of the predominantly empirical and quantitative 
tradition of social enquiry and the lack of success in bringing these two together. 
While in previous decades this tradition had been either ignored or dismissed on the 
basis that, in the early stages of the expansion of British sociology, the development 
of theory was of prime concern, the positivist rhetoric gave sociologists a chance not 
only to make room for, and associate themselves primarily with, new movements 
such as feminism and ethnomethodology, but also to dissociate themselves more 
decisively than before from survey and other quantitative research. Associating 





One way in which this was done was by recasting the empirical tradition of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as positivist; labelling it as the origins of 
positivism. For instance, in his account on positivism and sociology Halfpenny 
(1982), following Abrams (1968), makes reference to Galton, Pearson and their 
eugenics and statistical views as precursors of positivism, while Hobhouse is 
portrayed as non-positivist because he ‘objected strongly to attempts by the 
eugenicists to reduce the science of society to a part of the science of biology’ 
(Halfpenny, 1982: 39). The nineteenth-century statistical tradition is virtually 
equated with positivism, the latter being described as a theory of knowledge 
according to which the natural science of sociology consists of the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data about society.  
Another example comes from the study of positivism in America, France, 
Germany and Britain by Bryant (1980). In Bryant’s analysis of positivism in Britain, 
the re-casting of the British empirical tradition, and indeed the whole of nineteenth-
century British social science, as positivist is clearer still. A great deal of the 
discussion is also based on Abrams’ account of the origins of British sociology, with 
Bryant describing the empirical tradition of social enquiry as positivist due to the 
‘predominance of individualism’, ‘prominence of abstracted empiricism in statistics 
and surveys’; belief that knowledge of the social conditions is ‘of practical utility to 
the causes of administrative reform’ (Bryant, 1980: 108). These were almost 
verbatim the descriptions coined by Abrams in 1968; the difference being that in 
1980 they were no longer merely critiques, they were the basis for an anti-positivist 
critique. This opinion persisted throughout the 1980s, with Albrow, who had been a 
BSA president in 1986, arguing in 1989, that there has been ‘a persistent empiricism 
and positivism in the British approach’ since the eighteenth century’ (Albrow, 1989: 
214).  
It is through historical readings such as these that the existence of an anti-
positivist movement targeting quantitative methods was justified and the gap 
between the two traditions – academic sociology and empirical social science – was 
legitimised. In associating what they understood as positivism with the empirical and 
quantitative tradition of social enquiry sociologists found a way to relieve a tension 




But why was in the late 70s and 80s a stronger rationale for discarding 
empirical and quantitative research necessary? Could mainstream sociologists not 
object to quantitative methods without invoking their apparent association with 
positivism as justification? 
A stronger rationale was partly needed to resist numerous attempts by the 
SSRC to encourage the merging of the two traditions by funding empirical and 
quantitative research within sociology; something with which many sociologists 
strongly disagreed. During the 1970s, many sociologists developed a negative 
attitude towards the SSRC. They argued that the SSRC ‘always talked as though 
social research deals with politically unproblematic policy questions’ (Rex, 1978a: 
415) and promoted ‘old-fashioned forms of research design’ (Rex, 1978b: 296); 
therefore, the SSRC was ‘resented for the influence it does exercise by many 
sociology teachers’ (Rex, 1978a: 415). More evidence of the dissatisfaction of 
sociologists with the SSRC comes from Mack (1979: 15-17) who examined the 
problematic aspects in its structure and initiatives, outlining the disparity of opinions 
between mainstream sociologists and the SSRC itself. And there are a number of 
contemporary and more recent accounts that describe the SSRC as having a 
‘bureaucratic preference for positivism’ (Ditton and Williams, 1981: 11); as biased 
‘towards a positivist conception of social science research’, a clear example of which 
was, supposedly, Lord Heyworth’s emphasis in his 1965 report on the necessity of 
more and more adequate statistics training (King, 1997: 2, 21). The SSRC was seen 
as an institution that, due to its financial incentives, offered complete obedience to an 
overarching science and technology outlook, and therefore privileged ‘positivist 
social science’ (Donovan, 2005). Donovan even went as far as describing the early 
Clapham (1946) and Heyworth (1965) reports as having produced ‘a bias towards 
positivistic scientific methodologies which were seen as untainted by ideology’ 
(Donovan, 2005: 605) regardless of the fact that these reports were produced in a 
completely different social and political climate in which positivism was not an issue. 
Donovan’s arguments appear to be largely based on a misreading of the Clapham’s 
and Heyworth’s reports, attributing statements to them which are not present in the 
original text; and paying little heed to the wider historical – social and political – 




But while mainstream sociologists were criticising the SSRC for making 
attempts to encourage more empirical, policy-oriented and quantitative research, 
others such as Marsh criticised it for not doing enough in this direction, especially in 
promoting the development of theoretically relevant surveys:  
 
Despite the establishment of the SSRC in 1965 and despite the enormous 
growth in the volume and sophistication of survey research in Britain and 
abroad during that period, the improvement that this should have made 
possible in empirical studies of sociological nature has not occurred. If 
anything, the number of theoretically relevant surveys has declined and 
the interest of sociologists in surveys has suffered an eclipse (Marsh, 
1980: 2). 
 
Whether the SSRC was indeed biased towards one type of research, or not, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. But the examples above make clear that a variety of 
groups of sociologists – those who were anti-positivist, survey researchers and those 
who have studied the SSRC – expressed a lack of satisfaction with the way the SSRC 
functioned. As Bulmer (1980: 508) argued, ‘the world is not made-up just of 
knowledgeable sceptics and naïve hard-line positivists’. However, the disputes about 
positivism created the impression of a black and white world – this is obvious from 
the way the SSRC, and the empirical tradition of social enquiry, were enmeshed in 
these disputes.  
In sum, the disputes on positivism did not have an effect of decreasing the 
amount of teaching of quantitative methods; but they were powerful enough to instil 
a belief, a certain attitude among sociologists, that using these methods was 
somehow ‘un-sociological’ or insufficiently sociological: sociology students, 
developing under the influence of teachers who held such beliefs, emerged 
unconvinced that ‘empirical work is still necessary, possible and enjoyable’ (Rose, 
1981: 517). The legacy of these disputes lies in creating suitable conditions for the 
emergence and sustaining of an anti-quantitative culture; and in providing an 
influential, albeit questionable, epistemological justification of why British sociology 
could afford to disregard quantitative methods teaching and research and continue to 





But these debates also had the effect of turning the lack of effective 
incorporation of quantitative methods in British sociology into a topic of serious 
discussion. It was now for the first time vocally argued that dismissing quantification 
would inevitably harm any empirical research, since ‘most forms of empirical 
research involves statistical principles in a fundamental way’ (Bechhofer, 1974: 78). 
Such a position ‘can only be maintained if sociology is to be regarded essentially as a 
form of social philosophy’ (Bechhofer, 1974: 78); and if sociology teachers are 
content with producing ‘half-sociologists’ (Author’s Interview with Robert Moore, 
2017). 
Along with this came a clearer understanding of statistics that went beyond the 
technical skills involved in applying statistical methods in sociological enquiry. 
Learning how to produce and analyse statistics is not simply a matter of acquiring 
technical expertise, it is a necessary skill for understanding change in society and for 
being an intelligent citizen: 
 
If you don’t acquire some capacity to handle numbers with a degree of 
confidence, you are going to be a victim, so for heaven’s sake, lets get on 
top of this and learn how to appreciate the numbers [...] So I would say to 
students, this is in a sense nothing to do with sociology, it’s to do with 
citizenship and being a member of society (Author’s Interview with 
Robert Moore, 2017). 
 
And so, the discussions in the 1970s and 1980s made it clearer that the problem 
with the relationship between British sociology and statistics was not merely the 
problem of failing to produce technically skilled social statisticians, but, more 
significantly, the problem of failing to produce sociologists who appreciate the value 
of statistically informed judgment, within or outside of their subject and beyond the 

















‘Sociology’, wrote Malcolm Bradbury in 2012, ‘had a glorious heyday in the 
sixties and then began to fragment and die – not as a discipline among others, but as 
the great discipline, the key to all knowledge’ (Bradbury, 2012 [1975]: 250). 
Bradbury wrote these words in an apologetic post-script to his satirical novel, The 
History Man, whose infamous character, the sociologist Howard Kirk, had his small 
share in bringing about British sociology’s ‘fall from grace’ in the late 70s. Despite 
the fact that the popularity and public image of sociology in Britain have since 
largely recovered, Howard Kirk, the intellectual rogue riding on the crest of history, 
has remained one of the best-known stereotypical faces of British sociology. 
But Malcolm Bradbury was not the first novelist to make an assault on social 
science and Howard Kirk was not the first grotesque personification of a social 
science subject. Some hundred and twenty years previously, Charles Dickens also 
relied on the psychology of stereotypes in his novel Hard Times (1854) to satirise the 
burgeoning statistical movement through the character of Thomas Gradgrind. Mr 
Gradgrind was not a lecturer like Kirk, but a relentless school teacher, guided by the 
‘soulless’ philosophy of facts, constantly reprimanding his pupils for failing to see 
that ‘in this life we want nothing but facts’. Gradgrind’s fanatical lessons in ‘fact-
ology’ easily overshadow the London Statistical Society’s zealous tirades about aliis 
exterendum discussed at the beginning of this thesis. But despite his extreme features, 
Gradgrind’s character continued to dominate the perception of statistics for the 
majority of British sociologists throughout the twentieth century. 
Grandgrind and Kirk have little in common: Gradgrind being the hard-headed 
and emotionless fact-cruncher; and Kirk being the radical and complacent socialite, 
indulging in both passion and intrigue. As stereotypical, representative figures 
however, both served one and the same purpose – to distort, exaggerate and mock the 
image of the subjects they personify; what Gradgrind did for the image of statistics in 
the 1850s, Kirk did for the image of sociology in the 1970s. But it is not only 
literature that has viewed statistics as Gradgrind and sociology as Kirk. As this thesis 
has shown, sociologists and statisticians themselves have often seen each other in 




This thesis has attempted to expose the harm caused by applying the 
psychology of stereotypes to understand the historical relationship between statistics 
and sociology in Britain. By redressing some of the misunderstandings and dispelling 
some of the myths that surround the history of both subjects, it has attempted to show 
that statistics and sociology have had many faces, not just Grandgrind’s and Kirk’s; 
and that some of the ‘faces’ of British sociology can only be seen when we also look 
at the ‘faces’ of statistics. 
Looking at the historical development of both subjects simultaneously, we 
discovered an issue which is, at the very least, puzzling: how was it possible that in 
the country that spearheaded the development of modern statistics, academic 
sociology has not only consistently resisted the incorporation of statistical thinking 
and methodology but has actively defended and promoted its own a-statistical 
character?  
British sociologists have been effective in their use of the nineteenth-century 
Gradgrind image of statistics to justify the divide between academic sociology and a 
statistically based social science that developed elsewhere. Abrams’ 1968 essay on 
the origins of British sociology, discussed at the beginning of this thesis, is a good 
example. Abrams argued that the statistical and social reformist movements that 
developed in Britain in the nineteenth century were a failed start for social science: 
statistics was a Gradgrindean exercise in mindless number crunching; while social 
reformist research was limited to piecemeal empirical investigations. In his view, 
academic sociology had little to gain by investing time and effort in the incorporation 
of such types of social enquiry; what’s more, the fact that these types of enquiry 
developed institutionally, stifled any possibilities for the emergence of ‘sociology’ 
which Abrams saw as primarily oriented towards providing a theoretical insight into 
social development and processes. 
Parts of the statistical and social reform movements were, indeed, as Abrams 
described them. However, the first part of this thesis showed that Abrams’ 
description is limited by his failure to take account of the intellectual context in 
which statistics developed historically; and distorting because of his arbitrary 
assumption that a primarily theoretically oriented social science was the only right 




statisticians’ work in the early nineteenth century, as well as their own understanding 
of their contribution to knowledge, were closely related to the aims and 
understanding of science at that time. Placed in the context of the contemporary 
understanding of science, the events and discussions that took place in the two most 
prominent statistical organisations, Section F of the BAAS and the SSL/RSS, are an 
example of the very first attempts to establish precise, reliable and widely applicable 
knowledge about a constantly changing, complex and unpredictable social world. 
But why is it important that statistics was part of a wider scientific development; and 
why does it matter for our historical understanding of the relationship between 
statistics and sociology? 
There is extensive scholarship on the origins of modern science and the 
Scientific revolution (Butterfield, 1949; Jardine, 2000; Jacob, 2010; Knight, 2014; 
Wootton, 2015); few accounts, however, have come up with a convincing 
explanation of the conceptual changes, the watershed moments in humankind’s 
worldview, that have given rise to modern science. A recent book that stands out in 
this respect is David Wootton’s The Invention of Science (2015). Wootton argues 
that the discovery of the ‘New World’ by Columbus in the late fifteenth century was 
the motive force that convinced many European scholars of the real possibility of 
going beyond the great discoveries and monumental intellectual achievements of the 
ancients, whose thinking had dominated centuries, and embrace a radically novel 
view that creating new knowledge and transgressing intellectual boundaries is not 
only conceivable, but necessary. Columbus’ discovery is, of course, not directly 
responsible for the Scientific revolution that followed in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries but it showed that the ancients did not know everything, that 
they could be surpassed and it unleashed the power of scientific imagination. Is there 
an equivalent moment in the history of social science? And if so, who is the 
Columbus that provided the inspiration? 
The Renaissance and Enlightenment periods contain many prominent examples 
of philosophical scholarship relating to the development of society and various social 
matters. With few exceptions, however, these are based on deductive reasoning and 
abstract principles derived from certain assumptions about human nature. Although 




Rousseau and Adam Smith have provided valuable insights into some of the major 
principles underlying the workings of society, social science – the systematic 
investigation of social matters and their explanation on the basis of empirical 
evidence – only began in earnest in the nineteenth century. This was also the time 
when the development of natural science took a particularly important turn. What is 
special about this period was that discoveries and inventions in the fields of physics, 
chemistry, geology and biology triggered fundamental changes in the organisation of 
social life that were unprecedented, creating conditions for the radical 
industrialisation and urbanisation of society, especially in Britain. This, in turn, 
stimulated further scientific developments to help manage social life, for instance, in 
the fields of medicine, sanitation and technology. Thus, advances in science changed 
society and changes in society stimulated further scientific advance: the interaction 
between science and society during the nineteenth century was more intense and on a 
larger scale than ever before.  
It was in this climate that a genuinely novel problem emerged – how to even 
begin to study a society with an enormous amount of variability of social interactions 
and conditions which was rapidly becoming ever more complex? To solve this 
problem, one needed a new approach to studying society – a social science that is 
capable of harnessing social heterogeneity. A social philosophy based on social types 
or principles of human nature would have been ineffective for this purpose.  
There was one development which, more than anything else, helped in the 
actual realisation of the idea that a social science is possible – the rise of modern 
social statistics, which manifested itself most distinctly in Adolphe Quetelet’s 
invention of the Average man. The Average man was a ‘personification’ of the idea 
that data about human beings can be summarised in a normal distribution and used 
for empirical social analysis – that one can gain information by discarding 
information (Stigler, 2016). It was the systematic collection of numerical data and 
their analysis through the technique of averaging, to begin with, that brought about a 
conceptual change in Western societies not only in the way they understood society 
but also in the way they understood how to study society. Just like natural science, 
statistical social science offered unique access to knowledge about the world that 




New World, did for natural science; Quetelet, in his invention of the Average man, 
did for social science. 
This, of course, was just the beginning – neither Columbus, not Quetelet could 
have imagined the scale of the transformation that their discoveries were to bring. 
Just as Columbus believed, wrongly, that he had reached India and not a completely 
new continent; Quetelet believed, wrongly, that his Average man was a fictitious 
being encompassing all that is good about the human species. But to dismiss the 
importance of their discoveries due to their limited understanding of what it was that 
they had discovered and of the potential consequences of their discovery would be to 
impose limits on our own understanding.  
Statistics is not merely a set of techniques among many others; it is a 
worldview that came with the development of modern science and which forms the 
basis of an approach to social enquiry that most adequately captures the complexity, 
the variability and the constant change that characterises the basis of modern society. 
Statistical enquiries cannot serve as a replacement for other theoretical enquiries or 
enquiries based on the qualitative analysis of non-numerical data about society; 
statistical enquiries can, however, provide these with a firm base. 
It is precisely because of the historical role of statistics in the history of science, 
including social science, that the historical relationship between statistics and 
sociology in Britain matters. And it is because of the historical role of statistics in the 
history of science that it is misleading to describe nineteenth-century statistics as a 
‘frustrating’ factor in the development of British sociology, as Abrams does. And, 
unlike Abrams’ account which is based, albeit implicitly, on the arbitrary assumption 
that the right path for sociology is the theoretical investigation of society, the long-
term profound consequences that the development of statistics has had for 
understanding society and social change provides us with a legitimate historical 
reason to question the course of events that led to statistical social science and 
academic sociology in Britain taking different paths. 
The first part of this thesis showed that the nineteenth century gave rise not 
only to the statistical movement, manifested in the work of the SSL/RSS and, later 
on, Galton and Pearson and their followers; but also to the sociology of Comte and 




an important role in showing that it is possible to create a sociology of a non-
quantitative type in which the main and overriding element is theory of society. It 
was not that both traditions were somehow inherently incompatible; what was crucial 
was that both traditions perceived each other as mutually irrelevant.  
When the Sociological Society was established in the early twentieth century, 
it had a choice between two distinct paths for its development – was it going to 
choose to follow in the steps of only one of these traditions or create a bridge 
between them? The second part of this thesis traced the choices made by the Society 
with regard to the establishment of academic sociology in this country and its 
relationship with the statistical tradition of social enquiry. It showed that the Society 
achieved limited success in its attempts to define the goals and methods of sociology; 
to establish it on a firm basis in academia and raise its status among other groups of 
social scientists. There were also a variety of factors responsible for the failure of the 
Society to establish a statistical basis for sociology in Britain, including the Comtean 
understanding of sociology and methodology that they embraced and the preferences 
of its leading members for non-quantitative types of sociological enquiry. The 
absence of anyone in sociology with a more advanced understanding in statistics and 
a devotion to its incorporation into the academic sociology as well as the close 
relationship that statistics had already developed with economics, also played their 
part. Once sociology was associated with a particular choice of words, of thought, of 
institutions established by the Society, regardless of whether these choices bore fruit 
or not, it was very difficult for sociology to re-organise itself into something 
different.  
The examination in the second part of the thesis of the relatively stagnant 
development of sociology in the interwar period showed that there were few 
opportunities, if any, for the incorporation of statistics into the kind of academic 
sociology practised by sociologists such as Hobhouse and Ginsberg, after the 
Sociological Society secured sociology’s place at the LSE. This was not because 
they promoted a sociology which was explicitly hostile to statistics but because they 
perceived statistics as irrelevant, insisting that the true value of sociology lies in the 




through mere work on ‘drink, drainage and divorce’ – the derogatory term used to 
describe statistical enquiries.  
While sociology struggled to escape its marginal position in academia in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the application of the new English statistics spread 
in both the social and natural sciences while the empirical tradition of social enquiry 
that originated with the work of William Farr, Edwin Chadwick, Charles Booth, 
Seebohm Rowntree and others was being established, separately, in social science 
departments in universities, the most prominent example being the SSaA department 
at the LSE. How was it possible at all then that an explicitly non-statistical and non-
empirical academic sociology could have emerged and sustained itself in an 
intellectual climate in which the statistical movement and social empirical enquiry 
were both gaining ground? How was it possible for an academic sociology in this 
country to continue rejecting statistics which had given rise to social science in the 
first place and continue to exist, let alone thrive? If most of the empirical social 
science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries occupied the space for social 
science created by the discovery of the potential of statistical data to make society 
scientifically knowable, then what space did ‘sociology’ occupy and how was this 
space created and sustained? 
The conceptual breakthroughs brought about by statistics made social science 
possible; they also made largely redundant the contributions of social enquiries that 
did not make any use of quantification; but they did not eliminate the possibility for 
the existence of a type of enquiry claiming to offer insight about the social world that 
went beyond anything that could be discovered through statistical analysis. Thus the 
nineteenth-century social science based on statistical analysis, by failing to fill the 
space itself, left room for the social philosophy of the type that existed before the 
discovery of modern statistics. And it is this space which Comte’s philosophy, 
Durkheim’s sociology and eventually, the whole of British academic sociology, 
came to occupy. British sociology cultivated room for its existence on the basis of its 
opposition to statistical social science and its affiliation with the type of knowledge 
which was, essentially, social philosophy. Disassociating itself from the methods of 
statistical social science became one of its hallmarks and distinguishing features used 




This is most clearly pronounced in the intellectual and institutional 
development of sociology in Britain after 1945 which I examined in detail in the 
third part of this study. I showed that British sociology in the post-war period was 
dominated by a continued interest in theoretical enquiry, despite the fact that post-
war sociologists distanced themselves from the theoretical work of their British 
predecessors and embraced many of the post-modern theories first developed in 
America. More qualitative empirical work was being done during this period, but it 
was characterised by an even stronger and clearer rejection than before of statistical 
social research which was considered un-sociological or insufficiently sociological, 
in spite of the fact that there was still little clarity as to what ‘sociology’ itself 
actually was.  
It was the expansion of the higher education system in a particular context of 
social upheaval, desire for change and break with the norms and traditions of the past, 
political reorganisation and suspicion of science that created favourable conditions 
for the expansion of social studies more generally. Although sociology expanded 
more quickly and at a larger scale than any other social science subject, what’s 
crucial about the expansion of sociology is not so much its scale but the fact that 
what made it possible in the first place were external factors having little to do with 
sociology’s own intellectual or institutional progress. What in the early twentieth 
century looked like sociology’s greatest disadvantage – its lack of a clear sense of 
direction – in the post-war period turned out to be its greatest advantage as sociology 
could adapt to the institutional, social and cultural trends and make itself popular 
without having to conform to any pre-existing constraints (such as a well-rooted and 
dominant tradition or institutions). It was during this period that sociology 
established a strong reputation as a socially relevant, cutting-edge subject that 
appealed to students who aspired to challenge the status quo and change society for 
the better. But, crucially, sociologists consistently emphasised that this could, and 
even should, be done on the basis of sociological theory, not empirical, let alone 
numerical, data on society. Attacks on social surveys based on bad quality research 
conducted in America helped to fuel the perception that statistics would be useless 
for achieving the goals that sociology set for itself; Howard Kirk was ‘the history 




The expansion had an unquestionably positive effect on the institutional 
development of British sociology as an academic subject. The teaching of sociology 
became part and parcel of the programme of almost every university in the country 
and diversified both methodologically and substantively. This thesis examined 
teaching trends in much greater detail than trends in research due to the vital 
influence teaching has on shaping generations of students as well as prospective 
teachers and researchers and thereby the entire future of an academic subject. 
The analysis of the teaching trends at the LSE and also universities across the 
country showed that the teaching of statistics remained consistently at a basic level. 
Furthermore, the evidence discussed in Part Three showed clearly that sociologists 
rarely showed appreciation for the wider potential of statistics, as a result of which 
the teaching of quantitative methods to generations of sociology students was 
compromised. The teaching of quantitative methods has never been totally absent 
from academic sociology; on the contrary, up to the 1980s these methods were 
regularly part of the methodology curriculum. However, among British sociologists, 
statistics has consistently been seen, at best, as a specialist, esoteric skill and, at 
worst, as a dangerous and fruitless path that would bring down sociology, 
condemning it to a life ‘in the sands’, to use T. H. Marshall’s phrase. This has been 
the on-going attitude of both those who argued that sociology is a science and 
attempted to work towards making it scientific (like Comte, and his followers in the 
Sociological Society) and those who argued against closer affiliation with science as 
in academic sociology mostly from the 1960s onwards.  In addition, where the option 
of teaching statistics was embraced, this usually took place in an intellectual climate 
in which sociology more generally was conceived as subject aimed at providing a 
general education and in which the development of sociological theory was seen as 
the priority. Given that no special efforts were made in squaring sociologists’ 
intellectual ideals and epistemological concerns with the aim of teaching students 
how to become practically skilled in quantitative methods, the teaching of these 
methods, although consistently present in sociology, itself became an opportunity to 





The analysis of the methodological discussions that took place in the post-war 
period showed that often choices about what was taught in British sociology – 
especially methods teaching – were influenced by concerns of what would sustain 
the subject’s popularity; and often choices to make quantitative methods teaching 
optional or leave it to a post-graduate stage have been dependent on concerns about 
the image and popularity of the subject and student demand. But British sociology’s 
institutional stability could not totally compensate for its intellectual frailty which 
resulted from the fruitless attempts of sociologists in the post-war period to agree on 
the methods and aims of sociology. There is scope to argue that a good part of that 
frailty was a result of the fact that sociology in Britain has remained separate from 
much of the empirical, including statistical, tradition of social enquiry which itself 
rests on a firm intellectual basis laid by the founders of social science, such as 
Quetelet. 
This thesis has shown that the issue at the core of the relationship between 
statistics and sociology is not that there have been some British sociologists that have 
ignored statistics; or that there have been some areas of sociological enquiry where 
statistics could have been used with success but were not. The issue at the core of the 
historical relationship between sociology and statistics in Britain is that quantitative 
methods and the probabilistic understanding of society, and the statistical worldview 
more generally, have consistently and systematically been ignored or rejected by the 
majority of British sociologists44. Although this course of development was not 
inevitable, this thesis showed that, overall, since academic sociology was established 
in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century it evolved as if the Average man 
had never been invented.  
 One possible way to explain this divide in British social science would be to 
argue that since social statistics developed early in the nineteenth century and 
quickly established its own institutions and, throughout the twentieth century, was 
central to the work in other social departments, government institutes etc., academic 
sociology decided not to trespass cultivated land and instead establish itself in new 
territory pursuing a different type of social enquiry. The evidence examined in this 
                                               
44 Except for a small minority at Nuffield College and departments such as Essex and Southampton, 




thesis did not reveal any intense direct conflict between the statistical social science 
that developed in Britain out of the work of the SSL/RSS and, later on, Galton and 
Pearson’s ‘new English statistics’ and continued to be practised in social science 
departments and institutes; and the type of non-quantitative and largely non-
empirical sociology that developed academically in Britain. There was simply little 
interaction between these two ‘traditions’ on both institutional and intellectual levels. 
There were occasional outbursts of hostility against the teaching and use of statistics 
in social enquiries on the part of academic sociologists, especially in the post-war 
period, but these did not represent attacks directed at any particular body of statistical 
work existing outwith academic sociology. Given their overwhelming lack of 
statistical skills, sociologists have rarely been in the position to mount such attacks 
effectively.  So, indeed, at a first glance it may look as if the divide between 
academic sociology and the rest of social science which had a statistical basis was an 
unproblematic development.  
Had this been the case, however, then it becomes more difficult to explain why 
sociologists made consistent efforts to excuse themselves from using statistics and 
justify their efforts in this respect. Overall, the evidence showed that broad and 
mostly impressionistic criticisms of statistics took place consistently within British 
academic sociology, with a majority of sociologists arguing against the need for 
quantitative methods teaching and the use of such methods in research; and a 
minority arguing for the need for sociology to embrace statistics. If the divide was a 
solution to sociology’s problem of finding its own independent place in academia, 
then it would also become difficult to explain why the anti-positivism debates took 
root and spread so widely among sociologists since they were a clear manifestation 
of yet another attempt by sociologists to resolve among themselves the issue of their 
lack of engagement with statistics by arguing that any use of statistical evidence for 
sociological analysis would make this analysis ‘positivist’.  
If, therefore, there has been a conflict in the history of British sociology with 
regard to statistics, this was conflict within British sociology itself aimed at resolving 
the perennial questions of what exactly sociology is and how it should position itself 
in the intellectual conditions created by the invention of statistics, the very thing it 




Britain was struggling to define its object and methods of study, it exhibited such an 
obsession with quantification in the form of its numerous attempts to justify its lack 
of engagement with statistical methods and outlook, that this obsession, it could be 
argued, defines its character better than anything else. While British sociology has 
not yet made up its mind what it is; a long time ago, it seems, as this study has shown, 
it decided what it is not.  
The evidence presented in this thesis shows that the issue dividing sociology 
and statistics in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been of an 
epistemological and philosophical nature (rather than a practical one). This means 
that the lack of success in incorporating statistics into sociology was not the result of 
a failure to organise, in a practical way, the teaching of statistics in the sociology 
curriculum or secure funds for statistically based research. It was largely the result of 
a conviction, prevalent among British sociologists, that sociology and statistics are 
not epistemologically compatible. Statistics aspires towards objective knowledge, it 
relies on evidence and is based on the assumption that there is such a thing as facts 
and that both the social and the natural world can be described using mathematics. 
Sociologists, on the other hand, have argued that social reality is far too complex to 
reduce to numbers and mathematical relations; that there is no such thing as 
objective knowledge; that knowledge about society is socially constructed and 
relativist; and that the natural world and the social world are separate and distinct 
entities which require separate and distinct research methods. These may be sound 
epistemological concerns; however, it is questionable to what extent British 
sociologists were in the position to defend them, given that the widespread criticism 
towards statistics among British sociologists was based on general ignorance of 
statistical methods and impressions based on cherry-picked examples of bad 
statistical research, usually from the USA.  
The long-term, historical relationship between statistics and sociology in this 
country has been weak, troubled; at times, painfully antagonistic. There is good 
reason to believe that it has stifled the development of a healthy and vibrant social 
science in this country. Despite the assertions and belief of some that the relationship 
is of little concern, indeed irrelevant, the core aim of this study has been to show that 




merely to sociologists interested in statistics. On a micro level, this study has led us 
to question the choices made by particular people; to probe the factors responsible 
for the establishment and development of sociological institutions which were not 
receptive to the idea of developing close ties between sociology and statistics in this 
country; it has led us to revaluate particular teaching practices, to expose underlying 
attitudes and prejudices and to debunk some common myths. But on a macro level, 
this has been a study about the relationship of sociology with science and how 
sociology in this country has reacted to the conditions created by a modern science 
built on statistical foundations. Sociologists have been consistent in their insistence 
that the social world cannot be understood with numbers alone and only rarely have 
they acknowledged that the social world cannot be understood without numbers.  
The main purpose of this study has not been to condemn such ways of thinking 
but certainly to open eyes and open minds as to how, historically, such ways of 
thinking came to be seen as right. By doing so, it revealed that there were other 
possibilities, other ways of thinking, other possible paths that, had circumstances 
been different, might have been followed. This process of ‘opening up’, however, is 
not just about the past, about what has been and gone, it is about the future, about re-
evaluating the road we are on and the direction in which we are heading. Equipped 
with the knowledge and understanding that this study has tried to provide, we can, 
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 1969 1974 1979 
 Statistics Methods Statistics Methods Statistics Methods 
Aberdeen  x  x  x 
Aston   no info no info  x 
Bath x x x x x x 
Belfast x x  x  x 
Birmingham x  x  x x 
Birmingham Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Bradford       
Bristol x x x x x x 
Bristol Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
Brunel no info no info x x x x 
Cambridge no info no info no info no info no info no info 
Cambridge CCA&T not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
City not in list not in list  x  x 
Durham  x  x  x 
East Anglia x  x x x x 
Edinburgh x x x x x x 
Essex x* x x*  x x 
Exeter x* x x* x x* x 
Glasgow  x x x  x 
Hatfield Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
High Wycombe CHE not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Hull  x x x  x 
Ilkley not in list not in list not in list not in list   
Keele x x x x x* x 
Kent x   x x  
Kingston Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Lancaster not in list not in list  x  x 
Leeds x x x x  x 
Leicester  x  x  x 
Liverpool x x x x  x 
London Bedford x x x x  x 
London Goldsmiths no info no info no info no info   
LSE x x x x x x 
London College (City) not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
London College (Middlesex) not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
London College (NELP) not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
London College (N Poly) not in list not in list not in list not in list   
London College (PCL) not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
London College (S Bank) not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
London College (Thames) not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Loughborough no info no info x  x x 
 
Table 25. Statistics and methods courses/methods course elements within sociology degree courses at higher education 




Statistics course/course element is marked as present, if the degree syllabus summary mentioned ‘stats’ or ‘social stats’ or 
‘quantitative methods’ or ‘social survey methods’ or ‘maths’ or ‘stats methods’ or ‘econ & stats methods’ or ‘demography’ or 
other very similar variations of these. 
Methods course/course element is marked as present, if the degree syllabus summary mentioned ‘methods of sociol’ or 
‘methods of social res’ or ‘methodology’ or ‘methods of social investigation’ or other similar variations of these. 
Marked with ‘x*’ is where there is a separate joint degree ‘Sociology with statistics’ or ‘Sociology with quantitative methods’. 
This is important, as it could be expected that in these degrees there would be a much greater emphasis on statistics. In fact, if 
we want to be very strict and find out in which universities the statistical training was sufficient to produce statistically literate 























































  1969 1974 1979 
 Statistics Methods Statistics Methods Statistics Methods 
Manchester   x  x x 
Manchester CHE not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
Manchester Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Middlesbrough not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
Newcastle x x x x x x 
Newcastle Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Northampton (NENE) not in list not in list not in list not in list   
Nottingham    x x  
Oxford not in list not in list no info no info no info no info 
Plymouth Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Plymouth (St Mark & St John) not in list not in list not in list not in list   
Roehampton IHE not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
Reading x x x x x x 
Salford x  x  x x 
Sheffield x x x x x x 
Southampton x  x x x x 
Stirling  x  x x x 
Stoke on Trent not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
Strathclyde x x  x   
Sunderland Polytechnic not in list not in list not in list not in list x x 
Surrey not in list not in list no info no info no info no info 
Sussex  x x  x  
Twickenham not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
Ulster x  x   x 
Wales (Aberystwyth) x  no info no info  x 
Wales (Bangor) not in list not in list  x   
Wales (Cardiff)  x  x x x 
Wales (Swansea)  x  x  x 
Warrington not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
Warwick no info no info x x x x 
Wolverhampton not in list not in list not in list not in list no info no info 
Worcester CHE not in list not in list not in list not in list  x 
York  x x x x x 
 TOTAL (excluding ‘not in list’) 41 46 74 
 TOTAL (excluding ‘no info’) 36 40 64 
 
Table 25. (continued). Statistics and methods courses/methods course elements within sociology degree courses at higher 
education institutions in the UK in 1969, 1974 and 1979.  Sources: Which University (1969); Which University (1974); 
Which Degree (1979). 
 
Notes:  
Statistics course/course element is marked as present, if the degree syllabus summary mentioned ‘stats’ or ‘social stats’ or 
‘quantitative methods’ or ‘social survey methods’ or ‘maths’ or ‘stats methods’ or ‘econ & stats methods’ or ‘demography’ 
or other very similar variations of these. 
Methods course/course element is marked as present, if the degree syllabus summary mentioned ‘methods of sociol’ or 
‘methods of social res’ or ‘methodology’ or ‘methods of social investigation’ or other similar variations of these. 
Marked with ‘x*’ is where there is a separate joint degree ‘Sociology with statistics’ or ‘Sociology with quantitative 
methods’. This is important, as it could be expected that in these degrees there would be a much greater emphasis on 
statistics. In fact, if we want to be very strict and find out in which universities the statistical training was sufficient to 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Distribution of undergraduate students by subject, 1960-1979. Sources: University Grants Committee. 
1960-1965. Returns from Universities and University Colleges. London: HMSO; and University Grants 




The data in this graph come from two different sources: UGC’s Returns from Universities and University 
Colleges and UGC’s Statistics of Education. Although both sources use very similar categorisation, it is not 
possible to determine with certainty whether subject categories in both sources are identical, since Returns from 
Universities and University Colleges do not specify what subjects exactly come under the categories ‘Arts’, 
‘Social Science’ and ‘Pure Science’. Although it is unlikely that there are great discrepancies between the 
categorisation employed by the Returns and the Statistics of Education, the data should be treated with caution. 
 
With regard to the reliability of the categorisation, the Returns from 1964 and 1965 mention the following: 
 
‘Three of the Scottish universities were unable to make the distinction in 1964-65 and therefore included both 
arts and social studies under the “Arts” heading. The totals shown under “Social Studies” are therefore 
understated to some extent and comparisons with previous years should be treated with reserve’ (UGC, 1964). 
 
‘The proportion of both men and women studying social studies subjects has risen considerably over the five 
years since 1960-61. However, under the previous system of classification there was a tendency to include 
students taking combinations of subjects under the ‘Arts’ heading and it has therefore not been found practicable 
to determine the exact extent of this increase’ (UGC, 1965). 
 
For the period 1966-1978: 
 
Arts include: ‘Education’, ‘Language, Literature and Area studies’ and ‘Arts other than Languages’ (History; 
Archaeology; Philosophy; Theology; Art and design; Drama; Music) 
Social Science includes: Business management studies; Economics; Geography; Accountancy; Government and 
public administration; Law; Psychology; Sociology; Social anthropology; Combinations between the social 
science subjects; and combinations of social science subjects with ‘‘Architecture and other professional and 
vocational subjects’, ‘Language, Literature and area studies’ and ‘Arts other than languages’. 
Pure Science includes: Biology; Botany; Zoology; Physiology and/or Anatomy; Biochemistry; Other, general or 
combined biological sciences; Mathematics; mathematics with Physics; Chemistry; Geology; Environmental 
Sciences (other than geology); Other, general and combined physical sciences; Combinations of biological and 
physical sciences; Combinations of ‘Pure Science’ with ‘Social, administrative and business studies’, 
‘Architecture and other professional and vocational subjects’, ‘Language, Literature and area studies’ and ‘Arts 
other than languages’. 
All Science includes: subjects under groups ‘Pure science’; ‘Medicine, dentistry and health’; Engineering and 






















































































Figure 2. Average percentages of first-entrant male and female full-time undergraduate students in the 
UK by subject area in the period 1966-1978. Source: University Grants Committee. 1966-1978. Statistics 




Science includes the following subjects: Biology; Botany; Zoology; Physiology and/or Anatomy; 
Biochemistry; Other, general or combined biological sciences; Mathematics; mathematics with Physics; 
Chemistry; Geology; Environmental Sciences (other than geology); Other, general and combined physical 
sciences; Combinations of biological and physical sciences; Combinations of ‘Pure Science’ with ‘Social, 
administrative and business studies’, ‘Architecture and other professional and vocational subjects’, 
‘Language, Literature and area studies’ and ‘Arts other than languages’. 
 
Arts includes the following: subjects under groups ‘Language, literature and area studies’ and ‘Arts 
other than languages” (History; Archaeology; Philosophy; Theology; Art and design; Drama; Music; 
‘Arts general, and combined other arts subjects’). 
 
Totals include: all students studying for “First degree” and “First diploma” and “Courses not leading to 








Interviews with Sociologists and Statisticians 
 
To complement my documentary analysis, in the spring of 2017 I interviewed 
the following sociologists and statisticians: 
  
Bechhofer, F. Edinburgh, 7th February 2017. 
Burgess, R. London, 9th March 2017. 
Goldstein, H. London, 7th March 2017. 
Goldthorpe, J. H. Oxford, 1st March 2017. 
MacKenzie, D.  Edinburgh, 31st January 2017. 
Moore, R. Flint, 23rd February 2017. 
Paterson, L. Edinburgh, 2nd February 2017. 
Platt, J. Brighton, 3rd March 2017. 
Roberts, H. London, 4th June 2017. 
Wakeford, J. Edinburgh, 20th March 2017. 
 
These scholars have a long experience in either sociology, statistics or both and 
were all actively engaged with these subjects in the period between 1960-1980 which 
is the focus of the third part of this thesis. In the process of selecting possible 
interviewees, I did not focus on any particular cohort of sociologists or statisticians, 
as, inevitably, my choice was restricted by the numbers still living and restricted 
again to those who were able and willing to grant me an interview. My list of 
potential interviewees also included Martin Bulmer and Ann Oakley who, 
unfortunately, were not in a position to grant me an interview at the time, although I 
was able to discuss several issues with them via email. 
The interviews were semi-structured: I had a list of questions prepared 
beforehand to guide me in the interview process, but I also allowed interviewees to 
comment on issues that arose from our conversation, which they regarded as relevant 




There was some variation in the questions depending on the interviewees’ 
profiles; but many of the questions I asked were relevant too all interviewees. I asked 
all participants about their early experience with sociology: for example, how they 
first came to sociology; what subjects they studied as part of their degrees; what their 
impressions of sociology were in those early days; their memories of the expansion 
and any general comments they might have on the overall post-war development of 
the subject. I also asked all participants about their experience with methods and 
methods training or teaching. Where relevant, I asked participants about their 
experience with learning or teaching quantitative methods and how they perceived 
the role of these methods in sociology (or, if they could recall, how these methods 
were taught or perceived more generally back in the 60s, 70s and 80s).  
Only those parts of the interviews which included material that I was planning 
to quote in this thesis were transcribed; the rest of the material from the interviews 
was summarised for my records. The data from the interviews have been used as an 
additional support for some of the arguments made in the third part of this thesis; the 
data have not been used as primary evidence for these arguments, as, inevitably, they 
provided fascinating but, nonetheless, subjective and memory-based insight into the 
relationship between sociology and statistics. Overall, the interviews were helpful in 
suggesting new avenues for documentary examination and providing reassurance 
that my interpretation of the archival documents corresponded largely with the 
personal experience and observations of scholars who lived through the period I 
examine herein.  
Many thanks to Professor John H. Goldthorpe for inviting me to Nuffield 
College’s social gathering after the interview and to Professor Robert Moore and 
Professor Jennifer Platt for accommodating me overnight – your hospitality and 
generosity made my journey all the more pleasant.  
I greatly appreciate the contributions of all interviewees; they breathed life in 











British Sociology and Statistics (1945-1980s) 





The focus of this research is the relationship between British sociology and statistical 
methods, as it developed throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It 
examines the question: why sociology in the UK has never succeeded in establishing 
a firm, enduring relationship with statistical methods, given that statistical methods 
would appear to offer the prospect of enhancing many areas of sociological research 
and potentially add a kind of ‘scientific’ respectability that sociology has often been 
accused of lacking. My thesis aims to show that British sociology’s fraught 
relationship with statistics, and probabilistic thinking in general, has something very 
important to tell us about sociology’s association with the sciences as a whole, about 
the culture in which it emerged and about its concept of society. 
 
THE AIM AND COURSE OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
As part of my research on post-war sociology in the UK and its relationship with 
statistics, I am conducting a series of interviews with eminent British sociologists 
who were particularly active in the 1950s-1980s. To-date, I have collected a large 
amount of documentary evidence on the institutional development of sociology in 
this period and examined the role of statistics in sociological methodology. I believe, 
that the interviews will be helpful in providing a first hand perspective and will allow 
me to enhance, as well as double-check, my own interpretation of the documentary 
sources. Interviewees may be able to suggest important factors in the relationship 





I am asking all participants about their general experience in sociology and/or 
statistical methods. This will be accompanied by some questions regarding the 
development of post-war British sociology, if they are relevant to the interviewees’ 
experience and special interests. I am also leaving space for questions that may arise 
from the interviewees’ personal reflections and experience. I expect the interviews to 




You have the right to stop the interview at any stage or refuse to answer any question. 
If after the interview, you decide you no longer wish your interview to be used in this 
research, you have up to two weeks from today to contact me. If you have any 




In referencing any information derived from your interview, would you permit me to 
use your name, or would you prefer to remain anonymous? Please, indicate your 
preference as below. 
 
YES, use my name                              NO, I prefer to remain anonymous 
 
Participant’s Name (in capitals) 
Participant’s  
Signature Date: 
Researcher’s Name (in capitals) 
Researcher’s  
Signature Date: 
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